Evil and/or/as The Good

OMNICENTRISM, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND VALUE PARADOX IN TIANTAI BUDDHIST THOUGHT

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All translations from Chinese in this work are my own, unless otherwise indicated. All underlines, emphases, and parantheses in these translations are added by me. For Chinese terms and proper nouns I use the mainland *pinyin* system of romanization, except for contemporary scholars or writers who themselves use another romanization system in the spelling of their names in English.

B.Z.

Contents

1 Introduction: The Question 1

The Problem of Antithetical Values 2/ A Value-Free Universe? 18/ Antinomianism? 20

2 Value, Intersubjectivity, and Holism: Philosophical Parameters and the Chinese Background 26

Part I: Holism—Definitions and Distinctions 27
The Center 30/ Intersubjectivity and Chinese Holisms 41/ Object as Focus and Field 50/ Implications of Unicentrism, Oligocentrism, and Omnicentrism 55
Part II: Value 68
Speculative Ground for a General Theory of Value Paradox 69/ Inverted Pyramid of Instrumental and Ultimate Values 78/ Paradox in Chinese Rhetoric 85/ Applications of Holism in Early Chinese Thought and Their Axiological Consequences 95

3 Value and Anti-value in Indian Buddhism 101

4 Tiantai Basics: Omnicentric Holism 112

Part I: The Basics 114
The Four Teachings and the Three Truths 114/ The Three Tracks 135/ The Ten Thusnesses 137/ The Ten Realms 138/ The Transcendental Marvels, Relative and Absolute 140/ Opening the Provisional to Reveal the Real (Transformative Recontextualization) 145/ The Three Thousand Quiddites Inherently Entailed in Each Moment of Experience / Inherent Entailment 159

Part II: Transitional Historical Considerations of Later Tiantai 170
The Huayan School and "Nature-Origination" 170/ The *Śūraṅgama Sūtra* and the "Pure Mind" of Early Chan 176/ Zhanran's Reassertion of Tiantai 186/ Toward the Shanjia/Shanwai Schism 195

5 Intersubjectivity in the Tiantai Tradition as Understood by Zhili 199

Self-praxis as Identical to the Teaching and Transformation of Others 201/ Stimulus and Response (*Ganying*) 203/ The Pervasiveness of the Intersubjective 208/ The Ultimacy of Intersubjectivity as a Focus of the Shanjia/Shanwai Debate 218

6 Value and Anti-value in Tiantai Thought 240

Part I: Good and Evil in Zhiyi and Zhanran 240
Value-Paradoxical Consequences of Tiantai Upāya Theory 241/ The Moral Benefits of Inherent Evil and Zhiyi's Critique of Antinomianism 251/ Zhanran on Inherent Evil and Practiced Good 261
Part II: Zhili's Concept of Value Paradox 270
The Intersubjective Underpinning of Ineradicable and All-pervading Evil as Identical with the Good 272/ The Ultimacy of the Dung Beetle 295/ Comparison to Zhiyi and Zhanran 306/ Comparison to the Shanwai 312/ Objections and Responses 323/ Zhili's Practice of Evil 329

7 What's So Good About Evil: Conclusions and Implications 344

Metaphysical Implications 351/ Epistemological Implications 358/ Ethical Motivations and Implications 361

Notes 387

Bibliography 455

Glossary 465

Index 471

Evil

and/or/as

The Good

ONE

Introduction: The Question

In this work, I hope to make a contribution to three divergent and not always congenial fields: Chinese intellectual history, Buddhist studies, and philosophy. To begin with, the following discussion may be viewed simply as an overview of some fundamental concepts that developed in Tiantai Buddhism in China between the fifth and eleventh centuries and thereby serve as a general introduction to this unique school of thought, which has been underrepresented in Western studies of Buddhism. This, in turn, may enlarge our current understanding of both Chinese intellectual culture and of Chinese Buddhism. In addition, as I will attempt to make clear in the conclusion, the exposition of these developments may provide ideas relevant to certain aspects of modern philosophical inquiry into basic ontological, epistemological, and axiological issues. These three concerns converge in a particularly fruitful vortex, I hope to show, in the Tiantai tradition, especially in the thought of a Song monk, Siming Zhili (960–1028), whose work is the focus of this study.

In the simplest terms, this book in its entirety is an exposition of the philosophical implications of a single eight-character sentence in a letter written by this monk: "Other than the devil there is no Buddha; other than the Buddha there is no devil" (*mo wai wu Fo; Fo wai wu mo* 魔外無佛，佛外無魔). Later in this Introduction, I quote the local context in which the phrase occurs and make some preliminary comments about the doctrinal context that frames it. But in a sense the entire work is a gradual expansion and unraveling of a more complete context in which this one idea is to be understood. The aim and focus of the other discussions that follow are sim-

ply a better understanding of the intent, implications, and resonances of this one sentence. Before I get started, then, it would be worthwhile to give some indication of why I consider this idea important and rich enough to merit such intensive consideration.

The Problem of Antithetical Values

A little over a century ago, a perspicacious diagnostician of Western civilization made the following remark about what he considered the root of philosophical error and cultural decline in that tradition:

> 'How *could* something originate in its antithesis? Truth in error, for example? Or will to truth in will to deception? Or the unselfish act in self-interest? Or the pure radiant gaze of the sage in covetousness? Such origination is impossible . . . the things of the highest value must have another origin *of their own*—they cannot be derivable from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, mean little world, from this confusion of desire and illusion. . . .'—This mode of judgement constitutes the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized; this mode of evaluation stands in the background of all their logical procedures. . . . The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is *the faith in antithetical values.* It has not occurred to even the most cautious of them to pause and doubt here on the threshold, where however it was most needful they should: even if they *had* vowed to themselves *'de omnibus dubitandum'.* For it may be doubtful firstly whether there exist any antitheses at all, and secondly whether these popular evaluations and value-antitheses, on which the metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely foreground valuations, merely provisional perspectives. . . . It might even be possible that *what* constitutes the value of those good and honoured things resides precisely in their being artfully related, knotted and crocheted to these wicked, apparently antithetical things, perhaps even in their being essentially identical with them.[1]

Whether we agree with Nietzsche's own value judgment, as expressed elsewhere in his works, that this axiological tendency is the source of dangerous error and a symptom of decadence, his insight into the prevalence and influence of the assumption that there is a sharp antithesis between value and anti-value cannot easily be denied.[2] Indeed, Western thought can in many senses be characterized as sharing a faith in antithetical values and making this faith a cornerstone for further ontological, ethical, and epistemological developments. The contents of this faith can broadly be summed up as What is good is not bad; what is bad is not good. Indeed, the fact that this appears so self-evident to us merely proves the point.

There are, of course, many variants of how this is unpacked—a great many types of relations can still obtain between two things that are "not" one another. Nietzsche seems to have had a more restricted sense of "antithetical" in mind here. He means that Western philosophers tend to believe not only that good "is not" bad but also that what is good does not *come from, grow out of, originate in,* what is bad; it has another, transcendent source.[3] This is certainly the belief of many Western thinkers, although it is surely less universal now than it was in Nietzsche's time. Moreover, it is obviously much simpler to assail this belief than the more general belief that good and bad, certainly at least as abstract concepts and often also as sets of concrete elements, are in themselves antithetical and mutually exclusive, which is still part of our worldview, at both the commonsense and the more philosophically rigorous level.

Indeed, this intuition may even seem to be necessary for all modes of practical engagement with the world, in those ethical or existential situations in which an act of will or choice is necessary. Isn't practical life always a process of deciding which of two (or more) alternatives is to be preferred, and doesn't this concern mean judging one to be in some sense good and the other bad, or at least better and worse? Surely if these were not mutually exclusive, practical efficacy would be undermined, and all action, indeed all life, would be impossible. This, at least, would seem to be the presupposition behind our commonsense belief in the necessity of maintaining, on some level or other, the mutual exclusivity of the good and the bad.

The Nietzschean view is that this intuition, this faith in antithetical values, is the foundation determining the structure of all other cultural phenomena, especially morality. What would a culture look like that did not share this faith? What would its morality look like? How would it moralize, how would it conceive the world, how would its rhetoric seek to convince? Would an understanding of such a culture shed useful light on our own culture past, present, and perhaps even future?

It may plausibly be argued that the Chinese philosophical tradition, and especially Chinese Buddhism, is an exceptionally rich source of alternatives to this paradigm and that this faith in antithetical values did not attain the hegemony in, say, pre-Yuan China that it continues to hold in the West. This is not to say that this non-antithetical view of value opposites is unique to China nor to Buddhism, nor, be it noted, that it constitutes the mainstream of these traditions or the central factor in these traditions with which

they have most readily identified themselves. Nonetheless, certain extraordinary notions concerning the relations between value and anti-value are developed both in indigenous Chinese thought and in Indian Buddhism. When these two traditions came together to form Sinitic Buddhism, these developments were intensified, particularly in the Tiantai tradition and most especially in Zhili's thought.

Again, this tendency is by no means absent in classical Western thought. On the contrary, many intriguing examples of the non-dichotomous treatment of value terms spring to mind that we would do well to keep in mind as points of comparison as we proceed. Indeed, in the interest of framing the scope of alternatives in which this problem must be situated, I present a brief account of some gestures toward value-paradoxical intuitions we do find in the Western tradition, in spite of and in tension with the mainstream tendency indicated by Nietzsche.

Heraclitus, for example, began Western dialectical thought with a theory of flux that unites contraries, including value contraries, in a single process of change, and boldly declared that God is day and night, war and peace, and the like. Moreover, "it is not good for men to get all they want. It is sickness that makes health pleasant; evil, good; hunger, plenty; weariness, rest." This claim introduces a meta-value placed on the *contrast* between opposites itself, on conflict per se, including the conflict between (first order) value and anti-value (e.g., between life and death). Hence we find Heraclitus stating that war is the father of all things, the source of all being and of all value, two terms that, as we shall see, are repeatedly conflated in the history of treatments of this problem. This is not a "neither/nor" doctrine, a transcendence of opposites by reference to their unity in some third thing, a good prototype of which might be Advaita Vedanta, which posits a substratum of all contrary predicates of which nothing can be predicated, thereby effectively negating the apparent conflict between opposed predicates, rather than valorizing this conflict. Rather, Heraclitus' view is the prototypical "both/and" doctrine, which values the self-contradiction of value and anti-value within the world and God as a value, preserving both.

The both/and and the neither/nor conflation of opposite values can be compared with the Empedoclean notion of love and strife, both of which are necessary for all creation and destruction in the intelligible and the sublunary worlds.[4] Love, however, seems to be valued more highly than strife, and the two are not said to have a common source or a shared substratum or a resolution that undermines their contrariety. Rather, they are viewed as in-

separable in fact (not necessarily in the ideal) and responsible for the combination and separation of the elements in all things, but never convertible into each other. There may be a meta-value placed on the combination of the two, since this is the source of all existent things, and the combination may be seen as preferable to the triumph of love over strife, but the point is by no means clear.

The subsequent treatment of this problem in Greek philosophy followed these two possibilities and developed from them new structures to deal with value and anti-value. In Plato, for example, the division of the Good from the Bad may not be as absolute as common wisdom would have it. The subtle relationship of the Idea of the Good to other Ideas and to the phenomenal world must be carefully examined in this connection; the Neo-Platonic take on this problem, which definitively equates value with being, is also not to be overlooked. There is a deep and fruitful ambiguity in the Platonic notion of the Good, which can imply either an absolute value dualism or the thoroughgoing omnipresence of the Good, even in apparent Evil, which could lead to potentially non-dichotomous results. The crypto-Parmenidean concept of Being in the Platonic scheme, as unchanging and utterly free of any negativity, seems to tip the scales decisively toward value dichotomy in practice—a point I return to below.

The Western theological category dealing with the monotheist version of this problem is theodicy. The relation between value (God) and anti-value (evil, Satan, among others) here is obviously powerfully affected by the entity posited as the ultimate good, that is, a being omnipotent, omniscient, and good.[5] The Gnostic systems, particularly those that consider this ultimate Good to be completely separate from this world and its creator, are noteworthy in that two diametrically opposed sets of moral consequences were drawn from this same dualistic premise; namely, either that this called for absolute abstention from this world and hence extreme asceticism or that this meant that nothing occurring in this world matters at all, a view that led to extreme antinomianism. Proponents of the first adopted a variation of the either/or attitude toward Good and Evil, combined with a neither/nor attitude toward worldly goods and evils. Adherents of the second, on the other hand, held that any physical behavior in this world is ultimately neither good nor evil, which in practice resulted in an indifferent both/and attitude toward worldly action.

Augustine's solution to the problem posed by this value duality was to assert that all substance and all being are good, a stance that has remained the

orthodox view throughout mainstream Christian theology. Evil is a perversion of the will, a turning away from God due to pride, and therefore not a positive being itself but merely, in Neo-Platonic fashion, a deficiency of being, In this so-called privation theory of evil, evil is parasitic on Good; it is the corruption, misuse, decay, or perversion of something that, as a being, is intrinsically good, the "distortion" of something inherently valuable. Moreover, there are degrees of good, but everything that has being is good in its own way and degree, except insofar as it may have become "spoiled" or "corrupted." In this fashion, the putatively infinite and transcendent nature of this value impacts on the solution, which allows, by a sort of paradoxical ingenuity, for "everything" to be good while making sure that nothing in human life is as it should be—a useful and probably not uncommon strategy that results in a full-fledged practical value dichotomy. Aquinas added the Aristotelean concepts of potentiality and actuality to this point of view. For him, Being and Good are convertible terms, and evil *acts* only by the power of good. Evil is defined as unfulfilled potentiality "without its proper and due act," and God, value, as "pure, actual, active act." Here good and evil are again paradoxically joined, although, needless to say, this is the opposite of a claim that doing good is equivalent to doing evil.

Perhaps even more germane are mystical theologies such as those of Meister Eckhardt, Nicholas of Cusa, Duns Scotus, and especially Jacob Boehme, whose unique view of evil's place in God was to decisively influence Schelling and Hegel, among others. Boehme's conception of evil has much in common with the Kabbalistic notions of the *Zohar*, one of the central texts of the Jewish mystical tradition, which, in accord with the dark Talmudic injunction to "serve God with both the good impulse and the evil impulse," develops a doctrine that holds evil to be simply God's attribute of justice when isolated from his attribute of mercy, the two being inseparable in God himself. Evil is thus in a sense from God, a part of God, and a rightful part of man's work (even the will to evil being enjoined for man is part of a mysterious second-order Good), while also being a fundamental violation of God's nature (that is, Evil is man's impious separation of God's two inseparable aspects of justice and mercy).[6]

Both Schelling and Hegel explicitly asserted that Good and Evil are not just two inseparable aspects of some third thing but are in a certain sense the same.[7] (Tiantai writers, in an entirely different context and ultimately with quite different implications, made the same assertion.) Schelling's claim that Good is Evil resonates strongly with the privation theories: Good is the

"being" that is all that is substantial in what is identified as Evil. But for Schelling, this Being is no longer the substantialist In-itself of the dominant tradition but is, rather, determined precisely as freedom, that is, absolute free Will as precisely the capacity for *both* Good and Evil. This gives him room for an incisive critique of the privation theory, in the process of which he radicalizes it. For now the capacity for Evil is included in the most primordial definition of Being (freedom, Will) as such. Schelling solved the dilemma implicit in this view by following Boehme and the Kabbalists, positing a primal, unmanifest Will even in God himself. There is something in God that is not yet God, a dark obscure longing to become Himself (that is, to become determinately, actually, manifestly, known to himself). This longing remains other than God even when he succeeds in mastering and integrating it by becoming actual, manifest, conscious. Schelling distinguished the unmanifest Ground of any being (its preconditions, components, raw materials, and the like; for example, hydrogen and oxygen in the case of water) from its manifest Existence (the cohesion of these elements into the determinate X in question; for example, the wateriness of H_2O) and suggested that the same held for the Absolute, for God himself. The dark Will is then the "Ground" of God, or Nature in its abysmal unruliness and indeterminacy, which is integrated in God as Existence but still distinguishable from him.

God completely integrates his Ground, whereas finite creatures do not, and herein lies the basis of Evil. Here Evil is defined no longer as merely limitation or privation or an illusion based on a partial view of a greater whole or indeed the mere separation of the two poles that by rights ought to be united in the Absolute. Instead, it is a kind of perverted unity of these two principles, the inversion of their proper relationship. Schelling described blind animal craving as the Ground itself, only dimly connected to the unifying rational principle of God's "Existence," that is, the unifying universalizing of rational awareness. But this is not yet Evil. Only when the Ground is combined with the universalizing function of rational awareness in human subjectivity, in the complete freedom and self-centeredness of the human Will as self-aware—Will known as the universality of Will as such—can there be Evil. This Evil is simply Selfhood itself, the Willing being that also perceives itself as the center and unifying point of the whole of creation. But this Evil as manifest Selfhood itself forms the Ground for a higher Good, the Spirit, which bears the same relation to Selfhood that "Existence" has to "Ground" in all other cases, binding it into a new whole of a different

character. Evil is then the combination of Ground and Existence, with Existence fully operative but under the domination of Ground. Good would at first seem to be simply the combination of Existence and Ground but with *Existence* as the dominant term. But more strictly, it is the second-order unity of the first unity, Evil or human Selfhood, with the self-awareness of universal spirit, the full realization of the Existence pole, which is here rational universal awareness as such. This awareness, unlike the awareness of Selfhood, does not see itself as particular as center of all creation. Good is thus the Evil of Selfhood overcome, "retrieved from activity to potentiality," as Schelling puts it, such that it remains always present, but sublated.[8] In this ingenious speculation of Schelling's, we have a system that views Evil as instrumental for the Good, as that which calls it forth and against which it is necessarily manifested, as that which forms its eternal Ground or basis, and also sees the immanence of Good and Evil in one another and the ineradicable presence of at least the ground of Evil in the Absolute itself—all claims that resonate powerfully with the Tiantai system, as we shall see.[9]

For Hegel, too, Evil is synonymous with the negativity of human subjectivity as such, its awareness of its own invincible freedom and its withdrawal from all contingent content and is thus an essential moment in the final actualization of the Good as both subject and substance, albeit a one-sided and "abstract" moment that must be self-overcome in the concrete reality of collective ethical and political life.[10] Hegel even asserted that both Good and Evil, in their abstract meaning, can be reduced to the same meaning. "Evil," he wrote, "in general is self-centred being-for-self, and Goodness is what is simple and without a self. When thus expressed in terms of their Notion, their unity is at once evident; for self-centred being-for self is simple knowing, and simple [being] that lacks a Self is equally pure self-centred being-for-self."[11] Translated out of Hegelese, this is merely saying that evil is negativity or subjectivity as such, and good is positivity or substantiality as such, and that each of these, thought through to the end, turns out already to be the other; hence the Absolute is "both substance and subject," and these two are merely passing moments. Hegel very hurriedly followed up this statement by declaring that this assertion of the unity or even sameness of Good and Evil is an "unspiritual way of talking," for once they are understood as aspects of one another, they are no longer what was originally meant by Good and Evil; that is, two terms that are by definition mutually exclusive.

In both Schelling and Hegel, then, we go a long way toward value paradox, perhaps the furthest reach of such thought in the Western philosophi-

cal tradition. But interestingly, in both cases, there is a strong push to at least phrase the ethical conclusions derived therefrom in quite uncompromisingly value-dichotomous terms. Both even speak of the "elimination" of Evil,[12] just as in almost all the cases cited above. The opposite is, however, true of the Tiantai writers, a point of comparison that bears extensive further investigation.

These examples suffice to show not only the diversity of possibilities that surround this issue but also the many ways, even in the Western tradition, of combining value and anti-value that in no way detract from a commitment to moral rigorism. The motivation for finding a common ground between good and evil need not be to promote a tolerance for doing evil, however defined. But what is the motivation then? Does it somehow, contrary to appearances, serve to *promote* moral rigor?[13] Or does it have no effect on concrete moral prescriptions at all, serving only to fill a theoretical need for unity or monistic first principles? Might it even perhaps perform a compensatory role for precisely the tolerance for evil, which is lacking in the actual moral practices enjoined, so that an evil-accommodating doctrine would naturally pair with an uncompromising evil-prohibiting practice? Or is there a meta-level of Manichaean value-dualism lurking in the doctrines discussed above, such that in reality no rapprochement between good and evil is intended?[14] All these questions must be addressed for each case of apparent value paradox if we are to grasp the full range of its presuppositions and consequences.

Given this broad scope of approaches to the problem and the complexities inherent in it, a general typological mapping of the possibilities may reveal both how they are based on more general metaphysical and epistemological premises and how they may entail more general ethical consequences. First, let me try to define more systematically the problems that go with analyzing worldviews on the basis of their impact on this issue. Any worldview or system of thought postulates certain desiderata, certain values. The act of putting forth a statement, a thought, a system, implies an act of valuation: one does not make a claim unless one wants things to be one way rather than another or unless one is promoting one state of affairs at the expense of another. The question here is, In what ways does a system deal with its own negations, that is, with the things in the world that conflict its own posited desiderata and values? For example, how does a system espousing Truth, Beauty, and Goodness conceive of falsehood, ugliness, and evil? What is the relation of anti-value to value, and how are we to act toward the former?[15]

Several answers spring to mind immediately:

1. Anti-value is to be excised. Good and evil do not mix and do not contribute to one another in any way. They are two unrelated substances. The world contains both good and bad, and we who recommend the good struggle to eliminate the bad and augment the good. Bad and good are opposites and never overlap or converge. Bad is to be discarded, thrown away, to the greatest extent possible (Manichaeism).

This comes in several flavors:

a. Someday all the bad will be eliminated, and there will be only good (millenarian theology).
b. We will never be able to eliminate all the bad, but we can make some advances and improve our lot by getting rid of as much bad as possible (social activism, secular ameliorism; common sense).
c. We can never make any progress, and the proportion of good to bad may well remain roughly the same no matter what we do; nevertheless, we must struggle individually to get away from the bad and cling to the good (stoicism, Kantian moral absolutism, the cult of duty, etc.).

In contrast to this, we have:

2. A cluster of views claiming a more intimate relation between the good and the bad, where the bad at least depends on the good—and perhaps the good also depends on the bad:

a. Good and Bad are related as Reality and Appearance. Everything is in reality good; some things appear to be bad because of our misperceptions (quietistic mystical theologies, privation theory of the Good, Neo-Platonic equation of Being and Goodness, Alexander Pope, etc.).
b. Good and Bad are related as Whole and Part (privation theory, Neo-Platonism, Leibniz, Hegel in some moods).
c. Good and Bad are related as End and Means (Hegel in other moods; Machiavellianism); intrinsically undesirable states such as lowliness and weakness are to be pursued as a means toward the end of exaltation and strength (Laozi). Something similar appears also in New Testament millenarianism but with an interesting twist: on the level of "natural evil," bad (suffering, lowliness, self-abnegation, crucifixion) is instrumental to postmortem good (beatitude, the kingdom of heaven, resurrection, etc.), but in the moral

sense *evil* (pride, worldliness, lust, disobedience to God) is absolutely opposed to good, and never reconcilable with it.

3. Beyond Good and Bad
   a. Both Good and Bad are illusory, misleading terms, that distract from a pre-intentional Good (e.g., *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi*, Outer Chapters [8–10]).
   b. Both Good and Bad are real and objective, but both are unavoidable and should be followed in their due times with equanimity. Here, a new level of value is introduced: it is Good not to favor the good over the bad (see 3a), a claim that may or may not be itself deconstructed (e.g., *Zhuangzi*, Inner Chapters, where both natural good and natural bad are to be considered good, and human/moral/behavioral good and evil are to followed [a both/and attitude] while maintaining a central distance or pivot that will allow one to transcend this particular value perspective and adopt a new one later [a neither/nor matrix for an infinite both/and]; hence a second-order both/and system, affirming both neither/nor and both/and).
   c. Both are mere human perspectives, valid for humanity, but having nothing to do with reality (Spinoza, Voltaire, Hume, science, naturalism, rationalism).
   d. Both are mere human perspectives, but for that very reason they have much to do with reality (Hegel again; Confucianism, human reality being the fulfillment of the fundamental nature of the universe).

This schema, obviously, could be greatly extended and augmented, but it does give some sense of the issues involved and the wide variety of options that exist for thinkers in formulating the relationship between value and anti-value. Obviously, an individual's thinking on this subject rests on an extensive set of presuppositions and has far-reaching consequences. This provides us with a way to begin to understand what is at stake here. Nietzsche pointed out one consequence: the belief in the different origins of good and evil tends to lead to an "extirpation" morality, which seeks to pursue the good by rooting out and throwing away the evil ("castration" is Nietzsche's word for it), rather than to a "sublimation" morality, which pursues the good through transforming, beautifying, and developing the originally evil passions, using their strength to create greater goods. Nietzsche considers the

first tactic deluded, suicidal, and life-denying. In contrast, in those cases that assert some sort of commonality between good and bad, the approach to ethics will focus on transmuting evil into good. And indeed, many types of "sublimation" morality are to be found in the indigenous Chinese tradition (which I consider the most decisive antecedent of Tiantai thought, as I have shown elsewhere)[16] and serve as justifications for both highly moralistic and stridently anti-moral practical applications. This fact in itself is eloquent testimony to the very diverse forms, structures, and practical directions that can develop from the view that good grows out of bad.

Other significant ethical implications seem to go hand in hand with certain deployments of this orientation. In the Tiantai case, for example, the full complexity and ambiguity of human motivation, a factor that for obvious reasons is downplayed by certain kinds of moralists, is placed front and center. One of the upshots is, as we shall see, a notion of empathy as requiring *participation* in evil *and* suffering; this is in striking contrast to more familiar conceptions of both empathy and of evil. This notion has a powerful impact on the views of empathy and the role it plays in human life, affect, and cognition and delineates a distinctive view of the nature of evil.

In addition, the implications of this view stretch beyond the realms of axiology and ethics into the realms of epistemology and metaphysics. For example, there will always be a question of what, then, causes the illusion of the absolute difference between the good and the bad. If good and bad are in reality versions of one another in some sense, what errors or limitations of perception and cognition make both philosophers and ordinary people mistakenly think otherwise? Are they misled by an unacceptably narrow perspective, which fails to take account of some crucial metaphysical fact, for example, an additional realm of being in which the values of things are reversed, or a special definition of being or of good that transcends the mistaken ordinary definition of these things, or the uses to which apparently good and evil things are put, or the ways entities are structured so as to contain unmanifest elements as essential parts of their being? What kind of a world does the world have to be, what kind of being can an entity or idea have, what sort of relation can exist between appearance and reality, such that it will be possible for value to be "identical" to anti-value? Doctrines about the relation between good and bad always have ethical, epistemological, metaphysical, and ontological implications, and any inquiry into this relation will necessarily raise questions about all these other realms of inquiry as well. For this reason, I give rather extensive consideration to the relevant

metaphysical and epistemological issues before discussing the specifics of Tiantai doctrine, in order to present an accurate picture of Tiantai value theory, which is by necessity addressed directly only in the last few chapters of this book after these metaphysical and epistemological issues have been clarified.

The exact nature of the problem we are facing here needs to be clarified before we continue. Some will consider this claim about the lack of mutual exclusivity between value and anti-value obvious and insignificant (i.e., we knew this all along and so what?); others will find it absurdly implausible (how can good ever be thought not to be not bad!). Perhaps still others are not sure what I mean. For all these readers, I relate the following true story, in which appears the sentence that forms the pivot of this work.

In 1016, a prominent Chinese Buddhist monk, Siming Zhili, publicly revealed that he planned to pursue a certain course of action in the near future. A representative of the imperial court wrote him a number of letters urging him not to proceed with his plans. In one of these, the official argued that such actions were, according to the Buddhist faith espoused by the monk himself, an instance of incorrect and even sinful behavior. He averred, for complicated reasons to be discussed below, that the scriptures this monk had cited to justify this behavior were in fact the preachments of Mara, the king of devils, the Buddhist personification of evil temptations; to behave in this way would thus be to follow the teachings of the devil. The monk did not deny that he was planning to follow the teachings of the king of devils and that he was going to do something evil. Instead, he responded as follows:

> What difference is there between the Buddha and the devil? What inequality is there between the correct and the incorrect? Truly, it is because from the beginning the perfect principle possesses the natures of both the Buddha and the devil that they are not two and yet two, [two] and yet not two. According to different karmic conditions, [this principle] manifests itself either as the Buddha or as the devil; since the original natures of the two are merged together from the beginning, *how could their manifestations be any different from one another?* Thus in the ultimate Integrated teaching, if we speak in accordance with the true nature of all things, the quiddity of the demonic realm and the quiddity of the Buddha realm are said to be one quiddity, not two quiddities. Hence we are able to assert that *other than the devil there is no Buddha, and other than the Buddha there is no devil.* This is also to say that as long as there is one who is a devil, all are devils, and as long as there is one who is a Buddha, all are Buddhas; all these manifestations may be called the entire dharma-realm,

each pervades and permeates everywhere as one body. Therefore any one of them can be called "king," since each one is the imperial meeting place that brings together all other dharmas. So to give rise to the view that there is any superiority or inferiority between the Buddha and the devil is naturally a perverse thought and not the proper way to contemplate. From the beginning, the devilish phenomena have always been a glorious wonder. They are like the house of a wealthy man, filled with the seven types of treasures; the ordinary man is like a blind man therein, whose turnings and movements are obstructed by them, so that the treasures harm him. The Two Vehicles are like people with a fever who see these jewels to be ghosts, tigers, dragons, and snakes; they run away from them in fear. The gradual Bodhisattvas are like someone looking around in the dark; they see the treasures, but not clearly. It is only the practitioner of the Sudden Integrated teaching who sees them decisively as the seven types of treasures from the beginning and freely uses them; a Buddha is one who is perfectly unobstructed in doing so. Thus the devil is the entire dharma-realm [the universe qua absolute], the devil is the King of the Dharma, and everywhere there is nothing but this perfect principle—this is the identity [between devil and Buddha] on the level of the essential nature shared by all things. For the beginning student, there is the level of identity of name. . . . But only the perfectly enlightened one is at the level of ultimate identity. *Only at this last level are both the principle and phenomenon of the devil-dharma fully penetrated and exhausted to the bottom.* Only then can one unify and integrate all things in the universe within the realm of the devil and be free and at ease there; only one who does so is worthy of being called "King of Devils." You should understand that although Mara is called King of Devils, this is a name without any reality behind it, since he is unable to be free and at ease and unify and integrate everything. . . . This being the case, how can there be any doubt that the *Brahmajāla* and *Lotus Sūtra* passages cited [as preachments of the devil] are indeed spoken by the true King of Devils [i.e., the Buddha]? For "King of Devils" and "Enlightened One" are two names for the same thing. In the same way, Indra, with his thousand meritorious properties, has a thousand names, but we don't for that reason say that the preaching of "Indra" [personal name] is different from the preaching of "Kaśika" [Indra's family name]. What you now call the preaching of the King of Devils not only is no different from the preaching of the Buddha but is even able to deeply reveal the Integrated teaching. And why? *Because the perfectly Integrated teaching is not integrated in isolation; it is rather that each and every partial and incorrect dharma is itself perfected and integrated [through it].* The *Lotus Sūtra* pulls open and illuminates the Hīnayāna teaching, revealing it to be the king of all teachings. How could it then fail to pull open and reveal devils and heretics, showing that they are also the king? It's just that since devils and heretics are easy to open up [revealing their true ultimacy], this has already been explained in various Mahāyāna sutras, whereas since the Hīnayāna teachings are difficult to open up, the *Lotus* made a special point of opening them up separately, in accordance with this diffi-

culty. For example, in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, when the Heat-conquering Brahman throws himself into the fire so as to educate others, this is to use nothing but a heretical practice; or when the prostitute Vasumitra used tainted desire to attract sentient beings, this was utilizing nothing but a dharma from the devil's net [as a means to enlightenment]. If they didn't *dwell deeply* in the dharma-realm of devils and heretics, how could they have allowed countless sentient beings to attain samādhi? This is what is called mastering the way of the Buddha by practicing improper ways.[17]

Here we have perhaps the most emphatic statement to be found anywhere in world literature of the complete identity between value and antivalue. The exact meaning of the word "identity" in this context is, in a sense, what the rest of this work labors to unravel. We shall see that it means, as Zhili said elsewhere, not merely two things joined together or the front and back of a single object but, rather, the immediate sameness of all contents. The two terms in question not only are identical in sharing the same time and space and in having the same structure but in fact are viewed as nothing but *two names for a single entity*. To put it simply, the two terms "good" and "evil" are "identical" to one another because each of these terms *alone* is a way of denoting *all that exists*. The same is true, in the Tiantai view, of any two terms; that is, indicating any part of what exists, selecting and focusing on any quiddity, is an adequate and sufficient way to indicate the whole of what exists. Such a notion of identity is to be understood in the sense delineated by Gottlob Frege;[18] that is, sameness or identity is a relation that can be predicated not between objects but only between the names or signs of objects. To say "the morning star is identical to the evening star" is another way of saying "Morning star and evening star are two names for the same object." In the present case, this basic view of what identity means is applied to the premise that there is in existence only one "object,"[19] and that each name for a particular object is a different name for this one whole, but with different stresses and foci. The Tiantai theory of what exactly determines these stresses and foci that differentiate these different names and why they should exist at all is predicated on a certain view of what sort of an object it is that all names name, that is, what sort of whole there is, or, more crucially, what it means to be an "entity" at all. To be more specific, it is predicated on how this entity, which is all that exists, relates to the subjectivities positing names for it, which, by the same premise, must themselves also be aspects of this entity itself. This means that the indication of any of these subjectivities alone, however it may be naming or (mis)apprehending this entity that is the whole, is also a complete and adequate indication of the same whole, the

same entity. The pages that follow unpack and examine all the implications of this "omnicentric holism," as I term it, and the arguments adduced to support it. I regard this as one of the main contributions of this project to philosophical speculation.

As a contribution to Sinological research, too, this analysis of Zhili's statement is of the utmost significance. This claim of the identity of good and evil can perhaps serve as the zenith of the alleged tendency toward "conflict avoidance" said to permeate much of Chinese thought and culture, to the despair of many May Fourth reformers and the Chinese Communist Party, which has viewed it as an obstacle to the attainment of a truly Leninist notion of the role of "struggle" in dialectics.[20] Here we have the blanket universal statement that the two categories which by definition seemingly have to be in strenuous conflict, with the most immediate bearing on actual human behavior, namely, good and evil, are identical, and not in conflict at all—or, to be more exact, that their conflict, while necessary, is itself no obstacle to their identity with one another. The present work may also be viewed as a contribution to the endeavor to obtain a more comprehensive grasp of the sources and implications of this tendency. On the other hand, it may also help to remedy an overly simplistic understanding of this avoidance of conflict. In the present case it will become clear that we do not have a blandly placid "harmony" posed as the alternative to this sort of conflict—quite the contrary. Moreover, inasmuch as we will be involved in a self-consciously self-referential value critique, it also will not do to think that "harmony" is ever dichotomous with (in conflict with) its opposite, namely, conflict. The picture is much more complex. My hope is that the light this inquiry will shed on Chinese thought as a whole—and not only on Tiantai thought, which I regard as only the most obvious example of a trend that can be found in many spheres of Chinese intellectual history—will present a picture of that tradition which undermines both the simplistic moralizing of some of its modern advocates on the one hand and the condescending dismissiveness of some of its critics on the other.

At the moment, however, to make the case that this endeavor is worth the trouble, let us simply try to understand the full power and thoroughgoingness of the strangeness of this claim; this can be done by seeing what would happen if we plugged other terms into the formula. We are assuming that the terms "Buddha" and "devil" stand, in the writer's belief system, for the highest value and the deepest anti-value, respectively. Imagine similar claims in other systems. For example, in Christianity, "There is no devil but

God; there is no God but the devil." Perhaps some pantheistically inclined heretics and mystics could assent to the first claim (e.g., Jacob Boehme), in the form "There is no devil outside God." Indeed, all privation theories of evil, which regard evil as strictly parasitic on good and define good as interchangeable with being as such, would have to assent, at least abstractly, to this claim. The orthodox Christian theological view, from Augustine to Aquinas, insists that the *being* of evil, as a form of being, must in some sense be good, as already mentioned. But could any theist, deist, or even pantheist ever assent to the second claim, the reverse version, that good is parasitic on evil or even, as we shall see, *stricto sensu* a *form* of evil?[21]

Let's try a (unicentric—I define this term below) holistic cosmic system that locates value in the whole and anti-value in the finitude, limitation, and imperfection of the parts. "There is no part outside the whole; there is no whole outside a part." The first claim is no problem here; the second could perhaps work if we said "outside *all* the parts," but even this would deny the most salient feature of most holisms—the emergent properties of the whole that are beyond the sum of the parts. Zhili's claim, however, is clearly more closely equivalent to "there is no whole outside any one part, selected at random." For the (unicentric) holist, this would be precisely the primal error of mistaking the part for the whole. Indeed, for a thoroughgoing holist, one who holds that no two parts can exist in total isolation from one another, it would follow at least that good cannot exist without bad and that bad cannot exist without good. (This will be true regardless of whether good is conceived of as a certain part and contrasted to the "bad" part or as a name for the whole itself.) But this is not yet the same as saying the Good is *nothing but* the Bad, and the Bad is *nothing but* the Good. Is there any rational way to makes sense of the latter claim?

How about a scientific rationalist, who, in his professional life at least, holds truth to be the highest noninstrumental value and falsehood to be its antipodes? "There is no falsehood but the truth; there is no truth but falsehood." Neither of these will work. "There is no progress but stagnation; there is no stagnation but progress." Modern advocates of the ultimate value of progress will obviously not wish to assent to such a statement.

Zhili's claim, needless to say, has deep roots in the Indian Buddhist tradition. Nāgārjuna, for example, wrote obscurely, "The scope of saṁsāra is the scope of nirvāṇa; there is not the slightest difference between them." But I argue below that there remains an easily grasped outer limit to the value paradox in most Buddhist systems, including those of the Mahāyāna tradi-

tion that come closest to it, the Mādhyamika, the Huayan school, and Chan, even Tantric antinomianism. As Zhili points out, the more radical sounding claims of these schools can often be formulated as follows: "Fundamentally there is no anti-value; from the beginning there has been, in ultimate reality, nothing but enlightenment (*sunyatā* [original enlightenment, the dharma body, nirvāṇa])." This means that it is only illusion that made us think that anti-value existed; in truth, all that we thought to be anti-value was really value but misperceived. Hence everything we were calling anti-value has always really been nothing but value. But this is a far cry from the claim that delusion itself is real, as real as enlightenment, and irrevocably contrasted to it and yet at the same time identical to it, such that there is no enlightenment outside delusion, and no delusion outside enlightenment, as is the case for Zhili, as we shall see. The latter claim, like that concerning God and the devil above, would be acceptable to these schools, but the former could not, for they claim that in reality there is no such thing as delusion. I will have much to say about the details of this issue below.

We could continue this list indefinitely; if any reader knows of a system for which this formula can work, that is, there is no value but anti-value, and no anti-value but value, I would like to know about it. Or perhaps I should say, even when we find something that literally corresponds to this sort of a claim, as, for example, in the views of Schelling and Hegel summarized above, a close examination soon reveals that either a meta-value is implicitly posited that is unproblematically dichotomous (so, for example, in Hegel, Good and Evil are indeed convertible, but in the end they are not the ultimate value and anti-value in his system; to the contrary, Reason or the Absolute Idea is the ultimate value, of which both Good and Evil as specific abstractions are mere moments),[22] or some restriction is found in the practical application of the idea that limits the full reversibility of the reduction of one side to the other. To my knowledge, Zhili's claim, with its full and unflinching reversibility between the two sides in practice as well as in theory, is unique.

A Value-Free Universe?

But what does this extreme claim really mean, what motivates it, what does it presuppose, where does it lead? These are the questions that will occupy us for the next few hundred pages. A consideration of some possible interpretations of this claim will indicate that its true implications are much more complex. A cursory reading of this passage may lead to the belief that it

entails a total rejection of the concepts of good and bad, similar to our scientific/Spinozistic belief that nature itself is devoid of value and that value is added by human beings. But this is not the case here. Zhili admits that his proposed practice is indeed, on the first level of analysis, an evil act. He does not contest this value judgment. But then he asserts that whatever is evil is also the ultimate truth and is another name for the good and, moreover, on a practical level can be, at least if used in a certain way, a means to attain the good according to a more local definition—in this case, progress in the Buddhist path and eventual enlightenment, such that this evil itself, qua evil, becomes the synthesizing meeting place of all dharmas. As he wrote earlier in the same correspondence:

> You say, "If you cherish preferences [for the Pure Land over this world], this is to give rise to attachment and dislike, which leads to a mind that picks and chooses, and thereby the belief in subject and object." *The arisal of my sin is indeed as you say. But the way in which this sin establishes meritorious properties should also be mentioned here. Generally speaking, preferences and picking and choosing are good at leading to sins and also at accomplishing great deeds.* Thus Aśvaghoṣa takes them to be the basis of the first stage of enlightenment. Zhiyi called them the gradual method of the Pure Land. Vimalakīrti made heretical opinions and attachment his assistants. Manjusri used greed and anger as his power and faculty. All these show that the use of these [sins] depends on the person and that there is a way to ride them.[23]

On the surface at least, this explanation seems to imply the claim that no particular thing is necessarily or unmitigatedly evil; even the worst sins can be used as means to good ends, that is, to enlightenment. The justification for calling the admitted evil "good" would then be in line with a kind of "ends justify the means" doctrine. We might again be tempted to compare this to the Western theological and Neo-Platonic view, represented by figures such as Plotinus, Augustine, and Aquinas, which strictly equates Being and Good, such that any existing thing is necessarily good, unless decayed or corrupted. In addition to this, however, anything can be misused, by free-willed beings whose wills are not properly oriented toward its "proper" use. In this case, all objective states are inherently capable of a proper use leading to the good. However, subjective or volitional states have an absolutely dualistic basis. In the case of the Christians, they are *either* obedient to the will of God *or* not, and hence use the originally good beings *either* properly *or* improperly. For Zhili, on the contrary, the mental states themselves, even ignorance, misunderstanding, lust, and hatred, can be used properly as tools toward enlightenment. That is, improper usages can themselves be properly used.

They fall into the same category, we might say, as the being of things that can be used, and the same affirmation—that they are all good if properly used—applies to all kinds of being, objective and subjective. Nor is there any question here of decay or corruption: it appears to be simply a matter of how anything, including a mental state, is used, with the assumption that all states, even delusion itself, have the potential to lead to enlightenment.

But what about misusing them? Is that not a "thing" or "mental state"? In fact, is that not precisely what delusion is? Indeed it is, and it follows from the above that even misusing things itself is potentially good, if it is itself (later) properly used (which here means, again, used as a means to attain enlightenment for oneself or others). Any moment of delusion can be used by the *subsequent* moment, and misuse can subsequently be correctly used, so that all the errors themselves become means to the good, even those that are initially not used as means to the good. Moreover, as we shall see, for Zhili it is inherent in each state, both subjective and objective, that it is always being used both properly and improperly, that this "subsequent" moment, and its re-evaluation, is not a merely a contingent following moment in time, that each state is in itself multifarious and multivalent, and that it is always involved in uses and misuses from every side and is not reducible to any possible final value dichotomy at any point or on any level. Just exactly how this is supposed to work and how far the thinkers in question were prepared to take this are questions we will tackle in detail in the appropriate chapters.

Antinomianism?

Was this rhetoric used to justify outrageous acts of antinomian libertinage, a total negation of all moralizing constraints on behavior? The short answer is no. The "improper behavior" proposed by Zhili, which he defended with this surprising and somewhat dangerous-sounding rhetoric, was not to open a brothel in the monastery, or even to take a wife, or to lead the monks on daily excursions to the local wineshop, or to rob and kill local villagers and travelers. It did not involve breaking the monastic rules or reforming the institutions of the day by advocating a practice that had heretofore been considered evil but which Zhili considered good. Rather, what he wanted was, after three years of ritual devotion and concentrated practice of the Lotus Samādhi repentance, to burn himself alive as an offering to the Buddha, in hopes of being born in the Pure Land and continuing his Buddhist practice there. Such fanatical devotion and piety are the "evil" and "deviltry" he is de-

fending and putting in the same class as the heresy and prostitution of the figures in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, in accordance with the Buddhist tradition of considering extreme asceticism and one-sided unyielding obsessive desire—here, for purity and rebirth in the Pure Land and the concrete forms of Buddhist institutional practice—a deviation from the Buddha's "middle path." Hence he continued:

> Moreover, my present project, of burning the body and cutting off fingers, is helpful and in accordance with my practice, so that "the sacrifice of body, life, and wealth" [which the *Lotus* calls the true support of the dharma] will be beneficial to both our wealth and to the dharma. So "all phenomena are reducible to and converge in asceticism"; it is the entire dharma-realm [just like any other possible practice or fact]. Thus, since the Buddha and the devil are one in essence, proper and improper dharma-gates [i.e., methods of practice] are originally melded together; this is called "perfect morality" (keeping of the precepts), what is called the "skillful means" that are inherent in the body of the truth. How could this not be so of the devil's preaching? In this way, not to be afraid or surprised while hearing the devil's preaching and overcoming one's attachment to the Buddha are good ways to start practicing the three contemplations.[24]

Here we see a rather complex interaction of extreme antinomian-sounding rhetoric and a rigorous devotion to a plan of self-cultivation and improvement, in which the former serves as a means to the achievement of the latter. Zhili admits that being attached to Buddhism in this extremist, ascetic way is a snare of the devil; but like all other devilish preachments, he says, this one is another form of the one thing, the Buddha-vehicle, just like more obviously "good" practices, such as being unattached to Buddhism or moderation, would be. The subverting of any stable value dichotomy is fused with the pursuit of value. But what assumptions, what motivations, what habits of thinking, lie behind such a weave and make it possible, and what else does it imply? Of what total philosophical orientation is it a part?

What follows is a look at the main tenets of Tiantai thought as it manifested itself from the Sui to Northern Song dynasties, or, let us say, between Zhiyi's[25] birth and Zhili's death (hence, 523 and 1028), whose contents are governed by the perspective cast over it by the claim that there is no devil (the most despised thing, in this value system) but the Buddha (the most highly valued), and vice versa. Whatever considerations provide contexts that illuminate this claim—philosophical, historical, religious, Sinological, rhetorical—are included; whatever does not (given the usual cost/benefit

concerns that apply in conducting this sort of inquiry) are omitted. Philosophically, the contexts that I found most useful in clarifying this claim can be summarized as three thematic motifs: (1) value paradox, (2), sociality and intersubjectivity, and (3) holism. The concept of value paradox draws our attention to the place, function, and significance of axiological ambiguity, negativity, and antinomian rhetoric in the Tiantai tradition and to the various ways in which thinkers in this tradition asserted the positive function of terms that are simultaneously negatively valued (by mainstream culture or, more interestingly, by the same thinker who paradoxically asserts their positive value), culminating in the Tiantai conception of evil as inherently included in the Buddha-nature and as completely identical to the ultimate good. We will find the tendency to make such assertions closely intertwined with sociality and intersubjectivity, conceived as primary and constitutive, and conceptions of holism, of which I will distinguish several structurally distinct types. These two background concerns will help us understand some of the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of the tendency toward value paradox and the ways in which it is impacted by root conceptions of social and logical "unity" and the relations between whole and part thereby implied. This will, in turn, give us some insight into the concrete behavioral and attitudinal consequences and motivations of such doctrines and the structures that bring levels of instrumental and ultimate value into relation with one another.

Chapter 1 deals with the general philosophical issues underlying questions of holism, intersubjectivity, and value, defines the terms of the inquiry, and indicates what is at stake in it; Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the treatment of these same three themes, holism, intersubjectivity and value paradox, in the works of some relevant Chinese thinkers of the classical period. After a quick look at the question of value in Indian Buddhism (Chapter 3), the Tiantai view is explicated in three chapters, one each of the main themes of holism, intersubjectivity. and value paradox. Chapter 4 deals with the basic terminology and worldview of the Tiantai system, culminating in its most extreme and fully developed form, "omnicentric holism," which is characterized by the assertion that all possible quiddities are "inherently included" in each moment of experience. Chapter 5 examines the Tiantai notion of constitutive, all-pervasive and ultimate intersubjectivity, especially in the works of Zhili. Chapter 6 is a detailed inquiry into the value theories of the three central thinkers of the tradition—Zhiyi (523–97), Zhanran (711–82), and Zhili—ending with Zhili's doctrine of "the ultimacy

of the dung beetle" and the role of this line of thinking in his defense of his planned self-immolation. Finally, the last chapter of the book reflects on the human meaning of all this and attempts to think through what would happen if we applied the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical implications of Zhili's ideas to concrete problems.

This last question, concerning the "implications of all this for us," is brazenly "presentist," and in a certain sense the same can be said for this work as a whole. Obviously, my own concerns do not coincide exactly with those of the Tiantai writers I consider here, and I regard this as neither avoidable nor regrettable. My view, which I have developed elsewhere at length, is that any study of (even potentially) alternative conceptual systems must be done in terms of their present implications—"present" here meaning "on us," with "us" defined in a loose and ultimately undefinitive manner. This presentist orientation can take many forms. Even to treat such material purely historically is, I would argue, to treat it in terms of its impact on ourselves—that is, as a traceable historical fact, which can be used to support or to discredit some theory of history presently held or rejected by us or some conversation partner of ours. Even current scholarly standards of procedure and evidence must be included in this "for us." In angling for the meanings of Tiantai thought for us, we necessarily oblige ourselves to go through the usual steps in reconstructive intellectual historical research. In practice, my presentism is perhaps not discernibly different from the attempts of a naïve historicism to find out "what these guys really thought"; I proceed in just the same way as someone who thinks it possible to do so. The only difference is that I regard all such procedures as falling on the "us" side of the question—"What is Tiantai for us?" rather than "What was Tiantai for them?"—since no claim to reveal the Tiantai side in any reliable or privileged way could be meaningfully tested without resorting to a tautological hermeneutic circle. The rightness of our account of what the Tiantai thinkers thought would have to be compared to another account of what they thought that emerged from the intersection of these texts with researchers applying the standards (even standards of "comparison" and "rightness") of another "present" and another "us."

A more significant aspect of this presentism is seen in the comparative framing of the question in this Introduction. I have chosen this material for study precisely because it represents a fascinatingly extreme contrast to the Occidental tradition of value dichotomy. This makes Tiantai value paradox my main concern and encourages me to structure my inquiry around this

particular issue. That is, this contrast with the Western tradition is what made me choose value paradox, among all aspects of Tiantai thought, as the object to be explicated, and all other Tiantai ideas and practices as premises that will help me explain it. Needless to say, this is not what Tiantai thinkers, who are making no such contrast, themselves have in mind. Although they do, especially from Zhanran's time forward, frequently adduce some form of this doctrine as what distinguishes them from other Buddhist schools, their ultimate point of concern is, like that of all Buddhist schools, Buddhist practice and soteriology, for which they think this particular doctrine happens to be crucial. At least at the beginner's level, they arguably share the pan-Buddhist prioritizing of a particular sort of practice and experience (the liberation from suffering of all beings) and construct all their doctrines, including their extreme value paradoxes, as means to that end. This would also mean, on general holistic premises (as we shall see), that the meaning of these doctrines themselves is somewhat different from their meaning when placed at the center of this inquiry. Indeed, this is true to an important extent, and it is doubtful that Tiantai writers would bring forth these particular doctrines, among all those in their extensive arsenal, when asked to depict their ethical position for the uninitiated or for neophytes in a catechistic form for general consumption. More likely, they would espouse adherence to the standard Buddhist precepts.

However, as we shall see, in the Tiantai case we are uniquely permitted these particular liberties. This is because of the omnicentric holism of the system, which explicitly holds that any point in the system can be made the center to which all else is subordinated and which all else supports and explains. All points in the system, it is claimed, are integrated to such an extent that, by the time the system is fully comprehended, any point can be the end to which all the others are means, any point can by taken as the ultimate point, and this point will necessarily incorporate all the other aspects of theory and practice in the system. By this argument, the value paradoxes, too, can be a center, the end to which all other parts of the system can be viewed as a means, and a member of the tradition could view this work as an experiment in applying its own premises rigorously to its own tradition, in the context of its confrontation with a particular alien culture, namely, early twentieth-first-century American academia.

Another justification for writing a book around the Tiantai doctrines of value paradox can be found in the Tiantai *upāya* theory, one of the pluralistic practical upshots of the Tiantai omnicentrism. In some cases, this means

that the emphatic explication of these value paradoxes would be precisely the medicine required, even in encountering a merely casual inquirer. Perhaps the confrontation with Western value dichotomizing would be such a case? But, awkwardly enough, these justifications of my method here cannot be properly understood until the method itself has done its work and the Tiantai omnicentrism and upāya theory are made clear. Still, it is necessary to raise this point here at the beginning, to avoid any unnecessary misunderstandings.

TWO

Value, Intersubjectivity, and Holism: Philosophical Parameters and the Chinese Background

This work focuses on the relation of "value" to "anti-value" in the Tiantai tradition, especially in the works of Siming Zhili, and the structural dependence of this relationship on certain premises concerning "holism" and "intersubjectivity" in that tradition. In this chapter, I define each of these terms more abstractly and generally, in the process making my central concern more precise. At the same time, I outline certain important features in the way each of these three themes is treated in the indigenous Chinese philosophical tradition. It is this tradition, I hold, that constitutes the crucial conceptual background for an understanding of what Zhiyi and the Tiantai tradition do with Buddhism and forms the set of intellectual and existential tools by which they chiseled the Tiantai system out of the available Indian sources.

Stated in the barest form, the three guiding themes of this book, then, are holism (the primacy of encompassing relations over atomized identities), intersubjectivity (the primacy of social relations over either purely objective or purely subjective considerations), and axiology (the primacy of value theory over factual epistemology or ontology). It will come as no surprise to most students of Chinese thought to find the these topics thematized here.

It has by now emerged as a kind of consensus, if not a cliché, among sinologists that each of these themes is an especially important focal point of Chinese thought in general. What is not always so clear is the way in which these themes are interrelated and the various senses in which each can be understood. In this chapter I attempt to specify the content of these three notions, the range of their implications, and their impact on one another, both as general philosophical problems and as narrower issues in Chinese intellectual history.

I start by defining several distinct types of holism and indicate what I believe to be their relation to the problem of value. Then I discuss some features of the problem that are particularly distinctive and important in the indigenous Chinese intellectual tradition. Next I turn to the question of intersubjectivity, first defining the term and then focusing on its foundational position in Chinese thought and the implications of this for the development of Chinese forms of holism. Finally, I turn to the question of value itself and the role of axiology in Chinese philosophy. This involves a consideration of certain inherent rhetorical features of the problem, in the hopes of showing that in the abstract the value question necessarily opens a certain margin for paradox by virtue of its unavoidable categories of "instrumental value" and "ultimate value." I will argue that an initially intersubjective notion of holism serves as a matrix for value paradox, due to its locating of the meaning, value, and identity of any given entity in that entity's relation to its holistic context. This necessarily creates the possibility for a single item to be simultaneously a part of many wholes and therefore to be valued simultaneously in many, possibly contradictory, ways. The impact of holism on value paradox is thus profound and differs according to the *type* of holism operative in a given case. It is essential, then, to specify clearly what types of holism there can be and to identify which are operative here. The intersubjective model, as we shall see, allows for a type of holism that I call "omnicentric," which in turn makes possible the extreme value paradox of the Tiantai tradition, which is the main object of attention in the remainder of this book.

PART I: HOLISM—DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

I use the term "holism" in the sense defined by its coiner, Jan Smuts:

> Both matter and life consist of unit structures whose ordered grouping produces natural wholes which we call bodies or organisms. . . . Holism . . . is the term here

coined for this fundamental factor operative toward the creation of wholes in the universe. . . . The fundamental holistic characters [are] a unity of parts which is so close and intense as to be more than the sum of its parts; which not only gives a particular conformation or structure to the parts but *so relates and determines them in their synthesis that their functions are altered*; the synthesis affects and determines the parts, so that they function towards the 'whole'; and the whole and the parts therefore reciprocally influence and determine each other, and appear more or less to merge their individual character: the whole is in the parts and the parts are in the whole, and this synthesis of whole and parts is reflected in the holistic character of the functions of the parts as well as of the whole.[1]

Holism thus defines "parts" and "wholes" in such a way that the parts in a whole obtain their meaning from their contextualization in that whole and are altered, in all aspects of their being, by their relationship with the other parts. The context in which a part appears changes its meaning, significance, and character. The nature of each part is modified by the whole of which it is a part, which means also, *inter alia*, by all the other items, or parts, to which it bears a relationship. In other words, "holism" in the present work refers to all doctrines holding that the answer to the question "What is X?" is better answered by inquiring "What is X related to? How does X alter when these other relata alter? In what contexts can X appear, and what happens to it in these different contexts?" rather than "What is X composed of? What is X like when the distortions created by the various particular contexts and relationships in which it tends to appear have been removed?" The latter position may broadly be described as a kind of "atomism," that is, the view that the real nature of a thing is what it is in itself, removed from relations, and that the best way to understand something is to analyze the nature of its constituent parts rather than how they are related or how it behaves as a whole in its relations with other things. If we know the nature of the parts, in this view, we know that nature of the compound they form. Holistic views, on the contrary, hold that the nature of the compound, or whole, must be understood in terms of its relation to other things and of the relations among *whatever* components it comprises.

Smuts's definition thus implies not only something about how to understand each part of a given whole (it must be understood in its relation to that whole) but also something important about the wholes themselves—namely, that a whole is characterized by *structure*. What determines the nature, behavior, and characteristics of a whole is not so much its contents but *the way in which these contents are arranged, how they relate to, and thereby affect and modify,*

each other. A "whole," for Smuts, is not a mere collection, not just a set of parts thrown together in a container. It functions as a whole, which means it is capable of varying degrees of homeostasis, it can assimilate novel elements, and it is free from part by part causality (since a cause impinging on one part may elicit a response in the whole or in another part, rather than merely in the part that was directly affected; a blow to my arm, for example, may make my mouth cry out and my legs kick or run). As a consequence, it is possible that *two different wholes* can be formed from exactly the same parts, if the structure of the two differ. By the same token, a functionally identical whole may be formed from completely different parts. I may make a triangle either out of three matches or three pieces of string without diminishing the resulting triangularity. This point is of great importance in the discussions to follow.

Note also that Smuts points, in passing, to the effect of the whole on the parts, as well as that of the parts on the whole. This action of the whole on the part can be understood in a number of different and even contrary ways, and this point is of decisive practical importance. Indeed, it is one of the central foci of this study. I will argue below that Chinese holism is at times manifested as a kind of hyper-holism, or what I call "omnicentrism" (other possible names are "ontological synecdoche" or even "omnisolipsism"). In this type of holism, not only is the whole different in character from the parts considered in isolation, but also this whole is itself in an important sense directly and undividedly present and active in each part. Each part adequately and completely represents and expresses the whole, leaving nothing out. As such, however, the whole is distinctively and differently expressed in (*as*) each of the parts. This means that the whole is itself a *different whole* to each of the parts to which it is related; it is many, possibly conflicting, wholes at once. The part has many identities at once, since its identity is determined by its relations and it is simultaneously a part of many different relations; by the same token, the whole is itself many different wholes at once, since its identity, too, is determined differently in the case of its relations to each of its own parts, as well as to any other, external wholes. The determinative power of relation, if pressed, ends up in a thoroughgoing reciprocity between part and whole, such that neither is more ultimate or primary. One consequence of this is to confer on each part the authority and authenticity of the whole, rather than, as it were, robbing each part of its validity, due to its supersession by and inclusion in the whole, as can be the case in other types of holism. To understand what this means, we must introduce another key concept to our discussion: the notion of the "center."

The Center

Chinese holisms, going back to the ancient Ruist ("Confucian") concept of the ideal ruler's moral charisma as the unifying force at the center of the state, start from the premises not only that wholes are composed of parts best understood in roughly the way elaborated above but also that wholes have something that we may call a "center." The center may be defined as the point in reference to which, in any given case, all other parts of a given whole attain their significance, consistency, identity, and value. I have already said that the parts in a whole gain these four qualities by virtue of their relation to *each other*, that is, to *all* other parts of the whole. Here, however, a single point of convergence is posited, a mediator, as it were, for all these relations, through which all of them must pass in order to have their identity determined. The parts are not truly "parts of a whole" in the Smutsian sense until they have established a relation with this central part. Until that moment their identities remain in a state of ambiguity. This suggests a necessary structure and, with it, a kind of hierarchy. Given that identity is relational and contextual, any token has as many identities as it has relations in the whole; it "is" a different quiddity "for" each of the other parts of the whole to which it relates. Its relation to the center, however, is what untangles this confusion, what disambiguates which identity it assumes for any given whole. All the parts must relate to the center in a way that is mutually consistent or compossible, and it is this totality of consistent relations to the center by all the parts that make them a true whole. What role a part is going to play in the whole, then, is determined by its identity, the role it plays, in relation to the center. The center in this sense "represents" the whole.

This need not be the case. A Smutsian whole could be imagined that lacked any central focus or any tendency toward a center; centrality is not necessarily implied in the Smutsian definition of wholes or of holism. A whole without a center would still show the crucial features of modifying all the parts with respect to each other, such that their functions and natures were determined by their relations to one another and by the structures thereof. A whole in which a direct relation exists between all the parts and none emerges as having the role of fixing the values of the other may be possible. A water molecule consists of hydrogen and oxygen, and its "wetness" is a holistic function emerging from these two non-wet elements. It is not in any obvious way the case that their identities as "wet-for-the-whole" depend on a relation to some one point or part within that whole "for which" they

are wet. It has no center; the wetness of the hydrogen emerges from its relation to the oxygen and the wetness of the oxygen emerges from its relation to the hydrogen. This apparently clear-cut reciprocity, however, presents an epistemological difficulty, one that involves large metaphysical problems. Namely, from what *standpoint* can it be known that this collection of parts is in fact a Smutsian whole? Who is experiencing the wetness (*for* whom, in relation to whom or what, "is" the water "wet")? Evidently, one would have to stand *outside* the whole, survey all the parts, how they function both together and apart, and on this basis conclude that in the present structure they form a true whole, a whole that has the property of "wetness." If we can suspend our usual assumptions about cognitive relations, which assume an absolute break between the knower and the known, and recast the situation in holistic terms, it would seem that this "outside" point, whatever it is (some set of neurological functions, for example), is in fact a part of the *larger* whole that produces the phenomenological appearance of wetness and that it acts precisely as the center of this larger whole (made up of the parts "hydrogen," "oxygen," "someone's nervous system") in the sense described above. What they are for this nervous system is what they are for this whole, which qualifies it as the center of this larger whole. Perhaps there is some way out of this difficulty that can maintain the even-keeled reciprocity of the noncentric whole, and the commonsensical objectivist epistemology that it seems to assume. In any case, the concept of the center may be thought of as an alternative to this model, which circumvents (or at least transposes) this difficulty.

Some further points must be made about the peculiar role of the center. The center may be viewed as the sole self-maintaining and relatively self-sufficient variable in the whole. It is even in some relative sense self-determining, which is perhaps highly counterintuitive for a holism. Although its identity, too, may depend on its relations to the other parts, as holism demands, it is the part that initiates and ensures the existence of the relations that maintain its identity, the decisively unambiguous part, initially, that disambiguates the others. For example, consider the famous Wittgensteinian duck-rabbit. This holistic assemblage of dots and lines, all of which are intimately interrelated and mutually determining, can, as a whole, be "read" as either a duck or a rabbit. If, however, I add a drawing of a carrot to the part that could be read as the rabbit's mouth, I have disambiguated the figure; I cannot now read it as "duck" unless I disregard the carrot. The carrot is the "center" in the sense intended here. The relation of all the other

dots and lines are disambiguated, given a particular identity, by their relation to this one part; all the lines of relation must pass through this point, converge around it, and through this mediation relate to the other parts. At first glance, then, this center is the one point that is not ambiguous, that does not depend on its relation to the other parts to establish its identity. This is why we refer to it as the "center," although obviously in this case, as in most others, this does not imply spatial centrality. One aspect of its (relational) identity, we may say, is to ensure that other parts relate to it in a way that maintain its identity, its carrotness, which is indeed determined by the rabbitness of the figure, but which at the same time excludes the duckness. It is, to anticipate a trope to be used extensively below, the "punch line" that reveals the meaning of the other parts, which had thus far remained in a state of uncertainty. Part of the identity it holistically receives from its relations to the other parts is precisely its disambiguating effect on them, and it is this which I here call its "centrality." Whether this function of centrality can be associated with any quality or only with certain qualities is discussed below.

It should be obvious that the center is a rather problematic notion in any theory of holism. It is transcendent to the other parts; it determines them without being determined by them, at least not in the same way. In a sense, a holism that contains so non-relational a part is illogical. If we regard the center as really having an unambiguous, non-relational identity (for example, we regard the carrot as being incapable of being "read" as anything else), we are not being holistic enough. There are several possible responses to this challenge. The most obvious is to abandon holism altogether. The next most obvious is to abolish the function of centrality. It is easy enough to see that the carrot picture *can* indeed be read as something else, and for precisely holistic reasons; I can draw other figures around it that will ambiguate it. Encircling it with traffic cones would make it seem to be one of them. Or I can make it one point in a triangle made up of three carrots, which will make it no longer disclose just carrotness but equally "triangularity." And of course I can always see it as dots and lines on a page, rather than carrotness. In short, the center is in no better shape than any other point in the whole; I was simply unholistically restricting my gaze to a limited area and taking that for the only possible whole, instead of realizing that, by the premises of holism delineated above, there can be no final drawing of limits as to where relations end; that would land us back in a higher atomism of sorts. The first response to this consideration is thus to regard centrality as such simply as an illusion that is incompatible with thoroughgoing holism; we get infinite regresses of

dissemination and ambiguity that in principle can never be resolved and indeed dispense with the concept of the "whole" altogether, for reasons suggested above. There are just relations nested in more relations, and endlessly ambiguating identities. This may be regarded as the "acentric" response.

There is a third response, however, which is minutely but crucially distinguished from this one. This lies in accepting everything said by the acentrist but denying only the fixity or finality of any given center, not the principle of centrality itself, which is instead seen as necessary to any temporarily apprehended whole. Every center can be further undermined by positing a new center or by expanding the whole or by reorganizing one's gaze or reversing the flow of disambiguation, but wherever one is, however one is temporarily viewing the case, there is a center, representing a whole, which is presently operative. Centrality as such is necessary and omnipresent. This is already what I'll soon call "oligocentrism." It means that instead of abolishing the notion of centrality on the grounds that it is necessarily undermined by holism itself, we posit that there is always some center. If we assert that each part is itself the center, we have moved on to "omnicentrism." In omnicentric holism, centrality is always happening, as in oligocentrism, but by definition every part is always in the process of playing that role. But we will consider these points in more detail below.

For the moment, however, we must make clear all the implications of this function of centrality itself, whatever its fate. The center serves as the one constant in terms of which all other variables are defined. This attribute anticipates the discussion of value theory below: the center is the locus of *ultimate value* within the whole. Since holisms by definition locate ultimate legitimacy, that is, the power to determine the "true" identity, meaning, and value of any of the parts, in the whole per se, in the relatedness of the parts to one another, we may also think of the center as the point within the whole that *accurately* represents the whole qua whole, the point within the whole that has direct and undistorted access to all the parts, just as the center of a circle is the point of convergence of all its radii, which directly contact every point in the circumference, and moreover is the point in reference to which the position of all points on the periphery is determined. The center is authoritative, imposes a hierarchy, dominates, traps other quiddities into being supports and expressions of its own identity. It is understandable that most modern writers who have glimpsed this phenomenon, given the imperialistic structure of such an organization, consider it pernicious. As I hope to show, however, this "moral" objection to centrality—and hence to

all structure and determinacy—is based on the assumptions that centers are by nature mutually exclusive, that there can be at most one in any whole, and that the only alternative to centrality is thoroughgoing acentricity. Omnicentrism, to which much of the following discussion is addressed, is meant to undermine these assumptions.

The center is the "bottom line," the standard by which things are judged, and in relation to which anything that happens in the whole is viewed to matter or not to matter. It is that about which no further questions are asked, that which is not required to justify itself in terms of some other concern. Take a large set of processes, say, the international activities of a large corporation. A holistic analysis insists that the meaning and identity of each individual activity are to be understood in the context of the whole, that is, all the activities of the corporation. What appears as philanthropy may thus appear also as public relations. If we understand this holism as "centered," we may identify one overriding concern to which all these activities may be interpreted as ultimately reducible, for example, making money. All the effects of this wide range of processes will *matter*, in this view, only inasmuch as they affect profits. They are good if they contribute to this goal and bad if they do not. They are *motivated* by and also *judged according to* their relation to this one central concern. The fact that a teenager in Tahiti wears a Pepsi T-shirt is good for Pepsi if it makes them money; it matters not at all that the teenager does not know or care what it says or that he is unconvinced by Pepsi-centric rhetoric and would show no veneration for the CEO of Pepsi if they met. If the center lies in being loved or being obeyed, these will be the standard, and the exact same set of parts, the Pepsi corporation, may be seen as a different whole, and one that is judged differently, in the way it coheres around these different centers. What was good in one case will not necessarily be good in the others. The Pepsi CEO will no longer view the Tahitian teenager's attitude as acceptable if he shifts centers, if he comes to regard being worshipped rather than making money as the center of his organization. The center is the crossroads of all the connections, all the relationships between the parts; it ties them together and gives them a specific coherence, meaning, and value.

This has many implications. Epistemologically, it is only from a "center" of this type that the whole appears coherent, or as a Smutsian whole at all. On the premise of holism, this means that only for a center can a whole be considered a true whole and only from the view of the center are any of the parts themselves coherent. Ethically, this means that only a center can know

what the legitimate activity of any part, or of the whole, would be, assuming that this is connected with a coherent vision of what it is. Since only a center can know what anything truly "is," or how it is connected with the relevant vectors of lack (for what it lacks are other parts of the whole, which only a center can see comprehensively), only a center can know what anything should do; the center is a locus of *value arbitration*, as we shall see in the section on value below. Moreover, this is almost always connected with being a locus of value itself; to be a center is in some sense to be good, as defined by that whole. Value, as we shall see in more detail below, is connected with the power to obtain some goal defined in terms of a perceived lack, the ability to be also the contrary of one's present state, thus defining a dyadic good/bad whole to the sentient being in question. In the case of a whole that is conceived as a dyad, the center would then be the point that reaches to (perceives, understands, or, more radically, has mastery over) both opposed terms of the dyad. To anticipate further, the value posited by any system may be viewed, first, as a unification of the opposite value and anti-value of other systems (which are thus merely instrumental to the system in question) and, second, as the opposition to what it posits as ultimate anti-value. To stand in a position that perceives and has mastery over both poles of the value dyad is to be a center with respect to that dyad. Power means mastery over both of any two opposed poles, which means to unify a whole as a center does. In all cases, value is associated with centrality in the present sense, of ability to do X and to do anti-X as defined in the next lowest system, or which can see the two poles of the dyad as forming one Smutsian whole, or make them form one, unified in the self.

Another example may make this clearer.[2] In any system of terms, there will be one master term by reference to which the content of all the other terms is fixed. For example, if I am a feminist, I may also support Marxist and ecological movements, because I see them as dealing with aspects of the general problem of patriarchy and as contributing to the struggle for equal rights for women; in that case, I would believe that, once the real problem, patriarchy, has been solved, the ecological crisis and capitalist exploitation will automatically also be solved, for the feminist problem is the real root of the others. "Feminism" in this case is the ultimate value, the "center" of my system. However, if I am a radical Green ecologist, I will feel on the contrary that only a solution to the ecological crisis can solve the problems of patriarchal and capitalist exploitation; humanity's warped relation to nature is the real root problem, the "center," the ultimate value. A Marxist, of course, will

feel that feminism and ecologism are just epiphenomena of the root problem of capitalist exploitation and class struggle. Similarly, if my ultimate value is egotism, I may support feminism, Marxism, or ecologism if I think they will benefit me personally; my personal interests, in that case, form the center of the whole of value signifiers I employ. Feminism is good *to the extent* that it furthers my interests as a woman; Marxism is good because I am a proletariat, and so on.

This means that the "non-central" terms are always *fundamentally ambiguous* until tied to some center in a particular context. Their identity and content are not otherwise fixed. As Slavoj Žižek points out, "Ecologism['s] . . . connection with other ideological elements is not determined in advance; one can be a state-oriented ecologist (if one believes that only the intervention of a strong state can save us from catastrophe), a socialist ecologist (if one locates the source of merciless exploitation of nature in the capitalist system), a conservative ecologist (if one preaches that man must again become deeply rooted in his nature soil), and so on; *feminism can be socialist, apolitical . . . ; even* racism could be elitist or populist."[3] It is the connection to a center that fixes or stabilizes these terms in any particular case, bestowing on them a definite content or identity.

Legitimate autonomy or freedom of action, then, can emanate only from a center, for any other part of a whole is dependent on others extrinsic to itself for its meaning, purpose, and role. From the vantage point of the center, one can survey the whole and know that the whole is indeed a whole, in spite of the fact that one is located *within* the whole itself. It is a point within the whole from which one can know the whole as a whole and see each part as expressing the whole. It is also thus *representative* of the whole and may be said to include the whole, in some virtual form, within itself. This may also imply that from the center one can control the whole, can have a direct influence on any and all points of the whole. The center is the focal point around which all the other parts revolve.

On this basis, we may broadly distinguish two types of holism. "Unicentric holism," briefly, holds that the true meaning of the collection lies only in the whole as such; the source of all error lies in mistaking a part for the whole. Epistemologically, the ability to comprehend or see this whole may or may not be possible from within the system, from the viewpoint of a particular privileged part. (Such a point may also be asserted, in a given case, to lie outside the system as a whole.) This point—which sees the whole, is directly connected to all parts, and can in some sense control the whole—we

call, metaphorically, the center. It is a part that is also in some sense the whole or may legitimately and adequately represent the whole, just as all radii of a circle are extensions of the center. There is only one center, which is unique and irreplaceable. The power of determination flows unidirectionally from this center to the other parts, creating, at least ideally, a single, unambiguous whole with clear borders.

If the feminist in our previous example has a unicentric underlying conceptual system, she will have to claim that feminism truly occupies a special and privileged place among signifiers, that it is the real and true root of all the other problems, the uniquely adequate way of regarding the problem as a whole; ecologism and Marxism are merely parts. The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for the Marxist and ecologist, if they are unicentrists. If we are outside observers, we will, if we are unicentrists ourselves, have to believe that one and only one of these three contesting views is correct. One of these three terms truly represents the whole; the other two are just partial representations, which have mistakenly elevated their own status to the central position. Alternatively, we may hold that we, as observers, alone perceive the truth of the situation, that all three groups are mistaken about being the center; they form a larger whole, of which we are the true center, a center that can name itself as none of these three, a center of neutral comprehension.

Omnicentric holism, on the contrary, holds that we may in fact take the part for the whole, since any part, simply considered in itself, in its own characteristics already implies the whole of which it is a part. The part, in other words, is the whole, and any part can thus adequately stand for the whole. Centrality as such is ineradicable, by general holistic premises; but by the same premises, since no final delimiting of relevant relations can ever be closed, any part can equally function as this center, and indeed, in hard-core omnicentrism, every part is always already doing so. To be a center is to determine the identity of other things; all parts are always doing this, and hence all are centers, each defining an alternative whole around itself, which are, however, made up of an identical set of components. The same set of items is qualitatively a different whole for each part considered as center. To return to the duck-rabbit but leaving out the carrot, whatever point first emerges as determined serves as center in that case. The rabbit mouth becomes center, and the ears swing into focus; the duck beak becomes center, and the duck head swings into focus. Any point can function as center. Further, it is not just that they can at one time or another but not concurrently do so; each inherently has the characteristic of acting as the deter-

mining center that creates wholes around itself in its own image. An omnicentrist, observing the disagreement among the feminist, Marxist, and ecologist, would not insist that one of these three combatants was correct and the other two were mistaken. He would say, instead, that the whole field of phenomena and the questions to which they are referring can be described equally in these three (or four) ways, that the master signifier can in fact be located anywhere at all in the whole. The entire complex functions meaningfully in all these ways at once. Feminism can indeed be seen as the unifying thread running through capitalist and ecological exploitation. On the other hand, class struggle or ecological exploitation or my personal interests or anything else can also be viewed as the unifying thread. Or the center can be myself, the omnicentrist; omnicentrism is in that case another way of describing the nature that this whole is expressing, along with feminism, Marxism, and so on. The holistic mutual dependence of the parts is so thorough that the system of causality can not be conceived of simply as one-way, with one unique root that causes all the other parts of the whole. The concept of root or cause is here only "provisional," in a technical sense that we shall consider in more detail in discussing the Tiantai system. And yet it is not illegitimate; indeed, it is strictly necessary. The claim here is not an either/or position—that we must forget about having any master signifier or center at all, that nothing is the root of anything else and all are simultaneously present—but rather, a both/and position. The categories of cause and effect, of root and branch, of appearance and reality, are unavoidable if there is to be any meaning at all, but they always work in both directions at once. It is not that there is no real center (and center is therefore a mere ideological invention); rather, "centrality" is an indispensable category, such that all points are center, all points are periphery.[4] What is ideological distortion, if anything, is the claim that some one of these centers is the sole point of which centrality can be asserted.

In short, omnicentrism holds that the identity and significance of any entity is so thoroughly and completely a function of its relations to other entities—so completely "holistic"—that every identity is a sliding identity whose significance is always susceptible to grounding in something else, always ambiguous, changeable, and instrumental. However, *since this is also true of all the other entities in which it is so grounded,* every entity equally can and must itself serve as a ground, as a center, as a master signifier from which everything else attains its significance and identity.

We can perhaps understand this better by recalling my comment above

about the *ambiguity* of the identities of all non-central terms prior to their connection with a determining center. At first glance, this seems to suggest that the center is the one entity that is definite, fixed, "full," unambiguous, that is, the one entity with a fixed meaning or identity that need not depend on the connection to something else. This is true, but for omnicentrism it is only part of the truth. In omnicentrism, the holistic premise is pressed to the point of rendering this center at the same time completely *empty* of its own meaning or identity as well. For example, to use the ideological example cited above, if "class struggle" is the center of my meaning system, it will seem as if all other particular issues get their meaning just from class struggle, they all end up as nothing but particular expressions of class struggle. The meaning of class struggle seems to remain constant and prior, whereas the meaning of terms like "feminism" is transformed by the connection to this center. But if this mode of interpretation succeeds to the ultimate extent, it will come to explain *everything* as forms of class struggle; when this happens, "class struggle" turns out to be, not the most meaningful term in the system, but the one term that is completely devoid of meaning, since it means literally *everything*. It has become so modified by its use as the metaphier (the putatively known term that is used to explain other less familiar terms) for all these disparate phenomena that it ends up being no more than a null point in the system with no specifiable content. At this point, it is the dependent peripheral terms that actually provide the content and meaning for what had been the center. It is no longer possible to determine its meaning in contrast to its excluded opposite, "non-Marxism," since this no longer exists; whatever appeared as non-Marxism has by now been shown to be only an obscure expression of Marxism. It can only be given a content by reference to those peripheral terms that are its obscure expressions. The meaning-giving contrast is now between the direct and indirect expressions of this one thing; "Marxism" now means "the inner meaning of 'feminism,' 'ecologism,' and the like, or '*true* feminism,' etc."

Thus, when any one of these centerings (interpretative systems) succeeds to the utmost point, the center in question comes to mean both nothing and everything. At this point, however, *any* given term in the system can function equally well as the center—all the terms explain *each other*, and the starting point can be anywhere, as long its function is pushed to its ultimate. When "class struggle" completely succeeds as a center, it ends up revealing in all things, since this term has become meaningless, not just the character of class struggle but the fact of interconnection itself, the fact that one thing

can be used to explain another, that, when its work is complete, any term can be used to explain all others. It reveals omnicentrism. In this sense, it ends up revealing not only that class struggle is present everywhere, but also that patriarchal oppression is present everywhere, as are "sin," the exploitation of nature, sexual repression, glorious enlightenment, egoism, and so on. Any term is just as meaningful as the unifier of all phenomena as the one initially chosen and pushed to its limit. Similarly, when feminism completely succeeds as a center, it shows that gender issues are everywhere, which similarly empties the term "feminism" of meaning and ends up revealing most centrally interconnection itself, which in turn discloses the presence of all the other terms everywhere. When they succeed fully, these two opposite centers end up revealing the same thing, their meaning ends up being one and the same—the fact of interpretability from all perspectives, omnicentrism.

To put the same point in "classical" rather than "post-modern" idiom, let us suppose that I say, with Thales, that "all is water." That is, "water" is the center, and all other things—fire, air, and earth—are to be understood in terms of water, as forms of water, that they are "really" water, that all of them are identical to water. Initially, this term "water" means the wet element as opposed to the fiery, earthy, or aery elements. But if this theory is taken seriously, then the metaphier changes along with the metaphrand; that is, by my own theory, "water" refers not only to the wet element but also to all things that appear to be fiery, earthy, or aery. "Water" no longer means that which appears as wetness, but rather that which appears sometimes as wetness, sometimes as fieriness, sometimes as earthiness, and sometimes as aeriness. In effect, the term "water" now really means "water-fire-air-earth," with an emphasis on the central term of water. So in saying "Water, fire, air, and earth are all water," I am just saying, "Water, fire, air, and earth are water, fire, air, and earth." But actually I am asserting a little more; I am saying that when I name one of these four, I am really referring to something that includes all four. By the same token, if I now say "fire," since fire is just water and water is just water-fire-air-earth, I can equally say "All things are fire." Any term can be the center, since each of the four refers to all four at once. This also means that I can say "fire is identical to water." In all this, I have just asserted that all the four terms transform into one another, that they are inseparable, and that any starting point can serve as a point of reference by which to explain the others. This is omnicentrism, which can thus be viewed as simply a fuller thinking-through of the basic premises of holism per se.

A third type of holism, oligocentrism, may be seen as positioned between these two, spanning the range defined by these two end points. This is a view that assumes great importance in Chinese thought, arguably becoming the mainstream form of holism throughout the tradition in later times. I will speak more of the specific features of this doctrine shortly.

In these reflections I have simply adumbrated what is writ large and in another idiom in the Tiantai system of omnicentrism, which will be considered in detail below. Worth noting in particular here, however, is the manner in which the real meaning and content of any center ends up being the principle of "centrality" (mutual explication) itself; this will become salient when we consider the Tiantai view of the purported *Lotus Sūtra* teaching of "opening the provisional to reveal the real" as the ultimate truth revealed by all teachings—that is, not some specific teaching about *what* the real is but the act of opening and revealing is the ultimate teaching. Omnicentrism is here viewed not as one specific teaching among many but as the real significance of what it means for there to be any teaching at all; it is what is at stake when anyone suggests any center, any way whatsoever for interpreting experience.[5] What is revealed as omnicentrism is simply that whatever is is always revealed *as something else*, that manifestation is always manifestation in the form of some other, and that all experience is interpretable and always reducible to something other than itself. If this "always" is taken seriously, as we shall see, this will also imply, "reducible to *anything* other than itself."

Intersubjectivity and Chinese Holisms

We have given a brief introduction to the first of our themes. Now let us turn to the second, intersubjectivity. By "intersubjectivity," I mean the impact on any given subjectivity of other subjectivities. I assume there is a difference between the way a conscious being feels itself related to another being with a putatively similar consciousness and the way it feels itself related to what it regards as insentient beings. The intersubjective relation might include such things as the apprehension of being apprehended; the sense of being seen, of being challenged, confronted, and judged by an independent, unpredictable other with an unseen interiority like one's own; and the thought of being thought about, expressed perhaps as the desire to impress, inspire, intimidate, or please. When I speak of the *primacy* of intersubjectivity, I mean the idea that in an important sense intersubjectivity is in fact prior to, and more fundamental than, subjectivity per se, that is, the inner

sense of a given individual consciousness taken in isolation, without explicit reference to any other such consciousness.[6] This implies that individual consciousnesses, in spite of their inner sense of being independent of one another, are actually codependent poles of the intersubjective relationship and come into existence only as a by-product of a prior proto-aware intersubjective relation. Following Hegel, for example, we may say that intersubjectivity changes mere unreflective awareness of the kind assumed to exist in animals into self-consciousness of the type we generally mean when referring to human subjectivity.

It has long been recognized that early Chinese thinking begins with social and personal ethical questions, rather than with metaphysics and proto-science as in ancient Greece. The primary problem with which the first wave of Chinese reflection concerned itself, as evident in the *Analects* and the *Mozi*, was the question of how human beings were to live together, not how objects interact, where the world came from, what it was made of, or what the immutable laws of nature might be. From the latter concerns, Greek thinkers eventually came to find in mathematics a model for perfectly relating the interactions of quantitative entities and attempted to apply this method to other aspects of philosophical endeavor, especially, in earliest Greek (Ionic) thinking, to the realm of proto-physics. In other words, the "prototype," in George Lakoff's sense,[7] defining the broadest possible category, "things," differs between the two cultural complexes, with far-reaching consequences.

The domain of mathematics concerns the realm of pure quantity, which we may define as the realm of mutual exclusivity.[8] Quantification implies discrete objects, which, when added together, simply form a multiplicity, without bonding or synthesizing into a qualitatively different entity. The domain of physics concerns the interaction of discrete, mutually exclusive objects, each occupying a space occupied by no other, which are related by pushing and pulling one another from the outside. Each such entity is wholly external to every other. At most, mathematical and geometric entities allow for a kind of mutual inclusion that is unilinear (a larger circle can contain a smaller circle, a larger number "contains" smaller numbers as factors) but never reciprocal (the smaller circle in no sense contains the larger).

Very broadly, is it not possible to see the subsequent development of Greek thinking, and to a large extent of all Western thinking, as an attempt to apply these characteristics to all realms of existence and experience? The assumption would be that all other things (words, thoughts, acts, people, so-

cieties, abstract entities such as good and evil) interact as physical objects or mathematical entities do. That would mean that we assume, until proven otherwise, that all things are mutually exclusive, unilinear in their containment of one another (on the pervasive model of quantitative "larger" and "smaller"), and activated from without. Atomism of some form seems to be the inevitable correlate of these assumptions, unless the unilinear inclusion is taken as the dominant determinant of each thing's nature (unicentric holism). Where exceptions to these characteristics occur, for example, in chemistry (two chemicals suddenly form a new, qualitatively different chemical when mixed), human agency (something appears to act from within itself, to be self-moved), in the interaction of thoughts (they do not remain perfectly separate, and sometimes include one another in complex ways) or people (they are conscious of one another; they serve to define each other), or in consciousness itself (it seems to embrace and be completely occupied by an object other than itself, to be itself and something else at the same time), this mode of thinking inevitably leads to perplexities. To be consistent with the assumption that all things behave like physical objects or mathematical entities, thinkers holding these assumptions will either have to posit a wholly other realm in which these exceptions occur (soul is of another kind of substance than matter, for example) or explain them in terms of the assumed universal characteristics of existence (reductionism: these things are epiphenomena of the same mechanistic interactions seen in inanimate objects, for example, the chemical reaction's observed qualitative reactions must be analyzed into the bonding and interaction of discrete microscopic particles). Alternatively, it can pursue a rationalistic (i.e., "ratio" based) metaphysics, which attempts to orchestrate the relations of originally unrelated and separable things; the earliest attempt to conceive of necessary qualitative relations in the West, that of the Pythagoreans, had recourse to the relation between numbers, proportion and ratio, as a way of explaining qualitative difference—hence, a kind of derivation of relational quality from intrinsically non-relational quantity. Where holisms emerge, in order to account for the importance of relationship (of which, of course, these thinkers were well aware), it must be conceived on the basis of number or some other form of mutual externality.[9]

Chinese thought can be viewed as undergoing just the opposite development. It began with personal interactions, and this was the model thereafter applied to all other thinking. The way *humans* interact is the model for how *things* interact. Human interaction was thought to be characterized by conti-

nuity (members of a clan or family line are not wholly distinct, having some shared traits [endeavors, posts, personal characteristics, customs] over time), affection, authority, mutual awareness and attraction, spontaneous motion, and mutual regard and inspiration (these qualities will be discussed in further detail below). Humans were similar to one another and grouped together spontaneously, out of affection or admiration for the most visible elder of the clan. When, much later, philosophers started to turn their attention to the natural realm, they had no other conceptual vocabulary with which to explain it other than the terms of these human interactions. "To explain" simply *meant* to indicate the feelings, inspirations, attractions, obligations, mutual regard of entities, their consensual groupings, and continuity. Where exceptions to these qualities seemed to appear (in physical, mathematical, and abstract relations), there could be no satisfaction until they were explained in terms of the putative universal qualities of existence: mutual inclusion, voluntary self-moving regard for one another, social affectivity and authority and obligation, moral attraction, and so on. This is neither animism, the attribution of discrete and wholly separate, voluntary souls to each individual object, nor yet what we normally call naturalism, which sees life as somehow totally alien to the nature of physical objects. In their mutual responsiveness, things are "social" beings, just like humans. Neither things nor people necessarily have independent "souls," and neither are pure lifeless objects. Their being, in either case, is their relation to their group.[10]

This hypothesis is in my view what makes the further claim of pervasive Chinese holism plausible. All the characteristics of the latter to be adduced below—organization as center and spontaneous periphery, object as the focus of a field, shifting reference points, oligocentrism, and omnicentrism—are easily derivable from this fundamental assumption. Indeed, they would follow as the most direct and intuitive way to view things, if we assume this starting point. Hence we are not asked to believe that the ancient Chinese had access to some especially profound or abstruse intuition, nor any sophisticated theorizing—as the superficial resemblance of these ideas to notions to which Western thinking seems to have come around only recently, and only with considerable sophistication and counterintuitive rigor, might suggest. Instead, they are the immediate consequences of proceeding a few steps from a different starting point.

I am *not* here asserting that philosophical concepts emerge deterministically from particular social organizations. On the contrary, I am noting a

correspondence between the social conceptions and ideals of particular thinkers as the first object of their concern and the crucible in which their general conceptual constructs are forged and the effect these constructs have on their other ideas. Why they have these particular conceptions of society is an open question. But clearly it does not come wholly from the actual organization of society at the time in any direct way, since different groups within the same society conceived this ideal order differently, as we shall see below. Nor am I asserting that "the Chinese" failed to perceive the difference between the animate and the inanimate, between the social and the non-social components, of the world. It would be just as appropriate to say that Western materialists cannot tell the difference between animate and inanimate when they claim that all living organisms are "really, ultimately" made of inanimate elements. In either case we have a starting point from which all the empirical data, which appear to give examples of both life and lifelessness (or rather, sociality and externality), are to be explained. To illustrate with a more familiar analogy: Thales says all is "really" water; Heraclitus says all is "really" fire. This does not mean that they cannot tell the difference between fire and water or that they failed to notice the existence of both. But Thales must explain fire in terms of water, and Heraclitus must explain water in terms of fire. To the extent that fire is unlike water, Thales has a problem, which he must solve. Heraclitus has the converse problem. We will arrive at two alternative systems explaining all the data from these two starting points. The same is true in the case under discussion here. Chinese thinkers have a problem to be solved in dealing with objects that do *not* appear to behave socially, to group, to be spontaneously moved by the presence of one another; Western thinkers have a problem with those that do.

As noted above, the idea that holism is a dominant presupposition in most classical Chinese modes of thought is widely accepted. It is important for us to understand what sort of holisms we are dealing with here and the conception of the relational nature of things that goes with it. My claim here is that the role of intersubjectivity in the sense described above gives us an especially useful way of gaining access to this problem. We can begin to see this by considering the earliest uses of the most general word for "things" in general in Chinese, *wu* 物. The graph, with its cow radical, is etymologically indicative of domesticated living creatures, particularly herd animals. Indeed, in the earliest texts the term seems to mean primarily living things (especially those potentially of use to humans) rather than all objects (for example, the "Yugong" section of the *Shujing* uses the term *haiwu* 海物, lit., "sea things," to

mean "fish" and not, say, the coral and stone that come from the seas). This conception of "things" as herding animals lies in the background throughout early uses of the term, providing more examples than can be quoted here. The intuitive presuppositions and implications that go with this notion, which I regard as implicit but shared by most classical Chinese thinkers, are perhaps best summed up in an explicit form by Xunzi in trying to discuss the general characteristics of "things" as such:

> The origins of types of things necessarily have their appropriate beginnings. The arrival of praise or blame always corresponds to one's own qualities. When flesh decays, it gives birth to worms; when fish dry up, they produce maggots. When a man is careless and arrogant, disasters begin for him. . . . Evil and corruption of one's person invite resentment from others. If you lay out firewood, all other things being equal, the fire will go to the driest. If the ground is level, the water will naturally move toward dampness. Trees and plants grow together according to species; birds and animals dwell together according to type: *all things follow their own kind* (*wu ge cong qi lei ye* 物各從其類也).[11]

This passage assumes not only that things in general group together by type spontaneously and as it were voluntarily (they actively "follow" one another) but also that this is a universal trait of everything, even abstract psychological entities like virtues, which belong to a "kind" with good reputation and good fortune and thus spontaneously attract it. The Mohist Canons, which express the views of the most empirical of all ancient Chinese observers of nature, assert the same thing in attempting to explain the optical phenomenon of reflection: "It is inherent in things of one kind that they call each other up. If the energies are the same they act together, when a sound correlates it responds."[12] An entity in general is not an independent and inert substance; it is a social being, attracted to its own type, existing in a reciprocal regard with other things of that type and spontaneously moving toward them. To borrow the terminology that also appears first in the *Xunzi* but soon comes to dominate the scene (important also in the later chapters of the *Zhuangzi* and in the "Great Commentary" to the *Book of Changes*, and in some sense implicit in almost all late Warring States texts), things interact by a process of (preconsciously, be it noted) noticing each other and responding (*ganying*).[13] They are not autonomously active: they wait for the external stimulus or arousal. But at the same time they are not inertly passive: they respond. In a word, they are parts of a social totality. This pervasive assumption suggests a notion of causal interaction that is neither free nor coerced. To be stimulated by the ideal member of one's own kind is both

to be moved from outside, to be conditioned, and to be moved from within, to express one's own deepest self.[14]

This unique conception of causality has wide-ranging consequences, apparent in the philosophical systems to be considered below as well as in the humblest standard grammatical formations in the Chinese language.[15] If we assume this, rather than a notion of inert and separate objects, to be the general assumption behind early Chinese discussions of the way in which things, concepts, and states in general interact, many of the distinctive problems haunting early Chinese thought become much clearer.

All schools of classical Chinese thought share this assumption. From this starting point, however, a number of conclusions are possible. The final implications of this mutual "social" reactivity of things may differ from school to school, just as their more developed social theories vary, yielding various forms of holism, exemplifying varying degrees of unicentrism, oligocentrism, and omnicentrism. These in turn affect their treatment of the relation between value and anti-value.

In early Ruist conceptions of the ideal society, we find an emphasis on emulation of models, based in affection or personal feeling, which is closely related to this sort of intersubjective holism. A son is to emulate his father and indeed does so in most of his infantile learning. He is to admire and be educated by his father. The political model growing out of this affect-vector conception of human grouping preserves these characteristics. The ruler is to be a personal example, whose influence proceeds through affective attraction and subjective apprehension of his admirable policies. Following Donald Munro, we can go so far as to say that virtue itself, in the broadest sense (as that which makes something what it is), is conceived here as that which invites emulation, that which evokes a response from others and gets them to gather around one.[16]

Here we find a possible source for the enduring notion of the "center" in Chinese holism. The idea of centrality seems to be derived from a social concept of centrality; we can see this most clearly perhaps in the presentation of administrative space in the "Tributes of Yu" ("Yugong") chapter of the *Shangshu*. The mythical sage-emperor Yu first connects all known lands by clearing waterways to the capital, assigning names, noting the types of goods produced in each place, and ensuring the unobstructed flow of goods and information to and from the imperial center, around which the empire is divided into concentric spheres. Here, to civilize, to organize, to name, to give the benefits of culture and meaning, all indicate the same thing: to connect

to the imperial center, to define the relationship to that center administratively and materially.[17] In the ideal state put forward in such conceptions, the people follow and gather around Yu, and all exemplary rulers, not out of coercion or administrative controls but out of spontaneous affection and inspiration, which transforms and organizes them and bestows on them a meaning, a value, an identity.

This notion of centrality, as the focal point of interconnection, meaning, and value, is what gets translated into the more abstract and generalized types of holism occurring later in Chinese thought, of the unicentric (of which the "Yugong" is obviously itself an example), oligocentric, or omnicentric types, as we shall discuss in more detail below. Certain omnicentric potentials reside even in this modest conception; for model emulation requires that the subject perceive the embodiment of value as object and then, if to emulate means to seek to become like the object of emulation, to endeavor to become the embodiment of value as object oneself, to be seen by another. Rather than seeing value as a standard that he himself will of course never *be*, but can only "accord with," as would be the case if the standard of value resides in an abstract rule, he must become generative of value, by exemplifying it to others. He must again play both roles, the rule(r) and the ruled, without positing a metaphysical rule which he forever remains subordinate to or ontically distanced from. Moreover, this greatest whole, inspired and led by the example of the emperor, contains within it many smaller wholes, each of which equally has an indispensable center, the father, and the two must coexist, with a shifting focus of value ultimacy between them. This view of society yields a very distinctive type of holism: an oligocentric holism in which the parts spontaneously and simultaneously participate in (at least) these two different wholes. The parts are subsumed under the whole here, not in the manner of smaller circles drawn within a larger circle (where the smaller circles are mutually exclusive and joined only externally by their shared inclusion in the larger circle), but in such a manner that the character of the parts is itself constituted by the character of the whole (the ruler). The smaller social units (families within the state, individuals within the family) are not passively subsumed into the borders of the empire, nor (ideally) are they coerced into joining that collectivity. A totality is formed here in that the subjects are *influenced* by the ruler's virtue. Their participation in the totality is not external to their own character: they voluntarily *follow*; they are not pushed.

In a general way, we may also bear in mind in this connection the impor-

tance of the Yin-Yang dyad, with all its political and organizational characteristics, for here we find a crucial viaduct between the social notion of organization and its application to natural objects in general. The Yin-Yang polarity, with all its dynamism, is an attempt to harmonize the two sides, the paradoxical simultaneous ultimacy of both the smaller and the larger whole. The lack of passivity on the part of the "Yin" elements in this model (the "ruled") is important to remember; as Qian Mu has perceptively written:

> The virtue of Qian [pure Yang] is vigor, the virtue of Kun [pure Yin] is compliant following. Vigor is motion, but compliant following is not exactly stillness; rather, it is also a type of motion. It is just that Vigor is a ruling motion (*zhudong* 主動 [active]) and Compliance is a following motion (*suidong* 隨動). The reason I say a following motion rather than passivity (*beidong* 被動 [being moved]) is that passivity is when a certain thing is pushed and moved by another thing, but following motion is when a certain thing, following the motion of another thing, moves itself. Both ruling motion and following motion are self-moving; the difference between them is that one comes before and the other after.[18]

A mechanistic relation of pushing and pulling by mutually external parts does not apply, either in the social conception or in the Yin-Yang dyad correlative to it. Yin emulates Yang, as a son emulates a father, a wife emulates a husband, or a minister emulates a ruler. The son and wife and minister are not passive; they are attracted to the superior's virtues, inspired by his action and spontaneously seeking to complete it. This social mode of thinking is applied to wholes in general; the parts of a whole are thought of as members of a social community. They possess an active proto-subjectivity, and their motion comes from within, motivated by the virtue of the ruler. To follow him is their own doing. They "belong" to him because he inspires them to do so, not because he draws a line around them or extrinsically coerces them, in the manner of atomistic billiard balls, to do what he wants them to. The ruler's virtue is literally *inside* each member of the community who is inspired to follow him; it makes them what they are, "transforms" them.

Here we no longer have the mutual exclusion of parts characteristic of geometrical space or mathematical entities. The whole is (the domain of) the ruler; this is not constituted by the mere atomistic juxtaposition of the parts within a single boundary. On the contrary, the character of the parts is an *expression* of the character of the whole. Herein lies the "organic" nature of the ideal hierarchy. According to the ideal (which is all we have to do with here), it functions by means of the constituting influence of the larger units and the active response thereto of the smaller units. The parts are therefore unintelli-

gible outside their relation to the whole and thus their relation to one another. However, the relation remains reciprocal; the smaller units (families) are also capable of affecting those above them and being a potential transforming force, as we shall see in greater detail below, for this is the key to Ruist oligocentrism. It leads to a certain distinctive notion of what a whole, or a "one," is, apparent even in the concept of "unity" per se. In early Chinese thought, a "one" or a "unity" is conceived not as a homogenous or abstract mathematical unit but, rather, as an indivisible harmony of diverse elements, most explicitly on a social model and usually involving a hierarchy of distinct roles. This applies not only to concrete things but also to oneness in the most general sense; when two things are said to be "one" or "the same," this by no means implies complete identity or indistinguishability. Rather, it signifies a holistic harmony between two identifiably different elements that nonetheless are virtually present in one another due to the inseparability and reciprocal determination that follows from their foundational holistic relation.

Object as Focus and Field

The implications of this for holism should be obvious. Smuts, begins his discussion of holism by introducing the concept of "field," the indefinite area of influence and interaction surrounding an object. His "reformed concept of matter" is based on seeing this field as intrinsic to the object itself:

> Nineteenth century science went wrong mostly because of the hard and narrow concept of causation which dominated it. It was a fixed dogma that there could be no more in the effect than there was in the cause; hence creativeness and real progress became impossible. The narrow concept of causation again arose from a wider intellectual error of narrowing down all concepts into hard definite contours and wiping out their indefinite surrounding 'fields.' The concept of 'fields' is absolutely necessary in order to get back to the fluid plastic facts of nature.[19]

Whether or not one finds this position sound, it is clear that it is a fundamental building block in the construction of holism for Smuts. He feels that this alone makes causality intelligible.[20] He also applies it equally to both concepts and things:

> We find that round every luminous point in experience there is a gradual shading off into haziness and obscurity. A 'concept' is not merely its clear luminous centre, but embraces a surrounding sphere of meaning or influence of smaller or larger dimensions, in which the luminosity tails off and grows fainter until it disappears. Similarly a 'thing' is not merely that which presents itself as such in clearest definite

outline, but this central area is surrounded by a zone of intuitions and influences which shades off into the region of the indefinite. The hard abrupt contours of our ordinary conceptional [*sic*] system do not apply to reality and make reality inexplicable, not only in the case of causation, but in all cases of relations between things, qualities and ideas.[21]

The assumption of a field around a thing seems to be a premise for holism, as the only way to account for subsequent interaction and relation of apparently disparate and discrete things.

It is clear throughout the pre-Qin period, at least in Ruist texts, that a particular form of this focus/field picture is a prevailing notion of *human* social organization.[22] For example, *Analects* 12:19 compares the ruler (or exemplary person's) "virtue" (*de* 德) to the wind and that of the "lesser" people to grass that bends before it. A similar idea is assumed in both the *Mencius* and the *Xunzi* in speaking of rulers and exemplary persons, who serve spontaneously as models for those around them and determine the customs and tenor of the people as a whole. Mencius assumes that a benevolent ruler will become powerful because of the way his behavior affects the people: they will be attracted to him, and converge around him spontaneously; this same idea is implicit almost everywhere in the *Xunzi*, most notably in its discussions of ritual.[23] The idea also appears as the "manifestation of bright virtue" in the opening passage of the "Daxue" (Great Learning), where it is described as having an almost magical effect of transforming, concentrically, the society around the person with this virtue. But this "magic" is predicated on the notion that this is just what virtue consists in, that it is the power to affect, inspire, and transform other beings, who perceive one's virtue and are somehow attracted to it and transformed by it. This is why one family or one self with virtue can be thought to influence everything, so that the foundation or beginning of order rests in many different places at once—oligocentrically.[24] As Section 9 of that work puts it, "When one family is benevolent, benevolence arises throughout the whole nation. When one family is yielding, yielding arises throughout the nation. When one person is greedy and cruel, the whole nation goes into chaos. Thus is the power of the triggering set off by one person." This is mutual influence via recognition, the affective roots of what would later be called *ganying* 感應 between members of one "social" group. The text continues: "When Yao and Shun led the empire with benevolence, the people followed them. When Jie and Zhou led the empire with violence, the people followed them. . . . The Odes say, 'When their own normative pattern showed no flaw, they could regulate the four kingdoms.'

When they were worth imitating in their behavior as father and son, as older and younger brother, the people followed them." By exemplifying the normative pattern in the dyadic relations of father and son and older and younger brother, the ruler makes himself worthy of emulation, and the people are naturally drawn to him and cohere around him to form a paradigmatic type of voluntary or spontaneous unity.

What happens when this conception of social units as consisting of an attractively eminent center with a field spontaneously organizing around it is applied to things in general? One of the earliest blanket statements about these "things," which would also prove to be one of the most influential in the Ruist tradition, is found in the *Shijing*, Ode no. 260. The first eight lines of this ode employ the pivotal concept of *wu* as the vertex around which an entire implicit social and religious theory coheres:

> Heaven begets the herded masses of people
> Such that where there is a "thing," there is its normative
> standard (*you wu you ze* 有物有則).
> *The people have received this holy constancy:*
> *(Namely,) to love this excellent virtue.*
> Heaven beheld the ruler of Zhou
> Brightly affecting those below.[25]

The context here would seem to indicate that the masses of people are seen as a typical example of a "thing." All such things have their normative standard, their defining characteristic, and their ruling principle. What is this principle? According to Mencius' interpretation (VI.A.6) of this Ode, which would eventually become canonical in the philosophical tradition, the defining mark of the thing called "man" is precisely the "love of excellent virtue" itself, which Mencius interpreted as consisting of the "four fonts," the spontaneous inclination to *like* certain feelings and behaviors and not others. The "essence" of the human group, then, is an active affect, a feeling of attraction, not a static pattern or rule. To perceive and be affected and attracted by this virtue is what makes this thing, the human mass, what it is; it is the glue that holds the herd together and inspires them, and they congregate around the possessors of this virtue. Things naturally and actively group, consensually as it were (although spontaneously and preconsciously), as they perceive the most excellent example of their own herd-type and are attracted to it and influenced by it. For Mencius this trait is *both* present in each individual member of the group, as its "nature," which distinguishes

this group from all other groups, and is what makes the group a group, what literally groups it. The essence of this class of beings is literally what makes them cohere as a group, and this occurs because each member is characterized by a spontaneous attraction to the exemplification of this essence itself in its model members. To be a "human" is to have the nature of being attracted to the character of embodied "humanity," which is what makes the class of humans come together as a group, which is called, in distinction to all other, humanity.

As the Great Commentary to the *Book of Changes* would put a similar idea many years later, in a deliberate attempt to formulate the most general rules applying to all "things," "Tendencies gather according to type. Things separate according to group" (*fang yi lei ju, wu yi qun fen* 方以類聚，物以群分) (1.1). This is sometimes interpreted as "things *are separated* according to group," but the implication is, rather, that things spontaneously group themselves, "socially," by their natural relations to one another. The commentary on the "judgment" (*duan*) to the Xian 咸 hexagram in the *Changes* makes a similar point: "Heaven and earth affect each other, and thereby all things transform and come into being. The sage affects people's hearts, and thereby the empire becomes peaceful. By examining what [something] interacts with and affects, one can know the true nature of heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things." The "true nature" (*qing* 情) of a thing is here defined generally in terms of its relation to other things, and particularly in terms of what it stimulates, affects, and interacts with at a distance (*gan* 感). In order to know a thing, we are not told to examine the thing itself closely, to dissect its own inner structure, but to watch its relationships, to see what responds to it and what it responds to. Indeed, as Munro has noted, the entire interactivity of the trigrams in the *Changes* is modeled on familial relations, with Qian and Kun as father and mother, respectively, and the other six trigrams as their three sons and three daughters.[26] These symbols are then applied to understanding all the processes of the natural world.

The things in the group are also, by this same dyadic analogy, hierarchical, since some possess this normative standard in a fully manifest manner that allows them to serve as the emblem around which the others converge, whereas others do not yet do so. This model of human society and authority came to be elaborated in much Ruist thought (for example, in the wind and grass analogy in *Analects* 12:19, quoted above, and the notion of the ruler as the polestar in 2:1); Ode no. 260 was often cited in support of these views (especially in "Neo-Confucianism"). Heaven's role in this Ode is to be the

guarantor of the affective nature of all in the herd, such that every member of the herd loves the *ze* 則, the right pattern or standard for that type of thing. The principle or "normal nature" of an object is not its definition or its form; nor is it a static essence of any kind or some principle hidden within it. Rather it, like Mencius' "human nature," is a natural *tendency to be attracted to certain qualities*, an evaluative kind of affect. It is both the distinguishing mark of a certain group of beings and what actively binds them together, as the fellow feeling between them, their mutual attraction, their spontaneous motion toward an exemplary member of this species. This affect is the guarantor of social unity. Elsewhere in the Odes, for example no. 5,[27] the paradigmatic virtues of grouping harmoniously displayed by social insects are similarly extolled, and this power to group is associated with the continuity of a hereditary line.

In short, for a thing to live up to its nature, to be what the "Zhongyong" (Doctrine of the Mean) calls *cheng* 誠, to be in some sense really itself, consistent in diversity, acting as it should, realizing its inner tendency, *means* that it has the effect of inspiring and attracting the members of its herd, thereby forming them into a social totality, a unified group that has the power to perpetuate itself. The actualization of that "inner tendency" does not stop with becoming clear subjectively or cognitively, or in the person himself—it must continue to "complete things," as the "Zhongyong" puts it, in order to be considered fully developed. "Integrity does not merely consist in bringing oneself to completion; it also is that by which other things are completed. Benevolence completes the self; wisdom completes other things. This is the inborn power, the way that joins inner and outer."[28] Its relation to and its effect on other things are intrinsic to its own true inner constitution. We have already begun to see how this conception spills over onto the consideration of things as such. They, too, group themselves socially. The *Analects* says little about "things" per se, and the natural world held little interest for its protagonist. In the few references to natural phenomena, however, we can often see the implicit presence of the social model referred to above; for example, in Confucius' famous remark about the polestar (2:1): "Ruling by means of virtue is comparable to the north polar star: it dwells in its own position, and all the other stars turn respectfully toward it." Here a direct comparison is drawn between social organization and a form of organization believed to exist in nature, in which one star has the property of attracting and gaining the respect of the others, thereby spontaneously inspiring them to a ritual social organization. From our point of view, the

irony in this passage is that its conception of natural organization is itself a reflection of the political ideal that Confucius is trying to elucidate by means of the analogy itself. Nonetheless, the certainty of the assumption that nature works in this way is telling; indeed, the fact that it is appealed to as somehow a shared assumption, the better-known thing to which a less well known thing can be compared, is an indication of the pervasiveness of this conception of how things in the world interact.

This "vector" nature of the parts of a whole toward a center is central to the connection between value and holism. As we shall see in the section on value below, we have here the beginnings of a picture of a whole consisting of what in modern gestalt psychology is called "figure and ground," that is, a focal point of explicit attention and the background of subsidiary elements that contribute to its manifestation by orienting toward it and by being organized around it. The focus is the locus of *interest*, and hence of value, the giver of significance, and the determinant of identity; by the same token, the subsidiary background elements are effaced, unnoticed, and, in value terms, instrumental to the focus, positing it as their own value, in a kind of means-end relation. As Michael Polanyi's modification of the Gestalt paradigm suggests, the entire whole comes to manifest itself as the focus that is its end and locus of value, such that the subsidiary means are "absorbed" into it, so that both components appear explicitly *simply as* the determining focus. A hungry man is aware of some food; the whole situation appears to him as that food which is the object of his desire, the value implicit in the whole. The table, the silverware, the sky, the earth, even his own tongue, eyes, and brain, appear in that situation only as subsidiary features of his interest in the food that he is "valuing," toward which he is oriented; indeed, they do not appear at all except in the form of the presence of the food. A whole appears simply *as* its center, its focus. We will explore the implications of this idea in more detail below.

Implications of Unicentrism, Oligocentrism, and Omnicentrism

I hold, as a consequence of the preceding discussion, that Chinese forms of holism invariably assume the operation of a center. When they move away from a unicentric model, they do not opt for an acentric holism or for an outright anti-holist (atomistic, individualistic) model, both of which seem to have been all but unimaginable in traditional modes of thought. Rather, they

are pushed toward another type of model: the omnicentric. Some of the consequences of omnicentrism resemble those of acentrism; others very much do not.

This is a crucial distinction, particularly when considering the question of value. We can gain an idea of the significance of this distinction by considering an example of a strict unicentric holism without the further step of omnicentrism. We may characterize Augustinian theodicy as a type of holism (an outgrowth of Plotinian holism), which is not only unicentric but also "heterocentric," since it locates the center (the point of view that controls and also has the correctly comprehensive vision of the whole) in a single nontransferable place, one that lies *outside* the whole it unifies—God. There is no point *within* the whole (the cosmos) from which the whole is directly apprehensible: the whole itself has *no* center.[29] In this system, and therefore in most of traditional Western theology, we see an example of what John Hick has called the aesthetic principle (the idea that the whole cosmos may be good even though some parts appear bad in isolation, just as a painting may be beautiful in spite of the fact that some parts, viewed in isolation, are ugly), the principle of plenitude (that a universe that includes all grades of perfection is more perfect than one that includes only the highest grade), and the principle of moral balance (that evil is not considered a flaw in the universe or in God's beneficence as long as it is duly punished).[30] All these forms of theodicy presuppose holism in the first sense. Augustine claims, in fact, that evil (and its necessary punishment) is good in the context of the whole of God's creation. The universe is better with sin and damnation than without them, for it more fully expresses God's power to create a universe with more rather than fewer forms. Moral balance means that the holistic totality of sin-plus-eternal-punishment is itself good, an element of God's justice, just as sin-plus-grace-and-redemption-for-the-elect is another element in his goodness, his mercy. Bad is thus an element in the Good, as is the suffering of the damned. It is Good that they suffer eternally for their sins.

Here we see a consequence of the total disjunction between whole and part. The claim here is that from an external perspective that can perceive the whole, from God's perspective, these things are indeed Good. From the perspective of an individual part, the sinner suffering eternal torment for eighty years of sin or even disbelief or failure to receive the sacraments, they may not seem good; but this view is inherently false, limited, and evil. It counts for nothing. Only the view of the whole is true, and it is absolutely discontinuous with the view of any individual part. Indeed, this doctrine is,

strictly speaking, more than an absolute unicentrism, for the "center" in this case lies outside the whole; the universe is a holistic unit, but there is no perspective *within it* from which it can be seen to be so. The only way in which the whole can contact the part here is through direct, supernatural revelation. The mediation between unicentric and omnicentric holisms is here replaced by such doctrines as papal authority or the direct access of individuals, via conscience, for example, to the authoritative voice of God, which negates the value of any temporal (partial) authority. This view may thus be argued to be ultimately oligocentric in its implications: those who have access to the revealed truths also learn to see the sufferings of the damned as good and hence partake of the true view of the whole. This doctrine can, paradoxically, be quite revolutionary. But God's otherness ensures that no individual can ever be quite sure that the revelation he receives is genuine or that God might not change his mind or reveal something false to him in order to procure a benefit for the whole. God has carte blanche to revoke or redefine his revelations.

A conception based on the mathematical or physical properties of objects, which thus conceives them as fundamentally discrete, is consistent with two types of metaphysic, one holistic and the other atomistic. A holism based on this conception will tend to be a unicentric holism in which the union of all parts is effected from without (by positing a God who can view the entire collection of parts at once, instilling in them connections and harmonies that will be impossible to perceive from the limited perspective of any one part). If, however, the practical (social, political, religious) effects of this holistic theory are objected to (since it opens the door to an extreme form of authoritarianism, in which the claim of the whole—in the hands of priests or rulers—is absolute, and obliterates any validity for the claims of any limited part), a convincing, consistent atomistic individualism that eschews the principle of holism altogether and seeks the meaning of things in isolation from one another, thereby affirming the right of the individual, can be built on this basis.

There is, however, another way of avoiding the dangers of unicentric holism. This is omnicentrism, which, rather than eschewing holism, pushes it to its ultimate extreme and, in so doing, overcomes it. Here the knowledge of any individual part is asserted to be identical to a knowledge of the whole. This notion makes no sense if the parts of the whole are seen as originally discrete units, on the model of inanimate entities, whose function is modified by their adventitious union with other parts into a whole. But if things

are conceived as members of an interacting social group—if things, in other words, are a type of "social animal"—the door is opened to making sense of such a doctrine, paradoxical though it may sound.

Qian Mu has noted the importance of what I call omnicentrism within mainstream (Neo-Confucian) Chinese thought (with antecedents in the *Mencius*).

> [Western philosophy] tends toward an individualistic dualism. . . . Chinese thought holds that the ten thousand things exist in the midst [i.e., in the middle] of heaven and earth, and humanity exists in the midst of the ten thousand things, and the self exists in the midst [middle] of humanity. That is, from the viewpoint of my own self, I am tantamount to the center of humanity, and humanity is tantamount to the center of heaven and earth and the ten thousand things. Myself and human society and all things and heaven, when we seek their root, are all one total body, and so we are neither relative to one another [i.e., passively dependent on one another] nor absolutely distinct. The circumference is the largest unit; the very center is the smallest. Although heaven and earth are vast, their center resides in myself. But this is anything but individualism. Individualism starts by dividing the individual from society and from nature, defining him in contradistinction to them. But this is also anything but an obliteration of the importance of the individual, because each individual by himself becomes here the center of all nature, all things, all human society. The individual is contained within nature and society, and at the same time forms the pivot of their turning. Although this center is small, it can turn this vast totality. If we pursue this a step further, the so-called center here actually is no individual entity standing on its own, since it cannot exist independently of the circumference. Thus in terms of substance, the circumference is real and the center is empty, but in terms of function, when the circumference turns, the center may remain still, but when the center turns the circumference must turn too.[31]

Qian employs the language of the tradition itself (e.g., substance and function) and does not clarify or substantiate his claims;[32] moreover, he speaks of "Chinese thought" as if it were monolithic and universally followed this particular pattern. Although I do not share the latter view, I do believe he has put his finger on one unique conception, which, however, has a variety of different forms, varying intensities, and admixtures with other trends when used by different thinkers.[33] Qian's point about the role of the individual in omnicentrism should be closely heeded. Herbert Fingarette, for example, sees the "Daxue" as a departure from the *Analects* because of its emphasis on the individual. I believe, however, that he is here mistaking omnicentrism (or at least oligocentrism) for individualism; he assumes that

the social holism of the *Analects* is unicentric holism, which therefore must regard the individual part as valueless and ineffectual, and then finds the "Daxue" conception at odds with this. I would argue that although Chinese thought is devoid of atomistic conceptions of any hue, and hence of individualism in the strict sense, and thus tends to holism, this holism comes in a number of different forms, which can be grouped as unicentric, oligocentric, and omnicentric.

These two types have very different effects on value theory, and both differ from atomistic individualisms. If we place the three forms of theory on an inverted pyramid of instrumental and ultimate values (to be described below), we may say that atomisms tend to stand "low" on the scale of value paradox and unify relatively the smallest number of instrumental values. Since the good and the bad in this theory do not form parts of any whole in Smuts's sense, they need have no relation with one another. There is a focus in such theories on the rhetorical level that separates value and anti-value. Some things are good; others are bad. There is no necessary relation between the two, since in general all things are independently simply what they are. The bad could be excised without affecting the good, since the two are separate, atomistic entities.

Unicentric holisms tend to place value in the whole itself, in some sense, to the exclusion of the value of the parts as such. We saw this above in the case of Augustine, and we will see it also in Mozi and Xunzi. This allows for a relatively higher degree of value unification, since two apparently opposed parts, either or both of which may appear evil when considered separately, may prove to be good when they play a particular role with respect to the whole. Moreover, the change in value that accompanies the process of recontextualization, by the general principle of holism, leaves room for many particular value paradoxes to occur at the level of part-to-part relations. Nonetheless, at the level of ultimate value, there can easily be an absolute disjunction between the whole as such and the parts as such. In the Chinese unicentrisms, for a part to separate itself, to be oriented to its own private interests, to ignore the whole, is an ultimate anti-value (*si* 私). To be oriented toward the whole and play one's required part in it is the ultimate value (*gong* 公).

Omnicentric holism (of which there are also several types) is the most conducive to value paradox of these three alternative conceptions. Since each part *is* the whole, contains the whole, and functions as the hub of the whole (the decisive point around which the rest turns, which contains the true

meaning of the rest and is the locus of the value of the whole, and which, in various senses that we will elucidate in each specific case, has the power to decisively influence the whole), each part has the absolute value that unicentric holism attributes only to the whole itself. At the same time, each part is part of the circumference for all the other centers, which are equally the whole and the hub around which it turns, and thus is turned by them, is contained within them, is relegated to dependence and the lack of independent value (at best, merely instrumental value, and at worst, total valuelessness). This conjunction of absolute value and utter valuelessness naturally leads to the proliferation of value paradox, as well as to the blossoming of elaborate theoretical structures to resolve them. The rhetoric of such systems tends to place a premium on paradoxical speech, for that alone evenhandedly conveys the crucial value situation thus implied.

To put this another way, the holistic principle may apply also to the realm of concepts itself. Good and evil as such may be conceived atomistically, as absolutely separable and substantial with no intrinsic relation to each other, or holistically, as parts of a whole, characterized by some form of mutual dependence. This is perhaps more intelligible to us, since the two concepts "good" and "evil" are in fact *semantically* mutually dependent and can be defined only through their relation to each other. This argument is frequently used in the works we will be considering, but in the Chinese case it is based on other assumptions, namely, that even concepts behave "socially," which profoundly affect the nature of such an argument. A unicentric holism of these two parts result in the position that true value lies "beyond good and evil," that the whole formed by these two parts somehow transcends them—a position that Tiantai thinkers, who call it the "Exclusive Mean" (*dan zhong* 但中) criticized. An omnicentric holism of good and evil results in the assertion that since either part, "good" or "evil," contains the other and the whole, we need not transcend either one, that either is sufficient in itself to embrace the whole—this is the Tiantai position, called the "Nonexclusive Mean" (*budan zhong* 不但中). It is this position that makes possible Zhili's outlandish claim that "other than the devil there is no Buddha; other than the Buddha there is no devil."

Omnicentric holism is profoundly counterintuitive, magical-sounding, and illogical when evaluated in terms of our own linguistic and metaphysical assumptions, especially our root concept of an entity as an atomistic unit.[34] Indeed, it is an oxymoron; a center is by definition solitary and contrasted to a non-central periphery; if it is everywhere, it is no longer a center. Thus it is

my burden to prove that such conceptions can actually exist and that they can be made intelligible on the basis of other root concepts, especially those of semantic holism, polarity, and the idea that entities of all kinds are inherently neither atomistic nor animate nor inanimate but social. The counterarguments to omnicentrism—unilateral and one-directional causality and the assumptions that of any set of related terms some are exclusively causes and some exclusively effects, that a part is just a part, that opposites are mutually exclusive, that any notion of identity which allows opposites to be identical is nothing but an irresponsible misuse of the term "identity"—are, in this view, consequences of the root concept of entities as atomistic and separable units whose connections are merely extrinsic, which is woven into our commonsense notions of reality. This implies that these counterarguments, which appear to be appeals to universally accessible and admitted facts of daily experience—e.g., that I am I and not you, that pain is pain and not pleasure, that it is impossible to know and not know something at the same time, etc.—are actually not facts of experience at all but merely interpretations of experience, one-sided focusings rooted in atomistic and unicentric premises.

Indeed, omnicentricism could be seen simply as a serious consideration of our everyday experiences as conscious, social beings. This is certainly the view of Qian Mu, who is far from trying to construct an abstruse counterintuitive metaphysical system based on esoteric first principles. On the contrary, he refers to everyday experience, in which we "seem" to be the center of our own world ("from my viewpoint . . ."). An atomist or unicentric holist also has this experience, but considers it an illusion and a dangerous mistake based on perspectival difference. "Yes, of course, you *feel* that you're the center of the world, but the truth is that you are just one speck or a minute part of a much vaster whole that has its real center elsewhere or has no center at all. This sense of centrality is just an illusion that everyone has, but which logic proves to be incorrect. Don't be so 'self-centered'!" Omnicentrism, from these points of view, is both illogical and pernicious.

For these reasons, it is nearly impossible to argue the relative merits of atomism, unicentrism, and omnicentrism from a neutral starting point; almost any conceivable evidence adduced to support the veracity of any such foundational position already presupposes one or the other of these positions in its presentation and apprehension of these putative facts, making any argument circular. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine evidence that did not already bear the mark of one or the other of these interpretations, particu-

larly if they are assumed to be built into the structuring of our experience, or our immediate understanding of our experience, on a preconscious level. Theories about something as basic as "what an entity is" cannot be verified by reference to how putative entities behave, since that always entails an assumption about the nature of an entity, thus begging the question. Hence in this work, I will not argue that omnicentric holism is true or false.

Indeed, the notion that there is one unified truth, that there is one certain way reality is, is itself an epistemological consequence of atomistic or unicentric premises. Both atomists and unicentrists tend to believe in this—by now commonsense—notion, but for different reasons. For an atomist, since the quiddity of any entity is just what it is and all its relations are external, there is just one truth about any entity; every other perception of it is an error based on one of those external relations. In itself it is not perspectival or relational, it simply is what it is. An atomist who ceases to believe in the assertability or verifiability of such an absolute truth about what things are (as may also happen when the difficulties involved in conceiving the position from which these truth claims may be made, due to the diffuse and sundered character of the various monads, is foregrounded) will veer toward the other extreme of relativism, namely, that each entity has its own truth, and these truths are incommensurate, unbridgeable, windowless, and cannot communicate or meet or convince each other of anything. For a unicentrist, on the other hand, although there is one set of relations that is internal to a given entity—its relation to the center, to the correct point of view, the view of the whole—there is one and one only correct description of the entity; the quiddity that it has in this perspective of the whole is the truth about it; the ways it appears to other parts of the whole, however, are nothing but illusion. Hence, the notion of a single "way it is" is an epistemological consequence of unicentrism or atomism.

Omnicentrism brings with it quite a different epistemology, one with roots in some of the more radical portions of the *Zhuangzi* and fully developed in the Tiantai doctrine of upāya, especially in the notion of "opening the provisional to reveal the real." This epistemology provides an alternative to both the relativism and the totalitarian absolutism of unicentrism and atomism. Here every possible apprehension is valid and self-validating; it is neither an illusion nor a distortion of reality, and it is not subject to invalidation by a privileged perspective. This much is in accordance with relativism. However, since these perspectives are not themselves viewed as atomistic, they are not self-identical to themselves, stable, or closed; they already

"inherently include" all other views, and hence their communication with and their transformation into other perspectives are possible without external coercion. Consensus and conversion can occur because every position already has a constitutive internal relation to all other positions, already "inherently includes" them as its own unseen underbelly, as it were. The identity of every position is founded on the impossibility of its ever completely coinciding with any possible conception of itself, even in theory. To reach the other's position, it is not necessary for it to leave its own present position. Education here is a matter not of discarding the false to adopt the true but of expanding and making explicit all the implications of any given "false" starting point, as we will see below in discussing Tiantai epistemology. All the differing and impermanent appearances of things are in this sense not "merely subjective" or "truly objective"—they are, in a sense we will explore especially in Chapter 4, *intersubjective*, which here implies that in each appearance all other possible appearances, and the perspectives to which they would be correlated, are adumbrated. This view also stresses the *performative* aspect of this position, the manner in which it is self-verifying, since it also applies its view that any possible view is both true and false in this precise sense to itself, as will be explored in further detail in the chapters on Tiantai. Hence the accusation that it is a mere illusion is no reason to abandon its position; it has admitted from the beginning that it is an illusion, as is any possible position, but this is not a problem for it, since one of the beliefs of this particular illusion is that all possible illusions are also roads to truth and, indeed, are truths themselves.

These considerations are meant to challenge the assumption that atomism and unicentrism are the *only* two alternatives for viewing the world and understanding the nature of an entity. A unicentric holist conceives of a whole as something outside himself, something that can be viewed as a whole, as one views a picture, because he is not a part of it. This conception is then applied also to wholes of which one is putatively a part (society, the universe), and an observer is posited who can view these wholes correctly, that is, from without. Such a viewer sees the truth, that I am but one small part. I must step outside the whole, in thought, in order to see my true place within it. This logic is based on the fundamental metaphor of a whole viewed from without, of which the viewing self is not a part.

An omnicentrist proceeds in the opposite direction. His initial concept of a whole is based on wholes of which he himself is a part (in the Chinese case, the family or society as a whole). Since he, as a part, knows he has an appre-

hension of the whole from his perspective, he tends to assume that the parts of *all* wholes in some manner "know" or embrace the whole to which they belong. He then universalizes his relationship to the whole in which he participates as the relationship of all possible parts to their wholes. For this reason, an omnicentrist can conceive of various, equally valid perspectives of the whole, even though there is nothing outside the whole; each of the parts has its own view of the whole of which it is a part. This makes possible the Tiantai notion of the various different names for the one whole, which can then be asserted to be "identical" to one another. When viewing a whole of which he is not a part, the omnicentrist assumes that all its parts "know" their whole, just as he knows his. Both the unicentric and the omnicentric apply the model of one type of whole to the other (wholes of which we are ourselves a part and those of which we are not) and consider untrue what does not coincide with their model. This will only be "untrue" in the strict sense when a unicentrism considers an omnicentrism; it will be viewed as error, illusion, deception, a description that simply is wrong. On the other hand, omnicentrism sees unicentrism as "untrue" only in a very restricted sense, since strictly speaking the concept of illusion plain and simple cannot exist in an omnicentric epistemology. Thus omnicentrism will describe unicentrism as a less direct or more difficult to recognize version of itself. A logic based on a conception of things that are fundamentally like a self in a social whole will view as illogical the claim that parts are totally isolated from their wholes and will take experiences of this isolation as more indirect or hidden types of relationship. A logic based on the opposite assumption will do the contrary, or even go so far as to regard the sense of internal relation as wholly illusory. Both start from a primary model of the known and seek to explain the unknown in terms of the known. The difference in the two starting points leads to two opposed interpretive schemes, each of which explains the totality of data in its own way.

Both approaches have problems, and what is easy to explain and intuitively obvious for a unicentrist tends to be confusing and confounding for an omnicentrist, and vice versa. Epistemologically, as we have seen, the unicentrist has to believe that some beliefs about any given entity are just plain false and that one in particular is the right one. He does not know for sure whether the way things appear to him is accurate or not. If his belief about something (the world, his situation) changes, he has to assume that his previous belief is erroneous. Of all possible ways of appearing, one alone is true. The fact that each appearance seems so convincing at the time of its arrival

presents the central difficulty for this view; the experiential sense of certainty simply has to be explained as rank error. The fact that the subjective sense of certainty counts for nothing necessitates a radical abyss between subjective and objective; subjective apprehensions, especially the conviction of certainty, are seen as the greatest obstacles to truth. The result is that perhaps the most common experience of everyday phenomenological reality—the feeling of being the center of all, and knowing the values of things—is completely ignored or dismissed as simply wrong. Reason is split from emotion, with the former representing the unchanging determination of the truth about things and the latter the subjective feeling of their values to the extent that they relate to the individual's present situation and interests. A radical decentering of the human personality seems to be necessitated by this view.

For example, imagine an alcoholic who, when drunk, fears getting sober and, when sober, fears getting drunk. The unicentric view forces us to assume that one of these is the right view and the other is the wrong one, although the alcoholic experiences both in exactly the same way at the time of their appearance. Although each one regards the other as a horrible fate, one of these views is right and the other is wrong. To determine which, the data of the false view are not taken into account; the world of drunkenness, which ranks drunkenness itself as the ultimate good, is not relevant—only the sober view's data are used—a limiting of input that amounts to a circular argument. In other words, we have here a heteronomous epistemology, which necessarily raises tricky questions of authority and coercion, on the one hand, and relativism and license, on the other.

Although the omnicentric epistemology does not have these problems of surreptitious circularity and heteronomy, it does face another set of problems—for example, how to understand statistical regularity, the interconnections between opposed perspectives, the fear of moving from one position to another opposed position (drunkenness and sobriety, for example), and so on. The omnicentric view of the drunk, for example, would be that both perspectives are true, but they are not, as in standard atomistic relativism, self-enclosed; each is an aspect or moment that is intrinsic to the other, a peripheral element inherently related to the currently dominant center. The reason for this impossibility of self-enclosure is discussed above with respect to the "self-emptying" of any center: as soon as it does any explanatory work at all, as soon as it has any function as a center, it is ipso facto appearing *as* something else. Marxism is not self-enclosed because it does not appear just as the abstract idea "Marxism," but as a capitalist hitting a striker,

or as feminism, ecologism, and so on. When it succeeds fully, it no longer has any finite specifiable content. We will find the same principle expressed from another angle in the consideration of value below, in terms of the category of "power" that lies at its heart, which ensures that value always has to be able to appear as something that breaks through whatever self-identifying limits it has so far set up.

In the omnicentric point of view, the way the two opposed conditions fear transformation into one another is rather puzzling. This fear can only be viewed as a mistaken and ignorant attitude, which attests not to the fact that both know at least that only one view can be right and are afraid of falling into error again but, rather, to their suspicion that they have their own negation within themselves and that they have mistakenly taken themselves as the sole, self-enclosed center, which will lose something important if it appears as periphery rather than center. The position will have to be that both drunkenness and sobriety are a legitimate center of all experience; hence the perspective that sobriety is evil and the perspective that drunkenness is evil are both equally true. But they must also be equally false if they assume themselves to be the *only* center of experience, if they take themselves as *the* center in the unicentric sense. In the unicentric view, the drunk who self-assuredly assumes he is right is ridiculous and foolish; in the omnicentric view, neither the drunk nor the sober man is foolish for thinking he is right, but both are ridiculous and foolish if they fear turning into the other, if they assume their present rightness is the only possible rightness. Either way we have problems, and the facts of experience can be read either way. If we take the unicentric view, the mere fact of the self-assurance of both sides and the transformation between them requires elaborate work to explain away. From the omnicentric side, the fear of the transformation and the implied sense that the other side must be wrong and deceptive is hard to account for. This issue is obviously not easily disposed of; the entire Tiantai system can be viewed as an attempt to work out the problems involved, and, as we shall see below, the solution is by no means simple. My point here, however, is that each of these two starting points, the unicentric and omnicentric, accounts for the totality of the available data, including what serves as the starting point for the opposite perspective, in its own way. As indicated above, there seems to be no unbiased way to determine which of these starting points has greater validity, unless we posit some specific goal as the standard of validity, and such a positing will always presuppose a position on this very issue.[35]

Purely unicentric or omnicentric holisms are rare. Usually, we have some kind of mixture or mediation of the two. In Chinese thought, there are at least two related strategies for mediating them. One employs *hierarchy*. Hierarchy allows for oligocentrism, a doctrine I have already referred to a few times above while postponing its fuller exposition, which I will give here. This position consists of the claims that *some* parts have a more inclusive vision of the whole than others and that it is perhaps also *possible* for any part to gain a complete vision of the whole, to become functionally identical thereto.[36] There are at least two possible types of hierarchy, the fixed, in which the participants have roles that never change, and the movable, in which the ranks themselves are always hierarchical, but the players may move up or down the hierarchy. These two also are always mixed to some extent and admit of degrees of gradation. In China, certain relations were generally, with occasional exceptions, fixed. For example, in family hierarchies, men were almost always above women. Many relations, however, were movable. The father/son dyad, for example, which Francis Hsu and others have identified as the paradigmatic relation in Chinese culture, is movable, since the same person can be both a son and a father and indeed, ideally, must become so. In fact, he ought to be both, to always stand both as a son to his (eventually dead) father and a father to his sons. The structure of a hierarchy always allows one to be both a subordinate and a superior. In the father/son case, the attributes of a father must also be acquired by the son. The Chinese sociopolitical hierarchy was also marked by a certain degree of mobility, eschewing, in various degrees at various times, the principle of heredity.

The effect of a movable hierarchy on holism is to allow for the second strategy: the idea of the various *degrees of expression* of a shared potentiality. The claim here is that all parts of the whole can *in principle* embrace the whole and do in some attenuated potential sense. This potential, however, is realized or manifested to varying degrees. Those who fully express it are sages, who have realized, for example, that they have always been identical with the whole (which, however, was present potentially from the beginning, and which the sage can see in all the other parts too, although those parts themselves do not see it). Thus the prerogative of speaking for the whole is in the hands of those who have realized this shared potentiality. Those who have not realized it are asserted to be *capable* of the same vision but to lack it in practice, which allows those who "awoke to it first" the right to direct them temporarily, while not denying that, in principle, each is equally the

encompassing center of the whole. It is possible, under these conditions, to go on to claim the right to *verify* who has and who has not realized this essence, judged by the content of the vision of the whole. One who claims to have realized that he is the whole could thus be told that he is mistaken, if the *content* of his vision fails to accord with that of theirs. This is one way to construct a unicentric type of authority structure on the basis of an omnicentric general theory. In practice, it is oligocentrism, and that is the name used to designate such conceptions in the discussions below.

In terms of this example, an oligocentrist might hold that there is a certain limited set of terms that might effectively give legitimate explanations of the whole network of entities and meanings; he might allow that, say, feminism, Marxism, and ecologism are all valid ways of describing the situation, each one locating the other two as subordinate or peripheral, but there are also other systems that cannot legitimately explain the whole field, for example, Christianity, Freudianism, egotism, devil worship, and fascism. An oligocentrism of this type stresses the unicentric aspect and may be regarded as essentially a disguised or diversified form of unicentrism; there is a hidden ultimate value that permits adjudication of true centers and pseudo-centers. If, on the other hand, the oligocentrist holds that any of these centers *can* work if *developed* fully enough, that indeed any starting point can be developed to the point of functioning as the master signifier that gives everything else its significance and identity, he is stressing the omnicentric aspect and is in effect a modified omnicentrist. The complexity of the oligocentric position derives in part from the proximity of these two different attitudes.

These considerations should give some sense of how the aspects of the problem of holism that arise in the context of the question of intersubjectivity will play themselves out in the discussions to follow. Let us now turn to the third major theme, which has already been adumbrated somewhat: the question of value.

PART II: VALUE

By "value," I mean whatever a given thinker happens to call "good," including both natural good (pleasure and desirable physical events and circumstances; good things that happen to one) and moral good (behavioral good; good things one does) in contrast to both natural evil (pain, suffering, natural disasters, death) and moral evil (imperfections of character, transgression, crime, "sin"). "Good" here means whatever is asserted, by a given thinker or

tradition, to be recommendable, to be desirable, to be worth doing, having, thinking, working toward, prizing, remaining aware of, being motivated by. In addition to natural and moral value, we can distinguish "instrumental" and "ultimate" value; the former is good only relative to its contribution to obtaining the latter in a specific case. "Anti-value" refers simply to whatever is considered antithetical to these putative values in any given case.

My primary concern here is not with the particular *contents* of the values commended by each system (*what* a given thinker considers good) but rather with the structure of the relationship *between* these values and their posited opposites. Thus, I attempt no meta-ethical definition of true value as such and do not discuss the question of what conceptual content is shared by all these notions of the good (whether, for example, value is fundamentally utilitarian or virtue-centered). The content of the posited values, however, does in many cases promote a particular type of relationship between values and their opposites. To take an obvious example, if my ultimate value is "always obey God or the law," (assuming I know what God wants or what the law is in every case) or, what is structurally the same, "eat no beans," I can easily conceive of an absolute disjunction between value and anti-value: eating beans is bad, not eating beans is good. The two do not overlap on any level. Any conceivable act falls into exactly one of these two categories. If, on the other hand, my ultimate value is "always unify opposites, including value opposites," I am obliged to confront the question of how I then regard the opposite of this value, namely, keeping opposites in disjunction. The stated content of my values would lead me to think of its opposite as somehow unified with it, leading to a complicated regress of paradoxes that I must employ my ingenuity to solve. Similar difficulties result if my ultimate value is, for example, "consider everything good." It will be a system whose ultimate values lead to such paradoxes that will be of particular concern here. In the pages that follow, I pay special attention to the extent to which the positing of frankly paradoxical first principles and ultimate values is considered desirable in resolving just these difficulties.

Speculative Ground for a General Theory of Value Paradox

Broadly speaking, and with the usual caveats that must accompany gigantic generalizations, we may say that value was traditionally assimilated to the category of Fact in the West—it was regarded, as it were, as a species of fact.

The criterion for determining the validity of the concept of value was usually modeled on a particular concept of factuality: that what is factually so of a given entity must *inhere* in that entity as such, apart from its relations. The three angles of an equilateral triangle simply *are* equal, period. Their equality does not depend on this triangle's relation to anything else. Thus, this qualifies as an absolutely valid factual assertion about equilateral triangles as such. If value, to be "true," must be true in this sense, a thing can be valuable—good, right—if and only if its value can be understood as somehow inhering in it, apart from its contingent relations. Resistance to this view in the West, when it exists, has taken the form, since at least the time of Hobbes, that value is *not* a particular fact in itself but, rather, something like what Galileo and Descartes called a "secondary quality": it does not inhere in the object of which it is predicated but is projected there on the basis of that object's effect on a particular viewer. What is called value, in other words, is dependent on a relation—in this case, a relation to the observer. This is considered a critique of the validity of value because of the assumption that validity and truth most be nonrelational. Since, in this skeptical view, no similarly valid factual assertions can be made about the *value* of an object or action as such, apart from its relations to a particular viewer or evaluator, value assertions are considered invalid.

This primacy of Fact over Value, in the sense intended here, is most emphatically operative in precisely those places in Western metaphysics where it seems to be contravened. One may point, for example, to the Platonic and Neo-Platonic elevation of the Idea of the Good to the highest category and the attendant doctrine that Being is a subspecies of the Good or at best precisely synonymous with it. Although this appears to be an exemplary case of prizing Value over Fact, close examination reveals that it is not. On the contrary, the Good here is just one more fact, a sort of hyper-Fact beyond all Facts. The Good is no longer merely factual, but is conceived as being, as it were, "eminently" factual in the theological sense—more "factlike" than even any known fact is. That is, the Good is understood entirely according to the definitional notion of Being operative in the doctrine of Platonic Ideas; it has to be noncontradictory, free of any negativity or otherness, and unchanging. To succeed in being X, to be *good* at being X, we may say, is what it means in this doctrine to be truly X, to truly accord with the definition embodied in the Idea of X. Hence "to be good (at being such and such)" equals "being." Things that are less "good" at according with the definition of X may appear in varying degrees to be X, but they fail to "be" X fully. Hence, an oval, for

example, is less "good" at being like the Idea of the circle than a compass-drawn circle and hence possesses less of the "Being" of being a circle. A squiggle succeeds in "being" it even less, and even the most perfectly drawn circle is not entirely able to be like the model, in that it has many non-circle attributes as well—being made of ink, being in a particular place, and so on. The degrees of being are thus determined by increasing degrees of good-at-being-X-ness or success at according with the Idea. This line of thought is extended to Being in general, predicated on the concept of the appearance/reality split and the possibility of varying degrees of Being that is implies. And this standard, this definition, of X is conceived of as necessarily self-consistent, self-contained, fully determinate, univalent, and free from contradictions. This necessary "being good at" according with this definition of X is, I would argue, what makes "Good" the prior condition of all Being.[37] In any case, the sort of Value given primacy here is by definition non-relative; it is the most absolute of all absolutes, undetermined by any relation, and free from the pollution of any otherness. It is, as I said, more fact-like than a fact.

The axiological consequences of this can be seen in what is perhaps the most surprising and also surprisingly long-lived of the offspring of this notion, namely, the "privation theory of Evil," which, starting with Augustine's enthusiastic adoption and adaptation, has dominated mainstream Christian theological thought. In his struggle to oppose the dualistic Manichaean notion that Good and Evil came from two separate sources or formed two separate substances, which he could not square with the notion of a benevolent monotheistic God who had declared his creation good, Augustine made skillful use of the privation theory. Good and Being are convertible terms, and what we call Evil is in fact only an absence of the Good, not a positive existence in its own right. A naïve reader would expect the ethical consequence of this claim to be simply that everything is good, and therefore there is no need for ethics, for every act is also good. But this of course is not the conclusion Augustine drew. On the contrary, the free acts of human will are not exactly among those things that God created and hence are not guaranteed either Being or Goodness; in fact, they are arguably the instantiation of the *nihilo* from which man was created and have no Being as such. These interstices between beings, these acts of human will, may be perverse. They may choose a lesser good over a greater good—for example, pride over obedience to God—and this is the real locus of evil. This is, moreover, the use of a thing that contravenes its sole true use, the use intended by God when

he created it, in the context of which alone it qualifies as good. Between these perverse acts of will and the proper uses of will, we have a relationship not between two types of being but between non-being and being. That is, Evil is Non-being, Good is Being, period.

Far from subsuming Evil into Good, however, this creates an absolute dualism between them; they are not even members of the same ontological category; they have nothing at all in common, not even inclusion in the broadest possible category, the category of entities as such. The evaluating acts, the ambiguous indeterminability, self-contradiction, and unfixability of human will, do not look like a Fact, which here, as before, serves as the model for existence of any kind, and hence do not count as a Being at all. This peculiar form of Non-Being, however, has to be eliminated. It is an affront to God for this Non-Being to "exist" at all. Hence, the privation doctrine does modify Manichaean dualism: instead of asking one to remove the evil before one and find the good elsewhere, since the two can have no content in common, it enjoins one to search whatever is before one's eyes, the evil right here, and see that all the components of the good are already present but are being abused by a wicked and perverse bit of Non-being called the evil will. But in the context of the notion of the primacy of Fact, understood as unambiguous simple consistency, this notion, far from serving to bring good and evil closer together, pushes them even further apart, shifting the blame for evil from God to one's own baseless Non-being. Good and Evil here become even more dichotomous in a way than in Manichean dualism. Any alternative perspective, any center of valuation other than God, any hierarchy defined relative to point other than God's original will, is a violation not only of the Good but of Being as such. The importance of the primacy of Fact over Value in the unilateral value-dichotomous outcome of this doctrine is obvious.

If value is thought of as a species of fact, as classically conceived, there is little reason for value paradoxes to exist. X will be good in the same way that a stone has a certain mass; it is simply the case, irrespective of any other considerations such as what X's relation to other things. However, this is not the only possible model for conceiving the nature of value. Let us investigate the inherent potentialities for paradox that arise from another conception of the fundamental nature of value—as something posited within the context of a certain relation and dependent on that context, or as a way of describing certain types of relations. Following Leibniz, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer, let us assume, naïvely, that conation is fundamental to beings,[38] putting aside

for the moment the question of the ground or necessity of this condition. This assumption obviously plays an important role in the primacy of intersubjectivity in Chinese thought and the conceptualization of all things on the model of the behavior of social animals. This presupposition takes as its premise that desire or will is inherent in (living) beings. Where there is desire, there is *ipso facto* a positing of "value" on what is desired. Value, in any particular case, may be defined as the target of this conation. Following Nietzsche, we may consider conation to always, analytically, reduce to the general category of *will to power*. The reason for this reduction is simple: power means the ability to get what is wanted or to make happen what you want to happen. Will to power, as I am using the term, thus means simply the desire to have what you desire, which, as a tautology, is analytically necessary.

As a category, however, power leads to many paradoxes. Any concrete and specific goal that is posited as the object of a desire is ultimately secondary to the fundamental nature of desire as such, which is desire for power in the sense indicated above. To be sure, there must be some specific object on which value is placed in any specific conation, and we are free to speculate why an object is valued.[39] But the specific object is merely instrumental and may be replaced: what is really desired is the ability to have *whatever* one wants. Thus, one who feels he thinks poorly may desire the ability to think well, may desire to become "smart" and posit intelligence as a value; fundamental to this desire, however, is the desire to overcome an inability or limitation as such, not the inherent value of intelligence. The latter value is in fact purely derivative of the same property, the fact that the possession of "intelligence" is a way of breaking through the limitation of "stupidity."

However, as Spinoza pointed out, all determination is negation, which is to say, all definiteness is limitation. Thus to be only smart and unable to be stupid turns out, ironically, to thwart the original and fundamental intention of overcoming limitations. To be able to be *either* smart *or* dumb would require more power, more ability, more mastery, and thus is more desirable, a point emphatically not granted by Spinoza or by almost any traditional Western metaphysician. Spinoza, for example, considers "the ability *not* to be" an imperfection, not a further perfection. But Chinese speculation may be distinguished by its attention to just this point, broadly speaking; typically it goes the other way on this issue. To be able to be *and* not to be (or to be or not to be any given desirable X) is, in accordance with these considerations, actually *more* perfect than just being able to be or to be X. It is the

ability to overcome all and any limits that is desirable. This is the paradox inherent in desire as such, with respect to any finite object. Its implications and applications in the Chinese case are aptly illustrated in the following story about Confucius, found in the late apocryphal Daoist text, *Liezi*:

> Zixia asked Confucius, "What kind of man is Yan Hui?"
> Confucius said, "His benevolence is superior to my own."
> "How about Zigong?"
> "His eloquence is superior to my own."
> "How about Zilu?"
> "His courage is superior to my own."
> "How about Zizhang?"
> "His unapproachable augustness is superior to my own."
> Zixia came off his mat and asked, "In that case, why do the four of them serve you as master?"
> Confucius said, "Stay, I will tell you. Yen Hui is capable (*neng* 能) of benevolence but incapable (*buneng* 不能) of being contrary. Zigong is capable of eloquence but incapable of being tongue-tied. Zilu is capable of courage but incapable of cowardice. Zizhang is capable of being august but incapable of being common. If you offered to trade me the combined virtues of all four of them, I would not take it [in replacement for what I have]. This and this alone is the reason they serve me as master."[40]

The careful balancing of positive and negative qualities and the valorization of the ability to embrace either extreme that is encapsulated in anecdotes of this type are the subjects of the pages that follow. Indeed, we will at length come to an echo of this term "able" or "capability" in Tiantai thought, in Zhili's definition (which explicitly refers to Confucius) of the perfect man as "capable of both good and evil" (*shan e ju neng* 善惡俱能). What is of importance to the present discussion, however, is the veering toward this sort of paradox that seems to be inherent in the concept of "mastery" or "power" itself.[41] All the "positive" virtues listed here (benevolence, eloquence, courage, augustness) are positive *only because* they represent a greater ability or power than their contraries, they overcome the limitations of their negative contraries—to be able to feel for one's fellow man, to be able to speak well, to be able to face dangers courageously, to be able to conduct oneself with dignity. All these are overcomings of the limitation implied in the contrary condition. But this positive pole is also a limitation, and thus the ability to incorporate both the positive and the negative requires a still greater degree of mastery.

But in the nature of the problem as set up here, even this last formulation proves inadequate: mastery itself, by the terms set in the definition of power, fails to satisfy. The will to power, in this sense, is not to be confused with the narrower subspecies that might be called a "will to control." If the essence of the will to power (and hence of all will and hence of all value) is the overcoming of fixed limitations, then even mastery and control, objectified, become limits to be overcome; the ultimate expression of the same impulse thereby can easily be recognized in apparently contradictory desires for self-destruction, self-overcoming, and loss of control. We may say that the Good is systematically elusive; by its very nature, as defined above, it harbors paradox. It means always wanting always "this" *and* whatever is left out of the "this," both what is included in the initial desideratum and what it itself has excluded.

This both/and structure is to be contrasted to a neither/nor structure. Both are ways of signaling infinity, ultimate power, the ideal, the absolute—something that transcends the opposition of opposites. This is a staple of the *via negativa* in mystical theologies throughout the world, for example in the *Neti, neti* of the Upanishads and in the works of Pseudo-Dionysus in the Christian tradition. The point is generally that neither of any pair of opposites can be predicated of an absolute or infinite being. Nothing can be said of it; it is beyond words and thought. That is one way of pointing to supremacy, to ultimate power. The both/and structure is also occasionally to found in metaphysics; Heraclitus' system is an example, and there are others. Of course, in a certain sense the two alternatives seem to imply each other: the neither/nor *can* be construed to mean "fixed definitely as neither one nor the other (and therefore capable of being either)"—but it need not be so construed, and indeed the stricter and more radical adherents of the neither/nor position would certainly reject any such assertion. So there remains a subtle but important nuance of difference between them. The contrast is of great importance throughout this study, for we will find many examples of the both/and structure and the neither/nor structure as ways of indicating transcendence of the limitations of opposites, and therefore the ultimate power and the greatest ideal.

In the Chinese case, these structures are typically applied not so much to the Absolute as to the ideal human being, as in the *Liezi* passage about Confucius. This both/and rhetoric dates back at least to the *Guanzi*,[42] becomes almost a cliché by the time of the *Huainanzi*,[43] and is still strong not only in Neo-Daoist works like the *Liezi*[44] but also in Tang Buddhism and

Song Neo-Confucianism, although it is used distinctively and for widely varying purposes in each case. A certain ambiguity between neither/nor and both/and attitudes found in the *Laozi* bequeaths a fundamental ambiguity to later Daoism, leaving even the *Zhuangzi* divided on this issue (with the Inner Chapters, on my reading, leaning toward a both/and [actually a meta-both/and, namely, *both* both/and *and* neither/nor] and the Outer toward a neither/nor, with various mixtures in the appropriately titled Mixed Chapters, as I have shown in detail elsewhere).[45] This issue, too, reaches a kind of culmination in Tiantai theory, in which the contrast is made explicitly and in great detail, and a judgment made as to the relative value of the two views. The neither/nor position comes to be called *danzhong* (the Exclusive Mean—literally, "merely the Mean"), the both/and *budan zhong* (the Non-exclusive or Inclusive Mean—literally, "not merely the Mean"). In contrast to Indian Buddhist precedent, a higher value is placed on the latter. The implications of this issue when applied consistently to value theory (when the contrasted opposites are value terms such as good and bad, or good and evil) are discussed in detail below.

Value theory is inherently fertile soil for this sort of paradox. Another, equally important paradox is alluded to in passing in the preceding discussion. As noted by Xunzi and Tiantai thinkers, a being's values and desiderata are often precisely the opposite of what it is in itself, and indeed it is unsurprising for conscious values to form a perfect antithesis to the spontaneous unreflexive condition of any given sentient being. This principle has profound implications and will help us through many difficulties. Nietzsche points out, in a similar vein:

> *When morality is not boring.*—The chief moral commandments which a people is willing to be taught and have preached at it again and again are related to its chief failings, and thus it is never bored by them. The Greeks, who all too frequently failed to evidence moderation, cold courage, fairmindedness or rationality in general, were glad to give ear to the four Socratic virtues—for they had such need of them and *yet* so little talent for them![46]

Here we see this principle applied, somewhat tongue in cheek, to a culture as a whole; nonetheless, it makes an important point and provides a hermeneutical principle with which to approach the textual record. If we find records of an individual or a culture that seems obsessed with desideratum X, whose conscious endeavors are always aimed toward X, we should not therefore conclude that this person or culture is "Xish." At first,

we might be inclined to say, with Nietzsche, that this means, rather, that they are exceptionally "non-Xish." Ultimately, however, neither formulation is satisfactory. What is indicated by a concern with X is, rather, that the dimension X/non-X is a decisive and important one for this person or culture, that this is a category of value by which things are judged, an enduring problem, a lens through which things are viewed, and a schema through which things are understood.

Thus, to use some questionable examples, we might say that the later Athenians stressed the irrational/rational axis, the Chinese of certain ages the conformity/nonconformity axis, the Buddhists the world-affirming/world-denying axis, the Hebrews the pious/impious axis, and nineteenth-century Germans the rationalist/romantic axis. It is as wrong, on the basis of the Hebrew bible, to call the biblical Hebrews pious as it is to call them impious; rather, we are left to conclude simply that piety is an engrossing issue for them. In a certain sense they are always *both* pious and impious, in a way that, say, the Chinese are not; to judge oneself impious is to acknowledge the standard of piety, the latter being characterized most essentially as an inner recognition of the value or at least the relevance of the category of piety itself. The Hebrews, unlike the Chinese, are aware of piety as the central desideratum and of impiety as a central problem, as the most essential condition against which they must be on their guard and toward which they are always involuntarily veering. These two go together. To be "impious," in this precise sense, is to be pious, and to be either is to be both.

Note, moreover, that this sort of identity of opposites *presupposes* the opposition between the two terms. We will see a similar principle applied in some of the value paradoxes considered in detail below. We can discern it in the background of the Daoist critique of conscious valuation, and reversed and developed as if by a critique of that critique, it plays a crucial role in the Tiantai understanding of the identity between opposites such as saṁsāra and nirvāṇa, no-self and Self, impermanence and eternity, sorrow and bliss, defilement and purity. The first of each of these pairs is the guarantor of the second and stands in an indissoluble embrace with it.[47] Neither side is "the truth" of the matter, for both sides, in different ways, are the truth, and each implies the other. This structure, as filtered through the Tiantai concept of all-pervasive intersubjectivity, brings us to a notion of the ubiquitous overdetermination of two contrary symbol systems, of the disvalued fact and the value it posits by the very gesture of striving toward and falling short of it, by lacking it. This copresence of these two mutually implicative contexts allows

each individual token simultaneously to function as value and as anti-value. This obviously relates importantly to the both/and concept alluded to above.

Indeed, these two points are closely and inherently connected. The identification of some existing quality X as negative, undesirable, and limiting is simultaneously (1) the positing of the opposite possibility as positive and of the overcoming of this limitation as a desideratum and (2) an orienting of oneself on the line running between these two extremes, seeing it as a crucial faultline through the world of experience and action. If the existing quality X is a predicate of oneself and a felt limitation of one's own condition ("I am unworthy and would like to become worthy"), the recognition must belong to the totality of one's negative condition at that time and hence to that initial unworthiness. The same is true of all strivings toward the goal of worthiness and their results, including the final achievement of worthiness. The bad in this sense *produces* the good (if we assume sentience and conation). When the good is reached, it may wish to deny its roots in the bad, as Nietzsche suggested was generally the case in traditional Western metaphysics; the connection with the bad may be repressed from the consciousness of the good. This, however, ultimately constitutes another limitation, as noted above, and thus a further goodness must consist in acknowledging this relation to what was first posited as bad, the original limited condition. One way in which this attainment of further mastery may be accomplished is through the recognition that the bad was indeed the soil out of which the good grew, that the repression of the bad was a great achievement, but that an even greater achievement lies in reclaiming the ability to embrace both poles of what is ultimately an inseparable dyad. The development is from bad to good to good/bad, all of which can be derived from the simple assumptions delineated at the beginning of this section. It is these characteristics of the general structure of axiology that form the most general conditions for the possibility of the value paradoxes to be considered below.

Inverted Pyramid of Instrumental and Ultimate Values

The preceding discussion makes clear certain assumptions that might, under certain conditions, yield value theories that favor paradoxical rhetoric. Indeed, we may wonder why all reflections about value do not lead directly toward paradoxical formulations. Why do some systems and cultures seem to favor these formulations, while others do not? What work are such formu-

lations doing, what needs do they fill, and what are their consequences? Clearly, a simple transposition of values (for example, the declaration that all that has formerly been called bad is really good, and that all that has been called good is really bad) would not necessarily be of any interest for this project, if the structure of the relation between the two terms remained unchanged—that is, mutually exclusive.[48] If we consider the matter closely, however, every conceivable doctrine, no matter how axiologically dualistic, can be seen as unifying value-opposites of another conceivable doctrine. The other doctrine, that is, would "unify" these putative opposites by regarding both as serving a single goal (the new doctrine's ultimate value) and hence designate both equally as "good." Some of these conceivable doctrines will necessarily be absurdly abstract and unrealistic, but this does not detract from the point. Thus the doctrine whose ultimate value is "not eating beans" could combine, for example, both the act of killing and the act of saving life and call both good simply because neither involves the eating of beans, in spite of the fact that another doctrine would consider them axiologically opposed. The principle involved is quite simple.

Let us take another, more exhaustive and slightly less absurd, example, to show how these doctrines might build into a hierarchical inverted pyramid. Doctrine X holds, let us say, that exhalation is Good and inhalation is Bad. Doctrine Y, critiquing this, holds that *both* good^{x} (exhalation) and bad^{x} (inhalation) are really good^{y} as such (breathing per se is what is good, anything promoting breathing is instrumentally good, and anything impeding breathing is bad). Or doctrine Z might define ultimate value as, for example, motion, and considers the combination of inhalation and exhalation together therefore to be good when they promote motion, which is good^{z}, but to be bad when they lead to stillness, which is bad^{z}. Under certain circumstances, either inhalation or exhalation might be conducive to motion, and in that case both/either would be good. According to Z, neither good^{x} nor bad^{x} is good or bad in itself; both are merely instrumental, and either one can, under the right conditions, be good or bad. Further, Z may hold that it is precisely the totality of good^{x} plus bad^{x} together or a particular relationship between them (e.g., inhaling and exhaling in the proper rhythm and sequence of alternation) that is necessary for motion, which is good^{z}.

But then A comes along and claims that neither motion nor stillness is good in itself; either one can be good or bad, depending on whether they contribute to, say, helping others, which is good^{a}, or to harming others, bad^{a}. And so on. Any and every doctrine thus is value-dualistic (at the highest or-

der of inclusiveness it has reached, its own non-instrumental or ultimate values) and yet also unifies opposite value terms (of other, lower-order doctrines, which it includes and transcends). In this inverted pyramid of doctrines, each includes both the good and the bad of the smaller, lower-order doctrines as its own good (perhaps conditionally so; i.e., good when leading to X, good in a certain relation to each other, good when motivated by certain mental states, and so on) and opposing it to a new bad, the antithesis of this totality and its specified conditions.[49]

This model suffices up to a point. But complications come in when a certain type of doctrine enters the picture, namely, those that place value on value paradox itself, or posit an all-encompassing entity or concept of some kind as the good, or state that everything is good, or distinguish different senses of goodness and badness, or self-reflectively define their value relations in terms of the entire preceding inverted pyramid of doctrines. This is where the problem gets interesting, as well as difficult to follow; a set of conceptual tools that bring the subsequent axiological fireworks into some manageable order is needed. Thus, rather than seeking *absolute* counterexamples to this tendency to unify value opposites, which scarcely seem to be conceivable, we will be obliged to compare relatively narrow forms of unification of value-opposition with broader and more complex versions.

This raises a crucial point: the question of rhetoric. *Any* doctrine can be stated as a value paradox or as a straightforward unparadoxical opposition, depending on the focus of its rhetoric. Doctrines that include a narrower set of value unifications may well emphasize a more dualistic value rhetoric and fail to raise any self-undermining or self-referential application of their lower-level value reconciliations to their ultimate or non-instrumental values, which they will therefore regard as nonnegotiable. But it seems likely that in the final analysis this, too, will be more a matter of degree and emphasis than of irreducible difference, for there exist a sense in which any conceivable doctrine of value is absolutist and another sense in which it is not. It is important to note just what these different senses amount to. But the biggest difference between doctrines, I suspect, is a result of what kind of ultimate values are posited in each case. If these fall relatively "low" on the inverted pyramid, so that the ultimate values in which lower-order opposites are resolved are easily grasped matters of everyday concern (do whatever is necessary in order to "Be nice to people" or "Make as much money as you can" or "Make yourself famous"), this value tends to be applied dualistically. If, on the other hand, the ultimate value lies higher up on the inverted pyramid and thus is broader, in-

volving some element of paradox or self-referential complexity and reconciling a vast number of everyday lower-order contraries in itself ("Do whatever is necessary in order to see the unity of opposites" or "Affirm all experience as valuable" or "Taste the fullness of being"), the application of such a doctrine to everyday affairs tends to seem less value-dualistic, since it consider instrumentally good a more varied selection of activities. Many of these would be considered opposite in value in the everyday-value stance. The difference is merely in the order of abstraction on which one focuses. There is always a frame and something inside the frame—namely, smaller frames—in which there is also something, and so on.

Here we may begin to discern the inherent relation of the question of value to holism. The structure of instrumental and ultimate values, with the function and identity of the former being determined by their relation to the latter, brings us back to the concept of wholes and their determining centers. We may relate the question of value more explicitly to the concept of holism with the help of Michael Polanyi's notion of "tacit knowledge." Polanyi develops a useful paradigm for considering the means/ends relationship as a function of the part/whole relation. For Polanyi, awareness comes with a structure whereby we are always aware *from* some set of conditions *to* some object of awareness. The set of conditions—which includes our bodies and sense organs, the instruments by which we come to know something (a probe by which we feel our way in the dark, a signal preceding an electric shock, the individual features in a facial expression, a semantic signifier), and the "background" portion of a Gestalt—may be equated with the *means* of knowing, and the *instrumental* values focused on and centering on the object. The object that appears explicitly to awareness (the texture we discover at the end of the probe, the electric shock, the facial expression itself, the meaning of the signifier) is precisely the object of our *interest*, the *meaning* of the other terms, which absorbs them into itself as aspects or "moments," quite often completely effacing their presence to as us discernible contents.

This object of awareness and interest is also the locus of ultimate value in the whole in question and may be equated with the center in the sense described earlier. The whole in this sense will be mostly tacit and not explicitly present to consciousness. We may behave in a way that proves that we are in some sense aware of changes in these tacit contents without being able to specify what they are.[50] Any object of awareness implicitly unifies a vast totality of means. Indeed, in the Tiantai version, *all* things, or, more strictly, all *possible* things, including the opposite of the object, are included in the whole

that is experienced simply as the appearance of the object. This means that this vast collection of means is appearing *as* the end in any given case. What appears in experience is just the end—the facial expression per se as a visceral quiddity, say, or the anticipation of shock—whereas the means whereby this is accomplished, though also necessarily "tacitly" known and experienced, are known and experienced only *as* this end, rather than as quiddities in their own right. When one sees an object on a table, many means are involved—the cones and rods in the eye, the nervous system, nutrition, oxygen, light, molecular vibrations, the nuclear explosions of the sun—but none of these comes explicitly to consciousness. They *are*, however, genuinely experienced, but only *as* the object in question. The movements and processes in the eye, for example, are "read" *as* the appearance of the object, rather than eye-processes per se. That they are nonetheless a part of the experience is clear in that, as Polanyi points out, it can be experimentally verified that one can respond to alterations in the tacit triggers of the object of attention and concern without being explicitly aware that one is doing so.[51]

The Tiantai system, which regards *all* quiddities as tacitly experienced in each experience, also means, in value terms, that a given desideratum includes all other possible items, emphatically including the anti-values with which it is explicitly contrasted. Even more, the tacit part of the whole is identifiable with what is normally called the *experiencer*, and the manifest part is the experienced; as these two shift, the subject/object relation, so-called, also shifts. The perceiver of a perceived object is just the tacit portion of the whole of which the apparent object is a part, the devalued or instrumentally valued part of the whole, the part that is desiring and endeavoring to highlight and experience the other half, the object of interested conative awareness—this object being that *as* which this whole is temporarily appearing. This model is helpful not only in comprehending the Tiantai axiology but also the more general notion of subject and object reversibility operative in that system.

This point is obviously of great relevance to our present concerns. But another vista becomes evident when these two facets of the problem are joined with the help of Polanyi's categories. For we can now also see the tendency for *reversibility* implied in the holistic value relation. This is not the direction in which Polanyi himself wishes to develop this notion. Indeed, in accordance with his interest in establishing a basis for the validity of scientific inquiry, he wishes to see a means of gleaning a kind of universally valid

standard[52] in the structure of focal-tacit knowledge; that is, by "dwelling in" the coherence and focus evident in any given integration of behaviors, the inherent aim or valuation of that integration, an appreciation of *its own* purpose and action, can emerge. On the basis of this, we can *judge* the success or failure of the attempted integration "from within [the other's] own point of view."[53] As we shall see, however, the Tiantai system, taking the holistic premise to a more radical and uncompromising extent and in accordance with its deployment of the category of intersubjectivity, undermines this implication. In the Tiantai vision, there can never be any determinate limits set to a particular "whole situation" that would allow us to make a final judgment on its value that would not be susceptible to equally valid second-guessing via inevitable reintegration into a new whole. Moreover, this reintegration is not extrinsic to the initially conceived whole. Rather, given the omnicentric intersubjectivity undergirding Tiantai value theory, an infinite number of alternative modes of integration are always already operative in each integration and already rewriting it.

Imagine that I am throwing a rubber ball against a wall and catching it. Each time the ball comes back toward me, my world focuses into the motion of my muscles, the scope of my vision narrows to the ball, my feet and arms and spine all move in accordance with the purpose of catching the ball. My body, my mind, and all I know are integrated toward this focus; they all appear *as* the catching of this ball. For Polanyi, we may judge the value of my actions in accordance with this self-posited goal. If my muscles and nerves and sense organs integrate in a way that allows me efficiently and gracefully to catch the ball, I am doing something that can be judged as having a valid positive value. But in the terms that we are exploring here, this situation and its inherent value-positing have no privileged position from which to give a final judgment on itself. If in leaping to catch the ball successfully I also go flying off a cliff and to my death, the parameters of evaluation have been plausibly expanded to rewrite the initial valuation of my springing legs as a successful action. Moreover, all my actions, the whole situation of throwing and catching the ball and its inherent valuations, are themselves a mere part integrated into other wholes, indeed, on the Tiantai view, a necessarily infinite number of others, all of which evaluate it, equally validly, in accordance with their own purposes. The value-paradoxical consequences of this deployment of the focal structure of knowing and valuing stand in stark contrast to those invoked by the drive toward at least some semblance of adjudicability in Polanyi's view.

To get a clearer notion of the implications of the reversibility operative in this sort of conception of value, let us return to the example of Marxism. If "class struggle" is the central term in a "whole" consisting of attitudes toward a wide range of phenomena, from patriarchal oppression to sin to sexual repression to environmental crisis, for example, we can imagine how these terms can serve as "tacit" aspects of "class struggle." That is, the committed Marxist may experience phenomena that others might describe as "patriarchal oppression," but he sees them "transparently," not as patriarchal oppression but rather just another instance of class struggle. He sees *from* a particular instance of gender discrimination, for example, *to* the essence of class struggle instantiated therein. If, however, in the intersubjective situation of a polemic he is called on to explain this instance as class struggle rather than patriarchal oppression so that the patriarchal elements can be factored out as epiphenomena, he finds himself in the position of using Marxism as the means of explanation and the apparent instance of gender discrimination as the target or end, the thing to be explained. In this process, class struggle must become transparent to show how it can manifest and account for gender discrimination, which has now become the center.

To make the point more explicitly at a more directly axiological level, for the Marxist to really prove the truth (the centrality) of class struggle, he must show that the value of this conception is what really solves all the problems that mistakenly go under other names. To do so, he must be able to solve the latter problems to the satisfaction of those who (mistakenly) take them to be *ultimate* problems. He must show that by solving the class problem, he has really solved the problem they were experiencing as gender discrimination and also others besides. But to succeed in this endeavor, he must take the value of, say, gender equality as the center, as the value to whose fulfillment the solution of class conflict becomes instrumental. The means/end relation has reversed, simply in the course of the center or end fulfilling the implicit commitment that defines it as center or end, that is, to account for and solve all other, instrumental, value problems.

The intersubjective example of persuasion is by no means superfluous here. I deliberately chose it because it embodies the Tiantai notion of upāya, which is the operative mechanism for this inherent reversal of ends and means, or instrumental and ultimate values, in the Tiantai system. Ignorance is the means to realize enlightenment, but enlightenment is also the means to "realize" ignorance, that is, to fully develop and thoroughly actualize the initial ignorance. This cryptic remark will, I trust, become intelligible by the

end of this book. But the brief considerations offered here can, I hope, at least give the reader a broad sense of some ways in which the notions of holism, intersubjectivity, and value theory may intersect to create the value paradoxical doctrines that are the focus of this work.

Paradox in Chinese Rhetoric

On the basis of the discussion in Part I of this chapter, we may expect doctrines with relatively more quotidian ultimate values ("obey the law," "eat no beans") to bring with them fewer value paradoxes than those with more complex, abstract, or explicitly paradoxical ultimate values ("embrace the fullness of being," "have no fixed goals," "experience the unity of opposites"). But we also noted that any value discourse *can* be stated either in terms that underscore its unification of the ultimate values of even simpler value positions (taking their ultimate values as its own merely instrumental values) or in terms that focus on its own non-paradoxical ultimate value. What is even more crucial in overdetermining value paradoxes is the *rhetorical decision* to focus, in one's value discourse, on the level of value unification, rather than on the level of ultimate value, which may well be formulatible as a perfect dichotomy between value and its opposite, allowing of no overlap. My assumption here is that rhetoric is not irrelevant to how one thinks, and the form of a doctrine cannot be absolutely separated from its content. In this section, I try to give some reasons why a paradoxical manner of putting things may have become the norm in Chinese rhetoric. But this norm itself, as we shall see, greatly influenced the content of doctrines and the conceptions of ultimate value in this tradition.

In the discussion of the inverted pyramid of types, I tried to show that the same axiological content can be stated in either a paradoxical or a non-paradoxical form. Consider the expression "No pain, no gain." As it stands, this is what I call a paradoxical formulation. Pain and gain appear here as opposites. This way of phrasing the idea emphasizes not only their contrast but also their necessary coexistence. Their relatedness is emphasized by the rhetorical force of the statement. The same idea, however, could be phrased more straightforwardly to show that there is of course no real paradox or contradiction here; for example, "If you work hard now, even though it's uncomfortable, you will gradually achieve things that will give you pleasure." This muffles the contrast, with its "even though" phrase, and the non-parallelism of "hard" and "uncomfortable," on the one hand, and "pleasure,"

on the other. This has quite a different rhetorical effect. It focuses on the level of non-paradoxical consistency, the notion of "development," which unproblematically unites both hard work and the pleasure of achievement.

My claim here is that in an important and decisive sense traditional Western rhetoric tends to prefer the second type of formulation, which explicitly includes the encompassing higher level of abstraction, the non-paradoxical and absolutely true level, in the discourse itself. Phrases of the other type, in this tradition, require an explanation that solves the puzzle and articulates the resolution. Chinese rhetoric, on the other hand, tends toward a preference for resting at the level at which the contrast is most accentuated,[54] stopping short of bringing the next level, which would unify the contrasted terms non-paradoxically, into the discourse. Since language is itself instrumental to valued behavior in this tradition, as I show below, the unequivocal level of non-instrumental inclusiveness tends to lie outside language. In this view, there is a tendency to feel that when we reach the level at which the paradox is perfectly parallel and explicit, and the contrast all-embracing, we have reached a rhetorically satisfying conclusion. "X is also non-X" is, in this way of speaking, more satisfying than "In one respect the thing in question is X, but in other respects it is non-X, and in fact these are not really contradictory, since actually both X and non-X are types of Y," which might be considered more desirable in the Western rhetorical tradition.

But this cannot be dismissed as "just a different way of talking." A different way of talking, consistently applied over a long period of time, is a different way of thinking, and that means a different way of living and of seeing the world. Our thought and our behavior are in fact strongly influenced by our linguistic habits, and the rhetorical value given to paradoxical structures would not fail to have an impact on metaphysical and apodictic questions, when these in fact do become issues. When Buddhism, for example, entered China, it brought with it an apodictic conception of language (in spite of its own distinctive notion, not necessarily shared by the Indian tradition as a whole, of the purely instrumental status of doctrine in the pursuit of enlightenment, as in the parable of the raft, to be touched on in the next chapter). This tradition has other reasons for placing the "ultimate" outside the confines of language. This ultimate is, however, arguably still thought of primarily as a "fact" rather than a behavioral embodiment of value. In Sinitic Buddhism, these forms collide and form a new synthesis, as well as a new conception of the ultimate and of ultimate value. Value-centric forms of thought (which manifest themselves, as we shall see, through discourses in

which value is *absent*) are applied to apodictic problems, yielding extremely unique results. In this section, I therefore discuss in more detail some features of Chinese rhetoric relevant to this tendency to assert paradoxical value and their consequences.

Value theory is inherently a complicated and subtle field. But in the case of Chinese theories of value, we face certain additional complications, which have an impact on both the form and the content of doctrines. I refer here to the special relationship between fact (whatever is the case) and value (whatever should be the case) in Chinese rhetoric.

Chinese theorizing in the classical period, especially but not exclusively in Ruist writings, is marked by what has been called a fact/value fusion.[55] This means that a statement is intended not only or even primarily as a description of a state of affairs existing in the world but also as a part of a "guiding discourse" (*dao* 道) meant to orient the auditor to a particular type of affect and behavior, to guide him in the acquisition of skills and practices. Indeed, it is arguably value here that is primary, the independent variable, of which fact is the mere adjunct. This contrasts with the classical Western case, discussed above, in which value is seen as only a possible subspecies of fact. That is, as Chad Hansen puts it, apodictic statements in classical Chinese thought are understood in terms of and assimilated to the structure of imperatives, rather than vice versa, as tends to be the case in Indo-European languages, in which language first and foremost tells us what is the case, one aspect of which may be what values exist and how we ought to behave.[56] Value is seen as a special case of fact, a particular kind of fact that does not exhaust the category of factuality. A proposition such as "one should be considerate of others" is in this case seen (intuitively) simply as one of many things that are so and is modeled on the structure and function of a proposition like "force equals mass times acceleration." Both of these are seen as true propositions that describe the way reality is. It is "true" that one should be considerate of others, and it is also true that F = MA. Fact is here the larger category, which encompasses and assimilates all statements about value. Every formulatible value is a fact, like any other statement, but not every fact has to do with value.

In Chinese theories of language, on the other hand, language is fundamentally regulative of behavior. Even to learn language (and hence most of what we normally call reasoned thinking) is not so much learning to describe things "accurately" or "objectively," but learning a certain skill in making distinctions, which is itself a kind of acquired, potentially virtuosic behavior,

tied to other forms of virtuosic and valued behavior.[57] The forms of virtuosity that ideally can follow on mastering the behavior prescribed by a guiding discourse may, however, have a consequent effect on knowledge. That is, the acquisition of this virtuosity is thought to change the way in which one views the world. One will come to see it "correctly" after one has mastered the practices prescribed by language.[58] Words do not primarily tell us about the world, necessarily; words tell us what to do, and when we learn to do this successfully, we will come to see the world aright. The relation of words to apodictic truth is thus mediated by praxis. Behavior is the middle term, uniting the other two (words and reality). The structure of the fact/value fusion thus implies a kind of developmental process. Words are connected to both values and facts, but the facts are actually the last stage of the process of "understanding" a proposition. They are asserted through the medium of the value implications and the behavior thereby inspired. The factual content comes as the result of the successful internalization of these values and behavior. To "understand" a proposition such as "benevolence means to behave, when away from home, as if one were in the presence of an important guest" (*Analects* 12:2) one must first accept it and act accordingly. A person who has mastered such behavior will see that the statement is "true"—that this is an accurate description of what "benevolence" is. There can thus be a period of time, an intermediate stage, in which the effect of the internalized values has not yet "kicked in." At this stage, one might be forced to act in accord with values that do not coincide with the "facts" as one sees them.

Moreover, language, as a purely instrumental stage in this process of attaining correct knowledge and behavior, has no independent value of its own and in a certain sense aims at its own abolition. It can perhaps be asserted that the "sage" no longer needs the verbal formulations of his knowledge and values, for he has mastered the behaviors at which they were aimed and can see the world "correctly." He need only be aware of the situation that presents itself (fact) to spontaneously do what is right (value).[59] Words play no part in this process, as far as his own knowledge and behavior are concerned, for he no longer needs specific directives as encoded verbally to feel, act, and know correctly; they have now become part of his spontaneous behavior. Words, however, become important again, instrumentally, when he turns his attention to transforming others, either through teaching or through governance. In this case, the words are another element in his spontaneous mastery, the proper words issue from him in each situation, and the appropriateness of his language therefore reflects and expresses his sagehood,

while not containing the content of his own vision of the world, which can be known only after the practices encoded into his utterance have been mastered. It is in this special sense that his words "express" his being and are contiguous with his virtue,[60] such that they cannot be judged independently of his personality, his virtue, and his total self.

Now we, in dealing with Chinese philosophy, are dealing only with words left to us in old texts. These assumptions about the nature and function of words therefore put important constraints on how we are to understand the "doctrines" that appear to be expressed in these works. In other words, the fact/value fusion has an impact not only on the Chinese treatment of what we think of as pure facts (i.e., they are always tinged with various senses of value) but also on the structure of value itself. We cannot think of "value" here in the sense in which the term is defined by our own tradition, in which value is either an antonym of fact or, at best, a special category of fact. In the Chinese tradition, value is the prior and more fundamental category, and factuality as such is subordinate to it. Words are not meant as descriptions of the world, as in our own tradition, and the value theories we extrapolate from them cannot be taken as theories describing the objective manner in which value functions in the world. They must be taken, rather, as evocations of affect meant to incline one toward a specific type of behavior or distinctions made to lead us into spontaneously tending toward a certain kind of behavior.

When values are thought to be a kind of fact, one among many that we are describing when we use words, they must behave like all other facts. "Red is not black" is a fact; it is unchangeable, stable, objectively verifiable, and incontestable. The negation between the two terms denotes an absolute disjunction: what is red is not black, and redness is not, has never been, and never will be blackness. We cannot say that "sometimes red is a kind of blackness," or that "in a sense red is black," or that "let's just assume for the moment that red is black," or "try considering red as black, you'll see that it's right." Thus value propositions such as "stealing is bad" or even "good is not bad" must also have these qualities of clear-cut division, stability, and black/white disjunction. But when fact is assimilated to value, the opposite process occurs. "Only the benevolent person is able to like people and to hate people" (*Analects* 4:3) is an utterance made in a particular interpersonal context, with the aim of motivating the listeners, in this case disciples, to behave in certain ways and not others. In another context, another statement, perhaps the opposite statement (as, for example, the very next entry in the

Analects (4:4): "If one sets his will on benevolence, he will have no hatred"), might better accomplish this aim. The content of the statement is thus completely relative and instrumental to the behavioral goal, which necessarily lies outside language as such. From the point of view of the unstated ultimate value, behavior, two opposite statements may be effectively one. Ultimate value itself is not a fact to be spoken; it lies in affect, motivation, and behavior of a particular type. Thus any value that has been described is not ultimate. All values described *within* a given discourse must be by necessity instrumental and hence, at least in theory, negotiable.

This, I would suggest, might be a reason for a rhetorical focus that lingers on the level of making contrary value claims without attempting to bring them under a non-contradictory doctrine that embraces both. The level of ultimate value *always* lies outside language as such. It is affective, behavioral, and experiential. Thus there can be no focus on the level of ultimate value *within* discourse. Whatever can be stated, whatever value claims can be made, are always compatible with contrary claims, relative to the perhaps "non-paradoxical" absolute value that lies outside language. However, we must be careful at this juncture: for strictly considered, it is meaningless to speak of behavior as either paradoxical or non-paradoxical: these are categories that properly apply only to language and doctrines.

Since ultimate value does not enter into the limits of discourse itself, the disjunction between value and fact vanishes. As Anthony Flew notes, "Propositions asserting that this is instrumentally good, that this is an efficient means to get that, and propositions asserting hypothetical imperatives, that if you want this then in order to get it you must do that, are, in Humian terms, propositions belonging in the *is* category rather than the *ought*; . . . they describe or purport to describe our actual world, rather than recommended actions which (it is thought) would make it more ideal."[61] Where value in the absolute sense (ultimate value) lies outside the discussion or is assumed, *all* propositions are on the same level. Strictly speaking, as Flew points out, this is the level of fact. But since this also means that the entire discourse has been, even prior to its own beginning, subordinated to the value purposes that it is assuming, it also means that the entire discussion concerns value, albeit value in a sense redefined by its lack of separation from the category of fact. Since this separation and the consequent contrast usually play a large part in the definition of value, we can expect this situation to have a powerful impact on the concept of value operative in such systems.

Thus by collapsing the is/ought distinction, the "ought" side is simultaneously made stronger and weaker. It is stronger in that it now pertains to everything, and there is no way to get outside it. But it is weaker in that any ought *within the discourse* now has a much less absolute status, is more negotiable, less of a supernatural iron law standing above the entire domain of the "is" and bearing the same non-relational, dichotomous either-or structure that characterizes the "is." The type of "should" we find in classical Chinese philosophical texts, I will argue, is the type that operates in both the natural and moral senses and that denotes only probability. When Mencius says, for example, that a true king "arises" (or "should arise") every five hundred years, not distinguishing between what is so and what should be so, this implied "should" has the same status as the "should" in "this sort of soil should yield a good crop"—in other words, it will probably yield a good crop, and under normal conditions it will, but of course there may be exceptions. The true king may come in seven, eight, or nine hundred years—but this does not invalidate this sort of "should" or disconfirm this sort of "is." One should, for example, observe the ritually proper circumspection in touching members of the opposite sex, and one "does"—but if one does not, this neither invalidates the "fact" that one "does" this, nor does it necessarily imply that one is in the wrong—for this "probable should" allows for exceptions, in both its factual and its evaluative senses (*Mencius* 7B.38).

This is especially, but not exclusively, relevant to Ruist thinkers, and provides us with a way of thinking about their tendency to contradict themselves and their seeming lack of concern over doing so. For Daoists, on the other hand, another feature of this picture is crucial. If language is first and foremost a skill at making distinctions, then, as Hansen has noted with respect to the *Laozi*, a single act of division accounts for any pair of opposites. "Good/bad" is a single distinction. To master this concept is to know in any case which way to judge and, moreover to know, that this particular dimension is one about which one may judge and that the question "Is it good or bad?" is applicable to things in the world. If, on the contrary, "ideas" are conceived of as a certain mental "content," on the model of a circle encompassing a certain amount of conceptual space (such that "animal" is a "larger" concept than "dog," since all dogs are animals; the concept "dog" seems to fit "inside" the concept "animal"), "good" and "bad" are two mutually exclusive circles situated inside a larger circle called "Valuations."[62] They can be unified only by inclusion within a larger category, and this may or may not occur. The Daoist conception of value paradox owes much to this fundamental notion

of ideas as skills rather than conceptual contents, in which two opposites always rest on a single act of drawing a distinction. A sort of Ruist analogue to this idea can be found in the prominence of hierarchical dyadic role relations, which call for diametrically opposed and complementary behavior from the two participants, both of which nonetheless are seen to express the single right principle of that one relationship.

The inseparability of fact and value lies at the bottom of Daoist paradox in another dimension as well. When all naming is the naming of an object of interest, when any positing of a being is the positing of a value, we can see how the foreground/background structure of the tacit dimension makes for an inherent paradoxicality of all naming and all desiring. That is, whenever something is posited as a good and pursued as such (a Dao that can be "daoed," a "name"—already a value term, for "name" here means primarily "fame," eminence, a focus of conative awareness—that can be named), one is pursuing the focal and explicit part of a whole that is really equally inclusive of the apparently excluded negatively valued half that forms the context, background, and support for the positing of that value. Hence this pursuit, if explicit, turns out to be self-defeating. The closer one gets to pure X, the more X is destroyed, since X was really explicitly X on the basis of tacit non-X. One becomes aware of a flower as a flower, and therefore desires floweriness, as the exclusion of non-floweriness. But flower is just the explicit appearing of a totality that is really flower, stem, root, water, dirt, shit. In accomplishing the goal of attaining pure floweriness and excluding non-floweriness, one therefore destroys the flower; a flower that is pure flower is a plastic flower, that is, no flower, a dead flower. All the apparently cognitive paradoxes of, say, Laozi's Daoism can easily be derived from this initially holistic value paradox.

This concept of value, predicated as it is on the assumption of sentient beings perceiving a lack, also sets up what might be called the "paradox of missing something." That is, what is wanted is what is both lacking and what is cognized as lacking, hence what is both absent and in some sense (ideationally) "present." The fact of conscious positing or cognizing of a goal or value makes this situation inevitable. To "be missing something" (and thus posit it as a value) requires that the particular axis of which it is one pole be present to one. But this also means to posit value as one element in consciousness; so that instead of it being the completeness that unifies opposites, *I*, the positer of these values and their lack, am a completeness that must unify it with its opposite. I feel it as missing only if I somehow embrace

the contrast between this anti-value, my lowly present state, and the value to which it makes me aspire. But this makes me the more inclusive category, and value itself merely one of my aspects and less inclusive, thus less valuable, than the me who embraces both. To put this another way, we may say that there is a potential here for the claim that to posit something as a value (a unifying completeness of opposite abilities) paradoxically undermines its value. For this means putting it within the system of discourse, and anything within discourse is given its meaning by its contrast with its opposite, and hence, within the discourse, whatever is definite cannot be the whole but must be merely half of one dyad. This line of thought, like that discussed above, obviously bears a close relation to the Daoist arguments against the positing of value, as touched on above. Any Dao (a value term *par excellence*) that is posited as a Dao ceases to be truly reliable as a Dao.

Another potential paradox arises if value appears within discourse as one half of a dyad opposed to anti-value and thus in conflict with the implicit claim to completeness involved in all value assertions. As we have seen, in the most general possible sense, value is identical to the power to overcome limitations and thus to the ability to achieve completeness, to encompass both poles of any given dyad, with the significant dyads selected in accordance with any sentient entity's sense of lack. This notion of value is obviously significant for the problem of holism, especially the concept of "the center" as the point that connects opposed parts of a whole and as the locus of ultimate value for adjudicating the value and identity of all the other parts. Every attainment of a posited value implies also a renunciation of what one was spontaneously before positing this ideal, value, direction, or image of the good. But this, too, as a renunciation of a certain ability or power, may entail a loss of completeness and hence of value. Moreover, there is a tendency for the posited value to repress the original spontaneous state, which, since it requires no effort, is always threatening to burst through again and undermine the achievement, which may make the posited value that much more tyrannical and one-sided, and thus that much less complete and that much less valuable.[63]

It is clear from the above that certain logical and metaphysical assumptions tend to be associated with certain attitudes toward the problem of axiological relations. I have already considered the place of meta-levels of instrumental and ultimate value (second, third, etc., orders of value, as described in the inverted pyramid of types) in reconciling value paradoxes[64] and also the impact of rhetorical conventions on this problem. I have also

alluded to the other issues that naturally accompany the problem of value paradox, namely, the articulation of the metaphysical conceptions necessary to make these paradoxes intelligible. But it is now necessary to specify more explicitly how these structures have functioned in the stratum of early Chinese thought most relevant to the Tiantai project. As I noted above, the works of Warring States logicians, ethicists, and metaphysicians strongly suggest that the conception of a whole operative in this prototypical stratum of Chinese thinking, and applied even to the realm of concepts and objects, was modeled on the relations characteristic of human communities, with shared linguistic-conceptual and behavioral customs and organized according to hierarchical ritual structures, particularly those typical of a kinship system dominated by the father-son relationship.[65] In this model, the members that make up a social whole are not considered mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they partake of one another, and each is constituted by its role in the ritual hierarchy and its relation to the others, such that all are adumbrated in each, a conception that yields distinctive results when applied to natural, linguistic, and metaphysical wholes. This is to be contrasted, on the one hand, to the attitude prevalent in Aristotelian logic and in classical science, which arguably take the fundamental model of a whole from the relation among a collection of discrete objects or independent, inert parts and applies this model to the conceptual and social spheres, and, on the other hand, to animism, which conceives of objects on the model of autonomous human spirits and attributes a particular independent consciousness to each object.

This brings us back to the subject of this book, for here we have a bridge to connect these Chinese conceptions of social community with the seemingly unrelated and even incongruous opposite-unifying mysticism of the later Sinitic metaphysical and ethical systems. Indeed, it allows us to see how far from subverting the social order these apparently wild and antinomian doctrines were. We can also discern various forms of well-articulated intersubjective oligocentrism and a limited range of value paradox in classical Ruism and a full-fledged omnicentrism and value paradox in early Daoism, sometimes with antinomian implications but just as often with a more constrained set of implications. To illustrate this point, and to fill out the background of available tools and precedents relevant to an extended consideration of the Tiantai case, I offer a summary of some of the ways in which these doctrines appear in classical Chinese thought.

Applications of Holism in Early Chinese Thought and Their Axiological Consequences

Chinese holisms veer between a unicentric (albeit anthropocentric) holism, in which the whole alone has value, and the parts as such are individually valueless, except in relation to their fulfillment of a role within the whole, and omnicentrism, in which the whole is in some sense always present in any given part, such that the limited perspectives of the parts do matter, are true, and in some sense encompass the whole in a particular way. This is a fundamental tension in Chinese holism, which has unique tendencies toward the omnicentric form, due perhaps to its earliest assumptions about language and social conceptions of unity, but is also particularly susceptible to abuse, in the unicentric form, when politically applied. The result of the unmitigatedly unicentric form of holism is to rob any part or element—any individual—of an independent claim to his or her own standards or judgment; these are annulled by the absolute right of the whole—of God or the emperor, in other words. In this work I view omnicentrism as a kind of self-overcoming of holism, a consequence of its being, as it were, pushed to its ultimate logical conclusion.

Given these premises, an examination of key Chinese thinkers in terms of holism, social models of order, and value paradox, such as I have attempted elsewhere,[66] reveals a range of value paradox, forming a distinct and powerful current in Chinese thought throughout the classical and medieval periods. Here I briefly adumbrate some of the relevant highlights of this examination. I present only the conclusions of a detailed and extensive textual inquiry, some of which are controversial and perhaps hard to grasp in so summary a form.[67] Despite these limitations, it seems useful to give some sense here, however abbreviated, of the structural applications of the various forms of holism and their axiological consequences in early Chinese thought, as well as briefly noting the ways in which these applications anticipate the Tiantai problematic.

An analysis of the Yin-Yang duality of the Great Commentary to the *Book of Changes*, reveals a system that locates first-order value in "beginning" and anti-value in "finishing," which combine harmoniously to place ultimate meta-value on continuance of the process itself. Indeed, the double valence of "finishing" in this system, both as a provisional relative evil ("finishing"

meaning to end, to destroy, to discontinue) and as a necessary counterpart to the good ("finishing" in the sense of bringing to completion; if this is done in a way that triggers new beginnings, this can also mean to continue), is analogous to the Tiantai notion of the double valence of provisional evil (what is evil in the pre-enlightenment stage is good in the post-enlightenment context). This in turn may be related to the refusal to locate value itself within the field of discourse, as any one specifiable thing, as I suggested in the section on Chinese rhetoric. Rather, value would, on this reading, lie in the continuance of the discourse itself. This may be a reflection of the prevalent literary technique of parallelism in Chinese poetry and prose, in which the valence of any given term in the system depends purely on its relation to its parallel term.

Ruist forms of holism favor a multiple and simultaneous contextualization of the person in several sets of dyadic role relations, each with its own, sometimes contrasting imperatives. Most notable among these is the copresence of the Ruist son in the father/son dyad and the ruler/subject dyad, which called on him to locate his defining value in two contrary roles, in his relation both to the whole and to a specific part of that whole, and to retain the ability to shift his perspective to give precedence to one or the other in varying situations. In some cases, the Ruist son has to put the interests of the smaller whole above those of the larger whole, and this is precisely because the latter is seen to derive from the former and to rest irreducibly on its foundation. Hence Confucius would have a son lie to keep his sheep-stealing father from being punished by official justice (*Analects* 13:18), and Mencius would have the sage-emperor Shun abandon the empire, depriving it of the beneficence of his rule, in order to save his father from official punishment for murder (*Mencius* 7A.34). Both examples show the axiological consequences of the social oligocentric holism operative in early Ruism; the center, the true locus of value, comes from the filial relation, and in some cases this center may override the derivative centrality of the common good. Indeed, the justification of this little value paradox lies in the social nature of the whole in question, the intersubjectivity that obtains between the parts. By protecting his father without abusing the power of his office to do so (Mencius will not have Shun interfere with the administration of justice by the legal authorities by the issuance of a special fiat pardoning his father, which would allow him to retain control of the state), Shun acts as a true exemplar of virtue. His act, we may assume, is perceived by the other "parts" of the greater whole and has a positive transformative influence upon them. By

serving the smaller whole, he is in fact serving the larger whole, in spite of having to negate and abandon it. A similar intersubjective oligocentrism is seen in Confucius' claim that he is engaged in "governing" simply by practicing filiality in the private realm (*Analects* 2:21). The "timely" focus on different wholes, the application of different centers of value in different contexts, is central to the Ruist oligocentrism of value. Of particular interest here are Mencius' ideas of the "timely Mean," the repudiation of clinging to the Mean (7A.26), which foreshadows the Tiantai Nonexclusive Mean, and of virtue as the "enlargement" or expansion, the pushing to the extreme, of the original negative passions (1B.3–5, and *passim*), ideas similar to Zhili's crowning axiological concept, "the all-pervading dung beetle."

In contrast to the distinctive tendency toward oligocentric holism and a related openness to many layers of value paradox in the *Analects* and *Mencius*, the *Mozi* in general shows a hardcore unicentric holism and, with it, a sharp rejection of the Ruist tolerance for and promotion of value paradox. This is most obvious in the "Shangtong" chapter, which describes an ideally unified whole with a single center determining and adjudicating all value, and in the "Feiru" chapter, which takes strenuous exception to the Ruist casuistry that allows Confucius, for example, to approve the stealing of a pig for his own survival in one context while being a stickler for ritual norms in other contexts by applying different value-determining centers in different cases. The *Xunzi* may be seen as an attempt to absorb and neutralize the Mohist unicentrism by adopting a more or less unicentric set of ultimate values while seeking to accommodate as much value paradox at the instrumental level as possible; accompanying this is a marked preference for rhetoric that emphasizes this impression of paradox. The outcome is a system that place a nonnegotiable ultimate value on the satisfaction of communal human desires, and therefore on strength, and therefore on social order, and therefore on social divisions of labor and privileges, and therefore on ritual. Everything instrumental to ritual, however, is negotiable; all sorts of contrary elements may be affirmed as valuable, as long as they serve to promote ritual order.

The classical Daoist texts are even more directly relevant to the value paradoxical positions we will be considering here. The *Laozi* deliberately and self-consciously deploys value paradox through the tactical employment of the reversal of opposites, generally paired according to value disparities. A social resonance is found here as well, centering on the use of the term *ming* 名, interpreted to be a positively valued term meaning primarily "renown" and only secondarily "designation" or "nomenclature" in the logical sense.

The *Laozi* also introduces the term *wu* 無, equivalent to namelessness, "smallness," and valuelessness primarily with an eye to its value implications (absolute worthlessness) and determines it as the source of value and being, an emptiness that can also serve to unify and control the value and being that came forth from it. That is to say, if one refrains from eliminating the negative value pole, as one would be impelled to do if the positive value were explicitly posited as a course to be consciously and exclusively followed, the positive pole gains constancy and thus true value. This was illustrated in passing above in the example of the flower and the dirt. The Daoist innovation presupposes the Ruist model of value, the "magnetic center" model of the exemplar who embodies value and attracts all beings to him. Based on this assumption of the nature of value, the *Laozi* erects its paradoxes on the most magnetic and valuable power of the unseen and the lowly, of that which is left out of all explicit valuing and hence all explicit awareness, of the Absent per se, which we may identify with the tacit dimension that undergirds all more specific values and experiences. This tacit dimension is equally everywhere in that it is nowhere in particular. It is also construed as the "unhewn" (*pu*) that acts both as the negative pole of the positive/negative value dyad (what is left over after the "cut" that articulates the explicit good, the scraps of worthless wood chips left after the valued vessel has been carved) and, retroactively after the positing of the positive pole, as the transcendence of both poles (the totality of uncut raw material that existed before the vessel was carved). In the combined deployment of these motifs, we see the *Laozi* touching off the first, albeit primitive, omnicentrism. Although I interpret this as entailing a both/and attitude toward the two poles, this approach possessed inner tensions that often allowed it to be developed and adapted in some of the Outer Chapters of the *Zhuangzi* (as well as in the *Huainanzi*, *Wenzi*, and other later Daoistically oriented texts) to produce a neither/nor form of transcendence of value opposites.

To sum up, the *Laozi* has the following features: (1) the notion of value arising out of anti-value (also seen, in another context and put to other uses, in the *Xunzi*); (2) the deliberate positing of namelessness, the ultimate anti-value, as the key to ultimate value in the practical sense; (3) the adaptation of the Ruist values of unification and stability into properties of this unseen central point, which, due to the all-pervasiveness of this unseen origin, allows for omnicentrism and thus diversifies the meaning of unification; (4) the double status of this namelessness as both one pole in the nameless-named dyad and as the transcendence of all dyads (which, as we shall see,

structurally anticipates the "relative" and "absolute" marvels in Tiantai, in which we have first the defining contrast and then the sublation of that contrast); and (5) the creative use of the practical paradox of counterproductivity, for example, "if you want to shrink it, first expand it," such that when all know the good as good it ceases to be good. The implication is that if we keep all from knowing the good as good and keep the good from being purely or thoroughgoingly realized as the good, this serves to maintain the good. The continuing existence of the good depends on not fully realizing it. This last point is applied to just the opposite purpose in Tiantai: to destroy something, such as evil, we must expand and realize it.

In the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, we see a full-fledged omnicentrism, based on the consideration of pairs of value *terms*, that is, the opposed and mutually determining concepts of this and that, here and there, good and bad, right and wrong (a concept sometimes attributed, unconvincingly, to the *Laozi*, section 2). The full relativistic consequences are here drawn from the omnicentrism of the symbolic order, in which every "this" implies a complete "this/that" in order to define itself, a whole that is focused and complete in every part, whereby everything is thus equally "this" and therefore equally "that" and also equally "this/that." Zhuangzi thus developed value paradox to new levels. His system promotes a second-order both/and attitude toward negation (neither/nor) and affirmation (both/and) of any given value system. Indeed, even as we ascend the pyramid of instrumental values in search of a stable set of ultimate values, arriving at the opposition of non-knowing (not taking any definitive stance as to what is definitively good, not adopting any perspective as one's exclusively true identity) as the good and knowing (taking such a stance) as the bad, Zhuangzi takes significant steps to undermine even the clear-cut dichotomy between the two, a fact that is significantly related to his radical omnicentrism. In the thoroughgoing perspectivism of the "radical" Zhuangzi of the "Inner Chapters," each perspective necessarily possesses absolute authority to serve as its own defining value, and each, moreover, intersubjectively includes its other, its opposite number. At the same time, it transforms and revalues its opposite according to the standard it embodies as itself, the present perspective. This brings to mind the Tiantai dynamic of mutually contextualizing and redefining perspectives and moments, in eternal mutual regard, each with equal and irrevocable authority to rewrite the rest of the world in its own image, such that "where one is X, all are X."

To summarize a number of crucial thinkers in the tradition, we find

mixtures of unicentric and oligocentric holism in pre-*Analects* texts and in the *Analects* and an increase of the latter in the *Mencius* and late Warring States syncretic Ruist apocrypha (*Liji* texts such as the "Daxue" and "Zhongyong," and the commentaries to the *Book of Changes*, for example). In these texts, a doctrine of what might be called a "graded" oligocentrism appears (certain individuals, due to their cultivation of virtue or their adventitious social position, stand in the pivotal central position, but all have the potential to do so). This is still fairly closely connected to the more commonsense social level (the idea of interpersonal influence, inspiration, and mutual sensitivity), but occasionally it breaks into mystical-sounding extensions of the idea to things in general. Omnicentrism evolves in another, more radical, form in the classical Daoist texts.

Such is the way the most formative aspects of the Chinese philosophical tradition appear to us when we cast over it an eye focused on the issues arising from our core problem, Zhili's claim that "other than the Buddha there is no devil; other than the devil there is no Buddha." Now let us turn to the Buddhist tradition as it presents itself in the Indian tradition, as the other half of the explosive chemical reaction that forms the Tiantai system.

THREE

Value and Anti-value in Indian Buddhism

The three main themes of this work are holism, intersubjective sociality, and value paradox. The general scholarly consensus sees early Indian Buddhism as a religious doctrine whose approach to both human and non-human realms is neither holistic nor intersubjective nor value paradoxical. The dominant position in the Pali canon, indeed, seems to treat human psychology without positive reference to intersubjectivity, holistic structures, or possible value paradoxes. In a certain sense, the Pali canon can be seen as one long polemic *against* precisely these notions. The technique of dharma analysis used in Abidharmic exegeses of the *anātta* (nonself) doctrine, for example, refutes the error of the imputation of Smutsian-type "wholes" such as "self" by breaking down any apparent whole into its component parts, or "dharmas." All such analyses are based on the experience of single individuals, without reference to the influence of such vague presences as "other minds," which would quickly be dismissed in dharma analysis as yet another illusion, one with the terrible moral consequence of blocking liberation as well. Experience is analyzed into individual impressions, in a process rather reminiscent of individualistic empiricism. As for value paradox, there is little room for it in this doctrine. Overwhelmingly, we find a clear-cut dichotomy between good and evil (defined in terms of progress along the path to liberation), a firmly moral stance taken with respect to all possible experience, an

iron law of karma with decidedly moral implications, and a very strict imperative to pursue the good and eschew the bad.[1]

This is not to deny, however, that the seeds of contrary tendencies are present in the Pali texts. On the contrary, the radical negativity of the *anātta* doctrine tended to undermine the firmness of certain opposed categories. Even in Pali Buddhism, the overcoming of dichotomies is a direct consequence of the *anātta* doctrine, which in its more thoroughgoing texts can be read as a denial that the *skandhas* (the component parts into which the putative self is broken down), for example, are the self *or* are not the self. Moreover, the anti-desire imperative is subtle enough to prohibit the desire for nothingness[2] or for the absence of desire as much as any other desire, opening the way for neither/nor paradoxes of the kind described above in discussing the paradoxes issuing from the notion of power.[3] If value is defined as "non-attachment," a thoroughgoing application of this standard undermines itself, thus creating value paradox: to be attached to non-attachment makes non-attachment no longer a value. Non-attachment is hence both value and anti-value. The practical and metaphysical implications of this situation are a challenge to be worked out by each Buddhist system.

Consider also the potential for paradox in the practice of the Mindfulness and Insight forms of meditation. Both require an object, which can be *any* entity, good or bad. Successful mindfulness of a bad object is a good thing. The presence and contemplation of it are in this sense good. Insight into a bad object, even more strikingly, entails the refutation of attachment to that object and of delusions concerning its nature; this is also a good thing. Hence all bad things are potential objects of Buddhist practice and can contribute to progress along the path of enlightenment. In holistic terms, what was initially bad is made good by its inclusion in a different type of whole, namely, the practice of the Buddhist path, even if the item in question itself has not been changed in any way besides this recontextualization. Even in the canon itself, the paradoxical implications of this situation occasionally flash to the surface. Consider the stunning moment in the *Mahā-satipatthāna-sutta* (The foundations of mindfulness; from the *Dīgha-Nikāya*) where we find the deadpan assertion, in the section on mindfulness of the Seven Factors of Enlightenment as one of the Objects of mind, "When the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is absent, he knows, 'The enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is not in me.'"[4] That is, one is to be mindful that one is not mindful. This two-tiered structure of contemplation, allowing mindfulness to exist and not exist at the same time, with the resulting value implications,

provides an unobstructed viaduct for value paradox. Indeed, in a certain sense, the Tiantai value paradoxes are nothing but a direct extension of this simple situation. Anything, however evil, when made an object of contemplation, is a form of good.[5]

Another application of this overcoming of dichotomies can be found in the famous parable of the raft. Buddhist doctrine and practice are likened to a raft that is to be discarded once one has reached the other shore of enlightenment. Here, value (in this case, Buddhist Dharma and practice) is a means to an end, to be discarded when the end is reached. One should practice good and eschew evil. In the end, however, one is to eschew even this form of good, in the attainment of a kind of meta-Good that is in some sense beyond the first-order good and evil. Nonetheless, it bears a special relationship with the first-order good at the expense of the first-order evil, in that the former is the privileged means to the goal of transcending both. This primitive form of the upāya doctrine has ramifications for Tiantai doctrine of upāya, which in my view stands at the very center of the Tiantai doctrine. Indeed, the so-called world-denying nature of early Buddhism's ultimate values (good = tending toward liberation from life and death; bad = tending away from this liberation) necessarily sets up this structure with respect to worldly morality and its karmic consequences. Early Buddhism grudgingly acknowledges worldly morality and prudence, indeed provisionally endorses them, but at the same time it never fails to add that this morality itself is not salvific. The double valence of worldly "good," then. as both good and useless, establishes a rudimentary value-paradoxical structure.

Indeed, the thoroughly instrumental conception of value in Pali Buddhism leads straight toward what later Tiantai calls the doctrine of "antagonistic seeds," the notion that oppositely valued things and actions may create each other. The words usually translated as "good" and "evil" in Pali are *kuśala* and *akuśala*, meaning literally "skillful" and "unskillful." This is not equivalent to social good and bad. As P. A. Payutto notes, "*Kuśala* can be rendered literally as 'intelligent, skillful, content, beneficial, good,' or 'that which removes affliction.'" *Kuśala* and *akuśala* can act as catalysts for each other.

> An act of faith or generosity, moral purity, or even experience of insight during meditation, which are all *kuśala* conditions, can precipitate the arising of conceit, pride and arrogance. Conceit and pride are *akuśala* conditions. This situation is known as "*kuśala* as an agent for *akuśala*." . . . Sometimes the practice of Dhamma (*kuśala*) can be based on a desire to be reborn in heaven (*rāga, akuśala*). A child's

good behaviour and discipline (*kuśala*) can be based on a desire to show off to its elders (*akuśala*); a student's zeal in learning (*kuśala*) can stem from ambition (*akuśala*); anger (*akuśala*), seen in the light of its harmful effects, can lead to wise reflection and forgiveness (*kuśala*); the fear of death (*akuśala*) can encourage self-reflection (*kuśala*): these are all examples of *akuśala* as an agent for *kuśala*.[6]

I shall not here go into the complex question of the arising of the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism in India and its exact relation to the Pali tradition. From our perspective, however, it is clear that these paradoxical implications may be seen as one of the central premises for the development of the Mahāyāna and are brought into sharp relief in the Perfection of Wisdom (*Prajnāpāramitā*) sūtras, which are one of its earliest scriptural expressions. This implication was heeded by Nāgārjuna, the first great theoretician of the Mahāyāna and the greatest influence on Tiantai, and it is no accident that this intensification of value paradox went hand in hand with the radicalization of the doctrine of Emptiness (*sunyatā*), that is, the absence of any definitive "self-nature" or independent identity for all dharmas that are causally conditioned, which for Nāgārjuna meant all phenomena whatsoever. Emptiness, when applied universally and consistenly, as Nāgārjuna did, gives rise to all the characteristics of holism but without the wholes, as it were. When all elements are empty, all are placed in the state of ambiguity with regard to their identity that characterizes the parts in a Smutsian whole, whose meanings are dependent on their context within the whole. It is in the course of explicating this universal state of Emptiness that Nāgārjuna formulated his value paradoxes. As Ng Yu-kwan notes, Nāgārjuna "understands the Middle Way in terms of the transcendence of extremes."[7]

At first glance, Nāgārjuna seemed also to derive from this understanding the explicit identification of Buddhism's traditional highest value and its greatest anti-value, namely, nirvāṇa and saṁsāra (the cycle of birth and death). As Ng says in analyzing this assertion, however, in explicit contrast to similar value/anti-value conflations in Tiantai, this is really a relation of "non-difference" rather than identity in the strong sense. The *Mūlamādhyamakakārikās* state: "Saṁsāra has nothing that distinguishes it from nirvāṇa ; nirvāṅa has nothing that distinguishes it from saṁsāra. The limits of nirvāṇa are the limits of saṁsāra; there is not even the slightest something separating the two."[8] Richard Robinson glosses this as indicating "the identity . . . of nirvāṇa with saṁsāra," but, as his own translation suggests, the point is not really a question of identity; rather, since neither saṁsāra nor nirvāṇa has an

own-being (*svabhāva*) and hence no distinguishing mark of its own identity, there is no possibility of a difference between their own-marks.

The value implications of this claim remain rather ambiguous. The roundabout diction of the passage, and the thought expressed in the rest of the *Kārikās*, suggests that an apodictic assertion of identity per se, a definitive mark pertaining to the relationship between the referents of these two terms, would be unacceptable to Nāgārjuna.[9] The point would seem to be that what is usually called saṁsāra is simply a misapprehension of nirvāṇa, not something genuinely other than it. What is really at stake here, however, from the point of view of value theory, is the status of this misapprehension itself. That is, the question for us is whether this negatively valued misapprehension of the difference between the two is real, and how it is to be related to the positively valued true apprehension. Ng suggests that the motivation for this declaration is, in keeping with the non-apodictic tenor of Mādhyamika thought, not ontological but practical: "What Nāgārjuna means here is that nirvāṇa is attained nowhere else than within the life-death cycle. . . . The Truth is to be realized right in the life-death cycle and not elsewhere. . . . [This claim has] a purely practical and soteriological sense. . . . Nirvāṇa is not a place; therefore, it cannot have a realm of its own, but it can have a realm where it is to be attained."[10] This amounts to saying, "Without relying on everyday common practices (relative truths) the absolute cannot be expressed."[11] However,

> there is a subtle and significant difference between relying on ordinary practices to express the supreme Truth [as in the Mādhyamika case] and expressing the supreme Truth in ordinary practices [as in the Tiantai case]. In the former case, ordinary practices still tend to be instrumental and consequently external to the act of expressing the supreme Truth. In the latter case, ordinary practices become a part of expressing the supreme Truth. . . . Ordinary practices, if they are a part of expressing the supreme Truth, can never be dispensed with. . . . The need to extirpate defilements is, in fact, strongly asserted by Nāgārjuna in the *Kārikā*.[12]

That is, Nāgārjuna calls for the extirpation of false views, not of the empirical world itself, because only there can emptiness be realized. The Mādhyamika position

> identifies nirvāṇa and the life-death cycle to the extent that the supreme Truth (or simply the Truth) must be realized in ordinary practices in the empirical world. It holds that defilements must be extirpated before liberation can be achieved. In the Mādhyamika context, identification is the identification of nirvāṇa or liberation

with the life-death cycle, *not* with defilements. In view of the fact that defilements are part of samsaric existence or the life-death cycle, we have to make a distinction that the identification in question is one of liberation not with the defilements, but with the rest of the life-death cycle.[13]

In other words, although Nāgārjuna explicitly asserts the non-difference of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa, he does not make the systematic claim of the non-difference of *bodhi* and *kleśa* (defilements); that is, there would still seem to be room to see a dichotomy, not of objective facts of different value but at least of subjective apprehensions about these facts. Nāgārjuna does not admit the existence of *kleśa* in "ultimate truth" (*paramārtha satya*); they, like everything else, are empty, devoid of an actual referent.[14] But in practical terms, that is, in terms of "provisional truth" (*samvrti satya*), one can be *either* deluded *or* enlightened about the emptiness of all dharmas, and this is where the true value dichotomy comes in. One cannot be both deluded and enlightened at the same time; a strict excluded middle applies here. As Robinson notes, "In the *Stanzas*, Nāgārjuna maintains one viewpoint throughout"[15]—that is, the viewpoint of "ultimate truth."

From this consideration, we can see that the question really reduces to the relation between ultimate and provisional truth. What determines the character of Nāgārjuna's value theory is the fact that he maintains a fixed hierarchy between ultimate and provisional truth. On the level of ultimate truth, strictly speaking, neither the proposition "saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are the same" nor the proposition "saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are different" is acceptable. On the level of provisional truth, on the other hand, saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are definitely different. Nāgārjuna's statement that there is no difference between them is made, as are all the statements in the *Kārikās*, from the viewpoint of ultimate truth, not to establish a position but to negate the perverted view that in ultimate truth the two are in fact different entities. This is just one more example of the Mādhyamika rejection of any assertion of self-nature. This neither establishes anything about the relation of value and anti-value in ultimate truth (indeed, the question is there perfectly meaningless, since neither value nor anti-value any long refers to anything—as thorough a neither/nor as can be imagined) nor changes anything about the conventional dichotomous relation between the two in provisional truth.

In Mādhyamika Two Truths theory, we have really three separate categories: a large class of statements that are simply false, even in terms of conventional truth (for example, the heretical theories of non-Buddhist philosophers who assert the real existence of self-natures of various kinds, of

cause and effect, of self and other, and claim to have a consistent theoretical explanation of these as ultimate truths); a small set of statements that are true in terms of conventional truth (ordinary speech about things, self, causality, and the Buddhist deployment of these terms to express the means for the practice the path to liberation); and then ultimate truth, which is exclusive of both of the previous categories. This differs sharply from the situation in Tiantai, in which, as we shall see, all statements whatsoever are both provisionally true and ultimately false, and to be provisionally true is itself a form of being ultimately true. These two categories, in this view, are co-extensive with regard to their content; there is nothing in delusion that is not in provisional truth, and nothing in provisional truth that is not in ultimate truth, and vice versa. The implications of this strange notion leads directly into the heart of Tiantai value paradox.

The Mādhyamika view would seem to represent the furthest reach of the identification of value and anti-value in the theoretical works of Indian Buddhism (as opposed to isolated statements in the sūtras, whose susceptibility to an unconstrained range of multiple interpretations seems to leave the problem of their ultimate reference eternally open),[16] at least before the advent of Tantric Buddhism, which however postdates Zhiyi's work on this problem in China.[17]

Another Indian source that has bearing on this issue is Tathāgata-garbha (womb or embryo of the Tathāgata) thought, especially in the form of the Buddha-nature theory, for example as put forth in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and the related idea of universal Buddhahood,[18] ideas that were matters of intense concern in pre-Tiantai Chinese Buddhism.[19] The idea that all sentient beings possessed the Buddha-nature and would all without exception someday realize this potential and become Buddhas effectively asserts that, to some extent and in some manner, the anti-value of present sentient experience possesses within itself the potentiality of the ultimate value of Buddhahood, which will become actual at some time in the future. This basic notion can be unpacked in many different ways. The exact relation between this "potential" and this "future realization," on the one hand, and the present actuality of deluded experience, on the other, left room for numerous interpretations. Zhiyi would end up interpeting it in light of the value-paradoxical notions put forth not only in the *Prajñā-pāramitā* and the *Vaipulya* sūtras (e.g., the *Vimalakīrti* and *Ratnakūta*) and in Mādhyamika works but also, crucially, in the doctrine of the relation between conventional and ultimate truth developed in the *Lotus Sūtra* (*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra*), which were

without doubt the decisive theoretical basis for Zhiyi's developments concerning value paradox.[20] The notion of emptiness developed in these works is the key conceptual lever that makes the idea of value paradox possible. In Zhiyi's case, this notion evolves into the doctrine of the Three Truths (Emptiness, Provisional Positing, and the Mean), and the subtle spin this puts on the Two Truths of the Indian sources may be correlated with the extra developments on the value-paradox front that are found in Zhiyi but not in Nāgārjuna. That is, once the stable hierarchy between the Two Truths is transformed into the equality in status entailed by the "interfusion" or "mutual identity" of the Three Truths in Zhiyi's sense, the character of the value theory, or the interpretation of the ambiguous statements of value paradox and its relation to the fundamental notion of Emptiness, was also necessarily transformed. This in turn allowed the notion of Buddha-nature to be identified with the the Three Truths and hence made possible the overcoming of the duality between potentiality and actuality and between future and present that separated value and anti-value in the older Tathāgata-garbha vision. Above all, the *Lotus Sūtra*'s depiction of the relationship between the śrāvakahood and bodhisattvahood, such that the former is susceptible to being recontextualized to reveal that it has always already also been readable as the latter, without having to be changed in the least, provided a model for the key concept of inherent entailment or inclusion (*xingju* 性具), which was to form the cornerstone of the Tiantai system and radically transform its treatment of all the more general Buddhist concepts and themes found in the other scriptures.

The Indian notion of Emptiness *can be seen as* implying all three of the main themes of this work: holism, even omnicentric holism, since it does not permit the positing of any one whole but insists on the interdependence of all possible concepts and entities;[21] intersubjectivity, since no being can be independent; value paradox, because of the mutual dependence and inseparability of value determinations. However, these implications were not always drawn out to the same extent. As we saw above, Nāgārjuna seemed to take value paradox only so far. He did not seem to develop the ideas of intersubjectivity or holism at all, for reasons that are not hard to grasp when we consider the primarily epistemological goals of his project and the avoidance of anything resembling a positive doctrine entailed by those goals. This avoidance may be viewed as a result of the hierarchy that persists in the Mādhyamika teaching between the conventional and the ultimate truths. This, of course, marks the crucial doctrinal difference between Tiantai and

Mādhyamika. Tiantai starts by raising conventional truth to equal footing with ultimate truth, thereby also raising the importance of intersubjective communication (teaching, talking about doctrine—intersubjectivity); this in turn leads to a different attitude toward positive doctrine. Indian sūtras such as the *Avataṁsaka*, which make so much of the imagery of one entering all and all entering each, may be seen as taking the emptiness notion as a basis for holistic and intersubjective developments. But these developments raised potential problems.

First, there was the problem of the relation between the unspeakable ultimate truth revealed by the emptiness critique and the positive doctrines, practices, and institutions of Buddhism. This was far from a merely scholastic problem; it had vital practical implications. Indeed, in the early history of Buddhism in China, this was literally a question of life and death. For example, Emperor Wu of Northern Qi adduced three reasons for his persecution of Buddhism, the first being that "Buddhists had built monasteries and stūpas in flagrant violation of Buddhism's own claim that true Buddhas were formless." Huiyuan combated this by saying: "As for the proclamation 'true Buddhas have no images' (*zhen fo wu xiang* 眞佛無相), it is certainly correct as stated in your imperial decree [from the viewpoint of ultimate truth]. But living beings, who [depend] solely on their ears and nose, must rely on the scriptures to hear the Buddha and depend on the images for the truth to be revealed."[22] Huiyuan's response is an appeal to the notion of the Two Truths, the provisional (conventional) and the ultimate truth, which was aimed at solving this problem; here the conventional truth is tied to the intersubjective nature of Buddhist compassion, which must accommodate the interactive needs of sentient beings in promulgating the liberating doctrine. All Buddhist morality, institutions, and doctrines, *qua* positive contents, fall into the category of conventional truth (or, more strictly, propositions such as "these institutions have value" or "you should do these things" are merely conventional truth). Their ultimate justification rests on the importance of the intersubjective dimension of Buddhist practice. Tiantai Buddhism takes as its starting point and its guiding thread the refinement of this idea.

We could try to analyze how Zhiyi saw Indian Buddhism, a kind of reception theory of Tiantai, by identifying which texts Zhiyi mentions or quotes, the relative frequency and rhetorical emphases of these references, the signs of his particular level and angle of understanding of the various Indian doctrines available at the time, and the linguistic limitations and distortions under which Zhiyi labored. But in my opinion none of this would get

us to the essential impact that Indian Buddhism had on Zhiyi. My position is that the most crucial message of the Indian sūtras to Zhiyi, even above and beyond the specific doctrine of Emptiness, meditation techniques, devotional injunctions, and so on, beyond any specific content in this massive and contradictory set of teachings flooding into China, all attributed to the authority of the Buddha, was precisely that a massive and contradictory set of teachings was attributed to the authority of the Buddha.[23] In one sense, that is, it is almost irrelevant *what* the Indian Buddhist scriptures received by Zhiyi said. The real message of this massive influx of texts was this: The Buddha said *everything*, all contradictions, even opposed doctrines, and he never lied and was always right. In the face of this, what was not irrelevant was that this welter of contradiction contained two tools with which the welter itself could be understood: the notion of Emptiness and the notion of Two Truths, or upāya, especially as expressed in the *Lotus Sūtra*. Emptiness, as an assertion of the essential relativity of any positive content (ontological or epistemological), can function as a theoretical underpinning for the notion of upāya. The connection between these two great Mahāyāna themes forms the backbone of Tiantai doctrine.

Zhiyi faced the problem of establishing the relative status of all the Buddhist doctrines. He ended up putting the *Lotus Sūtra* at the very top. That is, he made the meta-doctrine concerned with relating all the other doctrines to each other and stating that all of them lead to Buddhahood the ultimate meaning of all the doctrines themselves. One result of this was to place the value-paradoxical doctrines found in various places in the sūtras (but notably lacking in any explicit or striking form in the *Lotus* itself) at the head of all doctrines. Zhiyi makes the judgment that doctrines that assert value dichotomy (nirvāṇa is the negation of saṁsāra; *bodhi* and *kleśa* are dichotomous) are less comprehensive and more preliminary than the value-paradoxical teachings (that nirvāṇa is the same as saṁsāra). He gave the seal of ultimate teaching to the *Lotus Sūtra*, which amounts to the doctrine that all these different ideas are one (nirvāṇa is the negation of saṁsāra and identical to saṁsāra, or to say one is to say the other as well), and all practices lead to Buddhahood. By doing so, it may appear that he is dealing the final deathblow to positive Buddhist doctrines and practices, but in fact, his antinomian-sounding proclamations actually function as a way of saving these positive doctrines and practices. In effect, Zhiyi was saying, yes, Buddhism as an institution is nothing but a huge mass of delusions and attachments—but the ultimate teaching of Buddhism, in the *Lotus Sūtra* as viewed through

its encounter with the Three Truths doctrine derived from the Mādhyamika notion of Emptiness, is that delusions are themselves the truth. Thus, the doctrine that defilements and delusions are identical to the ultimate truth is a way of saving Buddhist practice and doctrine. "Defilements and delusions" refers, in Zhiyi's usage, to both ordinary ignorance and sin *and* the specific Buddhist institutions meant to remedy the latter. The big gap, in other words, is not between "good" and "evil," but between both of these and the real truth, which is beyond good and evil or inclusive of both good and evil, and incapable of being definitively stated as any positive content whatsoever. The Three Truths reading of emptiness, as a development of upāya theory, is a way to bridge this gap. By affirming evil, Zhiyi was able to affirm morality. Otherwise he would have had to give up both. Similarly, Zhili's emphasis on the absolute indestructibility and ultimacy of every perverse and deluded phenomenon went hand in hand with his commitment to specific institutional forms of ritual praxis. We will try to explain how this works in the pages that follow.

FOUR

Tiantai Basics: Omnicentric Holism

The following discussion of the philosophical aspects of the Tiantai tradition is divided into three parts corresponding to the three main themes of this work. This chapter treats the question of holism; Chapter 5, intersubjectivity; and Chapter 6, value paradox. As I hope to show, the Tiantai case is the most extreme and thoroughgoing form of all three of these doctrines: the most complete omnicentric holism, the most uncompromising and explicit notion of all-pervading intersubjectivity, and the most radical notion of value paradox.

Needless to say, each of the three impacts on the others. This first chapter, moreover, takes the form of a refresher course in Tiantai basics, as well as a review of all relevant pre-Tiantai Buddhist ideas as adapted by Zhiyi, to give the reader my take on how these basic ideas are to be understood, in those cases in which scholars are not in total agreement. My aim is to deal with the terms and doctrines developed by Zhiyi himself (as depicted by his scribe Guanding), but in many cases it is impossible to do this without at least implicit reference to Zhanran's and Zhili's interpretations (that is to say, a writer partial to other interpretative traditions within Tiantai, for example, the Shanwai theorists—would explain these basic terms differently).

The Tiantai system, like all Buddhist thought, is rooted in the basic problem of suffering. The motivation underlying all this theorizing is ostensibly soteriological, a search for a remedy to the general unsatisfactoriness of

birth, sickness, old age, death, and so forth. The affirmations of evil and suffering involved in the Tiantai system, which may seem so contrary to that fundamental aim, are in fact intimately bound up with and determined by it. The Tiantai solution to the problem of suffering lies in thinking through to the end a tendency foreshadowed in much Mahāyāna thought. The overcoming of suffering is seen as ultimately a question of coming to understand that the apparent dichotomy between suffering and liberation (enlightenment, bliss) is false, rather than the elimination of a real entity called suffering. The torment of finitude lies, in this view, in the mistaken notion that torment and bliss (as well as finitude and infinity) are mutually exclusive, in the erroneous view that to attain bliss it is necessary to eradicate torment rather than to experience that bliss within, or perhaps even *as*, the (first-order) torment itself. The theory of omnicentric holism is a mechanism by which this aim is to be achieved. Value paradox of this kind, as explained in the Introduction, rests on a claim about the "identity" of good and evil. But this identity is also supposed to preserve the difference and even the conflict between the two, such that identity and difference are seen to be mutually entailing and mutually inclusive. This understanding of identity is mediated by the notion that each of the two opposite "parts" that constitute the situation (suffering and its abolition, evil and good) is, itself alone, the whole. Hence suffering is both suffering-and-bliss, and bliss is also both suffering-and-bliss. In this sense, they are identical to one another, even as they maintain their difference from one another rather than being dissolved into some neutral *tertium quid*. This, in a nutshell, is the link between omnicentric holism and value paradox.

As we shall see, the Tiantai concept of the Non-Exclusive Mean transforms the traditional Buddhist concepts of Emptiness and substancelessness into a doctrine about omnicentric holism. My aim here, then, is to build toward a comprehension of the distinctive Tiantai notion of holism developed from this concept of the Non-Exclusive Mean. This concepts of the Mean and of the holism it undergirds are embodied in the doctrine of "mutual entailment" (*huju* 互具), which is elaborated most extensively as "the three thousand quiddities inherently entailed in each moment of experience" (*yinian sanqian* 一念三千), the final topic of this chapter. To make this topic intelligible, however, it is necessary first to explain its component parts, and these span all the basic notions of Tiantai thought.

PART I: THE BASICS

The Four Teachings and the Three Truths

The Four Teachings (*sijiao* 四教)[1] are the backbone of Zhiyi's "classification of teachings" (*panjiao* 判教), his method for explaining and sorting out the doctrinal contradictions in the scriptures attributed to the Buddha. This method entails an implicit hermeneutic strategy, a strategy that underwrites all of Zhiyi's discussions of Buddhist texts: every term used in every text has a different meaning when that text is read in light of each of these four teachings. The term "Emptiness" in a particular text, for example, is understood differently by practitioners of each of the four teachings, even if they are reading the same text.

The first ingredients for the Tiantai theory of omnicentric holism appear in the development of the concept of the Mean, the third of the so-called Three Truths (*sandi* 三諦).[2] The Mean, in Tiantai, comes to be associated with the assertion that "all dharmas are reducible to" (*yiqie fa qu* 一切法趣) any given dharma. This is what makes possible the notion that all three thousand quiddities are inherently included or entailed in each quiddity, that this one dharma therefore includes the entire universe of quiddities as viewed by all possible subjectivities, that it is the whole, and that there is nothing outside it. This idea emerges in the course of explicating the doctrine of Emptiness (*kong* 空) and its relation to Provisional Positing (*jia* 假), which forms the matrix that produces the concept of the Three Truths, namely, Emptiness, Provisional Positing, and the Mean. These are understood differently in each of the Four Teachings.

The Four Teachings are:

1. The Tripiṭaka Teaching (*zangjiao* 藏教)—usually associated with the *Agamas*, and more generally Hīnayāna Buddhism as a whole, or the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas).

2. The Common Teaching (*tongjiao* 通教), so-called because it is common to all four teachings and is the basic tenet on which further doctrines are built in the last two types of teachings. It is associated with the teaching of Emptiness in the *Prajñā-pāramitā sūtras* and certain interpretations of the teaching of Nāgārjuna.

3. The Separate Teaching (*biejiao* 別教), so called not only because it is a special vehicle for bodhisattvas but also because it conceives of the parts of

various doctrines (e.g., the stages of practice, the Three Truths) as separate rather than integrated and interpenetrating. It is sometimes associated with certain versions of Buddha-nature, Consciousness-only, and Tathāgata-garbha thought.

4. The Integrated Teaching (*yuanjiao* 圓教), literally the Round or Perfect Teaching.

The Tripiṭaka Teaching propounds a doctrine of "analytic Emptiness" (*xikong* 析空). This is the concept of Emptiness as understood through dharma analysis, *anātta* (non-self), impermanence, and the like. Any given entity will eventually disintegrate since it is composed of various heterogeneous elements; hence, it is called empty. A self is composed of the five *skandhas* (form, sensation, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness), for example. When one see the self as entirely composed of these heterogeneous elements, all of which are impermanent and not within conscious control, the notion of self as a unified, constant master of experience is refuted, and clinging to this self, and whatever belongs to a self, is overcome. The extension of this method to external objects renders them "empty" in the sense that they, too, are impermanent, constructed, and without a constant self-nature of their own. This teaching conceives of the Four Noble Truths of primitive Buddhism (unsatisfactoriness, the origin of unsatisfactoriness in clinging or thirst, the possibility of overcoming unsatisfactoriness, and the method by which this is to be achieved) as referring to entities that come into being or go out of being (*shengmie sidi* 生滅四諦). That is, unsatisfactoriness and clinging to desire actually arise and then are remedied by another thing that actually arises, the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path, which leads to the real destruction of these defilements and their replacement with another real that then comes into existence, namely, nirvāṇa.

The Common Teaching propounds "embodied Emptiness" (*tikong* 體空). This means, first of all, a further thinking-through of the previous method, such that the heterogeneous elements into which a given entity is analyzed, revealing its dissolution into Emptiness, are themselves susceptible to the same analysis; each of the heterogeneous elements is itself composed of other heterogeneous elements. If this concept of Emptiness is extended universally to all possible states, elements, conditions, and concepts, the nature of Emptiness changes. Now all things per se are seen as empty *in themselves*, like mirages or illusory images in a mirror, irrespective of their dissolution. They are illusory in the precise sense that it is always necessarily

possible to "pull back" from them, to see their contingent or dependent nature, to see them as the elements or conditions that compose them rather than as themselves. More crucial than this extension of the notion of composition, however, is another feature of this teaching, namely, the shift in emphasis from Emptiness as a result of composition from elements to Emptiness as a result of relativity or conditionality per se. A given entity X is established by its relation to non-X, whether as an element of its composition or as an apparently external conceptual contrast that forms the background which makes its appearance possible. It is not the fact that it necessarily decomposes into its elements which qualifies it as empty here. Instead, the universality of conditionality itself, or the necessary reference to some otherness that applies to every possible existent, is what is meant by Emptiness. Moreover, the Emptiness of things is more real and more important than what they appear as; it is the truth about all things, the realization of which brings liberation. All things are empty as such, even if should they happen to be there forever. This is also known as the teaching of "Exclusive Emptiness" (*dan kong* 但空). It takes the Four Noble Truths (including both unsatisfactoriness and desire and Buddhist practices that overcome them) as referring to things that are neither born nor destroyed (*wusheng sidi* 無生四諦), for since both the suffering and the path are empty in this sense, there is no real entity that arises or passes away in the process of either ordinary experience or of Buddhist cultivation.

The Separate Teaching is quite complex, as we shall see below, but it is often associated with the slogan "Exclusive Mean" (*danzhong* 但中) or "Exclusive Principle" (*danli* 但理). This is the Exclusive Mean, which entails the realization not only of Emptiness, as in the Common Teaching, but of non-emptiness as well, and through this double realization posits a third term, the Mean, to be discussed in detail below, but which here is seen as transcending the two extremes, far away from them, "separate" from the two poles. It takes the Four Noble Truths as referring to an infinity of Provisional Posits (*wuliang sidi* 無量四諦). The Mean is itself neither Emptiness nor Provisional Positing, but it can posit itself *as* either, can take on an infinity of shapes, unrestricted to any one-sided form, in response to an infinity of types of unsatisfactoriness, in association especially with the Bodhisattva path.

The Integrated Teaching propounds the Nonexclusive Mean (*budan zhong* 不但中). This is just like the Mean of the Separate Teaching, but it is seen as interpenetrating with the two extremes, so that each extreme is identical to the Mean itself. Each of the three terms encompasses both of the

others. They are merely three aspects of one fact, three ways of stating the same thing, as, for example, "equilateral triangle" is another way of saying "equiangular triangle." One need only think any one through to the end to see that it is the others as well. Any entity that is empty is also provisionally posited and the Mean; any entity that is provisionally posited is also empty and the Mean; any entity that is the Mean is also empty and provisionally posited. This teaching takes the Four Noble Truths as referring to something which is beyond thought and unmade (*buke siyi wuzuo sidi* 不可思議無作四諦). That is, there is no Path and eradication of suffering separate from suffering and the cause of suffering, for these two value poles turn out to be one and the same.[3] Suffering thought through to the end turns out always to have meant the eradication of suffering and vice versa, just as Provisional Positing means Emptiness and vice versa, and both mean the Mean and vice versa. The distinguishing mark of the Mean, as we shall see below, is a particular understanding of the conclusion to be drawn from this understanding, namely, that "all dharmas are reducible to" any dharma, the principle of omnicentric holism.[4]

The Three Truths appear only in the Separate and the Integrated Teachings. In the Integrated Teaching, the Three Truths assert the presence of three aspects in any entity, however concrete or abstract, and at every level of self-reference. Any given quiddity—and this applies to anything present to consciousness on any level: an object, a thought, a representation, this sentence, the idea or assertion of the Three Truths itself, that to which such an assertion refers, the act of referring itself, a word, Buddhahood, the whole, a part, wholeness, partness—can be said to be empty of "self-nature"—that is, of an unchanging, independent, individual essence that is mutually exclusive with all that is not itself. It is empty because this quiddity X is causally determined and relative to other, qualitatively different quiddities, non-X's of various kinds. Indeed, this X is nothing but these non-X's. To be X, then, is to be non-X. In that case, there is no X (defined, again, as a quiddity that must be exclusive of non-Xness) that is in fact caused to arise by these non-X factors; no X ever arises. For that very reason, this X never perishes. Given the absence of this X as result, moreover, the non-X's cannot be considered causes or even non-X's, for there is no X to negate or stand in contrast to; so we cannot say all is simply non-X either. This applies to all X's of any kind. Such is the Emptiness of all things understood in Tiantai teaching, an understanding that is more or less consistent with the *Prajnā-pāramitā* sūtras and Nāgārjuna.

Zhiyi adds (while claiming that Nāgārjuna meant as much) it is true that whatever appears turns out not to appear, in this sense; that to be X is to be non-X; that X is empty. But this very X can also, equally justly, be described as provisionally posited. That is, to be non-X is also precisely to be X. Neither of these two claims is ultimate or has a privileged status over the other; they are of equal stature. Indeed, these two facts about the thing turn out to be one and the same fact. They are merely two alternative ways of referring to the same fact.

But *this* fact is one *more* thing that can be said about the quiddity in question: its emptiness *is precisely* its provisional positing and vice versa. This is what is initially called the truth of the Mean (*zhong* 中). The further implications of the Mean are derived from this starting point.

Before we look into these further implications, more must be said about "provisional positing." The term *jia* comes from the translation of the Sanskrit term meaning "provisional name" (*jiaming* 假名): *prajñapti*. The source for the term most often quoted by Zhiyi is Nāgārjuna's famous *gāthā* from the *Kārikās*. The Chinese version, famously and importantly ambiguous, can be rendered:

> All dharmas arising from causes and conditions
> I say are identical to Emptiness.
> It is also a mere Provisional Name.
> It is precisely what we call the Middle Way.[5]

As Ng Yu-kwan points out, "In this verse, Nāgārjuna reminds us of the provisionality of Emptiness, or the fact that Emptiness is a Provisional Name. . . . Emptiness as a name or concept does not convey anything ultimate."[6] Ng explains: "Provisional Name in Sanskrit, *prajñapti*, means 'appointment,' 'agreement,' and 'engagement.' Generally speaking, it denotes some sort of mental articulation, in which a name is appointed to represent certain worldly entities, which are in the nature of dependent or relational origin. . . . 'Provisional' in Chinese, *chia* [*jia*], means ' borrowed or 'instrumental'; and is therefore without absolute reference."[7] There is a distinction here between the name or concept and the entity itself. Nāgārjuna (especially in the *Kārikās*, with some divergence in the *Dazhidulun*, if it is indeed his work, which is highly doubtful) means the former, Zhiyi the latter, by *jia*.[8] As Ng sums up, "In other words, the Provisional is what Emptiness is based on, and it is through the Provisional that Emptiness can be expressed. It follows that the Provisional is the expressing, and Emptiness the ex-

pressed."[9] That is, Nāgārjuna is simply saying that "Emptiness" is a Provisional Name, and that this acknowledgment is itself an instance of the application of the old Buddhist notion of the Middle Way. He does not seem to be saying, as Zhiyi wants to read it, that all conditioned dharmas are (1) Empty, (2) Provisional Names, and (3) The Mean, much less these three are ultimately identical. As Andō Toshio says:

> The meaning of the Sanskrit text is that all dharmas are empty, that this emptiness is provisional, and this provisionalness is the Middle Path—it is absolutely not saying that all dharmas are empty, are provisional, are the Mean. Moreover, the term here for "provisional" is cognate with the term for "a supposition," implying a temporary borrowing and hence a sense of negation. "Emptiness" is what is here indicated as a provisional name. So the sense of the *Kārikās* is that this "provisional" is like saying that "emptiness is also empty"—it certainly does not have the sense of "establishing all dharmas," as Zhiyi would have it.[10]

Thus, Zhiyi's use of this term marks him off sharply from his Mādhyamika precursors. I do not mean to say, however, that he betrays them. From his own point of view, he is drawing out a meaning that is implicitly present in the *Kārikās*, which in Zhiyi's classification of teachings can be read as belonging to any of the last three types of teaching: the Common, the Separate, and the Integrated. In the context of each of these understandings, the words of the *Kārikās* will, and ought to, have different meanings.[11]

For Zhiyi, *jia* means "provisional positing." This means not only "establishing all dharmas," (as Zhanran summarizes)[12] but also establishing them *provisionally*. The claim here is that "to exist" really always means, and can only mean, "to be set up, to be posited, and to be posited in accordance with certain local conditions." This plays not only on the sense of the Chinese term as "falsehood" but, more important, on the notion of upāya in the *Lotus Sūtra*. As Andô points out, for Zhiyi not only is provisional positing identical to Emptiness, but it is also its opposite. In this, Zhiyi's use differs profoundly from that found in the Mādhyamika and its Chinese representatives such as the Three Treatise School of Jizang (549–623).[13] As Zhiyi says in the *Mohezhiguan*, "Provisional positing is a name for what is in itself deluded, baseless, topsy-turvy."[14] Here the term is contrasted to the truth of Emptiness: it really means falsehood in the first instance. This is crucial, for it means there is a real and severe conflict between the two truths, and the Mean is an identity between two terms that are true opposites, in a real conflict. The fact that all three truths are preserved equally,[15] furthermore, means that the solution offered by the (non-exclusive) Mean does not elimi-

nate this conflict; rather, the conflict exists forever within it—a point to be recalled later in the discussion of "inherent evil." In contrast to Emptiness (which is, indeed, often characterized as the "real, i.e., Ultimate, truth," *zhen di* 眞諦), which is a "true" insight into the non-establishment of the self-nature of any dharma, Provisional Positing is the ultimately *deluded* positing of all dharmas as existent and possessing a quiddity that excludes all others, together with the clinging and suffering thus implied.

However, this is not the whole story. The second point is that this "delusion" is itself to be understood according to the notion of upāya in the *Lotus Sūtra*. *Jia* can also mean "to provisionally posit" in the sense of saying "Let's put it this way," or "Suppose for the sake of argument." It is what a buddha or bodhisattva does in creating various "false" doctrines or temporarily assuming a form to enlighten listeners, in accordance with their capacities.—Zhiyi refers to this sense of *jia* as "provisional positing in the sense of putting forth provisional teachings" (*shiquan zhi jia* 施權之假).[16] This is the manner in which the two extremes of truth and falsehood, Emptiness and Provisional Positing, are reconciled, such that both are forms of "truth."[17] According to the *Lotus Sūtra*, all the teachings of the Buddha, in spite of their conflicting and often (strictly speaking) false contents, are "true" in the sense that all lead to enlightenment, and indeed all lead to Buddhahood (which is, among other things, the capacity to tell these true lies) itself. The existence of all phenomena is seen as fundamentally analogous to the way in which buddhas and bodhisattvas establish not-quite-true *teachings* in order to enlighten benighted listeners. The relationship between Emptiness and Provisional Positing is the same as that between what the Buddha knows in his own heart as the truth and how he expresses it through cognitively false statements to unenlightened others. These may be opposites in terms of cognitive content, but since the latter are merely means toward the former and derive from them, they are at the same time consistent and fundamentally one and the same. This sense of Provisional Positing has vast implications for intersubjectivity, which I discuss in Chapter 5.

The Mean that is the unity of these two extremes must be a "nonexclusive" mean to qualify for inclusion in Zhiyi's Integrated Teaching. That is, it must not transcend the other two truths. The difference between the first two truths, indeed even their opposition, must be preserved along with their harmony or identity. Both moments must be conceivable not only as separate, determinate, opposed, and necessary but also as inseparable and ultimately identical in content *by virtue of* their very opposition.[18] This Non-

exclusive Mean, as the insight into the mutual inherence of the presence and absence of any entity and hence as a refutation of the possibility of any "inside/outside" or "self/other" dichotomy applicable to any dharma, refers to the fact that this dharma inherently entails all other dharmas. The Mean, it is repeatedly said, is what cuts off the condition of mutual dependence or relativity (*juedai* 絕待—see below), so that to see that any given quiddity "is the Mean" is to see that this quiddity "is identical to the entire dharma-realm." As we shall see in more detail below, this means that there cannot possibly be any "it-excluding outside" to this quiddity and this quiddity must pervade whatever times and places exist. Moreover, since there can be no "other-excluding inside" to it either, there is no other quiddity in any other time or place that does not pervade it, that is not present here *as* it. Further, this aspect of all things, the Mean, itself works toward its own realization and expression. The ways by which one comes to understand and practice the Mean are no other than the end, which is itself just this understanding and practice in their mutual entailment.

By virtue of this understanding of the Mean as identical to, rather than transcending, the two extremes, everything that can be said of the Mean can also be said of both Emptiness and Provisional Positing. Hence, "all dharmas are reducible to Emptiness, all are reducible to Provisional Positing, all are reducible to the Mean."[19] As the *Mohezhiguan* puts it:

> Where one is Empty, all are Empty [i.e., from the standpoint of emptiness, emptiness may be predicated of anything]; there is no Provisional Positing or Mean that is not Empty—this is the contemplation on Emptiness as the Universal. Where one is Provisionally Posited, all are Provisionally Posited; there is no Emptiness or Mean that is not a Provisional Posit—this is the contemplation of Provisional Positing as the Universal. Where one is the Mean, all are the Mean; there is no Emptiness or Provisional Positing that is not the Mean—this is the contemplation of the Mean as the universal.[20]

That is meant to imply not only that all three aspects are applicable everywhere (even, reflectively, to the concepts and contemplations themselves) but also that any of these three concepts, if thought through to the end, reveals itself to be simply another way of stating the other two. You cannot speak of Emptiness without *thereby* admitting Provisional Positing *and* its identity qua harmony/conflict with Emptiness. You cannot speak of Provisional Positing without *thereby* admitting Emptiness *and* its identity with Provisional Positing. Indeed, Tiantai writers stress that Emptiness *alone* has the function not only of negating the own-being of all existents but also of

establishing them and manifesting their absoluteness. Similarly, Provisional Positing *alone* has the function not only of establishing all existents but of negating their own-being and manifesting their absoluteness. (The same, importantly, is true of any *particular* provisional posit as such; to be is to be provisionally posited, which is to have all three of these functions.) The Mean *alone* has the function not only of manifesting the absoluteness of all existents but also of negating their own-being and establishing them. Each one is all three, and each one functions as all three. The importance and content of this idea should become clearer as we proceed.

In Tiantai, all references to "principle" or "the Nature"[21] are, in the first instance, a shorthand way of indicating the Three Truths, which thus also means "that which serves to explain all other things" or, since the "explanation" intended here is not a single objective account but a soteriological device, "that aspect of things which, if seen, leads to liberation."[22] To say "X is identical to principle" therefore means "X is Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Mean, which necessarily implies that X is that to which all other dharmas can be reduced; this particular Xness (redness, dogness, evilness) per se is the principle of all dharmas. Liberation consists in seeing this Xness as that which all other dharmas are expressing, in seeing Xness as expressing all other dharmas, and in seeing the identity of these two claims." This must be recalled every time these terms are used.[23]

The Two Truths, Conventional and Ultimate, are a staple of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism and are especially important in Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika. There Conventional Truth usually refers to both the constructs of ordinary speech and the speech used in the edifying discourse of Buddhism itself, such as everyday discussions of self and other, cause and effect, suffering and liberation (although in Mādhyamika, in contrast to Tiantai, this does not include notions developed by non-Buddhist philosophers and religions). The Ultimate Truth refers to the Emptiness of these constructs, the realization that all of them are merely conventional terms with no corresponding real self-nature; this is manifested in meditational practice, which is itself strictly speaking beyond speech or concepts. In the *Fahuaxuanyi*, Zhiyi specifies seven distinct understandings of the Two Truths.[24] These amount to seven different ways of understanding the relationship between a particular quiddity and its own Emptiness, between a given X and its constitutive non-Xness. The first two of these seven correspond to the Tripiṭaka and Common teachings, respectively, and the last five are various forms of the Separate and Integrated teachings.[25]

Zhiyi introduces the phrase "all dharmas are reducible to" (*yiqie fa qu* — 切法趣) X in the fourth of these seven understandings as the hallmark of the Integrated Teaching. This concept, which provides a mechanism for understanding how the whole can be equated with any one part inserts into the discussion of the relation between Emptiness and conventional reality the idea of the Mean, which initially signified simply the simultaneity or mutual identity of X and its own constitutive non-Xness. A further thinking-through of this concept, as entailing this notion of "all being reducible to any one part," produces the Tiantai omnicentric holism. The phrase itself derives from the larger *Pañcavimśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā sūtra* translated by Kumārajiva (343–413), but, as Zhiyi points out in the text under discussion, adherents of each of the various teachings understand the phrase in distinctive ways.[26] Zhiyi notes three principal ways:

When the first type of person hears "All dharmas are reducible to the neither defiled nor non-defiled," they take it to mean that all dharmas are inseparable from Emptiness and that even if one were to traverse the entire universe, everywhere would be the same Suchness [Emptiness] as that found here as the Suchness of[, for example,] this vase [the Common Teaching]. Then there are those who hear this talk of dharmas' being "reducible" and know from this that they must use the various forms of practice and activity to move toward this principle of the Mean [the Separate Teaching].[27] Then there are those who hear that all is reducible and know that it means that this "neither defiled nor non-defiled" [i.e., the Mean as defined relative to the general quiddity "defilement"] itself inherently includes all dharmas.[28]

This last is the understanding of the Integrated Teaching. It is important to note how this Teaching is thought to differ from the conceptions of the others, especially that of the Separate Teaching. In the Separate Teaching, means and end are conceived as separate: all dharmas (practices and goads to practice) are paths that lead to a realization of the Mean, but they are not the Mean themselves. The methods of realization are not what is revealed; rather, they are that which reveals. Another implication of this understanding of the phrase is of considerable importance in Zhili's claim that Huayan omnicentrism is an example of the Separate Teaching, not the Integrated Teaching (see below), for we may also interpret Zhiyi's second description here to mean "The Separate Teaching understands the phrase 'All dharmas are reducible to neither X nor not-X' to mean 'What we mean when we say that any given entity is the Mean is the fact that it is neither itself nor anything else, neither X nor empty of X.' This fact implies that all other things in the universe, all the functions and activities of all times and places, lead to

the emergence of this X. It could not exist without all of them; all things join together in the being of this X." This would mean that this X does in fact represent all things, is the presence of all things, and in this sense is the center of all things. All things lead to this X. All are components or aspects of this X. But this falls short of the further claim that X is simultaneously the basis of all things, that all things also derive solely from this X and are reducible to it, and that X is the principle which can be seen expressing itself in all other apparent forms.

In the Integrated Teaching, all other things are both what reveal this given thing qua the Mean and what are revealed as/by this thing qua the Mean. The Separate Teaching implies that the fact that any given thing is identifiable neither as X nor as non-X means that this thing is the effect or consequence of all other things. But in the Integrated Teaching, this fact means that this thing is the center of all things both as the cause and as the effect of all other things. This is also spoken of in terms of the Three Buddha Natures, to be discussed below in the section on the Three Tracks. All beings have all three types of Buddha Nature, not only the Buddha Nature as the ultimate truth to be discovered but also the Buddha Nature as the practices and wisdom that do the discovering, and all three of these belong together to the truth that is discovered, since the three, by their cognateness with the Three Truths, are integrated, inseparable, and ultimately mutually inclusive.

Zhiyi describes the position of the Integrated Teaching proper as follows:

> The Conventional Truth includes both the claim that there is illusory existence [of a given X] and that this illusory existence is itself empty [i.e., is itself also non-X]. The Ultimate Truth is that there is neither this existence nor this Emptiness, and that, at the same time, all dharmas are reducible to this existence [i.e., the conventional designation of the being of any X], all dharmas are reducible to this Emptiness [its simultaneous non-Xness], and all dharmas are reducible to [its being] "neither existence [as such and such] nor Emptiness."

To say that, for example, this cup is empty, provisionally posited, and the Mean, here means that it is a cup, it is not a cup, and it is neither a cup nor not a cup, and further that all other phenomena therefore are reducible to (i.e., both based on and productive of) its being a cup, to its not being a cup, and to its being neither a cup nor a non-cup. Of this final form of the Two Truths, Zhiyi says, "Here the Ultimate is identical to the Conventional, the

Conventional is identical to the Ultimate. It is like a wishing jewel: the jewel itself stands for the Ultimate truth; its magical function for the Conventional Truth. The jewel is the magical use; the magical use is the jewel. They are not two; we simply provisionally speak of them as two."[29] All dharmas are reducible not only to the Mean but also to either of the extremes as such, for in themselves they are identical to this Mean and thus also to the particular being and non-being of any specific entity. This applies to both phenomena and religious practices. For the former, "reducible to" means that they have X both as their ontic basis and as what is revealed and expressed by all their activity as a result. For the latter, which are a special case of the former (human practices are one form of phenomena), "reducible" means also "leads to a realization of" or "are the means by which it comes to be manifested," but it still implies "have as their ultimate basis." Thus, the Integrated version of the relationship between the Two Truths leads to the identity of Ultimate and Conventional Truth and of all the various forms of teaching; this is the focus of the Tiantai reading of the *Lotus Sūtra* as the vehicle that "opens the provisional to reveal the real." (The concept of the Mean in the Integrated Teaching will become fully intelligible, however, only when we discuss the two types of "transcendental marvel" below.)

The seven versions of the Two Truths are easily converted by Zhiyi into five forms of the Three Truths,[30] since he excludes the first two of the seven because they have no concept of the Mean. The content remains the same with this change of form. Here, too, the point is that for the Integrated Three Truths, "not only does the Truth of the Mean inherently and completely include all Buddha dharmas, the same is true of the Conventional and Ultimate Truths."[31] In the Integrated Teaching, the Three Truths interpenetrate, so that whatever is true of any of them is true of all of them. In the Separate Teaching, they are thought of as separable.

Zhiyi further elaborates on the difference between the Separate and the Integrated teachings in the *Fahuaxuanyi*. There he says that, among other things, the Integrated Teaching "integrates" (*rong* 融), and the Separate does not. This refers to the fact that in the Separate Teaching, existence and Emptiness (and both and neither) of a given entity (its being X and its not being X) are presented as separate, so that "those who misunderstand" take them to be fixed and different entities or even as two separate facts about the thing in question. But also, perhaps even more centrally, it refers to the fact that in the Separate Teaching the refutation and absorption of various other teachings are conducted in a non-integrated manner:

They refute the non-Buddhists but not the Two Vehicles or the upāyas of the Mahāyāna itself. Moreover, their "absorption" [*hui* 會, lit. "bringing together"] is not Integrated [Rounded] either. For example, the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra* repeatedly absorbs [the evil practices] of ordinary people [and affirms them as perfect enlightenment], but it does not do this for the Śrāvakas [Hīnayāna disciples]. Impurities and vexations are absorbed as seeds of the Buddha but not the quiescence of the [perverted view of] the Uncreate. The "evil" persons of saṁsāra and the "evil" dharmas such as the defilements are all absorbed but not the "good" dharmas of the Two Vehicles and the sagely persons of the Four Arhat Fruits. In the case of the Prajñā sūtras, they absorb both good and evil dharmas . . . , but not good and evil persons, in that they do not state that they will all become Buddhas. This is the Separate Teaching. The Integrated Teaching, on the other hand, refutes all previous teachings, including those of the Mahāyāna, and at the same time absorbs all persons and dharmas, good and evil, and reveals them as Buddha dharmas.

In addition, the Separate Teaching, when speaking of existence, means a special, separate form of existence from that [conceived of by the deluded ordinary people of] the world, and in speaking of Emptiness means a different one from that conceived by the Two Vehicles. The Integrated Teaching, on the other hand, holds that the existence of saṁsāra is precisely the existence of the ultimate reality, all dharmas are reducible to this existence, this existence is itself the entire dharma-realm, and other than this there are no other dharmas. This goes for emptiness, for both, and for neither as well. The Emptiness and existence spoken of in the Integrated Teaching are precisely those found in [the deluded thinking of all the different views held by people in] the world.

In the Separate Teaching, the various practices and teachings are thought of as separate and sequential. In the Integrated Teaching, all inhere in each step of the process, so that each step is the whole.

In the Separate Teaching, usually the process of cutting off defilements is understood as a gradual extirpation based on definite separate stages. In the Integrated Teaching, the cutting of defilements is understood as "cutting off while not cutting off" (*bu duan er duan* 不斷而斷). The five types of defilements are themselves inconceivable—this is called the inconceivable cutting off of defilements.

In the Separate Teaching, of the three aspects of nirvāṇa, only the Dharma-body is there from the beginning. The other two, wisdom and liberation, are attained only after cultivation. In the Integrated Teaching, all three aspects are equally present from the beginning, before cultivation as well as after.[32]

Here, the distinctive mark of the Integrated teaching is a willingness to take the integration characteristic of the relation among the Three Truths and apply it to all possible separations, on all levels of reflection and self-

reference. In the Integrated Teaching, the Three Truths are claimed to be on exactly equal footing, none more "ultimate" than the other two. Each is said to imply the other two, and any two can be reduced to the other one. Any one of the Three Truths brings with it the other two; whenever one is spoken, all are meant and admitted. The same can here be said of the relation between evil and good dharmas, evil and good persons, misunderstood concepts and their real meaning (e.g., being and Emptiness), practices and what they lead to, defilements and the cutting off of defilements, and so on. The last point in the passage quoted above is especially important; the implication of the Integrated view of the Three Truths has a very specific impact on the notion of practice; namely, that the practices and conceptualizations leading to and expressive of Buddhahood have always been going on, not just that Buddhahood as object to be realized has always existed. This notion, derived ultimately from a particular reading of the *Lotus Sūtra*, has a profound impact on the Tiantai concept of practice and is crucial for the development of the Tiantai notion of value paradox, as we shall see in detail below.

We can formularize the main perspective, the Three Truths, as follows, so as to understand the significance attached to the Mean and how it is thought to lead to the unity of opposites, on which all that follows is predicated. Take any entity, let's say this cat. This cat is provisionally posited as what it is in three different senses:[33]

1. It is the result of efficient causes and can be analyzed into components (*yincheng jia* 因成假). That is, it is made of various physical elements.

2. Its appearance is one in a temporal series, conditioned by those that preceded it in time (*xiangxu jia* 相續假). That is, it appeared in the world as a link in a sequential causal chain, following upon the appearance of its parents, their mating, and so on.

3. It is semantically and phenomenologically relative to its own negation; that is, it is only intelligible, only apprehendable, as what it is in relation to what it is not. To know what it is is to know what it is not (*xiangdai jia* 相待假). That is, its catness is constituted only by non-catness.

According to both Jizang (of the Three Treatise School) and Guanding (of the Tiantai), the last of these three forms of Provisional Positing is most significant for the Mahāyāna bodhisattvas.[34] This type of Provisional Positing, premised on the notion of relativity, must be understood in accordance with Zhiyi's extended and central consideration of the relative and absolute

"transcendental marvels," the foundation of his theory of upāya, which we will examine in detail below.

The Tiantai concept of the Non-exclusive Mean, especially this last type of Provisional Positing, is related to the concept of the "center," discussed earlier in this work. There I suggested that omnicentrism be understood by considering the workings of the master signifier in various theoretical and hermeneutic schemes, feminism, Marxism, ecologism. All these terms are fundamentally ambiguous until connected to some "ultimate value," some final independent variable, of which they are then seen to be partial expressions. This "ambiguity" is equivalent to the Emptiness that Zhiyi attributes to all entities. Considered in itself, a thing cannot be said to be simply one thing or another; it get its meaning, content, and identity from its relation to a grounding, explanatory other. The provisional, dependent identity it acquires in this fashion is an example of Provisional Positing. However, since this same ambiguity applies also to whatever term might be chosen as the grounding center, and since, once successfully extended to explain all other parts as expressions of itself, the initial grounding center loses its determinate character, obtaining all its contents and identity solely from the "expressions" of which it was posited as the ground, all points end up being the grounding center, and any point can be chosen as the starting point for a system of interpretive connections and groundings. This second reversal is equivalent to the Mean. The fact that any entity thus ends up being both center and periphery, the ground and the grounded, the explainer and the explained, the root and the branch, is the Nonexclusive Mean. The final effect of setting up some X as the center, the grounding term by reference to which all others are explained, is not just to show that all are expressions of this particular X, but, more important, to show that *any* X can serve to explain everything else, that all things are expressions of any chosen X, that every X pervades all times and places, because the interconnections of things are precisely what constitute each thing's identity. It is the thoroughgoing interpenetration entailed in this form of omnicentric holism that sets the stage for value paradox.

Let me attempt to summarize schematically the results of the above discussion, in less technical but more abstract philosophical terms.

1. To appear as an element of experience is to appear qualitatively, that is, as some definite particular quiddity, as some homogenous "one." This means that any given datum, to appear in experience, must appear as a definitive, non-negotiable, unavoidable fact, a "something" that excludes its other, every

other "something," everything that is qualitatively other. Naïve experience appears as a series or array of such quiddities, in a sequence or a side-by-side array, as a mutually external "many."

2a. However, every "one" necessarily appears in a context of "others"—as either causes, conditions, background, or conceptual/perceptual contrasts. Therefore, no "one" is what it seems; strictly speaking, no true "one" is ever present. The mutually exclusive appearance of quiddities is, *in this sense only*, an "illusion." That is, it is an effect produced by a set of causes qualitatively other than the appearance (as a movie dinosaur is an "illusory" *dinosaur*, although it is at the same time really some other things—pieces of plastic, machinery, sound effects; the twist is that here it is also illusory that it is these other things, in the sense that it is also "really" a dinosaur). Appearing always requires at least two qualitative elements. This "two," however, also cannot be construed as a "one," as a finite set that fully accounts for the appearance. That is, we cannot solve this problem simply by extending the scope of reference, drawing a circle around the quiddity *and* its conditions and defining this as a new quiddity, which is now self-sufficient and fully transparent. No effect can be produced by any "one" and that also means that it cannot be produced by any finite set of causes. There must always be a figure and a ground, a necessary but necessarily excluded "otherness" in each appearance. As soon as this non-appearing set of conditions is included in the known, it becomes instead the conditioned, the figure, the "one," and another set of supports is implied, and so on ad infinitum. Every experience always has this unknown unseen "other half"; one manifestation of this fact is known as the subject/object split.

Axiom: Even this quiddity, of "always having more to it than meets the eye," is apprehended as a "one," and thus must have more to it than meets the eye.[35]

2b. All quiddities appear to be produced in reference to some elements or contexts, either as components, as preceding elements in a series, or as contrastive background. But no quiddity as defined in 1 above, that is, conceived as a definite datum mutually exclusive of its opposite and all otherness, can ever be produced due to (a) itself, (b) to another (or any finite set of others), (c) to both, or (d) to neither.[36] Therefore, no definite quiddity ever arises. This is what is meant by "non-birth" (*wusheng* 無生), from which follows, obviously, "non-destruction" (*wumie* 無滅).

3. The quiddity or whatness of any experience is determined by the horizons of relevance that are allowed to serve as its context. Relevance is deter-

mined by an arbitrary and active neglect of certain facts or other quiddities in the universe, all of which, by point 2, are potentially relevant.

4. This applies equally to all other possible quiddities that might serve as determining contexts. They are all equally determinate and indeterminate, context-dependent (Empty). This means that the way they can fix the indeterminacy of the first quiddity is itself indeterminate. What made them determinate as "determiners of X'" (read in this particular way among all possible other ways) was the appearance of X itself as something to be determined. Thus the determinacy of each quiddity is identical to (and also different from, as well as both and neither) its indeterminacy. Therefore, the defining relativity and contrast between its presence and its absence is seen to be no contrast at all. It is like space, whose presence is the same as its absence, and which therefore necessarily pervades all times and places. It has no inside or outside, nothing that is itself and nothing that is other than itself; it also has both, each being an expression of the other. It is "not thus and not otherwise," as the *Lotus Sūtra* puts it. For this reason, this indistinguishability applies not only to the relation between it and its own indeterminacy per se but equally to the relation between it and all other determinacies. This aspect of any given quiddity is known as the Mean. Thoroughly comprehending it in relation to any entity entails seeing that this is true of every other entity as well, of every particular sensation and determinacy without exception. Each permeates all places and times and is the "sole truth" about all other things. Everything else is reducible to it. This notion signifies that the context is the contextualized thing itself, the figure is the ground, and hence that "transformative recontextualization" (to be discussed in detail in a moment) is not something external "done to" the token or figure but something it is itself doing, just as much as it is done by something "other," and each is always both. Thus there is no determinable difference between "The context is done to me" and "I create the context myself"—hence any one of these formulations has always been saying (being) X, non-X, and both/neither.

"The Mean" is just another concept, a sensation and a determinacy, whose specific quality is "seeing that what appears here *as* X is in reality neither X nor non-X." This entails seeing also that this formulation is no better or worse than simply "X" or simply "non-X." This in turn entails, via the universal applicability of this proposition as expressed in point 2 above, seeing that *all* things, all possible quiddities, are reducible to this quiddity,

the Mean. But this implies also "seeing that all things are reducible to *any* thing." The Mean is established as the absolute truth above all other truths. But once this is done, it simultaneously establishes every other possible thing, sensation, or concept as the absolute truth. This is how the Mean "opens up the provisional to reveal the real." Comprehension of the Mean in this last sense thus implies seeing that all appearances and all transcendences are themselves also the Mean. That is, whatever appears to be merely an appearance (or a negation, or both) is always actually all three. This is revealed not by adding anything to it but by attending to it more closely.

5. The Mean describes the relation between the determinacy and the indeterminacy of each quiddity, its appearance as a particular Xness, and its being transcended as that Xness. We can now summarize the understanding of the relationship between any quiddity's appearance as a determinate something and its being transcended or negated as that something, between Xness and non-Xness, in each of the Four Teachings:

Tripiṭaka *Teaching*: Whatever appears in experience will be transcended: that is, it will disappear, will be recontextualized (will be seen as the elements that compose it), will assume a meaning other than the one it has appeared *as* (analytic Emptiness, impermanence).

Common Teaching: Whatever appears *is* transcended already. Appearance is apprehended here *as* (mere) appearance. Appearing and being transcended are always copresent. Wherever there is appearance of any quiddity, there is also necessarily already transcendence of that appearance. The two are necessarily inseparable (embodied Emptiness, mirage, illusion).

Separate Teaching. Whatever appears is *thereby* transcended. At least two versions of this idea can be distinguished:

1. That by which it appears is that by which it is transcended; there is a single cause of both of these two contrary aspects. The reason it appears is the reason it is transcended (the Exclusive Mean).
2. It appears *because* it is transcended; it is transcended *because* it appears. Here we have two looped and mutually entailing aspects (some interpretations of Huayan thought).

Integrated Teaching: Appearing per se is being transcended per se. They are not separate aspects at all. To appear is itself to appear as transcended; to be transcended is itself to be transcended as something that appears (the Nonexclusive Mean).

The Nonexclusive Mean signifies that to appear is itself also (1) to be transcended and (2) to present the identity (and contrast) between appearance and transcendence. To be transcended is also (1) to appear and (2) to present the identity between appearance and transcendence. To present the identity between appearance and transcendence is also (1) to appear and (2) to be transcended. Each of the three entails the other two. To be transcended *always* means to appear. That is, the only form of "disappearance" possible is not a retreat into utter annihilation but only into a modified *form of showing oneself*, showing one side, behind which the rest is hidden. To appear is to appear as something in particular, in some partial form, and to disappear is to appear as something else. "As" is the fundamental mode of all being. It follows from the premise that all things are "forms" of one another. Similarly, to appear *always* means to be transcended. Thus are the pseudo-concepts "being" and "nothing," "eternity" and "annihilation," "sameness" and "difference," "birth" and "death," "this" and "that," "here and now," and "elsewhere and elsewhen" overcome.

In other words, any datum that presents itself insistently as a non-negotiable qualitative fact depends on some unseen putative data fixed obsessively as its relevant frame, at the expense of other, neglected data. These framing determinacies are assumed to be factual qualities, but in reality they are also only a certain X with respect to another certain arbitrarily narrowed frame, and so on. In terms of the holistic paradigm, it is never possible for all parts of any whole to "appear" at once—that is, as distinct quiddities, none of which are concealed. By the holistic premise, any data about the whole of which something is a part are relevant to determining the identity of that thing. Therefore, some relevant data concerning the identity of anything that appears are always missing from experience. Hence it is never possible to determine the identity of anything. However, everything appears as some identity, some quiddity. This appearing, *in toto*, is all we have. All we know about the whole, which we cannot see in its entirety, is its capacity to appear as this form, which means to appear as a quiddity while equally presenting to experience the non-ultimacy of this form, the provisionality, the explorability, the more-to-come-ness of it. We know only that whatever does appear in the future will be a further expression of what we are now calling "X," by the general holistic premise—something that will, by being revealed, transform the identity of this X but also will necessarily be transformed by this appearance *as* X as one of its determining contexts.

Understanding "as" may be the shortest route to understanding the true implications of the Tiantai notion of the Mean. In the Marxism-feminism-ecologism example, we may say that Marxism appears *as* feminism when an instance of gender prejudice is seen as a subset of the broader category "class struggle." Two things should be noted. First, Marxism always has to appear as something besides "class struggle" *simpliciter*. If I happen to come across a guy dressed like the capitalist from Monopoly® hitting a striking worker on the head with his gold cane, an active interpretive choice is needed to name this as a "direct" appearing of class struggle—rather than, say, a biological phenomenon, an exemplification of the laws of physics, or a personal vendetta.

More generally, everything that appears must always appear as something else. Some other examples will make this clearer. Take love or hate. Love appears only as some non-love quiddities—particular gestures, acts, facial expressions, perhaps physiological states, perhaps the emptying of certain chemicals into the bloodstream at particular times, and so on. As much as we search, we can never find "love" *simpliciter*; rather, it always presents itself as some other, strictly non-love quiddities. The same may be said of every one of the components of love; a facial expression appears as the tensing or broadening of certain facial muscles, together with a particular social context that allows a certain interpretation of these muscular changes, and the physiological processes of the perceiver and namer of this set of actions as "this particular facial expression." The same goes for the physiological processes themselves, and so on *ad infinitum*. The opposite quality, hate, is susceptible to the same analysis; hatred, too, cannot be found anywhere *simpliciter*. It is *always* "read in" to other, "non-hate" quiddities. Or take an even simpler example: the triangularity of a triangle, something with clear objective characteristics, can appear only as some non-triangle elements—lines of ink on a piece of paper, a mathematical formula, three matchsticks on a floor, and so on. Even more concretely, a patch of blue, something that seems to be immediately perceived as itself plain and simple, is always also some non-blue things appearing as blue, which can thus also appear as these non-blue things: processes in the eye and nervous system, frequencies of molecular vibration, ink, paper, matter. This fact, that everything must always be appearing *as* something else, something not unequivocally itself, is the Truth of Emptiness. The fact that there is always some quiddity that is doing the appearing as these non-self things is the Truth of Provisional Positing.

But the second thing to be noted, for all these examples, is the implication that if this "necessarily always appearing as something else" applies universally to all elements, to all possible quiddities and configurations, then *anything* can be a form in which this thing appears, it can appear as anything at all. Class struggle can be seen operating in feminism, in Christian charity, in ecologism, in fascism, even in apparently contradictory expressions like liberal egalitarianism or philanthropy; there is in principle nothing that cannot be interpreted as an expression of class struggle. Love can be expressed as kindness, as sternness, as indifference, as murder; hate can be expressed as kindness, as sternness, as indifference, as murder.

These two examples, dealing with complex abstract concepts like "class struggle" and "love" are relatively easy to comprehend. It is more difficult to see the same thing operating in the case of, say, triangularity or blueness. The manner in which this works will, I hope, become clear after the discussion of the distinctive Tiantai notion of transformative recontextualization below, but even on abstract or general grounds, it can be understood. Anything can reveal itself to be an expression of "triangularity," no matter how "non-triangular" it may appear to be at first. A trivial but I think ultimately quite important example can be demonstrated by drawing three circles on a blank sheet of paper. Circularity is a strong case of non-triangularity, but, by virtue of the whole to which the three circles belong, reveals itself to be an expression of triangularity. Even more "non-triangular" things, like "hope" or "the Roman Empire" could also be shown to reveal triangularity with just a little ingenuity. Blueness is perhaps an even tougher example; how can, say, redness turn out to be an "expression" of blueness, how can blue appear "as" red? But we all know that colors perceived as homogenous to the naked eye at the macro-level may turn out to be composed of a composition of many disparate colors at a micro-level. Imagine a spot of red; then pull the camera back to reveal a vast field of dots of the same size, which as a whole read to the eye as blue. This is just another example of recontextualization on holistic premises. We can even imagine, say, "whiteness" being expressed by "blackness": imagine a black arrow pointing to a black square, inside of which is whiteness. Here we have a different sort of relation, that of referentiality (the arrow, which necessarily points "to" something) rather than that of composition, but the holistic point is the same. It is perhaps this sort of example we must keep in mind when considering the problem at hand, which after all requires us to comprehend how "goodness" can appear "as" "evilness." This will become clearer when the concept of transcendental mar-

vel is introduced. The point to be grasped here is simply that since X can never appear except as something else, X can appear as anything else. If it could only appear as a certain finite set of "something else's," this principle would no longer be universal; this complete set of expressions would simply be X itself appearing as it is, rather than X appearing as something else. This seeing of X in every other appearance is the Mean.

In a nutshell, the Three Truths are: that *X* always appears as something else is Provisional Positing; that X *always* appears *as something else* is Emptiness; that *X always appears* as something else is the Mean.

In terms of praxis, this is why mere consciousness of the relevant contexts is curative: as long as they are not figures of awareness, they implicitly function as brute facts in the frame, determining the fixity of the figure. But once they become figures themselves, this whole configuration calls out for further contextualization; the fixed determining contexts turn out also not to be experienced brute facts but to depend on an arbitrary narrowing of relevant contexts.

This explication in terms of the elements "as" which something appears is perhaps most readily understood as an elaboration of the Mean as resulting from the *first* type of Provisional Positing, that is, the provisional positing of X on the basis of the components that constitute it, its elements (*yincheng jia*). It may be more difficult to see how this analysis applies to the other two types of Provisional Positing, which are more central to the Tiantai system; namely, succession in time and semantic and experiential relativity. In reality, in the Tiantai view, these two types of positing are also revealed to be relationships exactly equivalent to the relationship of "composition from elements" presented here, but this may not be easy to see at this juncture. I will take up the question of the Mean again after I examine the notion of "relative and absolute transcendental marvels." This will provide the conceptual apparatus that will allow us to see that temporal and semantic relativity are also identical to the Mean and to understand how this relates to Tiantai upāya theory.

The Three Tracks

The Three Truths are correlated with the "three tracks" (*sangui* 三軌). The aspect of Emptiness is correlated with the track of subjective consciousness (*guanzhao* 觀照, "contemplation"); the aspect of Provisional Positing with the practico-inert or action (*zicheng* 資成, lit., "what is depended on for be-

coming and completion," i.e., practice); the aspect of the Mean with the absolute reality as the union-in-difference of these two (*zhenxing* 眞性, "the true nature") Absolute reality is also that which is revealed by the consciousness (the first track), as conditioned by the behaviors and other practico-inert conditions (the second track). In Zhiyi's *Jinguangmingxuanyi*, ten triads are correlated, representing ten stages, as it were, along the three tracks.[37] Each triad contains one member correlating with each of these three general ideas, subjectivity, the practico-inert, and absolute reality. These range from the "Three Paths"—karma (practico-inert), delusions-afflictions (subjective consciousness) and *duhkha*-suffering (absolute reality, i.e., the truth about what exists, at once both practico-inert and subjective, and indeed reducible to their mutual inclusion)—to the three Buddha-natures—the Conditioning (active) Cause—*yuanyin* 緣因 (practico-inert), the Revealing Cause, *liaoyin* 了因 (subjective consciousness), and the Cause Proper, *zhengyin* 正因 (absolute reality)[38]—and finally to the Three Meritorious Properties (*san de* 三德), which are characteristic of nirvāṇa: liberation (practico-inert), *prajñā*-wisdom (subjective consciousness), and Dharmakāya (absolute reality).[39] "Correlated" here, means in fact that all these are different names for the same thing. The three tracks *are* the Three Truths. The same goes for the other triads: for example, "karma" is one name for the truth of Provisional Positing, with a focus on a particular angle. "Liberation" is another name for this same truth of Provisional Positing, with a different focus. "Delusion-affliction" is one name for Emptiness; Prajñā is another. This is to be understood just as we understand that "the husband of Martha Washington" and "The Father of His Country" refer to the same man. Each refers to the entire man with nothing left out, but with two different foci; the first term stresses his relationship to his wife, and the second his relationship to American history. Similarly, "Delusion" refers to Emptiness in its entirety, but with a stress on its entailment in samsāric experience, and "Prajñā" refers to this same Emptiness, in its same entirety, but with a stress on its entailment in enlightened experience. This concept of the identity of all the stages along the Three Tracks is of crucial importance to the questions of holism, intersubjectivity, and value paradox.

In sum, all phenomena are analyzed into an omnipresent threefoldness; in all there are the three moments or elements of subjectivity, the practico-inert, and absolute reality. The moment of negation, of Emptiness among the Three Truths, is correlated with subjectivity, Provisional Positing (establishing, availing) is correlated with the practico-inert, and their mutual

non-obstruction and inclusion, the Mean, is the element of absolute truth, the ultimate fact about them. The Three Truths give us, as it were, the inner structure of all the terms in the three tracks, understood in terms of the root idea of conditioned arising.

The eternal presence of all three tracks is meant to have a powerful impact on the notion of practice. The eternity and omnipresence of the True Nature is equivalent to the omnipresence of the Mean; Buddahood or the dharma-nature is, crypto-pantheistically, present everywhere and in everything. This idea is also propounded by the Separate Teaching. But the Integrated Teaching holds in addition that everything is reducible equally to Provisional Positing and to Emptiness, which means that the practice leading both to and from Buddahood (i.e., the Bodhisattva path) and the awareness that realizes it and results from it is already functioning in all practices and all modes of awareness. That is, any practice and any conceptualization can always equally well be described as an adequate and accurate expression of Buddahood, and a cause leading to Buddahood, *and* as a deluded betrayal of it that obstructs the realization of it.

The Ten Thusnesses

The Ten Thusnesses (*shiru* 十如) are derived from the Kumārajiva translation of the *Lotus Sūtra* and are meant to cover all the determinate aspects of any particular entity's existence. They are:

1. Thus and so appearance
2. Thus and so nature
3. Thus and so entity
4. Thus and so power
5. Thus and so activity
6. Thus and so main cause
7. Thus and so secondary conditions
8. Thus and so effect
9. Thus and so retribution
10. Thus and so consistency from beginning to end

These can be correlated with the Three Truths. For example, appearance (what is visible from without and interconnected with external things) plugs into Provisional Positing; the Nature (unseen, unchanging) into Emptiness; Entity into the Mean. However, in accordance with the principle of inter-

penetration, each one in itself also involves all Three Truths. The Chinese for each of these consists of three characters, which can be rotated to be read in three ways, illustrating the Three Truths. Hence, "thus and so appearance" (*rushi xiang* 如是相) indicates Provisional Positing (as appearance, nature). "This appearance is thus" (*shi xiang ru* 是相如) indicates Emptiness. "Appearance and thusness are it" (or perhaps, "As for what is called appearance, it is precisely thusness"; *xiang rushi* 相如是) indicates the Mean.[40]

The Ten Realms

The Ten Realms (*shijie* 十界) are:

1. Purgatory (*diyu* 地獄)
2. Hungry Ghosts (*egui* 餓鬼)
3. Animals (*chusheng* 畜生)
4. Asuras ("Titans"—warlike demigods; *axiuluo* 阿修羅)
5. Humans (*ren* 人)
6. Gods (*tian* 天)
7. Śrāvakas (Hīnayāna disciples striving for Arhathood, especially those practicing the Four Noble Truths; *shengwen* 聲聞)
8. Pratyeka-buddhas (self-enlightened sages who have realized Arhathood on their own, but also, due to a famous misunderstanding, Hīnayāna disciples practicing contemplation of the twelvefold *nidāna* chain; *yuanjue* or *dujue* 緣覺・獨覺)
9. Bodhisattvas (*pusa* 菩薩)
10. Buddhas (*fo* 佛)

It is crucial to understand the structure of this Ten Realm field. First, it is obviously not a description of ten separate portions of space. The realms are defined not by sections of territory but by ten different ways of perceiving the whole world and all of experience. Subjectivity is built into the definition of each of these realms; they are the *Umwelts* of particular types of sentient beings. The inanimate world as such, as neutral ground for these beings, is not any one of the realms but has no separate realm of its own. It is included, in a different perceptual form, in each of the realms.

The other crucial point about the Ten Realms is that they negate each other. The first six realms, which are the ordinary universe of non-Buddhists, all of nature and supernature's sentient beings going about their ordinary business, are marked by various degrees of the Three Poisons:

greed, hatred, and delusion.[41] The next two realms, usually collectively referred to as the Two Vehicles, are the exact and direct negation of the first six realms. They stand for the total extirpation of greed, hatred, and delusion by means of moral and meditative practices of Hīnayāna and insight into the suffering inherent in those six realms and the delusion of self and substance underlying them. These two realms, therefore, are normally correlated with the truth of Emptiness.

The ninth realm, the Bodhisattvas realm, represents a step back toward the six realms—the creation of provisionally posited upāyas, the assumption of the provisionally posited teachings, bodies, and forms of the six worldly realms, so as to transform and enlighten the beings therein. This realm is thus correlated with Provisional Positing. The Buddha realm encompasses both the inner realm of Emptiness and the intersubjective realm of Provisional Positing and entails them as identical; hence this realm is correlated with the Mean, which is characterized as eternal, blissful, free, and pure (*changle wojing* 常樂我淨). But the Buddha of the Integrated Teaching is not "only the Mean"—he must be the Mean as identical with the other nine realms, which is what opens them up as being equally eternal, blissful, free, and pure.[42] As I noted earlier, this amounts to saying he is "not only the Buddha" but inherently includes all the non-Buddha realms as well; this point is of decisive importance in the value paradoxes to follow, especially in Zhili's concept of "the ultimacy of the dung beetle."

Hence, as Zhiyi puts it in the *Mohezhiguan*, we have several stacked contrasts of relative "good" and "evil." At the first level, the first four realms are evil relative to the good of the realms of humans and gods. But relative to the "good" of Two Vehicles, all six realms are evil. Relative to the good of the Bodhisattvas, however, the Two Vehicles together with the six worldly realms are all evil. Compared to the good of the Buddha realm, all nine other realms are evil. The further step is that, compared with the Integrated Buddha who includes all the other realms, the isolated "only-the-Buddha" is evil. However, this Integrated Teaching overcomes these divisions, for the very reason that the Buddha in this teaching inherently includes all the relative forms of evil just delineated; Buddha clung to as just Buddha becomes another form of evil. This is comprehending that evil is not evil, but that all evils are themselves the ultimate reality, which in turn is what makes if possible to practice the Buddha Path qua evil.[43] This is a classic example of Tiantai reasoning and feeds into the central doctrine of the opening of upāya to reveal the Ultimate Truth, to be discussed below.

The Transcendental Marvels, Relative and Absolute

The next two sections, on the "transcendental marvels" (*miao* 妙) and "opening the provisional to reveal the real" (*kai quan xian shi* 開權顯實) attempt to make the notion of "X's appearing as non-X" more comprehensible, particularly as they apply to Provisional Positing as temporal succession and as relativity. The term *miao* is generally glossed as "inconceivability" (*bu ke si yi* 不可思議)[44]—what is beyond conceptual understanding, what is miraculous, a glorious wonder. In Tiantai it is applied to all existing things—everything that is, is miraculous. Paul Swanson sums up the implication of the term admirably: "The gist of Chih-i's standpoint is that the term 'subtle' (*miao*) refers to any teaching, doctrine, practice, and so forth, which includes the concept of unity or integration."[45]

To understand the true importance of this term, as the crux of the Tiantai notion of upāya, we must look into the peculiar Tiantai exposition of the *two* types of marvel present in the *Lotus Sūtra*, as developed in the *Fahuaxuanyi*. Zhiyi there speaks of the "relative marvel" (*xiangdai miao* 相待妙) and the "absolute marvel" (*juedai miao* 絕待妙). The former means marvelousness as opposed to its opposite, coarseness (*cu* 麤). The latter means a sense of marvelousness that is not predicated on this semantic contrast with the opposite but that instead includes the opposite.[46] The specification for the Integrated Teaching given in Zhiyi's *Fahuaxuanyi* is:

> If we speak of the non-differentiated dharma, where even the extremes are identical to the Mean, then there is nothing that is not the Buddha-dharma, all [that would be other] has been swept clean. How then could the Buddha-dharma be relative to or dependent on the Buddha-dharma itself? This Buddha is precisely the dharma-realm—outside the dharma-realm where is there any other dharma with which it can be compared and thereby given any determination? Compared to what would it be coarse? In contrast to what would it be marvelous? In this case there is nothing to be depended on or compared with, and also nothing broken off—not knowing what else to call it, we give it the forced name, Absolute.[47]

Here the stress is that the concept of the Absolute in turn destroys itself qua concept, since any concept would have to be relative. That is, "absolute" is relative to "relative." Its work of destroying relativity is done only at the point at which it sees the infinity of this regress without having to go infinitely around in its circle, but comprehends it all at once, such that all terms are provisional posits, including Emptiness, the Mean, the Absolute, among

others. The *Mohezhiguan* notes three types of Calming and of Contemplation, the last of which corresponds to the absolute: the Calming that is also not Calming, the Contemplation that is also not Contemplation—that is, each includes the opposite against which it had defined itself. The essence of the Tiantai doctrine of upāya is that the latter cannot manifest except via the former. This is the key point that solves many of the problems we will be facing. A later sectarian Tiantai interpretation of Zhiyi, the *Siming zunzhe jiaoxing lu* 四明尊者教行錄, a record of miscellaneous works of the school of Zhili, contains the following question and answer:

Q. Since the *Lotus Sūtra* is revealing the one reality, why does the "Explanation of the Title" section of the *Xuanyi* describe it in terms of *two* marvels?
A. The *Lotus* is the teaching that opens up the provisional to reveal the real and thus is the returning point of all the teachings, the ultimate of all the five periods. If it is not understood by means of the two marvels, it is quite difficult to reveal the one vehicle marvel that reveals the real. Initially, the "relative" (*xiangdai*) discloses the *distinction* between marvelous and coarse. *Xiang* means "this" and "that" giving shape to each other, and *dai* means to have another in reference to oneself. Here it means waiting on the coarseness of the previous four periods and seven provisional teachings and only then [in contrast] revealing the marvel of the one vehicle of the *Lotus*. Truly it is because earlier the karmic situation of the [listeners to the] other sūtras was not yet ripe, so that the flavor of the teaching and contemplations involving both (*jian* 兼) [the Integrated and the Separate, as in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*], one only (*dan* 旦) [i.e., the Tripiṭaka Teaching only, in the *Agamas*], opposition (*dui* 對) [between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, as in the *Vaipulya* sūtras] and bringing along (*dai* 帶) are unequal to the pure comprehensiveness and absolute marvel of the *Lotus Sūtra*, and hence these are called "coarse." . . . Because this sūtra is pure and undefiled, it alone gets the name of marvelous, and for good reason. But next the section on the absolute (*juedai*) discusses opening the coarse to reveal the marvelous, cutting off the previous coarseness so that there is nothing any longer with which this [marvel] can be contrasted with and depend on [i.e., define itself in contradistinction to]. This is because the marvel of the *Lotus Sūtra* has the power to put an end to the coarseness of the previous four periods and seven levels of teaching, such that once their coarseness undergoes the *Lotus*'s opening and revealing procedure, using the marvelous single vehicle to string them all together and cut off their coarseness, this coarseness is henceforth identical to marvelousness. Outside the marvel there is no further coarseness. Provisional is thenceforth identical to reality, and outside the reality there is no further provisionality. It is as when a divine immortal transforms cinnabar sand or forges iron until it becomes gold. Once it has become gold, it is no longer iron. Thus the sūtra says, "Pulling open once and for all the Śrāvaka dharma,

showing it to be the king of all sūtras." This means that what you all have been practicing (as Śrāvakas) was in reality the Bodhisattva way. This is to open up the gates of upāya and reveal the true real-mark: once it is opened up, there is no longer any difference between the levels, no Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, for all return equally to the realm of Buddhahood, and all dharmas are Buddha dharmas. There exists no other vehicle, only the one real-mark has been revealed, and this is called the discussion of marvelousness in the absolute sense. But of these two types of marvel, if the division is not made in the relative sense, the *Lotus* will not be revealed as transcending all other teachings, whereas if the opening up and revealing of the ultimacy is not done in the relative sense, then we would not know that the marvel of the *Lotus* is able to make a marvel of all other dharmas and teachings as well.[48]

This passage is talking about the relative status of various sūtras. But this is the model for the Tiantai vision of reality. Both the distinction between value and anti-value and the subsequent abolition of that distinction are necessary here. By means of the distinction, the concept of value (marvelousness, inconceivability) is gained. Without first having the contrast, there would be no notion of what was meant by value. Moreover, this alone assures that value is able to perform its work of transforming anti-value into itself. Once this concept is in place hierarchically above anti-value, with which it gains meaning by contrast, it is revealed that this value subsumes anti-value within it, that by virtue of this particular kind of value, anti-value is no longer anti-value but is instead itself also, paradoxically, value itself. This is so precisely because the meaning of value was established by (its contrast with) anti-value, in a manner to be explicated more fully below. In the beginning were suffering, deluded beings, who have always existed. The Buddha comes along and says, "Notice that you are suffering and deluded; all reality is nothing but delusion and suffering." By grasping those concepts explicitly and as such, we simultaneously grasp the contrasting opposite concepts: enlightenment and bliss, defined so far only as distant ideals contrasting in every detail with reality: nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is at this point simply the pure opposite of reality, its unmitigated negation. Reality is impermanent, painful, selfless (unfree), and defiled. Therefore nirvāṇa is permanent, blissful, free, and pure. Nirvāṇa defined in this way is the relative marvel. Then comes the twist: existing reality is nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is saṁsāra. Reality possesses these qualities of permanence, bliss, and so on, precisely by virtue of the impermanence and pain that led to their positing. Value consists in revealing that the anti-value with which it was contrasted in order to become defined is itself the source and locus of this value and identical to value. To

say from the beginning "This is all value" would have no meaning at all, would not reveal anything to sentient beings, because they simply would not know what value (marvel) means.[49]

In other words, there is no way to establish the value of the world other than by first devaluing it absolutely. The world is the opposite of itself, axiologically. Guanding, Zhiyi's scribe and successor, sums this up admirably in relation to the Hīnayāna training of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness as related to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*'s teaching about the four virtues of nirvāṇa. Deluded beings assume their body and mind to be permanent, blissful, free (self), and pure; the Four Foundations are taught to explode this prejudice and reveal that everything in the world of experience is impermanent, unsatisfactory, unfree (non-self), and impure. The world and all empirical experience are thoroughly and absolutely disvalued. Then the Mahāyāna teaching, on the basis of this thorough refutation of these four errors, asserts that in fact all beings are in nirvāṇa from the beginning and thus characterized by—permanence, bliss, freedom, and purity, precisely the four value categories that have been so painstakingly refuted. However, these categories are no longer the same as they were in the unreflecting assumption that preceded the destructive work of the Four Foundations, which are compared to an insect accidentally and unconsciously carving words while eating wood. The mediation of the intervening negation has turned the final affirmation into something else entirely; it is now a determinate negation that sublates the previous stage. Indeed, the specifiable difference between the pre-negation "permanence" and the post-negation "permanence" is precisely that the former is a way of saying "both permanent and impermanent"—the Mean, the transcendence of the opposites, which are compared to two birds that always roost together and always fly together; you can either assert both or neither, never just one or the other. The Hīnayāna upāya, the thorough negation of the value of the world, is the magical city, the enticing lie about the chariots of the *Lotus Sūtra*—in negating the world, the *Lotus Sūtra* reveals that we are actually effectively taking a step toward its final affirmation.[50]

But there is more to this point. The *Lotus Sūtra* is marvelous in contrast to the coarseness of all lesser teachings. Through this contrast the concept of marvelousness is supplied with a content. In what does this "marvelousness" consist?

The passage quoted above from the *Jiaoxing lu* locates what is marvelous about the *Lotus Sūtra* in its ability to make sense of all the other teachings, to

organize them, to show how they fit together, to serve as the master key that unlocks them and also as the totality of which all of them are parts. It is the "X" that is chosen as the "center." When they are unlocked, the other teachings, like the *Lotus Sūtra* itself, are revealed to equally be marvelous. They are actually versions of the *Lotus Sūtra*, and they obtain their identity and significance through reference to it, are indeed partial expressions of it. But what is this X that they are revealed to be? What is the teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra?* The Tiantai answer is: its teaching is precisely this unlocking itself. The *Lotus* reveals that all teachings and all phenomena are marvelous. It reveals not so much a particular content as that things can be opened up and revealed to have always been something else, that interpretation is possible, that interconnections are so thorough that everything can be read as an expression of some X. But since the unlocking performed by the *Lotus Sūtra* reveals that all other teachings and indeed all other dharmas are as marvelous as itself, this can only mean that they not only are unlocked but in being unlocked are revealed equally to be *unlockers*. To be marvelous is to be a master key to all else, to be capable of showing that all else is really a version of oneself and can be opened up to reveal the marvel—of being a master key!

The implications of this turn in the argument are dizzying, but they are also crucial. Once this master "opening" is applied, everything becomes an opener. This is what saves the system from unicentrism and indeed enforces the most radical possible omnicentric principle. The totalizing work of the *Lotus Sūtra* shows that each thing is equally the totality, that each is absolute, that it can be said of any that there is nothing outside it, that any X can be chosen as the center; any starting point can unlock the whole of creation, revealing everything else to be an expression of itself, a part of itself, a version of itself. This is made most explicit in the classification of teachings in Zhili's school, for example, in another question and model answer found in the *Siming zunzhe jiaoxing lu*:

Q. Since [Zhiyi] uses the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*'s statement that the mind creates all dharmas to establish the marvelous object of the thousand suchnesses, it is clear that this sūtra already explicated the notion of opening [the provisional] to reveal [the real]. Why, then, do we also say that opening and revealing is confined only to this [i.e., the *Lotus Sūtra*]?

A. It is precisely because the *Lotus* is able to open up the *Avataṁsaka* that the passage about the mind creating all can be used to establish the object of the thousand suchnesses. Thus Zhanran makes clear that the Buddha-wisdom of the *Lotus* necessarily develops all the teachings of the four previous flavors, large and small, mixed in vari-

ous ways with upāya—does this not explain that that the "milk-flavored" teachings that are still mixed with upāya are completely the same as the "ghee-flavored" one true teaching? Moreover, the Master [Zhiyi] judged the *Avataṁsaka* to be the branch and the *Lotus* to be the root, so that it is necessary to bring the Separate teachings of the branches together to enter the Integrated Teaching of the root. The quote here uses the passage in the sense it attains after being brought together and back [into the Integrated Teaching].[51]

The point here is that the *Avataṁsaka* can also "open and reveal" once it has itself been opened and revealed by the *Lotus Sūtra*. The same goes for all sūtras, and for all texts, and indeed for all dharmas. The meaning of any given text changes once the hermeneutic angle provided by the *Lotus* is applied, and this new meaning is itself a hermeneutic angle that can thereafter be applied to any other text. Once it is revealed that the *Avataṁsaka* discloses the distinctive truths of the *Lotus*, the *Avataṁsaka* itself can then reveal that all other texts and beings disclose not only the distinct truths of the *Lotus* but also the distinctive "provisional" truths of the *Avataṁsaka* as well. Thus every text becomes the master key, the center, the one explanatory principle of which all other things are the mere exemplifications. This is the most distinctive underlying theoretical foundation for the famous notion that all dharmas are reducible to any dharma, that all is one, that the Three Thousand Quiddities are included in any particular dharma.

This notion of the two Transcendental Marvels, Relative and Absolute, is essential for understanding the Tiantai doctrine of the relation between Provisional and Ultimate Truth, which is the key to finally grasping the concept of the Mean and the omnicentric holism it entails. Let us therefore move to the final piece in the puzzle

Opening the Provisional to Reveal the Real (Transformative Recontextualization)

The real focus of the Tiantai edifice, which is truly unique and has the most implications, is its distinctive concept of upāya—skillful means—the catch-all category used in Buddhism to explain away all inconsistencies of doctrine: namely, they are upāyas meant to lead to the enlightenment of a particular listener with a particular type of delusion. Tiantai, in the final analysis, is a teaching about upāya. As I mentioned above, the apparently ontological notion of Provisional Positing must be understood primarily in the context of upāya, the provisional propounding of doctrines to enlighten the listener.

Many philosophical problems find shelter under this umbrella in Tiantai thought. The relation of the One and the Many, for example, with all its metaphysical overtones, is understood in Tiantai primarily on the model of the relation between the One truth realized by the Buddha and the many conflicting doctrines used to express it to deluded sentient beings. Upāya is about the encounter between two minds, a teacher and a student—and thus also points to the importance of intersubjectivity in the Tiantai tradition.

The premises for the Tiantai understanding of the importance of upāya can be found in a number of places in traditional Chinese thought. First and foremost among these is the centrality of intersubjectivity in early Chinese philosophy, as discussed in Chapter 2. Upāya is first and foremost an intersubjective category. It concerns the relation between two or more subjects engaged in a conversation, in which one is expressing something to the other or, rather, is expressing *himself* to the other, in a manner that is profoundly rooted in his apprehension of the putative subjectivity of the other. The priority of this consideration, and the centrality of praxis as the ultimate category toward which doctrine is oriented, has an important impact on the features of classical Chinese rhetoric, as noted above in regard to such seminal early Ruist works as the *Analects* and the *Mencius*, in which the pedagogical principle of tailoring the instruction to the student is explicitly invoked. Equally relevant here is the treatment of propositional truth in the *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*; the *Laozi* suggestion that any positive doctrine is by necessity self-undermining, that any positing of truth or value (which are inextricably linked if not identical in that text) *by virtue of its being posited as such* serves instead as an anti-value and destroys itself. The epistemological position developed in the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi* is even more directly and profoundly linked to what happens in Tiantai. There, especially in the "Qiwulun," we find a perspectival notion of "rightness" (*shi* 是), which manages both to assert the necessary rightness (value, truth) of any possible position and to undermine the absoluteness of any position and, in the process, redefines rightness in such a way that these two steps are mutually entailing. As we shall see, this is similar to the result produced by the Tiantai doctrine, although the mechanism and implications of the two differ intriguingly.

In India, this notion has important antecedents not only in the general development of Two Truths theory but also in the concept of the Four Siddhāntas from the *Dazhidulun*,[52] attributed to Nāgārjuna, and in the *Lotus Sūtra*. The Four Siddhāntas (lit., "established conclusions," axioms, dogmas) are the four forms in which the Buddha is said to have taught his dharma: (1)

in terms of worldly conventions; (2) as suited to the individual's habits and preconceptions; (3) as conflicting with and thus therapeutic to individual ailments, just as particular medicines prescribed for one ailment may be inapplicable to others; and (4) in terms of Ultimate Truth. The *Dazhidulun* says, "By virtue of these Four Siddhāntas, all the twelve sections of the scriptures and the 84,000 different dharmas taught therein are true and consistent. Some are true by virtue of the conventional *siddhānta*, some by the individual *siddhānta*, some by the therapeutic, some by the Ultimate."[53] For the author of this text, the Ultimate Truth *siddhānta* refers to what is realized in the praxis of Buddhist cultivators. It is implied that, unlike the other three, which can be refuted, this *siddhānta* is beyond words and hence cannot be overturned. But the content of this *siddhānta* is tricky; it cannot be spoken, and yet it can speak through the other three forms. The text says, "All is real, all is not real, all is both real and unreal, all is neither real nor unreal—this is called the Ultimate Reality about all dharmas. In this way, all the scriptures are everywhere speaking the Ultimate Truth."[54] The Ultimate Truth thus in a sense includes the other, provisional forms of truth and is implicit in discussion of the partial, provisional forms. Thus the Ultimate Truth is in a sense both beyond words and expressed in all words.

This notion of the relation between the Ultimate and the Provisional truths is consistent with that found in the *Lotus Sūtra*, as read (by Zhiyi) in the perspective of this doctrine of the Four Siddhāntas. The *Lotus Sūtra* holds that the Three Vehicles are really one, and that all practitioners, even those who think they are cultivating the Hīnayāna path, are in actuality cultivating the Buddha path, and all will become Buddhas. In this sense, all the lies told by the Buddha are truth, like the lies told by the father of the children in the burning house or the guide touting the magical city in the parables of that scripture. Both parables suggest that the true aim or *telos* of one's activities is other than the goal one believes oneself to be pursuing. The children believe they are running toward lesser carts, when in reality they are running away from a fire and toward a great cart. The travelers believe they are traveling toward the great city, when this goal does not exist; the true goal to which their steps are leading them is the great treasure beyond. The same implication can be found in the story of the lost son, who believes he is cleaning toilets in order to earn a subsistence wage, but in reality he is not earning anything, since unbeknownst to him the entire fortune out of which his paltry wages are doled is his own birthright. What he is really achieving day by day in his work is the gradual dawning of the state of mind in which he can acknowledge this

fact without being overwhelmed. The true efficacy of his actions lies in something completely different from what he thinks he is doing.

The *Lotus* is the sūtra in which it is revealed to disciples that what they have been doing is aimed not toward arhatship, as they had thought, but rather toward Buddhahood. Zhiyi takes this to apply not only to Hīnayāna disciples, but—as suggested by the Bodhisattva Never-disparage, who (on Zhiyi's reading) tells all he meets that they *are now* unknowingly practicing the Bodhisattva path even as they beat and revile him—to everyone and to all forms of activity and cognition. You may think you're trying to get rich, or laid, or to heaven, but really everything you're doing is practicing the Bodhisattva path, it is leading you toward the Buddhahood you will eventually achieve and also contributing to the practice of other sentient beings. And indeed, it is not something that needs to be achieved, but something you already have and are *expressing* in these practices that you think are premised on needing to earn something (such as cleaning toilets and getting the minimum wage while not knowing his identity as son are expressions of the son's sonship; it is the father's fatherly care that induces him to go to the trouble of deceiving the son in just this way). These actions are leading you not to the attainment of anything but to the realization that you have always already had something much better than what you think you were trying to get. These acts and intentions, while deluded by this false goal, have the power to move you toward the true goal and to the realization that the goal has always already been accomplished and that it was the precondition of the mistaken striving. These mistaken strivings therefore need not be changed or abandoned—on the contrary, they were necessary to get you this far.

It is in the treatment of this situation in the *Lotus Sūtra* that we find the basis of the distinctive Tiantai doctrine of "inherent inclusion/entailment" (*ju* 具), to be examined below. For in that scripture we are told that the practices and cognitions of the Śrāvakas are in reality also practices and cognitions of bodhisattvas, that to practice the Śrāvaka path is to practice the bodhisattva path. That is, śrāvakahood, recontextualized, may be equally validly read as bodhisattvahood. This is what it means to say that the Śrāvaka realm inherently entails the bodhisattva-realm. In Tiantai, this relationship in turn comes to serve as the model for the mutual inherent entailment of every quiddity in every other quiddity.

Zhiyi calls the act of revealing this fact to someone, vis-à-vis his or her own activity, "the opening of the provisional to reveal the real." The image to be kept in mind here is the lotus flower metaphor analyzed at great length in

the *Fahuaxuanyi*. The provisional (teaching, practices, forms, ideas, goals) is represented by the flower; the real by the fruit inside. The flower opens, and the fruit is revealed as the true point for the flowering. But now we see the petals no longer as a covering but as a frame to the fruit. By this simple change in position, they take on new meaning and significance. Hence this image is used to emphasize the identity between the provisional and the real—as analyzed through a minute analysis of the various aspects involved—the provisional posited for the sake of the real, by the real, and even in a certain sense falling away, as the petals do, once the real is revealed. But Zhiyi interprets even this falling away, not, as one might expect, to mean that the provisional is an adventitious means that can be done away with once the true goal is achieved (a firm disjunction between means and ends, one being ultimately inessential and dispensable), but as exactly the opposite, in terms of identity:

"Provisional" means what is a provisional plan temporarily used and then discarded, and "real" means what is really registered as the ultimate foundation and source. . . . The provisional is not the original intention, and yet the original intention does not reside outside the provisional; we just have to open up the three provisionals . . . to reveal the one real. . . . The provisional is put forward for the sake of the real, and now the real is established. We open the provisional to reveal the real: thus the provisional is seen to be identical to the real, and thus there is no longer any "provisional" to speak of [since it is all now seen as the real]. Thus we speak of "discarding the provisional to reveal the real, or of the provisional being discarded while the real remains." This is why the explanation of the term [provisional] as a "temporary usage" is after all appropriate.[55]

By "discarding" or "overcoming" the provisional, Zhiyi means simply the insight that the provisional has all along been nothing but the real itself. Hence there is no longer anything that is merely provisional. This of course amounts to the eternal retention of the contents of what had previously been called provisional, while eliminating the determination "provisional" (or, more strictly, the determination "definitively and exclusively provisional") from these contents.

On these grounds, Zhiyi is able to speak of the Four Teachings (here the respective four types of Calming and Contemplation) and spin out a few of the dizzying implications of this notion of truth:

The Four Types of Calming and Contemplation are all true and not false. And why? Because if we do not open up and interconnect (*kaijue* 開決)[56] the teachings, there is no way to enter into principle at all. Now we "open up and decide the

dharma of the Śrāvakas, revealing it to be the king of all teachings" and "open up the gates of upāya, revealing [them to be] the true ultimate reality." Thus each type of meditation practice is able to lead into the Integrated. . . . Thus all four types are the real. However, it is also true that all four are provisional. And why? Because all are beyond speech, unspeakable. The provisional is unspeakable, and thus is not "provisional" [that is, "provisional" itself is just a provisional name]. The ultimate is unspeakable and therefore not "ultimate." We simply take what is not provisional and give it the forced name "provisional," and we take what is not ultimate and give it the forced name "ultimate." . . . Because they are spoken at all, they are all provisional. Moreover, this provisional and ultimate are both really "neither provisional nor ultimate." And why? Because all of them are unspeakable. . . . Thus provisional and ultimate are precisely neither provisional nor ultimate, non-dual, not divided, not joined, not separated.[57]

Note that the "ultimate truth" here, as in the *Dazhidulun*, is present in the provisional truths, so that they, too, are in a sense ultimate. To this Zhiyi adds the further wrinkle that, to the extent that this "ultimate truth" is spoken of at all or given any form of determination, even just the name "ultimate truth" and the further proviso that "it cannot be spoken," it becomes provisional, just like the other forms. This irreducible symmetry between the levels is of the utmost importance in Tiantai. Zhiyi says, picking up the motif from the *śāstra*, All is provisional, All is ultimate, All is both, All is neither—and he makes sure to add that all, as spoken, is itself merely provisional. The Ultimate Truth is thus also provisional, the Provisional Truth is also ultimate. But since the provisional is identical to the ultimate, this does not lead into an infinite regress. The circle is closed, it is not a self-contradiction to say "The statement 'The Ultimate Truth is unspeakable' is itself provisional." This is in fact the very crux of the doctrine of the Three Truths. This can be seen in Zhiyi's meta-level comments on the identity of the Three Truths: "They are three but one, one but three, totally unobstructed. All Three Truths are empty, because all three cut off the paths of thought and speech; all three are provisional posits, because all are merely names; all three are the Mean, because all are the Ultimate Reality."[58] In saying that the Three Truths are provisional posits and merely names, Zhiyi means precisely that all three are themselves words on a page, are determinate teachings, and hence merely provisional.

Emptiness, in more conventional (Hegelian) terminology, is the universal of universals. But this universal of universals exists, it is spoken and thought of by existing beings, it is determinate in that it is the opposite of the "par-

ticular"—to this extent it is itself only a particular entity and not the abstract "all" it purports to be. In this way, the universal is both universal and particular; the same is true of the particular, since "particular" is itself a universal as well. Each is both, and this is what is meant by the Mean. This irreducible symmetry is based on a certain asymmetry between the levels: the Ultimate includes the Provisional and by this very gesture overcomes the asymmetry so that the Provisional also includes the Ultimate—the Ultimate, however, knows this mutual inclusion and the Provisional does not (a tricky point that will exercise us considerably below). This symmetry is the structural nexus of Tiantai's concept of intersubjectivity and also a solution to a metaphysical quandary about the speakable and unspeakable that has been around since the *Laozi* (dramatized in Bai Juyi's sarcastic comment that since "those who speak do not know," why had Laozi written the five thousand characters of the *Daodejing*?).[59]

A previous teaching that is opened up in this way is not exactly refuted. Instead, the hermeneutic context in which it reveals itself to have always been speaking the Ultimate Truth is revealed. The teaching itself is not changed, but now it is seen that all along it was teaching the Ultimate Truth; the content and implications of the teaching then become very different from those assumed to pertain when this provisional teaching was heard in isolation or taken in its literal sense. As Zhiyi says, "When we open up the upāyas to reveal the Ultimate Truth in them, we see that precisely the former bodies [of Buddhas preaching inferior doctrines] are the perfect eternal body and that the former doctrines are all the perfect Integrated Teaching, that the former practices and former principles are all precisely the ultimately real."[60] The ultimate reveals itself both in contrast to the previous upāyas and as a new contextual nexus in the light of which the former teachings are themselves revealed as identical to this ultimate teaching, thereby in the same gesture overcoming this very contrast. This is the structure of the Relative and Absolute Transcendental Marvels discussed in the previous section. As Zhiyi says, "How could the coarse thinkable be different from the marvelous unthinkable? Without leaving words and letters we can thus speak the meaning of liberation. The crux is just to realize how the thinkable is identical to the unthinkable."[61]

But this notion of opening and revealing does not apply only to doctrines and teachings, much less merely to the Buddha's teaching, although this is its initial and formative point of reference. It is deployed as general metaphysical notion. Zhiyi says:

All existing dharmas are marvels. Each color and each scent without exception is the Way of the Mean itself. Sentient beings capriciously cut themselves off from this marvel. [The Buddha's] great compassion is such that he goes along with beings and does not contend with the world, and thus he propounds all the various provisional and real teachings. . . . Here [in the *Lotus*] he opens these various provisional upāyic gates to reveal the ultimate truth . . . thereby allowing all of them to enter into the ultimate reality. . . . If we decisively open up the provisional *siddhānta* of worldly convention to show how it is itself the marvelous *siddhānta* of worldly convention . . . we see that the very names of the Ten Thusnesses, the nature and appearance of each, throughout all the nine deluded realms together become the nature and appearance of the Buddha's own dharma-realm.[62]

Here we see not only an emphasis on the preservation of individual deluded forms and even names in their glorified form but also the way in which the actual qualities, appearances, and characteristics of the nine realms, treated as a kind of upāya, are opened up and revealed to be the Buddha realm. By this very act, they are again simultaneously both provisional and real. Zhiyi says a little later on:

Each dharma realm possesses ten thusnesses, so the ten have a total of a hundred. But since each inherently includes the other nine, each has a hundred dharma realms with a total of a thousand thusnesses. Now these can be arranged into five levels: (1) The evil [hells, hungry ghosts, animals, Asuras], (2) the good [humans and gods], (3) The Two Vehicles, (4) the Bodhisattvas, and (5) the Buddhas. If we divide these in two, we can say that the first four are provisional (*quan*), and the last one is the real (*shi*). But a more detailed exposition reveals that each one possesses both the provisional and the real.[63]

Since each possesses all the others, each is both provisional and real at the same time. This of course accords with the notion of the Four Siddhāntas. The relation between provisional and ultimate teachings is here used as a model for the relation between the ontic realms themselves; ordinary reality is to ultimate reality as a provisional teaching is to the ultimate teaching to which it leads.[64]

In short, we may say that the Ultimate Truth cannot be separated from Provisional Truth and would not be itself without the lesser teachings that precede it. Provisional Truth can never be eliminated or left behind, because then the Ultimate Truth would fail to be the ultimate truth; it is ultimate only by virtue of its mutual inherence with the Provisional Truth, which is also, therefore, ultimate. With this, Tiantai has unified the two main doctrines of the Mahāyāna and drawn an intrinsic connection between them: the

doctrine of *sūnyatā*, expanded into the Three Truths, and the doctrine of upāya. In Tiantai, upāya is seen as having a profound ontological significance, as the most perfect manifestation of the Three Truths. Hence the *Lotus Sūtra*, which is concerned fundamentally with this issue, is honored above all other scriptures. Here the real nature of all phenomena is asserted to be none other than the principle of upāya itself, of a provisional positing that is perpetually exposed as false and superseded. The truth, in other words, is the process of falsehood (partial truth) leading to truth. All dharmas—that is the phenomenal world—are here characterized as *quan* 權, provisional, upāya, a term applied originally to types of teaching; the application of this concept thus overflows from the pedagogical into the ontological.

The logic behind this overflow is seen in the notion that the phenomenal world is a "cause" of Buddhahood or, more precisely, that the two causes associated with consciousness and action, with the moral sphere of practice (as opposed to the "object" of cultivation, that to which one is to become awakened, the truth per se) are the cause of Buddhahood. In both cases there is necessarily good and evil, since these are necessary conditions for the accomplishment of Buddhahood. Indeed, the direct cause, the truth, the real-mark, is nothing more than the two other causes seen in their necessary totality, their mutual non-obstruction, just as the third truth, the Mean, is nothing but the relationship of the other two truths. Here the nine realms, everything there is besides the Buddha (i.e., the real-mark) himself, is depicted as something put forth by the Buddha as a teaching device, on the model of the provisional teachings described in the *Lotus Sūtra*.

Moreover, as we shall see in the discussion of intersubjectivity in the next chapter, Zhiyi insists that this "putting forth" is not a special effort or deliberate miraculous act of the Buddha that depends on external impetuses but is, rather, a direct and natural expression of his own innermost nature, for the real-mark includes provisional positing within itself. This, he explains, is what is meant by "non-creation" and "non-doing." The world is thus to be experienced as a teaching device, something that is in itself false if taken literally but true in that it is manifested by and in fact inherent in the truth itself, as a means devised skillfully to lead one to the truth, which turns out to be this principle of truth and half-truth itself, fleshed out.

But this is only half the story, since it is as true to say "the Buddha realm too is merely a provisional upāya" as it is to say "the nine realms are really the ultimately real Buddha realm." In fact, all have to be both at once, and thus we can say that all evils are teaching devices of the Buddha *or* that even the

Buddha is just another delusion resulting from ignorant clinging. Both of these must be equally valid for all experience. We will play out some of the interesting implications of this irreducible double vision in the chapter on Intersubjectivity.

The entire Tiantai concept of the relation between Provisional and Ultimate Truth can be illuminated by means of a commonplace example: the structure of a joke. Provisional is to Ultimate as set-up is to punch line. Marvelousness is equal to humorousness; coarseness to seriousness. The whole set-up of the joke is experienced as serious until the punch line appears; once the punch line is understood, however, the entire set-up is seen also to have been "funny." One does not say, after all, "The punch line is funny, but the joke as a whole is not." One simply says that the whole joke is funny, including the seriousness of the set-up. Every atom of the set-up is thereby understood to have also been funny. But this does not mean that one was laughing while hearing the set-up. On the contrary, the punch line works, is experienced as funny, only if the set-up has been temporarily, "provisionally," taken seriously. It is precisely the contrast between the solemnity of the set-up and the absurdity of the punch line that constitutes the humor of the latter, and thereby, of the entire joke, including the serious set-up. The set-up, however, can be simultaneously "serious" and "funny," and the two are identical to one another and yet exist in a *necessary* conflict and contrast.

This model closely approximates the relation between provisional and ultimate in Tiantai and thereby, of the relation of value and anti-value. It demonstrates how "anti-value" (seriousness, purgatory, karma, afflictions, sentient beings, provisional teachings) can be both identical to and opposite to "value" (humor, Buddhahood), without changing in the least and without renouncing the experienced conflict between the two. Their conflict itself is experienced as harmony, just as the contrast between the seriousness of the set-up and the humor of the punch line is also experienced as their harmony, in the retrospective understanding of the humor of the joke as a whole. Thus Tiantai writers can say "All things, including evil, are Buddha, nirvāṇa, enlightenment, marvelousness, ultimate truth, etc.," without thereby destroying the meaning of these terms through the paradoxical assertion of any predicate of all things. Such statements do not deny the contrast between evil and good, nor do they join all the particulars and distinctions among individual things into one indeterminate universal neither-good-nor-evil Suchness or "night in which all cows are black." On the contrary, the goodness of all things is dependent on the eternal uncompromising contrast be-

tween good and evil (i.e., the less good). The truth of all things is dependent on the eternal uncompromising contrast between true and false (i.e., provisional). The *Lotus Sūtra* is the punch line of the universe and reveals that all provisional positings are as marvelous as the *Lotus Sūtra* itself, without altering in the least their immediate coarseness, illusion, and evil. Once the punch line appears, everything is always both funny and serious.

Let us return to the question of the Mean. Zhiyi sometimes glosses *miao* as *jue* (絕 "cutting off," i.e., the cutting of relativity, making absolute), the same term he uses to indicate the function of the Mean. The Mean, by the same token, "opens up" the provisional to reveal itself as the ultimate. Does the similarity in vocabulary mark a close structural relation between these terms? Let us refine our previous analysis of the Mean, with the help of this new resource. Some X, say, "love," appears in experience. As noted above, it never appears *simpliciter*, but always expressed *as* some non-X things. It, like all other phenomena, interpenetrates with *all* forms of non-X, on this level, only because this situation is universally applicable. But now we can see another sense in which any X and non-X are directly identified. X is to non-X as marvelous is to coarse, as the *Lotus Sūtra* is to all previous teachings. The Relative Marvel means that X contradicts, undermines, cuts off, destroys non-X: love eliminates or replaces hate, Marxism eliminates or replaces feminism or Christianity, and so on. The seriousness of the set-up is in perfect contradiction to the humorousness of the punch line. But the Absolute Marvel means that in this very process it reveals non-X to have been its precondition, the ground of its being, and indeed a continuing participant in its being, that indeed this non-X, precisely *qua* non-X, is itself an expression of X. The set-up is also funny and can now be seen as simply a deceptive form *as* which this humorousness was appearing. What is more, humor appears *as* precisely the absence of humor itself, as seriousness per se: what is funny about it is precisely that it is serious. All forms of non-X are tricky deadpan forms in which X is showing itself, and what is Xish about them is precisely their non-Xness.

The perfection of the Buddha's enlightenment is expressed by teaching imperfect doctrines, and it is their imperfection that makes them perfect—for as we shall see, it is precisely their bias and one-sidedness, not the unbiasedness they will be revealed also always to have possessed, that accounts for their efficacy in overcoming (other) biases, and this is precisely what makes them expressions of Buddhahood. When love appears, it sees hate as a way of revealing what love is. Regarding itself as the inevitable happy end-

ing of the story, as all moments of experience do, it sees the hatred qua contrast to love as a way love expresses itself, makes itself felt. When class struggle establishes itself as a particular theory with its own quiddity, it does so first by distinguishing itself from other, shallower or illusory doctrines. Then, to succeed as the "true" doctrine, it sees that all these others doctrines are in fact just expressions of itself, forms in which it had been appearing.

The Mean as a quiddity per se (that is, the realization of this idea in the mind of some practitioner) is this point as universally applicable: that all non-Mean things turn out to be the Mean expressed necessarily as non-Mean, because and only because of its non-Meanness. But also, since it is the universal case applicable to all quiddities, it signifies that *any* quiddity is in the same situation as the Mean itself. Each X is expressed by each non-X, because and only because of its non-Xness. Each quiddity cunningly assumes these forms of not-itself, by means of which alone it is able to manifest itself—somewhat as, say, the Śrāvakas express their bodhisattvahood precisely by forgetting they are bodhisattvas and instead appearing, even to themselves, as Śrāvakas. To accomplish the bodhisattva work, it is necessary to be non-bodhisattva for a while. Hegel spoke of the "cunning of reason"—the way in which universal Reason utilizes the passions and all forms of irrational behavior to carry out its own ends. Here we have something similar, except that it is applicable not only to Reason, as we shall see especially with Zhili, but to every quiddity whatsoever: every quiddity cunningly appears as its opposite so as to accomplish itself. My coffee cup has sneakily been manifesting itself as all the other experiences of my life so that I can now apprehend it as precisely this quiddity; the same goes for all my other experiences. We shall see this more clearly in the discussion of Zhili's doctrine of the "ultimate dung beetle" and in the notion that in enlightenment it is not only the essence of Buddhahood that becomes more and more explicitly and all-pervasively manifest but also that of every other quiddity: the doctrines of expression and unity by means of upāya apply to each and every one of them. Each one is the sole agent, actively conniving to bring itself forth by means of various "upāyas" of its own. Just as a buddha appears in every possible form, this coffee cup has had to appear as all forms of non-coffee-cup to express itself, and indeed, seen retrospectively, all these non-coffee cup forms have been adequate expressions of it, just as all previous upāyas of a buddha are actually the one Buddha-vehicle.

In contrast to a joke, however, in the Three Truths everything is a punch line to everything else, that is, the set-up is also punch line to the punch line,

in that everything reveals itself to be a negative form of everything else, revealed precisely by this negativity. Moreover, since this is the Non-exclusive Mean, it is equally true, obviously, to say that everything is a set-up to everything else. All is center; all is periphery. Here all three forms of Provisional Positing coincide: as composition of elements, as sequence in time (for the temporal aspect is crucial to the whole notion of opening the provisional to reveal the real, which, indeed, may be viewed as precisely an insight into temporality per se, as we shall discuss in the Conclusion to this work), and as semantic or phenomenal contrast. Moreover, the preceding moments in the sequence leading up to X and the pure negation of X are forms *as* which X was appearing, with the further wrinkle that what makes them forms and expressions of X is precisely their non-Xness, their contrast to X, their negation of X. This, in essence, is the significance of the Mean in the Integral Teaching.

Zhiyi develops the idea of Emptiness in a way that is diametrically opposed to the tendencies of the Mādhyamika school, which favors the negation of all possible propositions about entities. Rather, he develops the idea in a direction that brings value paradox and the omnicentric holistic identity of opposites to the forefront. This Tiantai notion of "identity" of opposite terms, mediated as it is by the omnicentric holism implicated by the Three Truths, can be recapitulated in the following propositions.

"Cat" = cat + not-cat

"Cat" is only intelligible, only "appears" in experience, as a focus that is dependent on its particular background. The contours of the set "cat" and of the set "not-cat" are identical. They are two ways of referring to a single contour; to develop the imaginary-visual side of the metaphor rather than the logical, we can say that the outline of cat describes a shape on two sides, each the mirror image of the other. "Cat" is a particular way of indicating the entire cosmos, with a focus on the dividing line between cat and not-cat. Neither side alone describes adequately what is ultimately indicated by this term. Similarly:

Dog = dog + non-dog

By the same principle: "dog" is a particular way of indicating the entire cosmos, but with a focus on the dividing line between dog and non-dog. From this we move to the next proposition:

"Dog" = "cat"

In other words, dog + non-dog = cat + non-cat, for both terms = the entire cosmos. On the other hand:

"Dog" ≠ "cat"

For these two terms indicate the entire universe with a focus on a particular dividing line within the totality of dividing lines that make up the cosmos. It was Zhili who asserted once and for all that these dividing lines exist, independent of human delusion. They are what is. Indeed, we may say that *all possible dividing lines, all possible differences,* is an adequate definition of the universe.

Here, too, we can see why in one sense it is adequate to describe the universe as fundamentally "cat" (or mind or Buddha or compassion or hatred or deviltry or desire or a dung beetle, etc.), For the word "cat" actually denotes the universe, from a particular focus.[65] The universe is also fundamentally "not-cat," for "Not-cat" = not-cat + cat, the entire cosmos. Indeed, not-cat = cat. Or we could say that the universe is fundamentally neither cat nor not-cat, since either of these, in its surface meaning, indicates only half of the dyad and is intelligible only in relation to the other. The whole can be neither one side nor the other. But this is very different from saying the universe can be neither X nor non-X because the universe is "really" Emptiness (as in the Common Teaching) or "really" something that transcends all possible extremes or determinations (as in the Separate Teaching, the Exclusive Mean). The Non-exclusive Mean indicates that "cat," "not-cat," and "neither cat nor not-cat" are equally valid descriptions of the fundamental nature of the universe (or, for that matter, of this apparent "cat" before me or any other particular quiddity). This is fundamentally what Zhiyi understands by the Mean. It is the absolute, that than which there is no other, outside of which there is nothing. It is the whole, if whole is understood omnicentrically, as not opposed to "part" but rather as the whole constituted of the pair "whole/part." Add to this the further considerations on the nature of X and non-X, and their identity to one another as constituted by their contrast, as elucidated developmentally on the model of set-up and punch line, and we have omnicentric holism. X is all things (X and non-X) appearing as X; non-X is all things (X and non-X) appearing as non-X. Everything in the world is X, everything in the world is non-X, and their appearing as Xness is accomplished by (or better, *as*) their appearing as non-Xness, and vice versa.

The Three Thousand Quiddities Inherently Entailed in Each Moment of Experience / Inherent Entailment

Having clarified the terminology and basic strategies of Tiantai thinking, especially the notion of opening the provisional to reveal the real, we may now return to the central theme of holism and the way in which the Tiantai doctrine of the Mean is to be understood as implying a thoroughgoing omnicentrism. As we saw above, the Buddha realm (the world as experienced through enlightenment) is to the other nine realms (the world experienced via delusion) as a real meaning is to its provisional expressions. Moreover, through the opening of the provisional to reveal the real, the nine are in fact nothing but the one and delusion is itself enlightenment. The opposite is also true: enlightenment is just one more delusion. This also means that the Buddha contains within himself all the other realms and would not be the Buddha if purgatories and hungry ghosts and sin did not also inhere within him, just as the ultimate truth cannot be separated from provisional truth and would not be itself without the lesser teachings that precede it—just as the punch line would not be a punch line without the contrasting set-up.

Moreover, the same is true of each of the other nine realms. Since each is revealed to be "marvelous" (this "marvelousness" is defined as the quality of "opening the others to reveal that they are in fact identical to itself"), each is an opener as well as the opened. Each would not be itself if not for the others; indeed the very contrast with the others is constitutive of each, and each is the point to which all others are reducible. Each particular quiddity is what may be "revealed" when the others are "opened up." The same is true of any dharma, any moment of experience. This is why, in the Integrated Teaching concerning the Mean, it is asserted that "all dharmas are reducible to the Mean *and thus also* to Emptiness and also to Provisional Positing." The Mean is the insight into the identity between Emptiness and Provisional Positing, the two most radical possible extremes. Thus, the Mean is used to indicate "that than which there is no other"—it is the principle that Emptiness is not outside Provisional Positing or other than it and vice versa. That is, the real meaning (Emptiness) and the upāya (Provisional Positing) are mutually inclusive—by thinking one through to the bottom, you think the other, as well as their mutual inclusiveness. Since this relationship holds for the ten realms and all the dharmas therein, it is possible for Zhiyi to say, "All dharmas are reducible to purgatory, and purgatory is the ultimate

beyond which there is no more reducing; just as it is right there and then is precisely principle, and there is nothing beyond itself that it depends on—thus it [like each of the other nine realms taken separately] can itself be called the entire dharma-realm. Precisely the same is true for each of the other realms, all the way up to the Buddha-realm."[66]

For Zhiyi, each determinate dharma is precisely principle. Principle is that which explains all phenomena, is that to which everything is reducible, and that which, if seen, brings liberation. His statement that each is principle means that this concrete thing here, *because* it is identical to the Non-exclusive Mean, functions as the principle of all other things. To say this cup is the Mean denotes that it is equally true to call it cup or not-cup, and that this is true of any other determination I devise for it. What I am experiencing as "cupness" is neither thus nor otherwise, and this "being neither thus nor otherwise" is precisely what it means for it to be the "hidden meaning" of all other dharmas, what explains them, what they are all actually pointing to—again, all this must be understood in the exegetical sense posited by the root metaphor of provisional and ultimate teachings. We can "open up" all other dharmas—the sufferings in purgatory, the bliss in the heavens, the realization of the Buddhas, the transformations of the Bodhisattvas, wars, sex, birth, death, Roman history, the distance between here and the airport, the price of beans in Bolivia—to reveal that their real meaning (what explains them all, their point of reference, that which grants them ontological consistency, both in the sense of their support and of their ultimate goal, and finally also what is expressing itself *as* them) is this cup. This cup is, in this sense, "principle." The same is true of any other dharma. The choice of any dharma as the point of reference at any point in time is wholly determined by the context or, more specifically, by the mechanics of provisional positing in the compassionate praxis of bodhisattvas. I shall speak about this in more detail in the section on Intersubjectivity.

The usual shorthand for expressing this idea in discussions of Tiantai doctrine is "the Three Thousand quiddities entailed in a single moment of experience" (一念三千). That is, all the quiddities are included in each other, and all are replete in any given moment of experience. We have already discussed the ten thusnesses and ten realms that are the main elements in the equation yielding this number.[67] "Three thousand" is more than just a way of saying "everything." It specifies also all possible views of this everything and the way in which these viewpoints view each other. It is also an "everything," which therefore includes irrevocably not only differentiation

and multiplicity as such but also, specifically, misapprehension, mutual regard, delusion and evil.

This is the form that "holism" takes in the Tiantai scheme of things. The whole is present in each part; every particular is itself the whole. But more than this, the "whole" is not merely the collection of all existing objects (in the strict sense, i.e., objective entities as opposed to subjectivity), excluding all the deluded and mistaken ways in which these objects might be misperceived by benighted subjectivities. Inherent in the objects is all the possible misperceptions (more properly, partial perceptions) of them. The true nature of any object is the whole three-thousandness. At any given time, sentient beings of various karmic dispositions see some given side of this three-thousandness, and the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas express that particular side to enlighten those karmically conditioned beings. Thus, we may say that each part is identical to the "whole." Why, then, does this whole express itself in these various limited and diverse ways, since it is always the same thing, which is everything? The Tiantai notion of Provisional Positing as structurally identical to upāya and the ineluctable intersubjectivity underlying this notion ensure that this particularization must always take place for two reasons: (1) in their karmic delusion, beings in the nine deluded realms see only a certain aspect of this totality; and (2) out of compassion, the Buddhas respond specifically to these delusions, and their upāya functions only in and as these delusions. *Both* these reasons are operative in every moment of experience, since all three thousand quiddities are included, and this explicitly involves both the deluded and the enlightened. Here again we see the ontological significance given to upāya in the Tiantai scheme of things.

Thus we must understand the famous concept of "inherent entailment" (*ju* 具) that Tiantai writers still use to differentiate their school from others (i.e., *xingju* 性具, inherent inclusion or entailment in the nature [or better, as Lang E. Ra has it, inherent inclusion of each in each "from the beginning" i.e., all along], as opposed to the Huayan notion of *xingqi* 性起, arising via the nature). The presence of the three thousand quiddities in each determinate moment of experience is *not* to be understood as the presence of a bunch of separate items somehow hidden in the unseen depths of this moment. As Guanding said:

If you definitively (*ding* 定) assert that one moment of experience inherently has within it all dharmas and is the womb of the Buddhas (*tathāgatha-garbha*), this is the same as the view of Kapila [founder of the non-Buddhist Sānkhya school], who erroneously reckoned that the effect pre-exists in the cause. If you definitively assert that

this moment of experience does not have all dharmas in it and that they are exist only through practice, this is the same as the view of Uluka [founder of the non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣika school], who erroneously reckoned that the effect does not exist in the cause. If you definitively assert that this moment of experience both includes and does not include, this is the same as the view of [the non-Buddhist naked ascetic] Ṛṣabha, who held that the effect both does and does not pre-exist in the cause. All six non-Buddhist teachers had some definitive view to which they were attached. . . . Thus those who, on hearing our teaching that the mind inherently includes all dharmas and is the womb of the Buddhas, imagine that these dharmas are there like grains of sand stored in a sack, or who, on hearing that all dharmas are not in the mind, imagine that they are then just like the horns of a rabbit, completely non-existent—how can the Way be discussed with such people, eternally attached as they are to perverted views? The scriptures compare it to the sound within a *konghou* [23-stringed zither], which cannot be taken as a fixed or definitively real presence inside the zither; to seek it out with the tetralemma based on concepts of being and non-being is to behave like the foolish king who cut the strings of the zither in order to search for the sound inside—all the positions derived from being or non-being are equally perverse! If, however, like the wise advisor who was accomplished at playing and bringing out the sound, one can skillfully play it, all the four propositions fit the case.[68]

All things are present in each thing, and Buddhahood is thus present in each moment of sin and delusion. It can equally be said that all things are absent from each other, but not as horns are absent from a rabbit. How then? As sound is present or absent in the musical instrument—that is, as a first approach, as a "potential," that can be brought forth by skillful "use" of this thing. This notion of potential however, is far from straightforward. It is not some inner nature lying dormant within a thing and waiting to be brought out. The word for it in Tiantai texts is *xing* 性, and Zhiyi vigorously denies any notion of potential that either implies or denies pre-existence, both of which fall prey to the original Mādhyamika critique of causality in general.[69] The concept of potential here is almost the exact opposite of Aristotle's, which is a way of differentiating things that look alike. The Tiantai concept is a way of asserting the unity of things that look different. For Aristotle, the potential of a particular seed differentiates it from another that looks like it—it can grow into a rose rather than a daisy, and that is its fixed and essential nature. Mencius also speaks in a similar vein. But for Tiantai adherents, everything has the same nature or potential. The potential of everything is always the same—it is the three thousand thusnesses, that is, all possible experiential quiddities. Moreover, it is misleading to say only

that a given dharma "possesses" this potential or that it "possesses" or "includes" the three thousand quiddities; as Zhiyi put it in the *Mohezhiguan*:

If there is the slightest experience of any kind, it inherently includes all three thousand quiddities. This does not mean this moment of experience is prior [i.e., the cause] and the three thousand quiddities are anterior [i.e., the effect], nor that the three thousand quiddities are prior and the one moment is anterior. It's just like the eight marks that constitute the flux of any object [arisal, persistence, decay, and extinction];[70] if the object is prior to the marks, it would not be in flux, and if the marks were prior to the object, it would still not be in flux. Neither prior nor anterior is permissible; it is just the thing we mean when we refer to its flux, and just the flux we mean when we refer to the thing. A moment of experience is also thus. If the mind created all dharmas, this would be a "vertical" way of looking at it [i.e., with a hierarchy of cause and effect, where the mind is ontically prior or "higher"]; if the mind simultaneously encompassed all dharmas, this would be a "horizontal" way of looking at it [i.e., a definitive side-by-side equality of distinct objects]. But neither the vertical nor the horizontal view is permissible; rather, it is just the mind that is all dharmas, and just all dharmas that are the mind. This is neither vertical nor horizontal, neither the same nor different; abstruse, marvelous, deep, absolute, it is not knowable by consciousness, not speakable in words, and hence is called the inconceivable.[71]

All Three Thousand quiddities are inherent in the mind in the same manner as the characteristics of a thing are inherent in that thing or as the process of a thing's arisal and decay is identical to the thing itself. The included and the includer are not two separate entities, one of which is enclosed in the other. Rather, the vantage point chosen as a point of reference is provisionally called the "includer" ("entailer"), and all the others are the "included" ("entailed"). If the vantage point and referencing are changed, that dharma is equally the includer.[72] In terms of the formulation developed above, all quiddities in the universe are appearing here *as* my mind—not as mind per se, be it noted (as the Shanwai later read this passage), but as this particular moment of subjective experience, this particular moment of anger, greed, confusion, and so on, with all its specific lineaments. This moment of experience is composed of all quiddities. In the terms developed above, it is what all things are appearing *as* at this moment. It is a center, than which there is nothing other, identical to the whole it unifies. It is the end toward which all things are working together as means, in such a way that the means are absorbed into the end and no longer immediately discernible as themselves, appearing rather as the end, as in the example of tacit knowledge derived from Polanyi earlier in this book. Here, as there, the relation can be re-

versed: this moment of experience can in turn appear *as* all things in the universe, the objective world, or any one particular element thereof, likewise construed. The Three Thousand appear as this mind; this mind appears as the Three Thousand. It is one and the same in either case but never definitively reducible to one side at the expense of the other.

Here we finally have a complete equivalence between Provisional Positing as component (*yincheng jia*) and as context (*xiangxu jia, xiangdai jia*); the non-X components of X and the non-X contexts (temporal and semantic) of X are equally all included in what is appearing here *as* X. There is no longer any qualitative difference in the way these various types of non-X contribute to the manifestation of X. To use Polanyi's example again, the tacit knowledge of X always involves, temporally and semantically, both its component parts (for example, the features of a facial expression that are read only as the expression, perhaps to the neglect of any awareness of the individual features) and its context (e.g., the sensations on the hand that are read only as the information experienced at the end of the probe). The contractions of the muscles of the eye (component) and the beating of the heart (context) equally appear here *as* this visual impression I am experiencing. No non-X of any kind fails to be either a component or a context determining X, and so all quiddities are appearing here *as* this quiddity.

The classic formulation of the principle involved in this omnicentric turn, which marked a sea-change in all Buddhist metaphysics, comes in Zhiyi's *Sinianchu*, in a critique of the unicentrism of the "consciousness-only" school and, by the same token, of any unilateral foundational metaphysic:

> In Vasubandhu's theory of consciousness-only, there is only the one consciousness, but it is divided into the discriminating and the undiscriminating forms of consciousness; the discriminating consciousness is what we usually call consciousness, whereas the undiscriminating consciousness is "consciousness appearing to be an object" (*sichen shi* 似塵識). All the physical objects in the universe—vases, clothing, carts, and carriages—are all this undiscriminating form of consciousness. . . . But since they are all one nature, we can equally say that there are two forms of matter, the discriminating and the undiscriminating. . . . It is in this sense that mind and matter are non-dual. Since he [Vasubandhu] is able to say there are these two different forms of consciousness, we can equally say they are two different forms of matter. . . . In the Integrated Teaching, we can also say that all things are matter only, or sound only, or scent only, or flavor only, or tactile sensation only, or consciousness only. In sum, every dharma inherently includes all the dharmas throughout the dharma-realm.[73]

"Discrimination" is, initially, the characteristic feature of consciousness, which distinguishes it from "undiscriminating" matter. However, as soon as we say that all is consciousness, we have to allow that what appeared to be matter, because it performed no discriminations, was in fact just a deceptively undiscriminating "form" of consciousness. The meaning of the term "consciousness" has thereby been expanded. But if the meaning of this term can thus be expanded to include what was precisely its opposite, in distinction to which it was defined, cannot any other term be similarly expanded? That is, if we can say that matter is really just a deceptive form of mind, we can equally say that mind is just a deceptive form of matter. As soon as we admit the principle of expression in many forms or the possibility of explaining any one thing in terms of another, interpretability as such, whatever X we happen to posit as this center is emptied of its specific meaning by the very fact that it is, by this very hypothesis, also something that appears to be its opposite. "Consciousness" turns out to mean "everything that appears, either as consciousness or as matter." But then, says Zhiyi, matter can also have two forms of appearing, qua consciousness or qua matter. It can also mean "everything that appears, either as consciousness or as matter." Hence matter and consciousness are non-dual. But the real import of this theory is that anything can be used to explain anything else, that all things interconnect and transform into each other such that any particular quiddity may be read as all-pervasive. The reader may recall the "all is water" example I adduced in explaining omnicentrism in Chapter 2, which was indeed inspired by the passage quoted above. When any "all is X" theory is taken seriously, it implies "X really means everything we formerly called X as well as everything we called non-X," and thus, "non-X also means just this same X, which really means X plus non-X," and therefore ends up meaning equally that "all is *any* X," and moreover that "X is therefore identical to anti-X."[74] This is omnicentrism.

This can be seen as another example of the principle elucidated in the discussion of relative and absolute marvels above. First, a distinction is made: mind is different from matter, X is different from non-X, on the basis of its distinguishing features. Only on the basis of this distinction is the quiddity of Xness established at all—for example, mind *as* discriminating, matter *as* non-discriminating. But once this is done, by the holistic principle of the Mean, each is seen to be a provisional expression of the other; mind is a deceptive form of matter (discrimination is a deceptive from of non-discrimination), matter is a deceptive form of mind. Thereby "mind" be-

comes absolute (literally transcending its defining contrast, so that it pervades everywhere, even in its opposite) and "matter" also becomes absolute, each in its very determination of contrast to the other. Without the contrast, *neither* could pervade anywhere, since no such quiddities could be established at all. The arbitrary starting point is the necessary supplier of determinacy per se, and the "absoluteness" does not destroy the particular quiddities. It does not reveal a pure transcendence to which none of these particular designations pertain; rather, it fully and thoroughly establishes them, as pertaining everywhere.

Hence, as we will see in detail below, Zhili pointed out that the statement that all sentient beings possess the Buddha nature is a way of stating the case so as to accommodate certain specific practical problems. It is in fact equally true to say that all beings possess the dung-beetle nature, the purgatory nature, the suddenly-waking-up-screaming nature, the killing-your-best-friend nature—and indeed, these are all one and the same "nature," the nature of the Three Thousand, and all of these are equally realized as ultimate with enlightenment. Indeed, for Zhili, this is the special nature of the position of Buddhahood, its realization is the realization that one is identical to the dung beetle, that the name and form and experience of the dung beetle are the ultimate hidden truth of all things. Here again the concept of "opening the provisional to reveal it to be the ultimate" is crucial. The relation of the "actual" (particular) and the "potential" (universal) is to be conceived on this model, the model used for upāya. Indeed, as we shall see below, it is this aspect that saves us from falling into a facile "everything is everything" view, where nothing can be determined and nothing matters. Because of the constitutive intersubjectivity entailed in this view, all the quiddities do not vanish when it is seen that all are equally causes and effects of each other. Rather, they inhere everywhere, preserving the individual differences created by the starting position of delusion, which, together with the compassion for delusion that arises with it, forever refracts this totality into the Three Thousand determinate quiddities.

We may sum up our results as follows: To say "X inherently entails/includes Y" means "X is inescapably readable, if properly recontextualized, *as* consisting of Yness, as instantiating Y, and ultimately as Y itself. Moreover, this process of recontextualization is not something alien added to the original X, but is rather implicit in its original (readability as) Xness, and indeed is as much its own deed as the original contextualization which allowed it to be read as X." Hence inherent entailment/inclusion does *not* mean

that, hidden inside each apparent quiddity, all the other quiddities are always already present, something we must accept dogmatically. On the contrary, this claim of inherent inclusion is intended as the *minimum* possible assertion, or the suspension of all possible definitive premises. It is meant to be the ultimate statement of a thoroughgoing skepticism that demolishes all possible positive claims, rather than a dogmatic and positive claim asserting the existence of a particular non-apparent metaphysical truth. The establishment of the doctrine of inherent entailment and identity is to be thought of not as the addition of one more unverifiable proposition to which we are to give our allegiance ("Contrary to appearances, X actually includes within it the Three Thousand quiddities") but as the removal or overcoming of one more proposition, the final and fundamental unexamined assumption; namely, "It is either true that 'X is really X' or that 'X is really not X.'"[75] The Tiantai position is that we are actually assuming *less*, not more, when we say that all quiddities are mutually included and identical in this manner, even less than if we were to say, for example, "All dharmas are empty," or "Fundamentally nothing has ever existed," or "There is no subject of which anything could be predicated," or "Truth is inexpressible, nothing can be asserted, all beliefs about the nature of reality are false" or "Nothing exists, and even if it did, we couldn't know it, and even if we could, we couldn't express it, and even if we could, we couldn't prove it." This blankness, much like the commonsense and substantialist/"atomistic" notions of identity already demolished by the Emptiness critique (and indeed, by any skeptical system, e.g., that of Pyrrho or Sextus Empiricus) of which it is a result, posits one more unexamined and un-"emptied" deluded assumption than the assertion of inherent inclusion in the Tiantai sense. That is, it still posits a definitive and self-identical blankness or exclusion of all marks, which is, however, actually a mark itself, since it has an opposite (i.e., "marklessness" is the opposite of "having marks") and is hence not yet "absolute" (*juedai*). Only the set-up/punch-line identity-in-conflict structure of upāya, the opening of the provisional to reveal the real, brings us to a truly absolute result that is free of all unrefuted presuppositions. We are not asserting as an unconfirmed positive hypothesis that a bunch of other unseen quiddities are hidden inside this quiddity. We are just asserting that this quiddity is unspecifiable except in the set-up/punch-line manner, that it is constantly rewriting itself as other quiddities without having to change in the least, which, thought through, equals the doctrine of the inherent inclusion of the Three Thousand. To appreciate the thoroughness of this result and all its implications fully, we must think through all the resonances of the inter-

subjective situation underlying the theory of upāya on which it is based, which will be the work of the following chapter.

The commonsense view, to use philosophical jargon, is that any entity has both internal and external relations; certain of its relations and properties are intrinsic to its identity as that thing, and others are not. There are two alternative extreme views that oppose this commonsense (and Aristotelean) notion. One is that all relations are internal—that you cannot change anything about that thing, any of its characteristics or relations, without changing its identity thereby. The other is that there are no internal relations at all—that any description of an object's "real essence" is merely conventional, that the real object has no specific intrinsic properties at all, its identity consisting in nothing but the fact that it is picked out as that thing by conventional speech acts, linking back to a primal baptism (e.g., in Kripkean antidescriptivism).[76] Its identity is constituted by a name and a link of linguistic usage and nothing more; all the relations and properties of the thing may change without its ceasing to be this thing. The Tiantai concept of inherent inclusion amounts in effect to the claim that the two extreme claims are both true and that the commonsense view alone is mistaken. The classical Buddhist view of no-self is an extreme example of the "external relations only" view; on the other hand, the indigenous Chinese holisms veer toward the "internal relations only" view. The doctrine of inherent inclusion rests on the insight that these two apparently opposite positions ultimately amount to the same thing, as opposed to the commonsense view (which however still retains value as an upāya).

Of the Three Truths, Emptiness (in the first three Teachings) corresponds to the external-relations-only view, Provisional Positing (in the first three Teachings) to the commonsense view of some internal and some external relations, Provisional Positing in the Integrated Teaching to the only-internal-relations view, and the Mean to the identity of the two extreme positions—which indeed implies that in the Integrated Teaching, Emptiness also means internal-relations-only and Provisional Positing also means external-relations-only. Inherent entailment of the Three Thousand in every moment of experience is an extreme way of stating the internal-relations-only view, and yet at the same time it denotes the extreme external-relations-only position, for the Three Thousand that are included are themselves devoid of any intrinsic properties, any internal relations, of their own. All of a thing's properties and relations are inherent to its identity, but none of these properties or relations is to be understood as exclusive of its opposite or of

its negation. Since it would still be itself even if it had exactly the opposite relations of the ones it now possesses, the external-relations-only view is true. Since its identity itself is constituted of nothing but these relations, however, the internal-relations-only view is also true. This is only possible because whether it presents itself as having relation X or relation anti-X, it really has *both* relation X *and* relation anti-X. This is the central insight of the Three Truths.

This is what differentiates omnicentric holism from the unicentric holisms in the European philosophical tradition, for example, monistic idealism, which tends to side with the internal-relations-only view to the exclusion of the external-relations-only view. For this reason, the Tiantai view may be better equipped to handle some of the criticisms to which the monist idealist view or the monist materialist view (or for that matter any non-monistic pluralist view) has been subjected. With analytic philosophers, it can maintain that the search for the "real essence " of any object, as some determinate and intelligible constant that provides its true identity, is incoherent, for the real essence of X will always be X plus non-X, and equally X or non-X. On the other hand, it can stand with the idealists in rejecting the atomization of entities and the sundering of their relations, leaving them as unconnected monads that simply are what they are, regardless of their relationships.

Moreover, although accepting the conventional nature of all naming, since any name only one-sidedly chooses an aspect of the fullness/emptiness that is everywhere present, the Tiantai view, by virtue of its notion of upāya, need not share the rejection of the truth-value of all conventional naming that adoption of this view usually entails. Every conventional name, after all, besides being what it is due to convention (that is, ignorance and compassion, as we shall see below), is also saying something accurate about the whole, the one subject/object that exists, which is its true referent—for every possible posit is inherently included in the nature, and each of these inherently includes all other possible posits. A clearer notion of the implications of this situation will perhaps become apparent when we consider in more detail the epistemological implications of this view, especially the performative notion of truth entailed in it, in the following chapter. In all these questions, it is well to remember that omnicentrism presents itself as a third alternative to absolutism or relativism in epistemology, just as it provides an alternative to the internal-relations and external-relations dichotomy in the question of the nature of an object or to the collectivism/individualism dichotomy in the social sphere.

In short, in this doctrine of universal mutual inclusion and entailment, neither the including quiddity nor the included quiddities are naïvely definitive entities. Both the included and the includer are already no longer definitively themselves or others; they are already transparent, that is, empty, provisionally posited, and the Mean. All other quiddities are this very quiddity, recontextualized; this recontextualization, however, is not added from outside it (to have an "outside," it would have to have definite borders of its own to begin with, which it does not), but is itself also an inescapable aspect of this quiddity itself, to exactly the same extent as any other aspect it might appear to have. It is thus that we must understand the omnicentric holism embodied in the Tiantai doctrine of "the Three Thousand quiddities inherently entailed in each moment of experience."

PART II: TRANSITIONAL HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF LATER TIANTAI

The ideas outlined above seem to be those traceable in earliest Tiantai, that is, in Zhiyi and Guanding, prior to Zhanran's interpretive and reconstructive work, although, as noted earlier, my account of these points unavoidably follows a line of interpretation that owes much to that developed by Zhanran and later by Zhili.[77] Some remarks may thus be in order, before we move on to the question of intersubjectivity, concerning the historical developments and contexts generally believed to have led up to the last two thinkers in the Tiantai tradition.

The Huayan School and "Nature-Origination"

After Zhiyi's time, omnicentric holism in one form or another became a staple of Chinese Buddhism. This idea was adapted and understood in various ways in later recensions. Of particular interest here are the Huayan school and the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra* (*Lengyan jing*), an apocryphal work composed in China during the Tang dynasty.

Figurative expressions that may be interpreted omnicentrically are abundant in certain Mahāyāna sūtras from India, in particular the *Avataṁsaka* and *Vimalakīrti*. It is clear that the philosophical basis of these themes has something to do with the doctrine of Emptiness, but the sūtras generally do not themselves spell out a systematic argument that specifies how these claims are to be understood. We are told in abundant and astonishing ways that all

things permeate all places and all other things, but we are not told exactly why, except in the most general way, or how this claim is to be understood, or which of the many possible implications we are to draw from this.

Dushun, a slightly younger contemporary of Zhiyi's, is the nominal founder of Huayan Buddhism. Supposedly he based his doctrines primarily on the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, but there is considerable doubt that the works attributed to him can be traced to this historical Dushun. Xianshou Fazang (643–721) is usually fingered as the de facto founder of the tradition. All the works attributed to both these figures, as well as to later Huayan masters, argue emphatically for omnicentrism. The typical Huayan formulation for this is the famous slogan "non-obstruction between events" (*shi shi wu ai* 事事無礙 or *shi shi yuan rong* 事事圓融), and the analogy of Indra's net from the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, developed in the works attributed to Dushun. It is well documented that an important shift in Huayan doctrine took place in the Tang Dynasty, whereby the concept of the Tathāgata-garbha and the notion of the pure mind, largely traceable to the *Awakening of Faith śāstra* (also probably of Chinese origin), becomes increasingly dominant. This tendency reached its zenith in the thought of Guifeng Zongmi (780–841), but it is already subtly present in some of Fazang's writings and becomes more visible in the thought of Qingliang Chengguan (738–839). In Zongmi's case, this has been interpreted as a shift from an emphasis on the mutual interpenetration of events to an emphasis on the interpenetration between principle and events (*li shi wu ai* 理事無礙), in which principle is identified with the pure essence of mind.[78] This moves Huayan thought away from the Mādhyamika principles used to argue for omnicentrism in Tiantai, especially in establishing a fixed one-way relationship between the pure mind (indeterminate in itself) and all other determinacies (which are both identical to and non-identical to this pure mind, which serves as their ontological basis). In the works attributed to Dushun, however, there is no trace of this doctrine of the true essence of mind as the basis for omnicentrism. Rather, Dushun argues for omnicentrism on the basis of a consideration of Emptiness. However, the manner in which this proceeds differs significantly from the use of Emptiness in the Tiantai establishment of omnicentrism. The difference can be best understood by reproducing the argument for omnicentrism in Dushun's main work, the "Huayan fajieguan" (華嚴法界觀).[79]

This work starts by considering the common Prajñā-pāramitā slogan "Form is Emptiness; Emptiness is Form." It cites three senses in which Form is Emptiness, and three senses in which Emptiness is Form. Each of these

three senses, in both cases, is of the form "X is identical to Y, because X is *not* identical to Y." This claim is read in three different ways for each of the two cases, the conclusion being that, when finally understood in this complex, mediated sense, Form is Emptiness, and Emptiness is Form. From this is derived the omnicentric claim of mutual pervasion of all particulars, as expressed in a great variety of ways. This is clearly analogous to the Tiantai attempt to establish the Mean as both the identity and the distinction between Emptiness and Provisional Positing. The Dushun work also takes pains to indicate that the "identicalness" of Form and Emptiness also includes their difference. But this difference takes on a very non-Tiantai significance here.

The divergence from Tiantai thinking can be noted most clearly in the asymmetry in Dushun's arguments for the claims that "Form is identical to Emptiness, because Form is not identical to Emptiness" and "Emptiness is identical to Form, because Emptiness is not identical to Form." This takes place in the second iteration of each of these claims in the work. "Form is not Emptiness" because the quiddity of "being Form" and the quiddity of "being Emptiness" are distinguishable; this is consistent with Tiantai thinking. But for "Emptiness is not Form," Dushun suddenly introduces the category of *dependence*: he says that which depends (*neng yi* 能依, i.e., form) is not the same as that which is depended on (*suo yi* 所依, i.e., Emptiness). This suggests a one-way relation of dependence between Form and Emptiness, a sense in which Emptiness is ontologically prior to or more fundamental than Form. It is implied that Emptiness does not require Form in order to be Emptiness, but Form (and all other determinate quiddities) does require Emptiness in order to be Form. This asymmetry is what opens the door for a new understanding of omnicentrism, which easily merges with the pure mind doctrine found in some forms of Chan, in one reading of the *Awakening of Faith*, and in other Tathāgata-garbha works.

The overall argument of this work can be summarized as follows:

1. To ask "What is X?" means "What are the characteristics that really belong to X?," where "really" means "intrinsically, inalienably, under all conditions, from all perspectives, at all times."

2. For any and all existent things (components of experience) of whatever kind, there is in fact only one characteristic that meets this definition: the characteristic of having no characteristics that meet this definition, except this one. That is, all things have the nature of "having no nature," the intrin-

sic character of "having no intrinsic characteristics." This also means that the ability to take on characteristics or to appear to have characteristics or to assume characteristics temporarily (i.e., non-intrinsically) is itself the *only* intrinsic characteristic of all things. The one feature that is inalienable, intrinsic, and functioning under all conditions and at all times for all beings is this feature of "being a space available for influence, for taking on characteristics, for being affected or imprinted with or assuming new characteristics." This one characteristic is called "Emptiness" or "Principle" or "the Universal" (i.e., the one characteristic common to all possible states or beings).

3. This is applicable at all levels. That is, if X is a thing with apparent characteristics A, B, and C, and by the above premises it is concluded that A, B, and C are not the true nature of X and do not intrinsically belong to X, then the same question can be asked of A, B, and C: "What is A, what is B, what is C?" The result is the same: the only characteristic intrinsic to any of them is affectability, the ability to take on characteristics. The true nature of each of these elements or characteristics is also none other than "having no nature."

4. This character of Emptiness, principle, or universality constitutes the *whole real* being of each and every particular—not a part of its real being, but its entire real being, inasmuch as this simply means all that is really intrinsic to it, in the sense discussed above.

5. This character of Emptiness or principle is indivisible. It cannot be partially possessed; to have this character is to have it in its entirety. The character of being susceptible to otherness, to other characteristics, is thus possessed in its entirety by every being and state. (N.B. the assumption: this character does not admit of degrees, one either has it or *per impossibile* doesn't, because it is the character of having no fixed character, and divisibility presupposes marks, parts, or characters that can be distinguished.)

The conclusions to be drawn from these premises are:

1. Every particular event is both identical to this universal quality (this is all that is truly intrinsic to it) and different from it (the nature of this quality is precisely to exclude whatever this particular event determinately purports to be). These are not two different facts, but alternative ways of stating the same fact. "The not-sameness is the not-difference."

2. Each particular is present everywhere—because each is nothing but this character of having no intrinsic character (i.e., this is all that is truly

intrinsic to it, and hence this is its only real identity), and this is present everywhere.

3. All apparently positive, self-standing, singular qualities are in fact manifestations of this one true quality, namely, the quality of "openness to other qualities per se," which by its nature cannot be a blank exclusion of all qualities but must rather be an acceptance of any and all qualities. All qualities are relations, irreducible to any finite set of terms. Thus, the observed phenomenal world is in one sense radically negated and in another sense radically affirmed. All appearances are valueless deceptions if taken as independent realities, but fully adequate expressions of the one true reality if viewed as expressions of the one true reality. Each thing is intrinsically nothing but all other things. The specific qualities of things are like the distortion or residue that accrues when mirrors face each other or the camera is aimed at the monitor. It is roughly this doctrine that comes to be designated as Huayan "nature origination" (*xingqi*) thought, in contradistinction to Tiantai "nature inclusion" (*xingju*) thought.

It is in this last point that we see the invitation for the marriage with the mind-only doctrine: this character of "receptivity to otherness" translates neatly into "reflectivity per se," i.e., perceptivity per se, awareness. For awareness, too, is something whose only self is its unending and ineradicable relation to some other, with which it is, at the moment of awareness, indistinguishable. From this comes the doctrine, adopted, as we shall see, by some Shanwai thinkers and so objectionable to Zhili, that Mind creates Buddhas and sentient beings, but these do not create Mind, that an asymmetrical relationship pertains to them, with the pure awareness, which has no characteristics of its own, an admittedly paradoxical starting point, assuming a privileged position over any form in which it might temporarily manifest itself, a pure mirror that has no appearance of its own and thus can reflect all appearances, which, however, remain less truly real than the appearance-less/all-appearing mirror itself.

The omnicentrism that follows from these premises is at first glance difficult to distinguish from the Tiantai version, until very special practical considerations come up, as we shall see in the case of Zhili. Repeatedly in Dushun's text, after adducing an argument meant to give an intuition of omnicentric mutual penetration, he says, "Contemplate this" (*si zhi* 思之). This is a meditation text, and the implication is that the form of meditation to be performed is to contemplate this, the highest truth of interpenetration

itself, until one has an intuitive grasp of it that applies to all one's thinking and experiences. The object of one's meditation is this doctrine and the religious vision it suggests. This is what Zhili later called "the contemplation of the pure mind." One deduces what is true, how the true mind must see, and then attempts to see that way. This is consistent also with later Huayan writing, which is conspicuously lacking in specific instructions for meditation, but richly equipped with striking and brilliant evocations of interpenetration per se. Interpenetration per se—that is, not some particular thing as interpenetrating, but the principle or fact that whatever is must be interpenetrating—is what is to be occupying one's mind. This at least is one possible way to read these texts, and one that seems to have had considerable influence in Tang and Song China.

Zhili later accused the Tiantai scholars of his day of surreptitiously adopting this attitude and reading it into Tiantai practice. But Tiantai practice, according to Zhili, proceeds by means of the "contemplation of the deluded mind," not the contemplation of the pure mind. That is, one always starts with whatever quiddity is in front of one, *as* it is to one in one's delusion, presenting itself as definitive; that is the primary object of contemplation and is never to be abandoned for pure generalized speculation. The method here is not to visualize the way in which this particular quiddity is interpenetrating with all others, while repeating to oneself arguments why it must do so. This would be to adopt a kind of meta-position that purports to supply a Buddha's-eye-view that is not itself seen as an aspect of one's own present ignorance. On the contrary, to go the other direction, the proper method is to see this quiddity itself as clearly as possible, to try as hard as possible to isolate it, to grasp it—and to fail to do so. That is, for Zhili, there is always a two-tiered structure to meditation; it involves both the presence of some determinate illusion and the application of theory, namely, the Three Truths, to this object. We start with this quiddity, and then by means of the Three Truths contemplations, we get to the bottom of it. This necessarily involves getting to the bottom of other elements as well, as they are brought into the contexts that make this quiddity what it is. Interpenetration is never contemplated as an object in itself; it is always a contemplation of some specific delusion *qua* interpenetrating. Zhili compares it famously to a hammer, a chisel, and raw material. The raw material is the delusion, the chisel is the Three Truths as theory, the hammer is the Threefold Contemplation, the adoption of this method as the actual per-

ceiver.[80] Adopting the Huayan method of contemplations would be like hammering a chisel against empty space; the raw material has been removed. This has important implications for practice and theory alike, as we shall see in the discussion of Zhili's doctrine concerning evil below.[81]

The Śūraṅgama Sūtra *and the "Pure Mind" of Early Chan*

Huayan thinking, with its emphasis on the pure or enlightened mind as the proper object of meditation in its own right, is further radicalized in the doctrine that sees things as identical not to some particular mental state and thereby to all particular states, as in Tiantai, but to Mind per se, to pure awareness itself. This trend reaches its ultimate development in the apocryphal *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*,[82] perhaps the most influential and well-developed mind-only version of omnicentrism in later Chinese Buddhist history, one whose implications, however, come to differ considerably from those of Tiantai omnicentrism. The doctrinal position developed there and the line of thinking used to derive it are worth a brief look.

1. The text starts with the question "What is it that is the doer of your actions—the one who experiences your experiences and makes your choices, the one who is attracted or repelled, the one who makes your mistakes or achieves your achievements, the one who suffers the consequences? The answer given is your "mind." But the essence of mind here is just seeing, awareness, perceptivity. In this text, mind refers not to ratiocination, memory, or will—all of which are crucial for the function of mind as "recontextualization per se" in the Tiantai case—but simply to awareness, the appearing of these things and all percepts per se.

2. A detailed set of questions attempting to localize or determine this awareness reveals that it has no position, direction, or condition. It is not an entity, nor is it the exclusion of any entity.

3. It is neither moving nor still. Even stillness is defined in contrast to motion, and since both of these two alternating states are within the field of things seen, neither pertains to seeing itself.

4. This mind is neither self-existent nor caused by anything else, for it is not a definite entity at all. If it had a determinate self, that self would be possible to point out. If it had causes, these would be possible to point out. But nothing to which one can point is seeing: anything indicatable must be seen or cognized, and anything seen or cognized is ipso facto something seen and not the seeing itself. If any finite thing, quality, or state could be identified

with seeing or the cause of seeing, everything excluded from this identity would be unseeable. But nothing fits this description; each particular seen object may vanish without thereby eliminating seeing per se, for the action of saying that the particular has passed away means that the passing away or absence of each particular can be cognized, and therefore this particular cannot have been the self or the condition of seeing per se.

But similarly, nothing to which one can point is not the seeing. If anything were not the seeing, it would be unseen and hence not indicable as something that is not the seeing. Moreover, there is nothing discernible in the seen above and beyond the seen that can be designated as the seeing itself. No border can be found in the experience of seeing between the seeing and the seen. They are thus completely, not partially, identical. But at the same time no seen thing is the seeing.

5. This seeing or awareness is neither limited nor limitless, since it has no self and nothing is excluded from its self. It is like the space in a box, which expands or contracts according to the dimensions of the box without having added or subtracted or changed anything whatsoever.

6. The text compares delusion about seeing and enlightenment about it to an "inverted" hand. The hand is just a hand; it can be in a state defined as inverted only by setting up a standard of uprightness, an act that implies that it could be in two contrary conditions. There is in seeing itself, however, neither singleness nor doubleness; it is therefore free from the doubleness that would allow the concept of inversion to make sense. Inversion cannot be found in the hand no matter which way it is facing; it is the doubling of the hand that creates a situation in which one state can be called inverted and the other upright and that gives rise to the question in the first place. This doubling is itself part of the "delusion"; it belongs to "moving and still, one and many," rather than the seeing of both, which is neither (but allows the appearance of both and, while so doing, is inseparable from them).

Similarly, the very question of "What is real, what is false?" or "Is it or is it not?" (my real self, the true perceiver, the absolute) arises when this "neither 'is' nor 'is not'" is misperceived as an array of both—things and the void between them, presences and absences, two realities between which there could be a choice, or a comparison, like the two moons seen by a drunken man. The real can neither be located in nor excluded from any appearance. If it were locatable in one of a pair of opposites, it should vanish in the other. But it does not, since the other is also "seen." Thus the "neither-nor" becomes "it must be located in one and excluded from the other." If it is in one,

it cannot be in the other. If there is only one moon, there is no question of real or false; it cannot be labeled the "real" moon until there is some concept of the possibility of another moon.

7. Even this seeing is not seeing when it is seen; as an indictable object, "seeing" is just one more object seen. There is no contrast between seeing and not seeing; the whole possibility of an alternative between them is the fundamental delusion. The true womb of the Tathāgata (absolute) is to this seeing as this seeing is to objects seen.

8. By the same token as in Section 7, all the particular elements of experience—form, feeling, thought, volition, consciousness, up to the elements of matter—have neither a self nor a not-self (i.e., specifiable external causes and conditions that really produce them). In other words, all the points made above are true not only of "seeing itself" but of every possible element of experience, every particular. All of them are like flowers in the air; they come from nowhere, go nowhere, dwell nowhere, and neither arise, perish, nor persist. They are an illusion emerging when clear eyes stare at a clear sky, attributable to neither the clearness of the eyes or of the sky nor to self-existence nor causeless. Is and is not do not apply to them, any more than to the "seeing" itself. Their origination cannot be attributed to anything, for they do not in fact originate. Each is neither caused by anything nor uncaused (self-existent). In this sense, the impression that they are any one thing or quality rather than another (i.e., that they have any status other than that of "neither identifiable as anything nor excluding anything" characteristic of the seeing itself) turns out to be, upon examination (via *reductio ad adsurdum* "searching for their source or root," as in the case of the mind), an illusion. Their appearance as one thing rather than another, or in one place rather than another, is a genuinely baseless delusion; it is inexplicable because the whole concept of explication is part of this delusion.

9. The same goes for false views and delusions that arise from individual and collective karma; they are also not identical to or apart from either objective reality or seeing, for they are not reals.

10. For the elements, and by implication for all the particulars, we get a re-presentation of Huayan doctrine of interpenetration. Each one arises from the Tathāgata womb and is *entirely* identical to it and therefore fundamentally pure; this is true also of its opposite, the absence of the element in question. As the text states, "The fire [etc.] of [i.e., qua, as an aspect or expression of] the nature is the true emptiness [i.e., absence of fire, etc.]; the emptiness of the nature is the true fire." Each of these "embraces all in the

dharma-realm" and permeates everywhere. This is *because* they are illusory, as is the unlocalizable seeing, and the Tathāgata womb. None can be located as arising from or going to anywhere in particular, nor of being something free from particular conditions. The manifestation of the presence or absence of any one particular at any given place or time is due to the *baseless* karma of the observing beings. It is everywhere because literally nothing is lacking even when this particular is lacking. There is no more fire where fire appears than where it does not. This line of thought may be regarded as a development perhaps of Huayan "origination from/as the nature" (*xingqi*) as opposed to Tiantai "inherence in/as the nature" (*xingju*). A different form of all-pervasiveness is invoked here, based on Mind.

11. Two important questions are posed in the text on this point. First, if all things are the Tathāgata womb, why do particular forms, the world as we know it, suddenly appear in/as it? And second, how can all these contrasting and mutually incompatible elements be all-pervading without extinguishing each other?

The answer takes the following form: Assume first this paradoxical seeing per se, the Tathāgata womb as the sole reality, awareness as such. We call it awareness (enlightenment) because, like our ordinary experience of seeing, it is neither specifiable anywhere nor excludable from anything. But does this imply that it has something it is aware of, an object of awareness, or not? If it does, there is something other than awareness, something that is not aware, contrary to our assumption. If it does not, however, it cannot be what we mean by the ordinary term "awareness," which always signifies awareness of some content, some object, in order to be awareness at all. Awareness in this primal sense means just being neither identical to nor exclusive of anything. But this condition comes to be read as an awareness *of something*, since it is awareness—perhaps of itself. The text says, "The awareness of the nature is necessarily illuminating, but this is mistakenly taken as illumination *of* awareness; but in fact awareness is never the object of illumination." Thus an *object* is established. Once this is done, a corresponding (false) subject is established opposite it and identified with as a self, a particular knower. From something beyond identity and diversity came diversity, then the concept of identity, then the concept of "beyond identity and diversity," which is actually even further away. The living being is this degraded form of "neither same nor different." The elements are then described as manifestations of this fundamental subject/object split: wind as the chafing and vibration of the two sides, shaking and hardening into metal,

friction causing fire, melting metal into water, burned to ash-earth. This is why in the phenomenal world they appear in and from each other, for in reality all are versions of this fundamental mistaken break or split of primal awareness into subject and object. Likes and dislikes arise from this assumption of particular subjects and objects, and hence karma, suffering, and the rest. In contrast to the Tiantai conception, in this text the break or mistake is not itself an inherent part of the nature, but, on the other hand, the nature has no self-nature, no way of guaranteeing this split will *not* occur.

Thus the contrary elements interpervade as space interpervades with light or with darkness: because space is expressed differently in different conditions. It is not a real something that can be the same as or different from something else. "Space" per se would seem to be something different from light or darkness; and yet they can be copresent, because space has no single intrinsic condition. It can be space qua light or qua darkness, all being equally illusory. The same holds for light and darkness themselves and for the other elements. Their nature is such that, upon close examination, they cannot be pointed out anywhere or as absent from anywhere; this is not only what makes them illusions but also what makes them identical to Mind, which has the same paradoxical characteristics. This is their fundamental nature, which is therefore neither fire nor water (nor does it exclude either). Thus they do not obstruct each other. This is to be contrasted to the Tiantai version of interpervasion, according to which we may say that in water, fire is expressed as water and as the nature that is both and neither, whereas in fire, water is expressed as fire and the nature.

12. The Mind of the Tathāgata womb is not identifiable as any particular, and yet every particular is identical to it. It is thereby above "is" and "is not."

13. A further question is posed: If all reality derives from some fundamental delusion in the original awareness, why does this delusion about the Mind itself arise? The Buddha answers this question with the story of the madman Yajñadatta and his lost head. He sees his head in a mirror, that is, as an object, and then goes crazy because he thinks that he himself does not have any "head" comparable to what he sees there in front of him—so stable, so visible, so real-looking. But, of course, it is just his own real (invisible to itself) head that allows him to see the illusory (real-looking) head that makes him think he has no head. The nature of the seeing head is to see other things but not to see itself as an object; its manner of functioning is to set up objects, but it errs when it wants to have the reality of an object of the kind it, through its much greater power, posited in the first place due to its not

being an object, that is, because it is a "seeing" rather than a seen. This madness also is neither self-existent nor caused by anything; it is not anything real—this is what is meant by its "falseness." No account of it can be given (there is no "it" to give an account of). Original awareness just means "not anything, not excluding anything." Hence the thought of the object is not excluded, and when it arises, there was no self-nature of awareness to be lost or occluded thereby. We need not inquire why the awareness fell into delusion, for this would imply that the awareness was a something, which could fall or vanish. Like Yajñadatta's real head, it was there all along, *expressing itself all the more in thinking it was absent.* Any and every perception would express it. The true (Yajñadatta's awareness, his true "head") and the false (his madness, his search for his head) alike cannot be described by means of either self-nature or conditionality. If the true had a self-nature, it would be impossible for the madness to appear. If it were conditional, it should have disappeared when the madness appeared; but it was copresent with the madness. If the madness had a self-nature, it should have been hidden in the pre-madness head, but no such thing is findable. If it is conditional, what conditioned it? The true original awareness is just "the lack of a self-nature," and this is what everything else, including delusion, really is as well.

Hence in an important sense there is nothing wrong about this delusion—the head has never really been lost—except that, in being obsessed with the search for his lost head, Yajñadatta was not able to use his head in other, potentially more gratifying ways. The implication is perhaps that a sentient being is a Buddha spending all his time trying to find his buddhahood (his true self, his true value), whereas a Buddha is a sentient being who realizes that the apparent lack of his buddhahood is the proof of his buddhahood and thereby goes about freely using that buddhahood for the sake of all beings.

Such is, very briefly, the basic philosophical argument of this text. It, too, argues for omnicentrism, but this omnicentrism is based on a doctrine of the Tathāgata womb as pure seeing, which in turn is structurally similar to the Huayan argument in the text attributed to Dushun analyzed above; that is, every particular is *entirely* identical to this seeing, and at the same time no particular as such can possibly be identifiable as it. Whatever appears is just "seeing," but whatever appears cannot be "seeing" per se, since it is the seen. Hence each appearance pervades all appearances *because* the Mind, which they really are, pervades all appearances. A million miles and an inch are

identical because each is identical to Mind, as a thousand years and a moment in a dream are identical in that both are productions of or manifestations of the dreamer's mind.

In practical terms, it is notable that, while the story of Yajñadatta's head might allow for certain value-paradoxical conclusions (since the delusion of the missing head is itself an expression of that head), this text takes a ferociously hard-line view of the Buddhist discipline and precept keeping and asserts categorically that enlightenment is impossible if one does not refrain from, say, meat and sensuality. This stands in sharp contrast to the doctrine of the *Lotus Sūtra* that all forms of practice and activity can ultimately be "opened up" to reveal that they lead to (and also result from) Buddhahood. If this is taken not as an upāya but as ultimate truth, the *Śūraṅgama* doctrine seems to assert the all-pervasiveness of the Buddha-nature as Proper or Objective Cause (*zheng yin* 正因) (that is, as the nature of the universe, which is to be comprehended in achieving Buddhahood—the omnicentric vistas would be part of this comprehension), but not of the Buddha-nature as Conditioning Cause (*yuan yin* 緣因) or Revealing Cause (*liao yin* 了因; the activities and states of mind leading to, and from, Buddhahood). There are some ways of behaving or thinking that never lead to the comprehension of the ultimate truth about reality (that is, the omnicentric truth as comprehended by a Buddha). Omnicentrism applies to the result and to the basis in the sense of the real truth about the way things have always been, but not to practices and beliefs. On the *Śūraṅgama*'s premises, and perhaps the Huayan premises as well, it does not follow from omnicentrism that all practices and all thoughts in the heads of sentient beings lead to enlightenment, as it does in the Tiantai case. Nor, as in the Tiantai case, does it necessarily imply that all practices and concepts are adequate expressions of achieved Buddhahood, even those practices that are its most radical apparent opposites, although this point is more easily admitted since it pertains mainly to mythological supermen rather than to their fellow mortals; hence they can sometimes cheerfully admit that a Buddha will eat meat or have sex or break the precepts, but not that a practitioner can attain Buddhahood by doing so. It is here that we must locate the most crucial practical difference between these new forms of Buddhist omnicentrism and the Tiantai version, as will become most clearly evident in the case of Zhili's doctrine of sin and evil, which was a foil for infiltrations of this other form of omnicentrism into the Tiantai camp.

This notion of the original omnipresence of Buddhahood, conceived only as the Dharmakāya (the Dharma-body), and approached primarily in terms of mind, had important resonances in the early Chan movement, which was taking shape in the early and mid-Tang. Zhanran, in his reinvention of Tiantai in the Tang, seems to have been reacting against certain aspects of the doctrinal formulations of this movement. The clearest way to appreciate the issues involved here is to focus on the doctrines of Buddha-nature. There exists an interesting controversy in early Chan concerning whether it is present in all beings, sentient and insentient, and whether it is merely the Dharmakāya or all Three Bodies of the Buddha that are inherent in these beings. This ties directly to the question of the status of the mind, and for both of these issues the contrast between Zhanran's position and that of Chan is decisive. Contrary to what Tiantai enthusiasts sometimes suggest, Zhanran's claim in the *Jin'gangpi* that insentient beings also have the Buddha-nature was nothing new or startling in Chinese Buddhism. Quite the contrary, it is a common Mahāyāna doctrine, openly declared by Jizang of the Sanlun school[83] and present in dozens of sūtra texts. Moreover, contrary to Chan claims, early Chan doctrines of mind and the Buddha-nature can arguably be read not as a new advance on general Mahāyāna thought, but more nearly a careless and "heretical" bit of backsliding. It was the new Chan movements, especially the Southern school, in both its Heze and Hongzhou forms, that almost alone among "sinitic" Buddhist schools denied the Buddhahood of insentient beings, a notion that went hand in hand with a new radicalization of the role of the mind in its ordinary function as already enlightened and "pure."[84] Huineng's disciple Shenhui, founder of Heze Chan and the man responsible for the ascendancy of Southern Chan, is reported to have said, "The Buddha-nature pervades all sentient beings, but not insentient beings." His interlocutor, who is astonished by this innovation, quotes a verse to which "all the eminent masters of former times" assented, stating that bamboos and flowers were to be identified with the Dharmakāya and with Prajñā. Shenhui calls this a heretical, non-Buddhist theory and quotes the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* in support: "To be without the Buddha-nature refers to insentient beings."[85] This is precisely the line of scripture that Zhanran takes pains to refute as merely provisional at the beginning of the *Jin'gangpi*. With Buddha-nature identified with the mind or with the essence of the mind per se, that is, with that which is the real agent of one's ordinary functions of sentience, the presence of this quality in the inanimate, which lack sentient function, was denied.

The Northern school of Chan, which perhaps represent general Chan doctrine before the advent of the Southern school, seems to take the standard Mahāyāna line that both sentient and insentient beings have Buddha-nature.[86] This view is shared by the Niutou (Oxhead) school, in which it is more explicitly developed,[87] and can be found in post-Huineng Chan among the leading figures of the line descending from Qingyuan Xingsi through Shitou and thus leading to the development of Caodong, Yunmen, and Fayan, three of the five classical "houses" of Chan. It is to be noted emphatically that this line is, however, not considered by Zongmi and other early sources to be part of the Southern school at all, nor to derive its teachings from Huineng.[88]

In Northern school texts such as the *Lengqie shizi ji*, early Chan comes across as a naïve demythologization movement, not particularly original in its doctrinal formulations but with a clear bent toward reducing the elaborate exfoliations of Mahāyāna cosmology and soteriology to simple metaphorical representations of the mind of the practitioner. Such an approach has roots in Zhiyi's commentary on the *Lotus Sūtra*, as the modern commentator Yinshun has pointed out. Zhiyi uses four rubrics to interpret the text: Causal Situation (reading the text more or less literally), Root and Trace (determining the hidden identities of the protagonists), Doctrinal Category (analyzing a passage in terms of Tiantai Classification of Teachings), and Contemplation of Mind. The last consists of a purely metaphorical reading of the text, in which each figure and situation represents some aspect of the practitioner's own mind. The early Chan approach, we might say, adopts and adapts this method while abandoning the other three.

The advent of the Southern school brought a radicalization of this approach. One result was a distinct "mentalization." All the "corporeal" elements of old-style Mahāyāna become mere convenient and even disposable provisional expressions; the Buddha-nature is in fact your own mind, the agent of all one's sentient functions. It is not surprising that soon enough the Nirmāṇakāya (the Buddha's "response body") was either excised or treated metaphorically, for this was, in standard Mahāyāna lore and even more so in Tiantai, precisely the locus of the externality and opacity of Buddhahood. In Tiantai, the Nirmāṇakāya, for example, refers to the physical body of the Buddha, which is an aspect of the Practico-inert Track, or the Truth of Provisional Positing. As such it is, in its physicality, identical to the Dharmakāya, the Truth of the Mean. Among the Ten Suchnesses, it correlates with physical or visible appearances and marks (*ru shi xiang* 如是相) of all

bodies, which are again made identical to the Ultimate just as Provisional Positing is identical to the Mean.

Philip Yampolsky dates the Dunhuang edition of the *Platform Sūtra* to between 830 and 860, but concludes that it is a copy of an earlier version, "some of whose material dates to around 780."[89] Linda Penkower dates Zhanran's *Jin'gangpi* to around the same year.[90] For our purposes, it is useful to read Zhanran's text as a response, a Tiantai corrective, to some of the Chan ideas represented in the *Platform Sūtra*, particularly the related doctrines of the "self-nature" (*zixing* 自性) and the Buddha-nature, which the *Platform Sūtra* puts into Huineng's mouth. The depiction of the self-nature as related to all other dharmas is rather strange for a Mahāyāna text and veers dangerously close to a mind-body sort of dualism, a point noted in the *Jingde chuandenglu* by Huineng's supposed disciple Nanyang Huizhong, who suggests that the introduction of this heretical notion in the text of the *Platform Sūtra* results from tampering. We are told that this self-nature "produces" all dharmas, that it "encompasses" or contains them like space,[91] and that it animates them and sustains and ensures their existence and integrity: its disappearance would mean their destruction. The relationship between this self-nature and the empirical body and mind is compared to that between a king and his territory; when the king departs, the territory falls apart.[92] In the crucial teaching on non-dwelling, Huineng says that non-dwelling is this original nature, manifested in the arising of thoughts, and that if thoughts are cut off, one dies—the king has departed—and this nature reappears elsewhere.[93] Huineng is also made to use insentient beings as examples of something lacking the Buddha-nature, as a matter of course.[94]

All this is intriguingly close to the notion Zhanran will characterize as holding that the Buddha-nature is "inside" sentient beings, not identical to them but also not outside them.[95] As one later Hongzhou text puts it, "the ignorant call it a soul (*jinghun* 精魂), but the wise call it Buddha-nature." Linji Yixuan is quoted as calling it the "true man of no rank," who is "on the lump of red flesh" and goes in and out of the physical body,[96] as well as saying that the physical elements of the body cannot speak or listen or function and that only this something other, the pure non-dwelling or indeterminacy of the self-nature, is what functions.[97] It is still that innermost something that we experience as the doer of our deeds, the perceiver of our perceptions, and so on; the difference is that it had previously been misconceived as personal, determinate, obtainable, and endowed with marks, whereas in reality this doer of our deeds is non-dwelling per se and hence always already non-

dual, beyond all marks, a "true man of no rank." It is by means of this latter proviso that Southern Chan attempts to find a way out of its heretical dualism; it starts with a radical inside/outside dualism but overcomes it, with an irony that the tradition itself starts to appreciate by the time the *gongan* collections appear in the Song, by finding that the "inside" by itself, defined by radical exclusion of the external and the determinate, is itself non-dual.

All this goes hand in hand with Huineng's redefinition of the Three Bodies of the Buddha. All the intersubjectivity and corporeality are knocked out of them. They become names for one's own nature, thinking, and ethical volition, respectively,[98] all aspects of heart-mind, not of corporeality. We can perhaps locate a similar tendency in the denial of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings and Linji's call for the destruction of the Nirmāṇakāya and Sambhogakāya (the bliss body) in favor of the Dharmakāya, which alone is real.[99]

Zhanran's Reassertion of Tiantai

The *Jin'gangpi*, Zhanran's final work, is a good index of the Tiantai reaction to these notions, as well as of the impact of this response on that tradition's subsequent history. The point here is not simply the emphatic reassertion of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings; the more crucial underpinning of this doctrine is the strict way in which Buddha-nature is itself defined. First and foremost, it always and everywhere means the Threefold Buddha-nature. This means that when we say that beings possess the Buddha-nature, we mean that they posses all three—the Conditioning Cause, culminating in the Nirmāṇakāya, the Revealing Cause, culminating in the Sambhogakāya, and the Cause Proper, culminating in the Dharmakāya. These are also Provisional Positing, Emptiness, and the Mean, as well as the Practico-inert (physicality and behavior), Awareness (mind), and True Nature (absolute reality). Moreover, this "possessing" of the Buddha-nature does not imply that it is an inner essence within something else, or even that it is the material out of which something else is made or the space and condition by which something else appears. Zhanran, at the end of the work, asked to summarize how he would present his doctrine to someone who had no experience of any of the provisional teachings, gives an illuminating exposition, which I will comment on section by section:

From the beginningless past, you have had nothing but afflictions, karma, and suffering. Precisely this is entirely the Three Causes (of Buddhahood, i.e., the Threefold Buddha-nature) as Principle and as the Nature.[100]

That is, in contrast to the implications of some of the Chan positions noted above, it is not that there is originally some state called enlightenment or purity that coexists in some way (e.g., as the substratum that is being expressed in a distorted state or condition or the space or precondition in which the other manifests itself) with another state called delusion—afflictions, flesh, impermanence. Rather, from the beginning there has been nothing but delusion. Every atom and every molecule of everything that has ever existed is and has always been delusion and suffering, through and through. Original enlightenment emphatically does *not* mean that all sentient beings were previously enlightened, or that an originally enlightened mind fell into a deluded state at some point, or that it was more truly or ultimately enlightened than deluded even in the midst of its delusion. Rather, precisely this nothing-but-delusion is the Three Causes qua Buddha-nature. Viewed in terms of delusion, there is nothing but delusion; viewed in terms of activities and conditions growing out of, leading to, and expressive of Buddhahood—for that is what the Threefold Buddha-nature means here—there is nothing but the Buddha-nature. This includes (1) the potential for enlightenment (the Buddha-nature as Cause Proper) as well as (2) activities (as Conditioning Cause) and (3) cognitions (as Revealing Cause) that produce and come from enlightenment, as both an ultimate objective fact and as behaviors and mental states. This identity between delusion and original enlightenment is not conceived in terms of a one-way dependence, as we saw in the summary of Dushun's text. Nor does it mean the whole disclosed field of quiddities, qua determinate things disclosed, is delusion, and that same whole disclosed field of quiddities, qua the function of disclosure itself, or perfectly non-determinate awareness itself, is the Buddha-nature. This would be a generous way to read, say, Zongmi's version of the Southern school's doctrine of awareness and its identity with the object of awareness. It lands us, however, in a one-way producer-produced relation between mind and the object to which it is identical, structurally analogous to Dushun's picture of Emptiness and Form, which, from a Tiantai perspective, undermines any thoroughgoing identity between the two terms.

Zhanran's text continues:

Because you have not yet given rise to the thought of enlightenment or added practices to it, the Conditioning Cause and Revealing Cause, qua Nature, are collectively referred to as the Cause Proper. Thus we say all sentient beings possess the Cause Proper.[101]

That is, in relation to naïve natural consciousness, this Threefold Buddha-nature, which itself possesses activity and thought expressive of and causative of buddhahood, is referred to as a mere thing, an object, a potentiality. This is of utmost significance; it shows, in consistent Tiantai fashion, that whether the Three are referred to as a fact or a mere potentiality, or as Three aspects that are always already functioning and realizing themselves in practice, is purely a provisional matter. Potentiality here does not mean a hidden something that is then brought forth. That which, from the initial perspective, is referred to as a mere potentiality that is not yet functioning, is what is referred to from the latter perspective—after *bodhicitta* (the aspiration for buddhahood) and practice—as something that has always already been operative. Indeed, *bodhicitta* and practice are seen as its operations. There is no absolute distinction between these two states. The thought that regards the Three as a merely potential One is itself an aspect of the Buddha-nature of Revealing Cause. It begins in a state of regarding itself, this thought, as outside the object, which is variously called the potential for buddhahood, work toward buddhahood, thoughts consistent with buddhahood, or enlightened action and thought. Through practice—that is, through certain of these actions and thoughts, which themselves initially emerge from the rest of the totality of actions and thoughts precisely by being their strict negations, which have always been implicitly entailed in them—it reaches a position of seeing that itself, precisely qua delusion, was always already the Revealing Cause of buddhahood. In other words, the Cause Proper—buddhahood as an inert potential that is not yet realized, something external that waits to be revealed and known—is simply a term for the Revealing and Conditioning causes themselves, when they are regarded as karma and delusion; that is, it is a term for all ordinary action and cognition. Ordinary action and cognition are the lack of liberation and wisdom, and this lack is what is meant by the Cause Proper. When, with *bodhicitta*, this same karma and delusion, this ordinary action and cognition, are renamed the Revealing and Conditioning causes of Buddhahood (which, by the way, means simply that these two are seen to be identical, that action and cognition, karma and delusion, are one and the same although opposed, just like Provisional Positing and Emptiness), what had previously been called merely the Cause Proper reveals itself to have always already been these two active and knowing causes as well, and to be always already functioning as such. Prior to *bodhicitta*, only the Cause Proper existed; after *bodhicitta*, all three causes are seen to have always been functioning. We have here

once again the retroactive structure of the punch line of a joke. In ultimate terms, it makes no sense to say simply that it is the fact of the matter that it is one or the other, or that the nature is already functioning or not.

Zhanran then reveals the next steps in the process:

> Once the listener accepts that his/her own mind possesses this Nature, I would next reveal to him/her that this nature is neither within nor without and pervades all space, and thus it is the same as all Buddhas and equal to the entire dharma-realm. Once he/she accepts that it pervades all, I would next reveal that it inherently includes and entails all. That is, since it is the same as all Buddhas and equal to the entire dharma-realm, this all-pervasive nature inherently includes and entails the bodies of all Buddhas, such that one body is all bodies. And again, it (inherently includes and entails) all the lands that are called forth by all Buddhas, such that one land is all lands. The body and the land it inhabits are thus identical, such that speaking of the body is speaking of the land. The same is true for large and small and for one and many. It is because beings possess this nature that we say they have the (Buddha-)nature.[102]

Here we see the importance for Tiantai of not conceiving this Buddha-nature as something that is in any sense "within us." What makes it precisely *Buddha*-nature is that it is a nature shared with something initially conceived as "outside" us, the Buddha. The Buddha must be outside, must be an other (indeed, the most complete possible negation of our current state), for the nature to do any good. (We will examine further ramifications of this conception in the *Jin'gangpi* in the following chapter on Intersubjectivity.) What is salient about this nature—which is delusion itself—is that it is nothing but the Three Truths. The Three Truths mean that, for any given quiddity, there can be no question of inside versus outside; what is inside it (intrinsic to it) is outside it (excluded from it), and vice versa. Hence in this delusion, which has always existed from the beginningless past, what is excluded from it—enlightenment—is what is intrinsic to it. It is therefore the very nature of buddhahood, qua that which is by definition excluded from it. The Buddha's nature, of course, is also precisely that what is excluded from him—sentient beings, delusion itself—is intrinsic to him. Hence one's nature is the same as that of all the Buddhas—the Three Thousand quiddities, the entire dharma-realm. Because it pervades all places—because its inside is its outside and hence anything placed outside it is only all the more placed inside it—it also inherently includes any possible quiddity, including that of buddhahood. Because one's own nature inherently includes the quiddity of buddhahood, it can be called the Buddha-nature. But strictly speaking, as

Zhili subsequently pointed out, it could equally be called the nature of any other quiddity, for example, the dung-beetle nature. The quiddity of dung-beetlehood is as unavoidable—unobtainable as that of enlightenment in every moment of sentient experience. It is because, as Zhanran says earlier in this text, "you are presently studying the Buddha," that it is referred to as Buddha-nature rather than dung-beetle nature.

In other words, all your ordinary deluded actions and cognitions of the infinite past are Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Mean; this is their nature. For this reason, these particular deluded/suffering quiddities pervade all places; they cannot be excluded from any other quiddity or locus. They are ineradicable, inasmuch as they appear *as* all other quiddities everywhere. Moreover, all those other quiddities that are appearing have always been appearing here *as* these deluded actions and cognitions of yours. All dharmas everywhere, including buddhahood, are reducible to these delusions and evils and sufferings of yours, turn out to be versions and expressions of them. This is why this nature of your delusions can be called, among other things, the "Buddha-nature." By reviewing your deluded cognitions and evil actions, you can see that they are also readable as forms of buddhahood, or the Revealing and Conditioning causes—actions and cognitions that both derive from and lead to enlightenment.[103]

Zhanran then criticizes contemporary versions of the Buddha-nature doctrine and speaks directly to the concerns outlined above:

> There are some these days who say, "Sentient beings possess only the pure nature. If they apply various practices to it, it becomes the substance of meritorious functions. Thus it is only when one reaches the stage of the result [buddhahood] that it has its great function." But this means only that Buddhas have sentient-being-nature, not that sentient beings have Buddha-nature. The statement "the three [mind, Buddhas, and sentient beings] are no different" [from the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*] disproves this theory, and expositors should be careful not to contradict it.[104]

This critique seems at first glance to be aimed at a kind of Northern school Chan notion that the originally pure nature is already present hidden in beings but can function only when certain practices are applied to it. On this reading, it exists but does not function in the midst of delusion. When certain practices are applied, which need be only of a negative nature ("wiping away the dust") since the nature is already present, it begins to function as enlightenment. What one would then see, in looking back at the deluded state, is that this pure Buddha-nature, now manifestly functioning, was al-

ways implicitly underpinning even delusion, but that delusion blocked its full and direct expression. Here "possessing the Buddha-nature" means that the potentiality for buddhahood was hidden underneath delusion all along, as a kind of unrealized potential. In a crypto-Mencian way, the "raw materials" of the function of Buddhahood are available to all, concealed beneath a bunch of other, extraneous stuff, the delusions.

For Zhanran, however, for X "to have the nature of Y" means, instead, that X, by virtue of the Three Truths, which are its nature, both pervades *and* inherently entails Y. X has this nature, first of all, if X is seen to be readable in all places and times. But if this is X's nature, then for X to be present in Y means that its nature is present in Y, and, indeed, on omnicentric Tiantai premises based on this very concept of the Three Truths, this means that this same nature is the nature of Y as well. And that means that Y is also readable in all places and times, including X. This means for X to be "readable as" Y, and also vice versa, for Y to be capable of being seen as "reducible to" X, an expression of X. Each is discoverable in the other, if the nature of each is the Three Truths and not merely an Exclusive Mean. This complete reversibility, supported here by a quotation from the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, is what is central and distinctive to the doctrine of inherent entailment. Whichever one is implicit in any moment of experience is called the nature of whichever one is explicit. As Zhanran makes abundantly clear in this work, "X has the nature of Y" does not mean that Y is hidden in X, but that X has a nature that pervades and includes (among other things) the quiddity Y. Sentient beings have the Buddha-nature because sentient-being-ness is Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Mean, and this means sentient-being-ness can have no particular location, no inner and outer, and hence is found everywhere as much as here and includes, among (3,000) other things, all the virtues of the Buddhas. The latter are readable as operative in us because, understood correctly (non-exclusively), this pervasion of Y by X also implies the pervasion of X by Y.

We have the Buddha-nature because our delusion itself can be seen to pervade all quiddities and expresses itself as all quiddities, including buddhahood. And here this also means that our delusion is pervaded by all quiddities, as well as being an expression of them. As Zhanran tells us earlier in this text, when the sūtras speak of this nature as the "Buddha-nature" in particular, this is because

Buddha is a person who has achieved the result, and this is just saying that sentient beings possess a nature which is that of a person who achieved the result. That is

why this biased one-sided phrase is used [i.e., calling this nature "Buddha-"nature rather than X-nature, although in reality it pervades and entails both Buddha and X, or Y, or Z]. Because the people of the world are deluded and do not proceed by this result, it is said that "sentient beings possess" [this nature in particular], thereby obscuring the real meaning of "pervasion." For it is only because the nature of the afflicted mind pervades that we say that the Buddha-nature pervades. Thus failure to understand the meaning of the pervasion of the Buddha-nature is a direct result of not knowing that the affliction-nature pervades. When we speak of "mind-only," how could we mean "only the Pure Mind"?[105]

Both the deluded mind and the pure or enlightened mind pervade all quiddities and loci, and the pervasion of delusion is pragmatically primary; it is because of the pervasion of delusion that we speak of the pervasion of enlightenment. This is what is meant when we say that sentient-beings have the Buddha-nature. Delusion can be discovered within buddhahood, functioning as buddhahood, and also buddhahood can be discovered within delusion. Whatever quiddity might be adduced can be read as an instantiation of my present delusion, which stands as the center of all other quiddities, in the sense outlined earlier in this work. Our delusion is present in all places, precisely as the specific quiddity of delusion; it is impossible for anything, including enlightenment, not to be readable as the particular bit of delusion I am perpetrating at this moment. In the position being criticized here, on the contrary, delusion is merely the covering of an implicit enlightenment; delusion itself is not discoverable in enlightenment. It does not, in Zhanran's sense, possess the nature of enlightenment, but rather conceals some separate quiddity called enlightenment, which is copresent but not identical to it.

In a certain sense, it might be said even so that, on a generous reading, buddhahood is nonetheless here considered to be discoverable "within" sentient beings. But the problem still remains. For this means only that the Buddha's nature is the one pervading all others. But this is a pervasion that does not at the same time imply the reverse, inherent entailment. Pervasion brings with it inherent entailment only via the switch of subject and predicate ensured, in particular, by the Three Truths doctrine. It does not occur in conceptions of the nature based on Emptiness or Suchness doctrines (Common Teaching, Exclusive Emptiness) or Tathāgata-garbha, Pure Mind, or Original Enlightenment doctrines (Separate Teaching, the Exclusive Mean) alone. Hence the discoverability of enlightenment "within" delusion in these doctrines does not entail that our deluded nature also pervades the Buddha, is discoverable within enlightenment, and expresses itself as it.

Hence, Zhanran says, this means only that the Buddha has the sentient-being-nature, not that sentient-beings have the Buddha nature. The real problem here is that the nature is not the triple nature of Tiantai thinking, the Non-exclusive Mean, which necessitates both pervasion and entailment and therefore reversibility. It is instead a bare Buddha-nature as Cause Proper, Dharmakāya Buddha, the Exclusive Mean, without the Revealing and Conditioning causes. This leaves it as an inert truth waiting to be discovered, which pervades all things but does not inherently entail them.

In the Southern school materials outlined above, however, delusion is clearly readable as enlightenment, and here there is no question of these being two separate but copresent quiddities. It is not just that enlightenment is discoverable in delusion; the claim here is clearly that delusion as such is readable as enlightenment itself. But keeping in mind Zhanran's definition of the nature and his critique that this means only that Buddhas possess the sentient-being-nature, not that sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature, we can see that his criticism applies equally well—indeed, perhaps even more tellingly—to the Southern school position. There, it would seem, enlightenment has two modes, expressing itself either (indirectly) as delusion or (directly) as enlightenment itself. We are not told that delusion has two modes, expressing itself either as enlightenment or as delusion, which would be necessary for a full identity-in-difference and Integrated reversibility of the two. That is, the early Southern school materials do depict the originally enlightened (pure) mind as always already functioning. Delusion never really obstructs it; rather, it is one more expression of it. In this, it does not exactly claim that "only at the position of result is there the great function." Instead, it claims that this pure nature has always been functioning, and thus the dust obscuring it was just one more expression of it. But the one-way relation between the pure nature and its expressions—delusion—remains. Original enlightenment is capable of taking on the characteristics of delusion. It can appear and function "as" delusion. In the early Southern Chan materials, delusion can be seen as an expression of enlightenment, but enlightenment cannot be read as an expression of delusion. Hence Zhanran says that this only means buddhahood—enlightenment—possesses sentient-being-nature—that is, the quiddity of delusion—not that sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature. Put the other way round, buddhahood has the potential to become, express itself as, lead to and from, delusion, but delusion itself does not in any way express itself as buddhahood. Once again, then, we have the one-way relation of dependence, as in Dushun. Delusion depends on enlightenment, but enlight-

enment does not depend on delusion. The pure nature has delusion nature (Buddha has sentient-being nature), because it is omnipresent, discoverable in all states, can be found to be expressing itself equally well "as" delusion, and is inherently entailed and included in all delusion. But, since this ability to express itself is not a relation of inherent entailment and therefore is not reversible, the reverse is not the case. Delusion does not pervade all and is not discoverable in enlightenment. This is because, first of all, the means by which delusion can be seen as either delusion or enlightenment, the particular active practices and cognitions that manifest the realization of this fact, fall outside the power of delusion as such. Hence, it is not delusion as such that has this power of manifesting enlightenment as one of its own attributes. It needs something else, a sudden flash of enlightenment that breaks into it, before it can be seen to be an expression of enlightenment itself. Enlightenment is not a form of delusion; rather, it comes as a sudden intrusion into delusion and cannot coexist with deluded discursive thinking. We have the same asymmetry, in which enlightenment is all-encompassing (all quiddities, deluded and enlightened, are really expressions of enlightenment), but delusion is not (when enlightenment is expressed as enlightenment, it is not also delusion, for delusion only covers part of the total field, not, as in Zhanran's first statement quoted above, the whole).

As Zhanran's critique implies, this is a result of not clearly thematizing the Buddha-nature's "act of recognition" of itself. The cognition that does so is not supposed to be acquired by practice, and yet, as a particular cognitive act with a beginning and end in time, it cannot be simply the always-existing nature of awareness itself. Hence, whereas delusion inherently includes and entails enlightenment, it is not clear that enlightenment inherently includes and entails delusion. Enlightenment seems to be able to appear in a "pure" form, unmixed with delusion, simply as itself, as in the unmediated expressions of enlightenment for which the Southern school would become famous, which are absolutely other to ordinary (deluded) behavior and thought, rather than expressed through and as them. In other words, Buddha-nature is conceived as merely Cause Proper, or Dharmakāya (the Exclusive Mean). The acts of misrecognizing and recognizing it, as such, fall outside it, or inside it only qua facts of existence included in Dharmakāya, not as the Dharmakāya's realization of itself as the Nirmāṇakāya and Sambhogakāya. We have the omnipresence of the Buddha-nature as Cause Proper, but not as the Revealing and Conditioning causes. It is just this point that Zhanran takes up next:

If they say, "Sentient beings have the Buddha-nature Cause Proper, which is equal to the Dharmakāya but not to the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya," this ends up meaning simply that sentient beings are equal to sentient beings. And why? Because without the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, they are still simply sentient beings. If they say, "They are equal to the Dharmakāya, which possesses both the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya," this means the Dharmakāya is not something other than the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, and this means that they must be equal to all three [as I claim].[106]

This is a direct critique of the tendency to reduce the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya to the Dharmakāya, as seen, for example, in sayings attributed to Linji Yixuan, cited above. Zhanran says that to possess simply the Dharmakāya and not its expressions as Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya is by definition just what a sentient being is. That is to say, "sentient being" means simply one who has the Dharmakāya but has not yet produced the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya. If we say that the pure nature originally possessed by beings is simply the formless and markless Dharmakāya, not the determinate Buddha with the 32 marks and all the cumbersome cognitive and behavioral marks of a Buddha, that the "true Buddha is formless" and it is this that all beings possess within them and that has always been functioning as their delusion, then we have said nothing. The Tiantai position is that enlightenment entails the retrospective recognition that it was accomplished—indeed, is still being accomplished—by precisely the previous delusion itself, just as the punch line entails seeing its own humor as a product of the seriousness of the set-up and as already fully expressed in and by that seriousness as such. This means that not only does enlightenment express itself as both enlightenment and delusion (humor appears in the two forms, humor and seriousness), but also delusion expresses itself in these same two forms (seriousness expresses itself as both humor and seriousness—the true nature of seriousness as such is realized also in the humor of the punch line). What humor does is to work as seriousness and as humor; what seriousness does is to work as seriousness and as humor. This subtle but crucial distinction may be viewed as the crux of Zhanran's reassertion of Tiantai in the Tang. It would have great practical consequences in the hands of Zhili.

Toward the Shanjia/Shanwai Schism

At the same time, Zhanran's reconstitution and revival of Tiantai can be viewed as having succeeded partially on the strength of his incorporation of

Huayan "nature-origination" (*xingqi*) thought into the further development and schematization of the "nature-inclusion" (*xingju*) conceptions that Zhanran saw in classical Tiantai, with a corresponding but ambiguous tendency toward the idealism of the later (Chan-influenced) Huayan school. In Zhanran's case, this seems to have been a method by which nature-inclusion could be reinstated and gain the upper hand by sublating the Huayan strains of thought that had been gaining ground.[107]

The persecution of 845 and the increased influence of Chan that came in its wake, together with ambiguities thus already present in Zhanran's teachings, left the Tiantai tradition in a state of crisis in the late Tang, Five Dynasties, and Northern Song dynasties. The period following Zhanran's death has been described as the second "dark age" of Tiantai,[108] marked internally by the deterioration of distinctive Tiantai ideas and externally by the loss of crucial texts and breakdown of monastic institutions. After the persecution, with the scattering of texts and loss of institutional supports, the Tiantai school found itself again in need of a reconstitution. The non-dialectical and idealistic trend described above, of "tracing principle and cutting off the nine realms of delusion" (using the pure truth, the unsullied and featureless Mind or principle, to eliminate the impure realms of deluded determinate existence), dominated the Buddhist world by this time and made inroads into Tiantai thought as well. This is evident already in the teaching of Zhanran's disciple Daosui[109] and becomes more and more prominent in the syncretist careers of figures such as Zhiyuan (768–844), who studied first at Mount Tiantai and then at Mount Wutai, combining Heze Chan with Tiantai teachings,[110] and Daochang Ningfen (754–828), who also combined Chan and Tiantai tendencies and lived at Mount Tiantai.[111] After the persecution, the Chan elements of this synthesis tended to take the ruling position. Even Deshao (881–972), renowned in his time as a reviver of Tiantai, was closely associated with the Fayan branch of Chan.[112] His student Yongming Yanshou (904–76) took this syncretic tendency even further, attempting to unify Tiantai, Huayan, and Yogācāra teachings under the auspices of a form of Chan theorizing emphasizing the "one pure formless Mind,"[113] a notion owing much to the *Awakening of Faith śāstra*, the *Perfect Enlightenment Sūtra*, and especially Guifeng Zongmi's adaptation of the "Numinous Awareness" of the Heze school of Chan.

Zongmi's infatuation with Heze Chan had all but eliminated the Tiantai influences, especially the notion of the evil inherent in the Buddha-nature,

traceable in the thought of his teacher, the fourth Huayan patriarch Qingliang Chengguan, who had spend some time studying under Zhanran himself and whose work incorporates elements of both Chan and Tiantai traditions. Zongmi put the pure undefiled Buddha-nature, identified with undifferentiated and objectless Awareness, on center stage.[114] Indeed, as Peter Gregory has shown, Zongmi radically reinterpreted the Huayan tradition, taking away the centrality and ultimacy of "the non-obstruction between events" (*shi shi wu ai*) characteristic of Fazang's teaching and replacing it with the ultimacy of "the interpenetration between principle and events" (*li shi wu ai*). For Zongmi, "principle" was identical with "Mind" or, rather, Numinous Awareness. In earliest proto-Huayan thought, such as the works attributed to Dushun, on the contrary, principle equals Emptiness, as we have seen.[115] Fazang at times identifies principle with the mind as suchness, and phenomena with the mind of birth and death (a distinction deriving from the *Awakening of Faith*),[116] thereby beginning the trend toward Tathāgata-garbha idealism that would come to culmination in Zongmi's Chan-friendly teaching. In Zongmi's own classification of teachings, of course, Tiantai's old-fashioned and disconcertingly complicated system of thought (in which principle is equivalent to the Three Truths) and practice (centered, as we shall see, on contemplation of not the mind but of the nature of mind [*xin xing* 心性] as identical with this principle), was made to appear quaint and cumbersome and to fall short of this new trend emphasizing the undefiled Numinous Awareness, which seemed to have won the day. To further complicate matters, alternative versions of crucial texts attributed to Zhiyi were being recovered, mainly from Japan, giving normative authority to sometimes diametrically opposed doctrines and assertions.[117]

It was in this atmosphere that an embattled Tiantai tried to reconstitute itself. Schematically, two opposite paths were taken to meet these challenges. One approach was to incorporate these new elements (the One Pure Mind, the original absence of affliction, and the like) by saying that this was what the Tiantai school had always been saying and earlier than anyone else—thus admitting the superiority of these ideas. The other was to attempt to insist on the difference between this Zongmi/Chan view and the view of the Tiantai tradition and to establish the superiority of the latter. The first approach was that of what was later polemically designated as the "Shanwai(jia)" (Masters Outside [Tiantai] Mountain, i.e., the non-orthodox), while the second was taken by the "Shanjia" (Home Mountain Masters, i.e., the orthodox).

In this chapter, we dealt with the scaffold of ideas surrounding the structure of the Tiantai version of omnicentric holism, particularly the concept of "The Three Thousand Quiddities inherently entailed in each moment of experience." In the next chapter, I outline an aspect of Tiantai thought that has so far received little attention, the question of intersubjectivity, and argue that it forms a neglected but significant focus of the Shanjia/Shanwai debate. The subsequent chapter will deal directly with the question of value paradox, especially as developed in Zhili's thought as opposed to that of the Shanwai thinkers.

FIVE

Intersubjectivity in the Tiantai Tradition as Understood by Zhili

Intersubjectivity, understood in the sense given in this book, is an aspect of experience that seems to be inadequately addressed not only in current Buddhology, but perhaps even in Buddhism itself. Our current reconstructions of early (Pali) Buddhist doctrine, especially as found in Abidharmic dharma analysis, reveal an approach to consciousness that can be described as atomistic and empiricist, if not almost solipsistic. Whether experience is analyzed into *skhandas* (constituents of existence), *ayatanas* (sense organs and sense objects), and/or *dhātus* (fields of experience) or reconstructed as a result of the four material elements or of the *nidāna* chain of psycho-physical causality, there seems to be no room for a constitutive role for other consciousnesses in the structuring of experience. The same can be said of Indian Mahāyāna doctrine, at first glance, for quite another reason; in one way or another, most Indian Mahāyāna schools deny the ultimate existence of "other" minds, either because all minds are really manifestations of one essence (Tathāgata-garbha, Suchness, and the like), or because the category of "otherness" (like "sameness") belongs to the realm of those delusions dispelled by an insight into Emptiness. The Yogācāra school, which might constitute an exception to both of these claims, remains an ambiguous case (since there appears to be considerable dispute on whether the *ālaya*-consciousness is collective or individual), but in any case since it does not seem to take notice of the question of other minds in its practical theorizing,

we can assume that at least one of the two reasons given above to ignore this problem might also apply here.

Of course, the Indian Mahāyāna schools admit the "provisional" existence and importance of other consciousnesses; what is denied is the existence of these presences in "ultimate truth." Therefore we may expect that in re-evaluations of the relationship between provisional and ultimate truth, the consideration of other minds might come to play a different role as well. This, I will argue, is indeed the case, which is one reason intersubjectivity assumes a constitutive role in the Tiantai school, which elevated the status of provisional truth to a level of equality with ultimate truth and even with the Mean, the relation of non-duality between these two truths.

Hints of the theoretical potentials of intersubjectivity that the Tiantai school developed were indeed already present in Indian Mahāyāna devotional writings, where they were generally theorized into the framework of provisional truth: the key lay in the bodhisattva ideal. The relation between a bodhisattva, or a Buddha such as Amitābha or Śākyamuni in the *Lotus Sūtra*, who had expressed a specific thought about deluded sentient beings that guided his actions, and those sentient beings themselves as they remembered or contemplated that Buddha or those bodhisattvas, came to be the fundamental axis of intersubjectivity that Tiantai theorists used as a cornerstone not only of their devotional writings but of their entire ontology. The bodhisattvas experience the world in a way that always references other experiencing beings and constitutively takes into account those other experiences. This may be conceived as simply one additional thing they do after realizing the truth through purely "solipsistic" or individualistic means, as a preparation for teaching and leading beings to salvation. However, the Tiantai school takes the referentiality-to-another-consciousness on the part of both deity and worshipper as constitutive of the experience and the truth-realization of both. The unique consequences of this approach can be analyzed by adding to the standard quasi-theistic deity / sentient-being I-Thou relation the three Tiantai doctrines of (1) the relation of non-duality (also described, more emphatically, as identicalness, sameness [*ji* 即]), obtaining between provisional and ultimate truth (*quan* 權 and *shi* 實), discussed in the previous chapter; (2) the mode of action of the deity in question (non-intentional stimulus-response, or *ganying* 感應); and (3) the relation of non-duality between subject and object, or between any living being and its environment, realized in the perceived world of the deity in question, which is predicated on the claim that both subject and object are themselves the

whole dharma-realm and that each part is equal to the entire whole, predicated on the omnicentric holism of the notion of the Three Thousand Quiddities inherently entailed in every moment of experience.

As noted in Chapter 4, in the early Northern Song dynasty, in the process of reconstructing the declining Tiantai tradition and adapting it to the new intellectual environment of the Buddhist world at this time, two different theoretical orientations came to be applied to the writings of Zhiyi and Zhanran, the two defining sources of Tiantai doctrine, resulting in a lively schism between two groups of exegetes, retrospectively known as the Shanjia and the Shanwai. I take the Shanjia polemics, spearheaded by Zhili, to be in part an attempt to preserve an interpretive approach to Zhiyi and Zhanran that maintains the centrality of the intersubjective vision. In this chapter I try first to establish the basis of this view in Zhiyi and Zhanran[1] and then the specific angle of interpretation from which Zhili deployed these concepts, as preparation for the discussion in the next chapter of the impact of this concept on his doctrine of the evil inherent in the Buddha-nature and the non-duality of delusion and enlightenment.

Self-Praxis as Identical to the Teaching and Transformation of Others

The Tiantai conception of intersubjectivity is rooted in Zhiyi's understanding of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Zhiyi states that the "essence" (*ti* 體) of that sūtra's teaching is to embody the truth that "the provisional teachings and ultimate truths involved in the transformation of others are precisely the provisional teachings and ultimate truths involved in one's own praxis" (今經體者，體化他之權實即是自行之權實).[2] That is, the contents of the expressions used provisionally by the Buddha to point to the ultimate truth, in his interaction with other sentient beings, are precisely the contents of his own realization, and indeed this teaching of others is itself the fulfillment and completion of that realization. This also means that "the provisional teachings employed in one's own praxis are identical to the ultimate truth of one's own practice."[3] Or as Zhiyi puts it a bit later from another angle, "The two forms of wisdom [provisional and ultimate] involved in one's own practice are identical to the two forms of wisdom employed in transforming others."[4]

This is an argument against the idea that the personal realization of the Buddha, or anyone who would follow in his footsteps, differs from his subse-

quent teaching of various (not literally or ultimately "true") doctrines to enlighten deluded beings and that his teachings bear no intrinsic relation to his inner experience. But this is more than just opposition to the conception of upāya as totally separate from a formless, wordless inner truth. It is an assertion of the non-duality of the two apparently opposite realms of personal meditation on and realization of the ultimate truth and the practical problem of going out into the world and talking to people about it. Zhiyi's statement that these are one and the same thing means that when one meditates, he is dealing with others, and vice versa. Implied in this as well, as we shall see in more detail below, is the notion that the self is intersubjective from the beginning, which is not surprising in light of the general theory of dependent origination. This is nothing more than an exfoliation of the Tiantai doctrine that all things are inherently included in each other from the very beginning (*huju*, *xingju* 互具，性具). We are not only ourselves as opposed to others; others inherently and constitutively include us, and we inherently and constitutively include others from the beginning. We are, besides being ourselves, also others. To become enlightened to your own being is to teach (and be taught by) others, and vice versa. As Zhanran says, summing up Zhiyi's analysis of the *Lotus Sūtra*, "If one comprehends the marvels of the traces [i.e., the Buddha's teachings, his interactions with others], the marvels of the root [his own experience] are not far off. It must be understood that the only difference between the two is the way they are grouped [*li he* 離合—their separations and joinings, i.e., the way they are classified]. Since cause and effect are one in meaning, how could self and other differ?"[5] The actual contents of the Buddha's "being for others" ("traces")[6] and his being in himself ("root") are the same—they are simply organized differently in the two cases.

This claim is simply an expansion of the more abstract concept of the non-duality and interpenetration of the Three Truths. As Zhanran says, initially "self-praxis is exclusively a matter of the truths of Emptiness and the Mean," whereas it is the truth of Provisional Positing (*jia* 假) that concerns "helping others, which is all the three thousand forms of responding to objects."[7] According to the Tiantai conception of the Three Truths, that multiplicity, differentiation, and determination exist at all is strictly a function of the existence of intersubjectivity: only *because* there are sentient beings and the Buddhas responding to them, that is, only because there is Provisional Positing are the Three Thousand Quiddities inherent in (and not merely adventitious to) ultimate reality. *Because* this intersubjectivity is inherent in reality, these Three Thousand Quiddities are also inherent. The particular

determinations of the universe exist only because intersubjectivity exists.[8] Zhili puts the matter succinctly: "In self-praxis, both pure and impure are utterly destroyed, since all Three Thousand are identical to Emptiness and the Mean. In benefiting others, the Indra's net of interconnections and interactions is replete, since all Three Thousand are identical to Provisional Positing. Since the Three Truths are one while being three, self and other are also undivided while divided."[9] Provisional Positing, the second of the Three Truths, is itself intersubjective, being understood most fundamentally, as indicated in the preceding chapter, on the model of the Buddha's "provisional" creation of "false" upāya in order to relate to other sentient beings, as expounded in the *Lotus Sūtra*. By the non-duality between the Three Truths, therefore, one's own praxis and interaction with others are identical.[10] But what does this really mean?

Stimulus and Response (Ganying)

How does Zhili read the Zhiyi/Zhanran tradition as characterizing this intersubjective relation between the enlightened being and deluded beings? What is its extent, how and where does it occur, and what are its implications? To answer these questions, we must start with the concept of stimulus and response, *ganying*.

To describe the intersubjective relation between a deluded sentient being and the enlightened beings, Zhiyi adopts the traditional categories of *ganying*, stimulus and response, an indigenous quasi-naturalistic dyad deployed broadly in Han cosmology (and earlier—the term dates to the *Xunzi*). The traditional context and usage of this pair of categories bring with them a set of semantic resonances that go a long way toward effacing any conception of the interaction in question as being a deliberate theistic interference. On the other hand, Zhiyi uses the terms in such a way that their usual "naturalistic" unidirectional nature is completely eliminated.[11] This move ends up emphasizing a distinctive Tiantai conception of the intersubjective confrontation between deity and practitioner, in which neither exists independently of the other and indeed in which each plays both roles simultaneously and at all times and places. Once again we get a complexly balanced synthetic concept that brings us to the action of the intersubjective matrix itself. This, indeed, is the mechanism by which the significance of this concept is extended beyond the strictly devotional sphere and made to apply to all intersubjective relations, and thereby to all experience of any kind.

Zhiyi says in the *Fahuaxuanyi*:

The sages of the Tripiṭaka and Common teachings also respond (*ying*), but this is via deliberate miracle working. . . . As for the [sages of the] Separate and Integrated teachings . . . [they partake of] the purity of the Dharmakāya, unstained like empty space, transparent, and responding to everything. With neither thought nor intention, when a stimulus appears, they instantly match it. The moon does not descend from the sky, and the waters do not ascend to heaven, and yet the moon appears all at once in all the waters, none before or after any others, and in perfect accordance with the length of every river and the shape of every vessel. This is [like] the marvelous and inconceivable form of response. Or it is like a mirror, clear and transparent inside and out, one image or ten thousand, they all appear in it as they are presented, with no choice or effort being made, and yet each one is a perfect likeness.[12]

The "marvelous" or ultimate form of response to the stimuli provided by all the actions of sentient beings is thus (1) infallible and (2) non-intentional or effortless. In this, it may appear that we have gone beyond any analogy to human interaction as we normally conceive it (note, too, that the Dharmakāya's form of response does sound suspiciously like the responsiveness of a Daoist or Ruist sage, who also has reached a degree of responsiveness beyond choice and cogitation). However, as we shall see, this specification that the ultimate form of response is infallible and non-deliberate is not a way of effacing its intersubjective character; rather, it is a way of making a point about intersubjectivity itself.

The ultimate form of sentient response (that of Buddhas and bodhisattvas of the Separate and Integrated teachings), then, is non-intentional; in contrast, all other, lesser forms of sentient interaction are deliberate. However, in typical Tiantai fashion, this distinction between the ultimate form of response and the lesser (fallible, deliberate, and effortful) forms, exhibited by finite and particular beings, is effaced, as in the following section of the *Fahuaxuanyi*, which describes "the opening the provisional to reveal the real":

If we just say that one form of stimulus [and response] [i.e., that of the realm of Buddhas] is marvelous and that of the other nine [all deluded sentient beings] is coarse, we haven't yet gotten to the concept of the Dharmakāya responding even to the coarse. . . . In fact, the stimuli of all the other nine dharma-realms are precisely the stimulus of the Buddha-realm, and there are no responses in all the four sagely realms that are not the marvelous responses.[13]

The perfect form of response (of Buddhas and bodhisattvas as understood by the Integrated Teaching) thus not only (1) is infallible and non-deliberate

but also (2) pervades all times, places, and activities, including both the (deluded) stimuli that provoke this perfect response and the inferior deliberate forms of response to these stimuli. In reality, all these things are equally the perfect response. In other words, all the stimuli and responses taking place among all the nine realms of deluded sentient beings are themselves the stimuli and responses of the Buddhas and thus are also actually infallible, effortless, omnipresent, and continuous, built into the nature of all things themselves, and salvific, like the responses of the Buddhas. This means that the actions of all beings that provoke the Buddhas to respond are actually also the actions of the Buddhas themselves.

But implied here as well is the converse point that the responses of the Buddhas to those sentient beings are also the actions of the sentient beings themselves. The structure of the stimulus/response dyad demands this: the response is a corrective and remedial measure matched to a particular stimulus, and in that sense it depends on the deluded partial stimulus for its existence. This already militates against conceiving of this "everything is Buddha" in a straightforward, unidirectional God-controls-all manner. But the mutuality goes much farther than this. Each stimulus and each response are solely the work of the Buddha, but at the same time each stimulus and each response are solely the work of each sentient being. Zhanran makes this point rather explicitly:

> The benefiting of others in accordance with their particular capacities is a phenomenon that depends on the noumenal root. The root is the one nature, in which both self and other inhere. At the point of the final fruit, [one sees that] self is precisely this helping of others. . . . All sentient beings in principle include all the Three Thousand [including both the deluded stimuli and the enlightened responses], and thus they are able to provide the stimuli. All the Buddhas have realized this principle of the Three Thousand [including both stimulus and response], and thus they are able to respond. The stimuli pervade all places, and the responses also pervade all places—thus there is never any disparity between them; they never miss.[14]

Stimulus and response pervade all times and places; it follows that everything is stimulus and that everything is response. That is, *ganying*, the interaction between the enlightened and the deluded, is a process in which the whole[15] (Three Thousand) meets the whole; the two are identical because each is identical to the whole, and it is for this reason that they correspond and interact so perfectly. Each is in the other, and indeed each is precisely the totality of itself and its other. Thus each event that occurs is both a stimulus (a

deluded act, proper to the "deluded beings" half of the equation, the nine deluded realms) and a response (the enlightened remedy for that deluded act, proper to the "enlightened beings" half of the equation, the Buddha-realm). Since each half is in reality the whole, both stimulus and response pervade all points of space and time. As Lang E. Ra puts it, "The beneficiary (beings) and the benefactor (Buddha) are in the same retinue by their own nature from the very beginning. In short, all the three thousand realms are simultaneously the beneficiary and the benefactor. The two are non-dual and encompassed in a single thought-instant."[16] Since each term pervades all that exists, any given thing must always be both.

This notion, that all things can be described as "solely" any particular thing (i.e., as ultimately reducible to "only" this, but also to "only" that—any reference point chosen at random can be accurately viewed as the explanation and source of all other phenomena) is a restatement of the famous Tiantai principle of "the Three Thousand Quiddities inherently included in each moment of experience." Zhili's writings make this point especially clear, placing it in a position of central importance. Commenting on a passage in Zhiyi's *Guanyinxuanyi*, for example, he elaborates on this idea:

> Matter and mind, environment and organism, are all identical to the Nature [i.e., the Three Truths], and so any dharma chosen at random incorporates all others, and the same goes for every other dharma. Since each dharma pervades all others, each is without border or limit and takes this limitlessness as their defining limit. This realm of all dharmas melds and includes all, i.e., all the hundred realms and the thousand suchnesses, the hundred suchnesses and the thousand realms. Thus it is equally true to say all is matter, or all is mind, or all is environment, or all is living being. Otherwise what we have is not the realm of perfect interpenetration and inclusiveness. . . . This entire inconceivable substance [i.e., the universe as a whole, as seen from every possible perspective] is what gives rise to the form [of the deity] which comes as a response [*ying*] (when Avalokiteśvara responds to sentient beings). It is a case of the entire dharma-realm as response coming before the entire dharma-realm as stimulus, or we could say it is the entire dharma-realm as stimulus bringing forth the entire dharma-realm as response.[17]

That is, since all things inhere in each thing, the response of the deity to the sentient being is the whole responding to itself, and the stimulus of the deluded being to the deity is the whole stimulating the whole.

This conception has important implications for the theory of intersubjectivity. As Zhili says later, applying a typical Tiantai formulation:

How can this type of stimulus and response be comprehended with thought conceived in terms of self, other, both or neither? At the same time, if sentient beings can be benefited by saying stimulus and response are entirely a matter of self, it is accurate also to say that the process is self-stimulating and self-responding [i.e., that stimulus and response are one, that a deluded being's action and the divine response are one]. Likewise if any of the other three perspectives yields benefits to sentient beings, we can say that stimulus gives rise to response, or that response gives rise to stimulus, or that both together give rise to the stimulus or to the response, or that apart from both one or the other arises—all of this can be said. Free from attachment to any of the four, one can say whichever of the four is appropriate to the capacities of the listener.[18]

Zhili's phrasing of the matter here will be of great importance to us later. His stress on the irreducibly intersubjective nature of all experience is founded on this logic, which treats on equal terms all four descriptions of the origin of a given experience—that is, as coming from self, other, both, or neither—none of which is more or less true or false than the others. This is unsurprising if we recall the standard Tiantai adoption of Madhyāmika treatment of the four propositions (that is, the non-acceptance of any assertion of being, non-being, both, or neither; or, in another permutation, the arisal of any dharma from itself, from others, from both, or from neither), and the familiar twist that all that cannot be said can also be said in the process of interaction with and transformation of beings, in accordance with the teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra* on the function of upāya. Ultimately nothing can be said, but provisionally anything can be said, and since the provisional is identical to the ultimate, this also means that ultimately anything can be said and is ultimately true.[19] To the extent that we can say that anything is done, that there is any acting or reacting going on, however, the upshot of all this would be: your thinking of the Buddha is an act of the Buddha's. At the same time, the Buddha's response to your devotion is your own act. The mutual non-duality of Buddha and you is constituted in this irreducible mutual embrace, not in the reduction of both to one or the other, or to some indeterminate third substance. It is permissible to say that the agency is located in the intersubjective matrix itself, or in both loci, or in any given place in the network; it is not restricted to any one place. Everything everyone does is also, by its nature, done by the other. To act yourself is to have the other act in you. This does not undermine the efficacy of the action; rather, this constitutes it. This is the domain of intersubjectivity in a peculiarly thorough sense, in which each is entirely constituted by the others. It is not

only that "man's desire is the desire of the Other," as certain moderns have claimed; we must also say that any act, human or otherwise, is the act of the Other, or of all others—including, perhaps, momentary, virtual, imaginary, and mythical beings. That this is not merely Spinozistic or ultra-theistic *tariki* is ensured by the fact that this must be read not only to mean, "Everything you do is really the Buddha's will, the Buddha controls everything," but equally, "Everything the Buddha does is done by yourself."

In the Tiantai context, this is predicated on the premise that every possible act is simultaneously Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Mean, the last being the simultaneity and non-duality between these two aspects being experienced as some quiddity and not being experienced as that quiddity, the fact that to be some particular thing is also not to be that thing. The Mean is often characterized as that which has no outside, which transcends and includes the pairs of opposites, in this case the opposites of presence and absence, of universality and particularity, of any X and the negation of that X. But for any X, the negation of that X is all that is non-X, all else that exists, the rest of the universe. By this reasoning, each particular thing is simultaneously nothing, something in particular, and everything. It is thus that all things are reducible to any one thing, chosen at random, and equally reducible to its opposite or any other thing. The interaction of two particular beings is thus the interaction of the whole with the whole, and what is more, as we shall see in more detail below, salvifically in both directions.[20] It is in this way that Zhili reads the "non-duality of subject and object" of the enlightened being—not as some phenomenological absorption of the observer in the object, nor as the Zongmi/Shanwai realization that the object is merely a projection of the non-objectified perceiving pure mind (i.e., the absorption of the object in the observer), but as the simultaneous absorption of each in the other, such that each side simultaneously includes in itself both sides, ultimately reducible to neither one side nor the other—a model that corresponds very neatly with the fundamental structure of intersubjectivity as such. The world is neither objective nor subjective; it is intersubjective.

The Pervasiveness of the Intersubjective

Zhiyi claims, as we have seen, that everyone's self-practice is identical to the bodhisattva's interaction with others. The same concept is evident in the *Guanyinxuanyi* in his doctrine of the Three Bodies of the Buddha, each of which pervades all times and places:

The explanation given by other teachers is that the hidden benefit given by the Dharmakāya is what is meant by permanent [benefit], whereas the Nirmāṇakāya (*yingshen*, 應身 response body) temporarily appears and then vanishes, and this is impermanent. But now we must make clear that although these teachers are right that the Dharmakāya is constantly both quiescent and illuminating, it is also the case that the response body is constantly and everywhere appearing and bringing benefit and has never once ceased for a moment—this is also permanent.[21]

That is, everything that happens "everywhere" (*chuchu* 處處) is not only the passively or objectively pantheistic Dharmakāya but also a specific response to a specific stimulus, bringing benefit, as part of a bodhisattva-esque transformation. Everything is the Nirmāṇakāya, including the stimuli themselves. The pervasiveness of the intersubjective concept of being is clear here as well: each thing is a response, an interaction, an encounter.

This notion is to be understood as an expansion of the claim in the *Lotus Sūtra*, explored in the preceding chapter, that everyone is actually "practicing the bodhisattva path" without knowing it.[22] The implications of this claim must be considered carefully. To be a bodhisattva (understood in the Tiantai tradition as one of the ten realms of existence, with its own set of characteristics) means (at least) (1) to be striving toward enlightenment and (2) to be assuming various forms so as to enlighten other sentient beings. If all sentient beings are practicing this path, it follows that at all times all beings are engaged in self-practice toward their own enlightenment and buddhahood and, simultaneously and indeed by virtue of the very same activities, already assuming various forms, including this form of a benighted seeker, in order to help other sentient beings reach buddhahood. This would mean that any encounter between two sentient beings can be analyzed into at least four levels: (1) both A and B are deluded, and each is totally enmeshed in greed, hatred, and delusion and trying to harm the other; (2) A is a bodhisattva who is assuming the form of someone who is totally enmeshed in greed, hatred, and delusion, so as to educate, enlighten, and help B; (3) B is a bodhisattva assuming this benighted, evil form to enlighten A; and (4) both are bodhisattvas, enacting this scene as part of the eternal drama for the edification of all other sentient beings and as an expression of their own enlightenment. Zhiyi's concept of the mutual inherence of all possible states would, of course, complicate the arithmetic of this equation, but the idea remains focused on the inherence of the enlightening and the deluded states in any single act. Each act of any sentient being is both a deluded act wholly conditioned by karma and a provisional transformation of a bodhisattva

(who has temporarily forgotten his ancient vows) for the sake of all beings, a form of enlightened/enlightening activity.

The concept of "overdetermination" may be applied to this situation, especially in considering the question of karma and the soteriological transformations of a bodhisattva. Any particular event (in order to be strong enough to emerge into being, like a symbol in a Freudian dream) must be significant to both systems and have a meaning in both of them. We may think here of how a single semiotic token, for example, "O," may be read as having completely different meanings, as either the letter that follows N in the alphabet or the number zero, without changing in the least, simply by being placed in different contexts. It is not the case that some part of it means zero and some part of it means the letter O. The entire symbol means both, in every molecule. If placed in both contexts at once, for example at the crossing point of a vertical line of numerals and a horizontal line of letters, the entire marker will mean both at once, without any change or division. It will be read one way or another simply according to a change in focus, as one or the other context is brought into effect as the relevant background.

Given the all-pervasive intersubjectivity of the Tiantai universe, in which every aspect of existence is simultaneously an element in ten qualitatively different realms, a token to be read in ten different contexts at once, this multiplicity of meanings is ensured for every possible instance of experience, without that experience having to change in the least, and without it being partially one way and partially the other. No act has only one meaning. The same act can be both completely enlightenment (a part of the enlightened being's world, viewed by him as an expression of his own enlightenment) and completely delusion (part of the deluded being's world, experienced by him as such). Hence my murder of a friend is, on the one hand, a karmically conditioned and conditioning act, total unfreedom and ignorance—it works as a significant and efficacious link in that chain of events. But, on the other hand, it is a token in the opposite language, the language of salvation, of growing awareness, of the Three Truths, of buddhahood, a cause toward enlightenment. Neither of these is more true than the other, neither ultimately reduces to the other; it is not the case that eventually one will turn out to be an illusion and the other the truth. Always and forever, there are these two (or more) accurate ways of reading this event.[23] This point is made most explicitly in the Shanjia school, for example, in Zhili's exam questions in the *Simingzunzhe jiaoxinglu*:

Q: All living beings and their environments are sometimes said to be the karma of sentient beings and their stimuli (*gan*), and sometimes said to be the transformative appearances of the Buddhas. How is the matter to be settled between these two?
A: These two senses require one another, and the matter is not to be judged one-sidedly in favor of one or the other. The thousand different types of living beings and environments, the ten thousand levels of joy and suffering—these are indeed the karma of sentient beings as stimuli. . . . But this karmic stimulus is itself the marvelous response of all the Buddhas, who transform and manifest in accordance with the minds of sentient beings, to cut off and subdue, to receive and embrace them, to help them mature and attain liberation. . . . Although the scriptures put it in these two opposite ways according to circumstance, from the ultimate point of view neither sense can be lacking for an instant. This is because the Three Thousand existing in the minds of sentient beings are no different from the Three Thousand existing in mind of the Buddhas, so tainted and pure interpenetrate, and stimulus and response never miss the mark. Because sentient beings are deluded, they conceive of differentiations, even though they are always constitutively within the Buddha's world [i.e., the Buddha and his environment], and because the Buddhas are enlightened, they are free and at ease, even though they are always constitutively within the world of sentient beings. Thus we know that the supreme function at the stage of the final fruit is no different from the churning flux of the three paths [karma, afflictions, and ignorance]. Moreover, the [enlightened and enlightening] creations of the sages in their transformations are nothing but the temporal transformations and creations of sentient beings.[24]

Deluded karma is thus identical to compassionate upāya, with neither ultimately reducible to the other; in Tiantai terms this means either can be provisionally said to be reducible to the other, to be wholly included in the other, equally.[25] Every act or condition is *both* your being ensnared by your deluded karma *and* your being saved by your own enlightening upāya and compassion qua your non-duality with the bodhisattva that you have forgotten you are (provisionally transformed into this deluded form of your present self) or with the one you will become, which is not separate from your present moment of experience or from all Buddhas of all times and places. Because every act is constitutively intersubjective, it is perceived and hence brought into being by more than one perceiver and indeed regarded as part of the self of more than one self; hence it is acting as a token in two contrary, holistic meaning-structures, which have identical contents but opposite meanings.[26]

In other words, the perfect fit between suffering and compassion, between stimulus and response, is possible because they are in fact one and the

same moment of experience, the same token read in two different meaning-contexts. Only this accounts for a response that is both non-deliberate, all-pervasive, and infallible. Because the response is the stimulus itself, nothing additional need be added (non-deliberateness). Wherever there is stimulus, there is response (all-pervasiveness—since every possible act counts as a stimulus).[27] The stimulus perfectly matches the response, since they are one and the same token (infallibility).[28] All acts, if contemplated as identical to the Threefold Truth, reveal themselves to be stimuli that bring about Buddha-effects, and the effects are themselves identical to the stimuli that incited them. The *Mohezhiguan* metaphorically expresses this perfect matching of the deluded challenge and the enlightened response, conceived as one and the same substance: "It is like fighting bandits. Bandits are the root of glory; it is because a general is able to destroy bandits that he attains fame and reward. Infinite lust is a seed of the Tathāgata in just the same way. It makes the bodhisattvas come up with an infinite number of Dharma-gates in response."[29] It is important to notice what is implied by this rhetoric of "seeds" and "roots." Here Zhiyi presents the stimulus and response as opposites that are serially related and that are then viewed as cause and effect; this must be understood in the context of Zhiyi's notion that cause and effect are themselves inseparable and ultimately one, that the division between them is merely provisional. The "one" that they are, however, is one that includes both opposite aspects of root and flower. This means, for example, that when we say "the root is itself the flower," we mean that "root is really root/flower, flower is also really flower/root, *therefore* root = flower"—rather than, for example, "root and flower are both really nothing but root, flower is nothing in itself, therefore root = flower; since flower is really root, this just means root = root." Thus it is with stimulus and response as well. A single act is thus both the sin and its overcoming. This does not mean that there is really only the sin or really only the overcoming; either one of them is always both, and both are always replete and present in either. Thus Zhili can say: "Since we admit that the poisons which are overcome are identical to the principle-nature, how could we deny that the function of overcoming is also identical to principle. . . . Since the poison itself is identical to the ultimate nature, it is just this poison itself that does the overcoming."[30]

Every possible action, then, is simultaneously (1) an instance of deluded karma, (2) a stimulus bringing about Buddha-responses, and (3) a salvific transformative Buddha-response brought about by this stimulus. Since an upāyic transformation of a Buddha is, by the non-duality of provisional and

ultimate, also the ultimate truth, any token may also be said to be (4) the ultimate being of the Buddha in himself. All four of these are one and the same moment of experience, read simultaneously in four different interpretive contexts.

This simultaneity of multiple interpretive perspectives on each token of experience draws our attention to the fundamental intersubjective situation assumed by the Tiantai writers to be inherent in reality. Zhanran brought the intersubjective question to the very center of Tiantai doctrine in the *Jin'gangpi*, in which he establishes the doctrine that "insentient beings have the Buddha-nature," as briefly discussed above. This is taken to imply that the environment, too, will achieve Buddhahood, an implication that eliminates any one-way subjective/objective relationship between the self and things. The subject is as much environment to things as things are environment to the subject; their mutual regard always moves in both directions. The work more or less opens with the thenceforth oft-repeated formula, "The organisms of the lowest purgatory and their entire environment are located completely within the ultimate sage's own mind, and the body and land of Vairocana Buddha do not exceed a single moment of the experience of the lowliest unenlightened being,"[31] which concisely adumbrates the mutual inclusion of the highest value as a token in the constitutive environmental field of the experience of the lowest value, and vice versa. The two value opposites are placed in a mutual regard and embrace in which each side completely absorbs the other without remainder. The unenlightened are part of the world of the enlightened and hence a part of enlightenment, which in omnicentric terms means they are enlightenment. Conversely, the enlightened are part of the world of the unenlightened and hence *are* unenlightenment. The intersubjective premise is here explicitly invoked as a key to Tiantai value paradox. At the climax of the same work, in explanation of the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*'s claim that "there is not the slightest difference among one's own mind, all sentient beings, and Buddha":

My own mind, and each and every sentient being, in every moment of experience without exception, interpenetrates with and mutually enters into the virtues of Vairocana's enlightenment, body and mind, living being and environment, self and others, in perfect equality. I and all other sentient beings equally possess this nature, which is thus called the Buddha-nature. This nature creates everywhere, transforms everywhere, subsumes everywhere. . . . Once it is understood that this nature pervades everywhere without exception, it becomes clear that the result of buddhahood includes the causal nature of self and other, and equally that my own mind possesses

the virtues of the result of buddhahood. From the point of view of the result, the Buddha-eye and Buddha-wisdom contemplate me and see only the Buddha's own unbornness. In the position of the cause [sentient beings], if we see things in occult correspondence with this true vision and true wisdom, we also see that all sentient beings are nothing but Buddha, and there is no other resultant Buddha than this. Thus outside of sentient beings there is no Buddha. . . . Thus when one Buddha attains enlightenment, nothing in the entire dharma-realm is not part of this Buddha's constitutive environmental field. The same is true for all Buddhas. Sentient beings are from the beginning within the Buddha's own constitutive environmental field, and yet they give rise to views of difference such that joy and sorrow alternate, and each one thinks it is his own body and environment alone.[32]

Note how the proposition "there is no Buddha but sentient beings" hinges again on the putative fact that at least one sentient being has attained buddhahood, on a being initially conceived as "outside" us, indeed as our most thoroughgoing negation. It is the non-empirical assertion of the existence of Buddhas that itself accounts for the superfluity of Buddhas. We are Buddhas because somewhere, someone attained Buddhahood, which meant seeing us as Buddhas. The Buddha sees us as identical to himself. Casting his eye over the entire universe, he perceives nothing but himself, his own unborn essence, his own constitutive environmental field. He and his environment are not two, and we are part of his environment. By being deluded, we posit the negation of delusion, enlightenment. This is intrinsic to delusion because it is outside it, negates it, as explained above in the exposition of the Three Truths. This perfect negation of delusion, which is posited by that delusion, has the character of viewing that delusion as an aspect of itself (also because our delusion lacks this ability). Ergo, we are the Buddha.[33] Because of the Tiantai doctrine of the non-duality of provisional and ultimate, this proposition is reversible. There is no Buddha but sentient beings, no sentient beings but Buddha. The Buddha sees that we all have the Buddha-nature, which means that each of us will become a Buddha. What we are doing right now is a cause of our future buddhahood. But buddhahood is the kind of result that includes its cause (non-duality of cause and effect). From the perspective of that result, we shall look back and see this other who is the sentient being we are right now, identify with him, and realize that the ignorant karmic activities we are currently engaging in actually turn out, via "opening the provisional to reveal the real," to be stimulus/response acts of the Buddha we have eventually become (who is identical to all the Buddhas of past, present, and future). Hence there is no Buddha outside the

sentient beings who are struggling toward buddhahood in ignorance and karma-creating confusion.

This does not amount, however, to a psychologizing reduction whereby we no longer need any Buddha since our own mind is Buddha; the fact that our own mind is Buddha, that there is no Buddha outside our own mind of this moment, is constituted by the view of the Buddha, the Buddha we will become and all the other Buddhas, with whom, needless to say, he is identical. It is indeed true that both mind and Buddha are mind, but it is equally true that both mind and Buddha are Buddha. By being regarded by this other as identical to itself, we are constituted as not needing any other, for this other is inherent in our own being, as is our being-viewed-by-the-other. Indeed, there is no self of ours prior to this, we have been intersubjective from the beginning, and all our self-practice was also interactive. Zhanran's point is to make this intersubjectivity irreducible to any one thing; as he says earlier in the same work, "Every speck of dust and every mental act anywhere are precisely the nature of the mind of every sentient being and every Buddha. There is no question of any of them belonging to anyone's own mind alone, since all together create them, all together become them, all share in being the same objects of liberative transformation, and all share in performing the same acts of liberative transformation."[34] Each token, however slight, is a presence in every interpretive world; indeed it is the "center" of each and fully expresses the quiddity of each. This includes being on both sides of every liberative action performed everywhere, and on both sides of the Buddha / deluded, sentient being relationship. The Buddha-mind we are to realize, then, is not the one looking out of our eyes at the world, as, for example, Zongmi and the Shanwai writers would have it, but the one that is looking at us, seeing us as itself, and seeing that we are looking out at the world and also thinking of the Buddha, who is thinking of us. The intersubjective moment is crucial and always present, as is the concept and the name "Buddha" as the looker who sees us this way, existing in our own minds.[35] It is the thought "Buddha" within our own mind that makes this situation possible. We are to experience the world through the mediation of our being experienced by a Buddha, to see as one who is seen by a Buddha, one who sees himself in what is seen, even in the deluded seeing of others, including their deluded seeing of himself seeing. To a certain degree, then, the use of the word "Buddha" is a self-verifying performative utterance; by entertaining the idea of the existence of such a being viewing us, we see ourselves as seen as he would see us, and our actions thereby become tokens in

that alternative semiotic network, which is precisely that in which our own buddhahood consists.[36]

Here we discover the distinctive basis of the Tiantai conception of the non-duality between deluded beings and the Buddha: to be a Buddha is to appear to be a bodhisattva, which is to constantly be appearing, for the sake of the salvation of sentient beings, to be a sentient being who is struggling with a certain form of karma. A sentient being already appears to be this, and a Buddha is also someone who appears to be this—perhaps even to himself, since the *Lotus Sūtra* claims that one can be a bodhisattva without knowing it.

Indeed, since self-practice and interaction with others are the same in content, and since every interaction is really the whole confronting this whole in mutual inherence, that is, intersubjectively, this intersubjective vision can be seen as the basis even for the non-duality of opposites in one's own private practice of meditation. That is, the relation between any two thoughts, any two mental events, can be analyzed into the four levels described above, and each mental event is equivalent to a sentient being.[37] As Zhiyi puts it:

> Each mental event is identical to Emptiness, to Provisional Positing, to the Mean. . . . To contemplate it in this manner is to open up the Buddha's wisdom and experience in sentient beings. "Sentient beings" here refers to the mental events of greed, anger, and delusion, each of which clings to the notion of self: What has a self [in this manner] is what is meant by "sentient beings." When mental states that chase after the notion of self arise, giving rise to the three poisons—these are what are called "sentient beings."[38]

Guanding indicates this idea with the term *zhongsheng xinshu* 衆生心數, "the sentient beings [which we call] mental events."[39]

The notion that the intersubjective relation of *ganying* always pervading both sides applies also to what we normally think of as the purely "subjective" realm; this helps explain some of the initially puzzling features of Tiantai "mind contemplation," which always involves this two-tiered structure of contemplated object and contemplating act. When each mental event is viewed as a sentient being in its own right, all thinking, and especially all internal conflict, may be viewed as the intersubjective interaction of these beings, conceived as the four levels of mutual *ganying* described above, in that each has within it the Three Thousand Quiddities and subsists in the same complex intersubjective matrix. For example, a moment of anger meets the

thought, "One must not be angry (because this event is empty, or in order to realize Emptiness)." By the application of the Three Truths, in one sense both are deluded thoughts; in another sense the anger is being corrected and enlightened by the moral imperative; in another sense the moral imperative is being corrected and enlightened by its encounter with the anger. The anger is a bodhisattva, as is the puritanical moral restriction; both assume deluded forms to enlighten the other and all else. Each is biased in its own way, and the bias of the one corrects the bias of the other. The anger is biased to the provisional, the six mundane realms; the puritanical moral injunction is biased toward the Two Vehicles, the otherworldly transcendence of the passions. Either in itself is a biased delusion, but each delusion is a remedy for the opposite delusion—since delusion, in a Tiantai context, means fundamentally bias or one-sidedness, the misapprehension of the Mean, which signifies the overcoming of all one-sidedness. A moment of anger is both an instance of delusion and an upāyic bodhisattva-transformation responding to the stimulus of the delusion of the Two Vehicle delusion of the moral injunction, in order to enlighten it. The opposite is also true.[40] One could thus address any moment of lust or rage in one's own mind (and equally, any moment of bigoted puritanical moralism) just as Never-disparage addresses all beings: I dare not disparage you—you are practicing the bodhisattva path and will one day be a Buddha. That is, not only each sentient being as usually conceived, but each moment of thought itself, will become a Buddha. It also follows that even hedonistic pleasing of oneself is actually an interactive, intersubjective activity.[41] All experience is constituted by this irreducible intersubjective relation; oneself alone with oneself no less than oneself with others, for in both situations all experienced contents are "neither self, nor other, nor both, nor neither," but provisionally equally self, other, both, and neither—that is, if our grammar forces us to name an agent,[42] the working of the universal intersubjective matrix itself, or any point within it. There is no atom of experience anywhere that is not thoroughly intersubjective.

As we have seen, then, all activities in the universe are in this tradition (as read by Zhili, as I claim) considered relationships, specifically the intersubjective relationship working both ways between a transforming bodhisattva and a deluded sentient being, both of whom are the entire universe and are identical to their entire environments and inherently include all possible ways of viewing the world and each other, including, at least in Zhili's reading,[43] all divisions in themselves, including the division between self and other.

The Ultimacy of Intersubjectivity as a Focus of the Shanjia/Shanwai Debate

This vision of each moment of experience as intersubjective and as the multidirectional relation between a bodhisattva and a deluded being is especially important for our present inquiry, with its goal of understanding the extremes of Zhili's value theory, because it stands at the center of Zhili's reading of the Tiantai tradition and is one of the crucial points of dispute in his ongoing debate with the Shanwai thinkers. This concept of intersubjectivity and mutual inherence of the *ganying* relation comes to the fore in Zhili's writings, usually taking the form of symmetrical formulas on bidirectional relatedness and mutual reducibility, which are one of the most prevalent and distinctive stylistic features of his works.[44] It is on such a basis that Zhili can conceive of this intersubjective *ganying* as operative in all experience, including every thought in one's own mind. Hence he can state, "This is the contemplation that the Three Thousand in one's own mind are identical to the Three Thousand in the Buddha's mind. Hence with every moment of experience one is receiving [the Buddha's miraculous transformative *ganying*] nourishment (*nianniansbourun* 念念受潤), constantly soaked in the wondrous benefit."[45] Since the Three Thousand includes all the determinations of both the Buddha and oneself, the division between the two, and the relation between the two, and since this Three Thousand is as replete here as there, no one is ever not in the embrace of this intersubjective matrix, which includes the compassionate assumption of all forms of response in the interest of enlightening all beings. Zhili states:

> The dharmas of Buddhas and sentient beings are what are called "other"; but each inherently includes both all Buddhas and all sentient beings. If the sentient beings and Buddhas inherent in oneself become manifest, they are identical to the sentient beings and Buddhas that are inherent in any Buddha who stands as an other to oneself, and in this instance they play the role of "the one who transforms" [who takes on various forms so as to guide and enlighten all beings]. The sentient beings and Buddhas inherent in sentient beings in that case play the role of "the ones who are transformed." Since all this takes place in one moment of experience, how can self and other be considered only different?[46]

In other words, every sentient being and every Buddha alike has the entire system "Buddhas' taking on various forms to enlighten all sentient beings" replete and inherent in himself or herself. Both the guide and the guided are

replete in the guide and the guided. Thus every moment of experience is interpretable as the stimulus/response experience, and every encounter allows both agents to play both roles.

> Since the three [mind, sentient beings, and Buddhas] have no difference among them, stimulus and response absorb each other. Sentient beings stimulate the response of the other Buddhas existing in their own minds; at the same time, the Buddhas respond to the other beings existing in their own minds. . . . [As in Zhanran 's metaphor of the mirror,] the Three Thousand [in the minds of] the Buddhas are the principle of manifesting any form, and the Three Thousand [in the minds of] the sentient beings are the nature that is able to reflect any form. [The Three Thousand are the same in both cases.] Otherwise, it would be impossible for the stimulus to be identical to the response, and the transformations would not be nondeliberate.[47]

Note that this does not mean that the whole thing goes on solipsistically in someone's head, and there is nothing else out there, no other minds or beings. Rather, the interaction happens "only" in the mind of both of the two real partners, and either way of putting it is equally accurate. If anything, the interaction itself is in this sense more real than either of the participants as such, since the interaction [= the Three Thousand] is really prior to the existence of any one particular being. Any being is really already the whole interaction, and each act is both a deluded stimulus and an enlightened response.

Obviously, the privileging of the dharma of mind in Shanwai thinking[48] undermines the basis of this vision of the mutual inherence of two real minds engaging and referencing each other, by creating a situation that is unilateral and unidirectional. In the Shanwai vision, all dharmas are nothing but "mind"—mind inherently possesses all dharmas, period. There is no further reference point out there that includes this mind that includes all dharmas. Hence Yuanqing, representing the earliest Shanwai position, explains the lack of distinction among sentient beings, Buddhas, and mind by flatly stating that "Buddha means the true contemplation, sentient beings means delusion, and the mind is the mind in these two states, not separate from them. But the mind is the root of both Buddha [enlightenment] and sentient beings [delusion]."[49] The irreducible intersubjective triangle is here reduced to a one-way emanation of various states from a single hypersubjectivity. Their mutual regard is no longer a fundamental aspect of the state of things. At most, any looking back and forth is one more manifestation or emanation of this one, markless, all-embracing mind. The notion of

the Three Thousand as an irreducible dialogue between the deluded and the enlightened, conditioned thus omnicentrically from each possible determination within the matrix, is lost here.

Thus in discussing the last six of Zhanran's "Gates of Non-duality," all of which deal with the concept of stimulus and response, Yuanqing is able to conceive of "response" as a pure function of enlightened mind per se, untainted by delusion, rather than as something that is always determined both as enlightened and as deluded. The point here is made most clear in the different interpretations of a line in the Fifth Gate, the non-duality of taint and purity (*ranjing bu'er men* 染淨不二門), given by Yuanqing and Zhili. The issue is complicated by the fact that several alternative versions of Zhanran's text were in circulation at the time. Yuanqing's version of Zhanran's text gives the following sense (interpreting according to his reading of the character *zhi* 之): "The dharma-nature goes to [becomes] ignorance and creates all dharmas everywhere, and this is called taint; ignorance goes to [becomes] the dharma-nature and responds to all conditions everywhere, and this is called purity" (*faxing zhi wuming, pian zao zhufa, ming zhi wei ran. Wuming zhi faxing, pianying zhuyuan, ming zhi wei jing* 法性之無明，遍造諸法，名之爲染。無明之法性，遍應諸緣，名之爲淨).[50] Yuanqing comments:

Another version of the text adds the character *yu* 與 [together with] here, yielding, "The dharma-nature together with ignorance creates all dharmas everywhere" (*faxing zhi yu wu ming pian zao zhufa* 法性之與無明遍造諸法) and "Ignorance together with the dharma nature responds to all conditions everywhere" (*wuming zhi yu faxing pian ying zhuyuan* 無明之與法性遍造諸法). This is taken to mean that the dharma-nature joins together with ignorance in creating evil. . . . If the dharma-nature joins in with ignorance to create all dharmas, then the following line about purity must be read to mean that ignorance joins together with the dharma-nature to create responses. . . . How could the pure nature of the result [buddhahood] need to join together with ignorance before it can give rise to responses? In that case, tainted and pure are inseparable, and there's no way to distinguish between delusion and enlightenment—truly laughable![51]

Zhili's version of Zhanran's text has the two *yus* 與 in it, but he states in his commentary that either version of the text makes sense—but not the sense Yuanqing sees in it. Zhili writes:

Whether or not the two *yus* 與 are there, the text makes sense, but reading *zhi* 之 to mean "go" is rather forced. . . . [Without the two *yus*] it reads simply as meaning "Ignorance that is identical to the dharma-nature is the tainted function, dharma-nature that is identical to ignorance is the pure function." This works from a literary

point of view, and the sense is a bit clearer. . . . But with the two *yus* the meaning is even clearer. *Yu* means to lend, to bestow, which is to say, to help. When ignorance and the dharma-nature transform back and forth in the two functions, there is a sense in which they are mutually supporting and helping each other in both cases. The subordinate at any time lends its power to the dominant. If the dharma-nature's inherent influence is powerless and the tainted function of ignorance is dominant, then the dharma-nature lends power to ignorance in order to allow it to create all dharmas qua tainted. If ignorance's clinging affect is powerless and the inherent influence of the dharma-nature is strong, then ignorance lends power to the dharma-nature to give rise to all pure responses. This is because although ignorance has the function of bringing things to completion, since it is empty in its essence, it cannot transform and create on its own, but must borrow power from the dharma-nature in order to bring about all tainted dharmas. Although the dharma-nature inherently possesses all Three Thousand quiddities, the pure function manifests only through praxis. Even if one insists that the late stages of praxis do not depend on ignorance, how could the early stages of practice do without [ignorant emotions like] preferences, likes, and dislikes?[52] . . . Only if ignorance lends its strength to the dharma-nature can the pure function appear. Since Jingxi (Zhanran) allows the concept of following conditions, he must also allow the dharma-nature and ignorance to function mutually as primary and secondary cause; it is just that he explicates this following of conditions with a focus on inherent inclusion in the essence itself, and so his view naturally differs from that of the provisional teachings.[53]

Purity can function only in conjunction with taint, and vice versa. How are we to understand this? This discussion takes place in the context of the concept of *ganying*, stimulus and response between the deluded and the enlightened. The response, the pure function, cannot occur without the stimulus, the tainted function. The stimulus also possesses the Three Thousand, including the Buddhas and their pure response—without all Three Thousand determinations, it cannot exist as the tainted stimulus. Indeed, the stimulus is identical to the response. On the other hand, there is a question of the relative strength of the elements in the organization of the two participants, both of whom are irreducibly involved. This talk of relative strength and weakness is best thought of as a question of focus and field, of figure and ground. The enlightened is the Three Thousand with the dharma-nature as figure, as the dominant center that includes and is identical to its ground of ignorance (i.e., they are determined by, indeed are nothing but, the same defining outline). The ignorant is the same Three Thousand with the focus on taint, which is also inseparable from the enlightened background.

This model raises another hairy question, since "focus and field" cannot be conceived without a relation between an observer and an object. The observer's focus changes, whereas the object remains the same, rendering a different appearance. Whence this division, if we are looking for an initial explanatory principle? But in a Tiantai context, the oneness of subject and object is not to be privileged above the specific karmically conditioned/upāyic divisions of subject and object proper to all particular sentient beings. These two aspects are equal, simultaneous and identical, belonging to the Truth of Emptiness and the Truth of Provisional Positing, respectively. It is not the case that "originally" or "in actuality" there is no subject/object division and hence no particular perspective, that these things are merely an illusion that will eventually be dispelled. Rather, it is always equally true that there is and is not such a division and hence such a perspective, such a choosing of focus and field. Hence, in any moment of experience of any being it is always equally true that there is some subjective perspective with a particular focus obtaining (some emphasis on one element at the expense of the others, some partiality, e.g., to dharma-nature or to ignorance) and that all things are equally weighted with no particularizing distinction between subject and object.

Let us look at another example. Zhanran says, in the "Gate of the Nonduality Between Inner and Outer":

> First one must comprehend that the outer bodies and minds are all one moment of experience, which is identical to a non-moment of experience. It is nothing but the Three Thousand inherent to the inner essence, identical to Emptiness, Provisional Positing, and the Mean; thus external dharmas are nothing but the nature of one's own mind. There is nothing outside the nature of this mind, nothing it does not integrate into itself. All the Buddhas of the ten directions, all sentient beings in all the dharma-realms, do not differ in the least in this essential nature. All of them equally pervade everywhere. So who is there to refer to as inner, outer, matter, mind, self, other?[54]

Yuanqing comments: "Outside the dharma realm there is nothing; sentient beings and Buddhas are all one suchness, because Emptiness has no inner and outer, and the nature has no self and other to it."[55] This interpretation of Zhanran's text obliterates the ultimacy of intersubjectivity in favor of a conception of Emptiness that is devoid of the marks of self and otherness, rather than containing and sublating them. Compare Zhili's commentary on the same passage:

Buddha and sentient beings, each one pervades and absorbs everything else. Moreover, this "essential nature" does not refer to "the one nature." It means, rather, the nature of the Three Thousand, the Three-Thousand-nature. Only because Buddhas inherently include in themselves the Three Thousand are they able to integrate into themselves all minds and sentient beings. Only because sentient beings inherently include the Three Thousand can they integrate into themselves all minds and Buddhas. And since all minds inherently include in themselves the Three Thousand, how could they be divided off from Buddhas and sentient beings? If the mind lacked the "Buddha nature," how could it integrate Buddhas into itself? If Buddhas lacked the "sentient beings nature," how could they integrate sentient beings into themselves? Thus a statement like "They do not differ in the least in this essential nature" is known and admitted by everyone, but the following line, "All of them equally pervade everywhere," must be carefully contemplated. As for those who explain "non-dual" in this case to simply mean absorbing the outer into the inner and nothing more, how limited this is! How, then, do they understand the claim that "all of them equally pervade everywhere"? Moreover, the way [these same exegetes] explain the other nine gates using this principle of making everything reducible to one side [of any given dyad, especially to mind] (*jiegui yibian* 皆歸一邊) thoroughly damages the overall structure [of the teaching].

Next, [Zhanran 's text says] "Who is there to refer to . . . ?" and so on. The negation of them all is meant to show that, once they all interpenetrate, there is no longer any fixed division or identity for any of them. (*ji ge rong ji be ke ding fen* 既各融即不可定分). Since this contemplation accords with principle, who could say they are dual? But the three dyads [inner and outer, matter and mind, self and other] are just a general way of indicating that relative pairs of opposites have now all been negated by means of mutual interpenetration. [Zhanran says outer matter and mind are all nothing but oneself,] but he could equally say inner matter and mind are nothing but oneself, or outer matter and mind are nothing but the other [etc.]."[56]

Here Zhili explains "non-dual" as meaning "interpenetrating" (*rong* 融, melting into one another) as opposed to "divided" (*fen* 分), not the blank emptiness Yuanqing suggests, in which no determinations of any kind can be made. This sort of non-duality between self and other, or inner and outer, does not mean that there is a neutral substratum that is the true nature of both, and which in itself has no determinations of self and other, but rather that self always includes other and other always includes self. No matter where you go in the dyad, both are there; their non-duality actually makes them omnipresent ("pervading everywhere") rather than eliminating them altogether. There is no atom anywhere that is devoid of self-and-other,

nor is there any third substratum that is blank with respect to them. Such is the all-pervasiveness of the intersubjective (and any other differentiation) in Zhili's understanding of his tradition. Indeed, Zhili quite often uses "interpenetration" as opposed to "division" to pinpoint the distinctive doctrine of the Integrated Teaching. For example, commenting on a passage from Zhanran, which I translate below and discuss in some depth, Zhili explains the meaning of the term "illusory" (*huan* 幻) as follows: "This is not illusory in the sense of principle-only following along with conditions [as in the Separate Teaching], much less does it mean illusory in the sense of having no essence of its own because it arises from causes and conditions [as in the Common Teaching]. Rather, [Zhanran] is here showing that since each element inherently includes [all the others], they are all originally interpenetrating, but their temporary separation is as an illusion."[57] In other words, as Zhili puts it in his famous explanation of the metaphor of water and ice, the ten realms are really interpenetrating like water, but deluded thinking clings to them as separate like chunks of ice. It is not that there really are not ten different realms, but simply that they are simultaneously ten and not ten, simultaneously separate and inseparable—that is, they are interpenetrating. This concept of non-duality as interpenetration, far from eliminating intersubjectivity, only intensifies it. The interchange between elements is made all the more central, unobstructed, and ultimate. Indeed, it is hard to know how else to conceive of this "melting" into one another that nonetheless does not destroy the individual determinacy of what is melted, if not as a description of the intersubjective relation. Hence Zhili makes a point of even reading Zhanran's final comment, which seems to eliminate all contrasting determinations (self, other, inner, outer, matter, mind), as readable in any direction, with the other five reducible to any of these six elements, so that self and other are not eliminated but, rather, all the more irreducibly embroiled in one another. In contrast, the Shanwai masters' reduction of all to one side, usually mind conceived as Emptiness and as absolutely indeterminate, completely eliminates this sense of the ultimacy of intersubjectivity, the irreducible back-and-forth that can never settle on any one side. In this sense, Zhili's insistence on explaining non-duality as interpenetration may be seen as a strategic way of maintaining the importance and ultimacy of the intersubjective reading of the Tiantai tradition.

The passage on illusion in Zhanran, on which Zhili was commenting, speaks to the issue of the relation between delusion and enlightenment:

It is in the nature of each thing from the beginning to include both the provisional and the ultimate. Due to their various conditionings from the beginningless past, some manifest as provisional and some as ultimate. Their appearance as one or the other is due to this conditioning, but in principle they are all equally both. They differ according to conditioning, not nature. But although their nature is not different, this nature necessarily depends on illusions to manifest itself (*xing sui wu shu bu jie huan fa* 性雖無殊必藉幻發)—illusory triggering preconditions, illusory stimuli (*gan*) [of sentient beings], illusory responses (*ying*), illusory arrivals [of compassionate deities] (*huanji huan'gan huanying huanfu* 幻機幻感幻應幻赴). Both the one who responds and the one who is transformed thereby are equally neither provisional nor ultimate [in nature]. But because sentient beings have this neither-provisional-nor-ultimate [nature], they can take on the form of the provisional and ultimate stimuli, and because the Buddhas in the result position have this neither-provisional-nor-ultimate [nature], they can take on the form of the provisional and ultimate response. Thus the stimuli provided by beings is matched by the responses [of the Buddhas], and body and environment match without going askew. Both are equally the eternal land of quiescent light; each without exception is the entire dharma-realm.[58]

Thus it cannot be said simply that the Buddha-realm is the truth and all the other, deluded realms are falsehood, or that the true meaning of any token is its meaning as conceived from the point of view of Buddhahood alone, that is, that all dharmas are originally pure, enlightened, and nirvāṇic. That is only part of the truth. At the same time, all tokens are also *always* deluded, provisional, and impure. They must always be both, always capable of being read from all points of view. That is, the deluded realms cannot be thought of as simply mistakenly ascertaining the truth that is correctly perceived by the Buddha. All the alternative interpretive systems, enlightened and deluded, ultimate and provisional, must always exist and always inhere in each other. The "true" reading is not something separate from the "false" readings. Instead, the truth depends on the false to manifest itself and includes these falsehoods in itself (as Zhanran says, "this nature necessarily depends on illusions to manifest itself").

How are we to understand or conceive of such a situation? In the context of the primacy of the intersubjective model, one helpful way to comprehend what is meant here is to conceive of the universe, the Three Thousand quiddities, as first and foremost a dialogue or conversation between the enlightened and the deluded. This provides a way to grasp the manner in which both the Buddha and the sentient beings are able to embrace the opposite

subjective states in their own subjectivity, and not just a collection of diverse objective data. How is it possible to subjectively *feel* both sad and happy at once, both enlightened and deluded, both free and bound? Consider the everyday example of an ordinary conversation. Every word spoken in a conversation between two subjective beings is predicated on two types of understanding at once; when I address you, my words cannot be understood only in terms of me or only in terms of you. The text of the conversation is the same in the perceived world of both participants, a certain fixed set of particular words and gestures, spoken and heard, performed and perceived. To be sure, while I am the one who is speaking and expressing an idea, my subjective state is the dominant focus, but since my words are directed at you, they are also thoroughly conditioned by your state of mind, your interests, your beliefs, what language and experiences I think we have in common, and so on. Your understanding of my words, on the other hand, is a function of your own mental state, and your position serves as the focus undergirding your interpretation, but your mental state also has to take into account your conception of me and my state of mind, interests, and knowledge. Although we may share an objective world and also mutually embrace in our conception of that world the existence of the subjectivity of the other, your understanding of my words will differ from mine, since you comprehend the same totality of the words and gestures coming from both of us with your present state as determining focus. Similarly, when a Buddha "speaks" to me, everything he says takes as premise the entire universe as I see it, that is, all dharmas as tainted, the entire experience of delusion. Given the Tiantai notion of all experiences as provisional pedagogic transformations of the Buddha addressed to deluded beings, as well as the non-duality of the provisional transformation of others and the ultimate self-praxis, we get a picture of ignorance and enlightenment as always both operative in every token of experience.

This indeed marks the fundamental break between the Shanwai and the Shanjia positions. The former say in effect "Being is perception," whereas the latter say, "Being is interpellation." That is, all experience is *addressed* to someone, nay, to everyone, and everyone is always answering. To experience a thought is to address that thought to every other subjective experience; to contemplate it is to see all others as responses to it. The subject-object division of experience is thus transcended not by elimination but by sublation into mutual address.[59] Only thus can we get beyond a position that says in effect, "Objectively everything is equally pure, but subjectively there are two

ways of viewing it, either enlightenedly, which means seeing the truth that all are pure, or deludedly, which means mistakenly seeing everything as tainted, or making a distinction between purity and taint." Such a premise would still make it impossible to be both enlightened and deluded at the same time, for in such a view, although the objective realm may contain the potentiality to be seen in either the enlightened or deluded way, any given subjectivity, or any given moment of subjective experience, must either be one or the other. The dichotomy would then be overcome in the case of the objective realm, but the subjective realm would continue to be viewed dichotomously.

This view that "if one is deluded, all is impure afflictions; if one is enlightened, all is pure bodhi," in which an objective fact is susceptible to being viewed in two opposite ways (so that the objective realm is non-dual), but any particular subjective state is always one way or the other (hence dual) was explicitly and emphatically rejected by Zhili,[60] as is explored in greater detail in the following chapter. In Zhili's view, to realize the Buddha-mind does not mean to suddenly see the "truth" that the world is purity only, as a Buddha supposedly sees it. The Buddha mind we are to contemplate is instead the one described above, which sees our delusion and our deluded world and whose every response (that is, all our experiences) is thoroughly conditioned thereby, not a pure view looking out through our eyes and finally seeing the world as purity.[61] In this way we can understand why all functions are determined by the working together of the pure dharma-nature and tainted primal ignorance, such that neither side can ever be lacking. As in a conversation or any other intersubjective encounter, both sides are eternally present in every word and gesture produced.

This notion of intersubjectivity, premised on this sort of coextensive *ganying* relation, can be seen operating between the lines in Zhili's notion of "contemplation of the deluded mind" (*wangxin guan* 妄心觀), another of the key points of dispute with the Shanwai writers. I have already alluded to this idea briefly, in discussing the Huayan style of contemplation. But to understand Zhili's concept of meditation, we must make take the *ganying* structure into account. Zhili holds that Tiantai contemplation is properly contemplation of the deluded mind and takes the deluded mind as the object. It is not contemplation of the ultimate truth per se, nor of interpenetration per se.

But just what is the deluded mind that is contemplated, and precisely who or what is the contemplator in this case? In the *Shiyishu*, Zhili specifies that the proper object of meditation is the deluded mind, which, in the phe-

nomenal realm, is the creator of all determinate phenomena—that is, the ignorant, conditioned focal setting that determines our present experience as X rather than anything else, that attributes the definiteness we experience in the world to the objects of contemplation.[62] It is the agency that habitually differentiates, making clear-cut judgments of what is what, fixing the boundaries of relevance that accounts for our experience of the world. Successful contemplation entails the use of the Three Contemplations (contemplation of the object as empty, as provisionally posited, and as the Mean) as the contemplator, applied to this deluded function of the mind, as the contemplated, revealing that this deluded function inherently includes all Three Thousand quiddities as Empty, as Provisional, and as the Mean. Again, "inclusion" must be understood in the sense elaborated in the previous chapter: it signifies that this quiddity here—the act of prejudicially desiring, bias, anger, ignorance, and the like, construed as determining agents acting on our perception of the world—can also be read as any other quiddity, when the horizons of relevance are shifted, without changing in the least. This anger or greed, for example, which zeroes in on one aspect of the world and focuses on it to the neglect of others, is itself the function of the Buddha-mind, or the Asura-mind, or the dung-beetle-mind, as we shall see in more detail below. When this is revealed in its fullness, the deluded mind has become the true mind; not by changing, of course, but by being seen anew, in a new contextualization.

But who is it who does this seeing? Zhili sharply criticizes the Shanwai theorists for positing the true mind as the object of contemplation, stating that this is the result of confusion about both the contemplator and the contemplated. For one thing, it suggests that the True Mind is already present as some one portion of present experience, to be picked out and concentrated on. But Zhili's position is that, qua delusion, the mind is purely delusion; prior to the contemplation, there is no "part" or "aspect" of consciousness that can be identified as the True Mind. For Zhili, this True Mind is not the undifferentiated perceptivity we saw described in the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*, which is always present undivided in various phenomenal forms, like a single light shone through an array of different filters. It is not the doer of our actions, the feeler of our feelings, which has always been operating and can be perceived to have been there all the time if we just turn our attention to it, as in some forms of Chan. Zhili holds that the doer of our actions and feeler of our feelings and seer of our sights is and has always been nothing but delusion itself. No true light shines through it. But this delusion

itself, this homogenous mass of ignorance, has the power, by means of ignorance itself, to overcome itself and recontextualize itself and thereby discover that it is, qua this delusion, also identical to enlightenment. It is only in this sense that we may claim enlightenment from the beginning. No aspect of delusion can be singled out as the concealed enlightenment; it is delusion in its entirety that turns out, by means of itself, to be enlightenment in its entirety. Hence Zhili further asks the Shanwai, if the true mind is the object of contemplation, who is doing the contemplating? His own answer to this rhetorical question is quite telling: it must be the deluded mind![63] For if the True Mind is the object, the only thing left to be the subject is delusion itself.

This brings us back to the notion that the Tiantai version of the idea suggested by Polanyi's ideas of tacit knowledge and the ends-means relation would in fact depict the subject-object relation as one in which whatever was not the object, that is, the manifest portion of experience, would necessarily be the subject, that what perceives any object is everything else in the universe, all possible other states. Zhili says, along the same lines, that the contemplator of delusion is the Three Contemplations—that is, the True Mind itself. Merely by explicitly positing and manifesting the delusion, enlightenment is implicitly posited as its perceiver, in response to it. It does not appear as object because it is the subject. But what is revealed by this contemplation is that the deluded mind itself is precisely the True Mind; there is no other True Mind outside this moment of deluded consciousness. Zhili invokes the idea of "antagonistic seeds," to be discussed in the next chapter, to defend his picture of contemplation; that is, the idea that something may give rise to an effect opposite in kind to itself, that evil may give rise to good, that delusion may give rise to enlightenment.[64] Zhili's picture of contemplation follows the same contours as the *ganying* relationship: the deluded mind becomes an object of contemplation, that is, it becomes explicitly posited; by being explicitly posited, it has become just what it always was, only more so. This means that it is revealed to itself to be a provisional posit, therefore empty, and therefore the Mean, and finally all three at once. But this means that the delusion being so contemplated entails all other quiddities and hence is itself the contemplator so regarding it, the enlightenment mind—and this is a perfect picture of a response to a stimulus. A deluded stimulus gives rise to an enlightened response. The True Mind is evoked by the positing of the Deluded Mind, which is thereby revealed to be an instantiation of the True Mind. But, as we have seen abundantly above, this True Mind,

which then comes to do the looking at the Deluded Mind, is itself nothing but the Deluded Mind itself; the same token is both stimulus and response. This Deluded Mind responds to itself as the Enlightened Mind which in turn realizes that it has always been enlightened. We may equally say that the Enlightened Mind posits itself as deluded stimulus upāyically and compassionately responds to reveal its identity therewith. Contemplation itself, in Zhili's system, is an example of the intersubjective *ganying* relation, and this accounts for its distinctive lineaments and its deep-seated conflict with the Shanwai True Mind contemplation.

Let us consider some of the broader philosophical implications of this position for the Tiantai worldview. The Tiantai ontology fills the gap of intersubjectivity that arguably had marred Buddhist metaphysics. The Tiantai conception of *ganying* as the mutual viewing, love, and embrace of delusion and compassion implies a notion of praxis as a calling to all-sentient beings qua all Buddhas, and all Buddhas qua sentient beings. To meditate or do a repentance or to recite the Buddha's name is to call the attention of the Buddha, who is all Buddhas as well as all sentient beings—all of whom have been my father and mother, my son and daughter, my lover and enemy, my teacher and student, a million times over. Now all of them see me again, but through the eyes of their buddhahood, and I see them, and my enlightenment consists of this being seen by them, which is seeing them and being them and being be-ed by them.

In one sense, then, it can be said that the Tiantai ontological application of upāya, and its category of manifestation, saves Buddhist metaphysics. All schools of Mahāyāna philosophy with a monistic bent have a problem: if all is in reality from the beginning some X in which X is axiologically either neutral (beyond axiology, as *śūnyatā* or *ālayavijnāna*) or good (as Buddha nature or Tathāgata-garbha), where does the illusion of axiological contrasts or evils come from? We are often simply told that the undefiled undetermined nature, being empty, is capable of assuming any shape, without being fixed and defiled by that form. Thus when it encounters "bad" conditions, or conditions of ignorance that assume a non-monistic view of the world, it goes along, and yet remains uncontaminated. It is always whole in spite of this temporary shape. It is simply because of its unfixedness, its emptiness, that it is capable of assuming these various forms, and thus they are its expression. It "follows conditions." (It is malleable, in other words.) But where do these conditions come from? As long as this ontology is construed in any sense as a cosmological theory of how the world came to be and came to be as it is, it

is hopelessly self-contradictory. It cannot account for the existence of these negative conditions that temporarily create the illusion of plurality, axiological differences, and evil.

Tiantai "opens up" this provisional theory and reveals its ultimacy. The same expression continues to be used, but it is given a new sense. Zhanran writes:

> What sentient beings possess in principle is brought to completion by the Buddhas. Whether brought to completion or merely possessed in principle, the nature is always equal. This is to say, all mental phenomena are entailed in each mental phenomenon, all matter is entailed in each bit of matter, all matter is entailed in each mentation, all mentations are entailed in each bit of matter, all moments are present in each bit of matter, and the same is true for all matter in each moment. All dharmas, all matter, all moments, all bodies—their entities are there in all clarity and lacking in self-nature. *What has no self-nature originally changes along with things* (*wuxing benlai sui wu bian* 無性本來隨物變), and thus even in their mutual penetration they are phenomenally always separate. Thus my body and mind, each moment and each bit of matter, pervade the universe, and the same is true of all Buddhas and sentient beings. Each self and each environment is forever the same in its inner entity, but this is no obstruction to the differences of mind, Buddha, and sentient beings.[65]

The italicized phrase reveals the problem: since there is no self-nature, there is a following along with things. What things? Where do they come from? Are they somehow "outside" the nature of self-nature that is supposed to encompass all things? This is the same problem we encounter in mulling over Zhanran's famous adaptation from Huayan thought, namely, the phrase "unchanging but following conditions, following conditions but unchanging" as a description of the Absolute Nature as mind (or any other particular quiddity) and of the mind as the Absolute Nature, respectively. But if there is nothing outside the Absolute, what are these "conditions" that it follows? Zhanran gives the definitive Tiantai answer to this eternal question in the *Jin'gangpi*. There he tells us that when he says "The Buddha-nature follows along with conditions," he means specifically the Dharmakāya Buddha nature, that is, the Buddha-nature as Cause Proper.[66] This is one of three Buddha-natures and corresponds to pure inert potentiality or mere presence, as opposed to the two others, which correspond to cognition and practico-inert conditioning. What this means is deluded thought and action, as well as enlightened wisdom and liberation, which came to realize the Cause Proper. These three are related as the Three Truths are related;

indeed they are alternative names for the Three Truths. Any of the three bodies is all of the three bodies, and all things are reducible to each. The same goes for the three Buddha-natures and the Three Tracks. So it is the Mean, the unity as contrast of the other two, which serves as their shared identity, and also brings about their all-pervasiveness and inherent entailment of all other quiddities, that follows conditions. What conditions? The only possible answer is the other two Buddha-natures, the Revealing and Conditioning causes. The Buddha-nature as Cause Proper is the Absolute following conditions, whereas the Revealing and Conditioning causes are the Absolute as the conditions that it follows.[67] These three have the neither-same-nor-different structure of the Three Truths. That is, the thought and action of sentient beings are the conditions. These are neither identical to nor different from the Cause Proper, on the Three Truths model. So these conditions it follows are active/deluded formations which can be read both as expressions of itself, as identical to itself, and as othernesses that confront it. When awakening occurs, in other words, one sees that the conditions which have been distorting the truth are (also aspects of) the truth; that the contingencies pushing the Absolute around and forcing it into these ungainly forms were always already identical to the Absolute itself. The self-realization of the Absolute, that is, entails the realization that the external forms which it had been allowing to determine it are not external and the reclaiming of these as aspects of itself. It retrospectively knows itself as (sees that it has always been readable as)[68] positing its own obstacles and distortions as a means to fully realize itself.

Clearly, this is not intended as a cosmological theory about the origin of things. This is suggested also in the use of the term *benlai*, "originally," in the passage quoted above. In fact, cosmologically, as Zhili was to make most explicit, there has never been a time when the pure essence was undefiled. It is not the case that there was first this pure thing, which then encountered things and became confused, or inexplicably started to go awry and depart from its original purity for some reason. A Chan master once asked Zhili about the expression "Suddenly there was unawareness, mistaking the correct principle and producing primal ignorance." The Chan master quite reasonably posed the questions: "But where does this unawareness come from? What does it consist of? What is it made of? For what reason does it suddenly appear?" Zhili replied:

The source, which is the deep nature of the Tathāgata-garbha, is neither true nor deluded. In following conditions, this nature is either true or deluded [conscious-

ness]. Thus the *Buddhatā-śāstra* says, "The true alone produces nothing, nor can the deluded alone complete anything. Only when true and deluded combine is there activity." Thus we say in the teaching that the true has the meaning of following conditions while remaining unchanged, whereas the deluded has the ability to bring specific events into being while remaining empty in its essence. Truly, this is because the numinous source abides nowhere, so that it gives rise [to various entities] by following along with delusion. Once [what has been in any case only] provisional [original true] enlightenment is thus confused, [the deluded world of sentient beings as we know it] obliviously arises. But this phrase "delusion arises" is misleading, and you should be clear about its true meaning. When we talk about things like "the perfect, bright, originally enlightened nature of all sentient beings," this is to be understood as directly referring to the beginningless ignorance of all sentient beings qua the dharma-nature, since the dharma-nature and ignorance are one in essence. Thus if we say "suddenly there is a moment of unawareness producing primal ignorance," this is said with reference to praxis (*xiu* 修), speaking of arisal in contrast to the unchanging nature (*xing* 性), such that from the originally enlightened essence there comes unenlightenment. If we do not speak in this way, there is no way to manifest the matter to people who are involved in cultivation. This is the way to return to the root and come back to the source. For this reason the sūtras and śāstras tend to say, "Delusion arises from the originally true." But in reality [i.e., on the literal, surface level] all sentient beings, from the beginningless past to the present, have only possessed delusion and unenlightenment and nothing besides. Thus the *Awakening of Faith* says, "All sentient beings are not designated as enlightened because from the beginning because they have never departed from [deluded] thoughts. This is called beginningless ignorance." You ask why the unenlightenment arises. If you have understood the above, you will not need to ask thus. . . . The delusion of sentient beings has been there from the beginningless past; it has always been there.[69]

The point here is that in the literal sense, there was never any original time when a godlike pure enlightenment alone existed. Instead, in realistic terms, there has only been unenlightened sentient beings from the very beginning. As we saw already in Zhanran, the remote past is to be imagined not as a perfection from which we have fallen into delusion, but as nothing but delusion and ignorance.[70] Terms like "original enlightenment" are used for two reasons. One is simply with respect to practice, in which the notion of the arisal of a moment of inattention against a phenomenological background of an original nature that is consistent with enlightenment serves as an effective practical upāya. The other reason is more crucial: this very delusion is what is meant by the original enlightenment, according to Tiantai

value-paradoxical principles, founded on the Three Truths. That is, it is precisely this beginningless delusion that is being referred to by the term "original enlightenment." We have already touched on some of the reasons for this claim—it has to do with how this delusion looks from the position of enlightenment, which sees it as its own antecedent and indeed sees itself not as something other to or opposed to the delusion but as its true expression. But on the surface level, there has been only delusion since the beginningless beginning of time.

This is precisely the import of Zhanran's claim, quoted in the preceding chapter in the context of his polemic against early Chan notions of the Buddha-nature, that afflictions, karma, and ignorance are all that has ever literally existed, and these are precisely the originally present Threefold Buddha-nature. In their inexplicit, unenlightened form, however, they can also be regarded as fused together into the Cause Proper, that is, unmanifest enlightenment concealed and distorted by afflictions and karma. It is this that "follows the conditions" of the Revealing and Conditioning causes. These two causes, in their entirety, can be referred to either as afflictions and karma or as wisdom and liberation. In either case, they are the same totality of all mentations and actions of all ten realms, both deluded and enlightened. Because these ten realms are constitutively mutually regarding and absorbing, expressing themselves as each other, both predications (enlightened and deluded) apply to the whole field. The intersubjective premise makes it intelligible to say that the Cause Proper follows the conditions established by the Revealing and Conditioning causes, which are nothing but itself. In any configuration, the malleable mere-potentiality—the raw material determined by some particular way of regarding it—is the Cause Proper. Whatever cognitions and activities function to give it shape are the other two causes, the subjective position viewing and determining the other as something other than itself but simultaneously determining it as an aspect or expression of itself. The contents of both sides of the equation are the same, since the Mean (the Cause Proper) is nothing but Emptiness and Provisional Positing (the Revealing and Conditioning causes) in their relation of omnicentric mutual entailment. Hence, what is merely the Cause Proper plus covering and obscuration in the eyes of delusion is, in the eyes of enlightenment, the functioning of all three causes. But neither of these can be the simple fact of the matter.

Both views of the latter two causes, as enlightenment-as-delusion (afflictions and karma) and as delusion-as-enlightenment (wisdom and liberation),

have to be operative constantly, for the specification "following conditions and yet unchanging, unchanging yet following conditions" to make sense. If they were not delusion, there would be no otherness to the conditions and hence no following. If they were not enlightenment and thus identical to that which follows the conditions, there would be no true unchangingness to these various configurations. In particular, they must be operating in the simultaneous interpenetration characteristic of the *gan/ying*, provisional/ultimate, set-up/punch-line structure; their unity is *stricto sensu* an aspect of their absolute contrast and irreducibility to either side, which is the same as their full reversibility to either side. This is the Tiantai reading of "neither same nor different." The intersubjective relation itself is thus central to the doctrine of inherent entailment, the unchangingness of what follows conditions. Here we have genuine sameness-and-difference, since both sides of the dialogue are replete in each side, precisely in their difference to one another. It is only for this reason that what follows conditions remains the same, that whatever arises from the nature is "inherently entailed" by the nature rather than merely adventitiously arising out of it (and hence changing it). This intersubjective split constitutively determines every moment of experience.

The importance of this intersubjective factor in the Tiantai metaphysics cannot be overstressed. It is here that we must look for a solution to the vexing problem of the origins of the particular determinacies of the experienced world, if each them inherently includes all possible quiddities. The Three Truths can be paraphrased as (1) X always appears as something else (Provisional Positing); (2) X always appears *as something else* (Emptiness); and (3) X *always appears* as something else (the Mean). But the question remains, where does Xness per se, that which is appearing as something else, come from? If, say, love can be expressed in any possible form and the same goes for hate, why is it love or hate that is designated as expressed at any given time? The Tiantai answer, as hinted already, is that the starting point of the inquiry must be deluded sentient beings (or even the most deluded of sentient beings, namely, insentient beings), whose behavior is a concretization of the baseless inferences and assumptions that form the practical maxims of their beings, founded on the narrowness of their experience and needs. In real time, what comes first is some form of existence that knows nothing about the Three Truths. Insentient objects, for example, are *ipso facto* a form of existence ignorant of the Three Truths. Once one understands the Three Truths, all the determinacies that emerge from this starting point are subsequently seen to be inherent in the Truth only because the

delusion that is their foundation is included in or, more strictly, seen to be identical with the Truth. This ineradicable copresence of delusion and enlightenment is guaranteed by the intersubjective premise. This eliminates the contradiction of a pure, undefiled essence somehow encountering some mysteriously appearing "things" or "conditions" that it follows in order to become apparently defiled. The things and conditions, the karmic tragedy, are there was from the beginning. There is no question of where they came from or how they appeared out of the original purity. Indeed, the concept of "source" or "origin" is in Tiantai terms a merely provisional idea; ultimately, any dharma can equally be designated as the source of all others. "Original purity" is just a deliberately paradoxical way of describing these conditions and things and karma, a description with a particular soteriological import. This paradoxical identification of enlightenment and delusion saves Buddhist metaphysics from a problem that seems to me otherwise insurmountable without some sort of backdoor dualism.[71]

We now have a picture of the basic metaphysical, epistemological, and soteriological principles on which the Tiantai theory of value paradox is based. In introducing the notion of omnicentric holism, I mentioned some commonsense objections to omnicentrism, for example, that a part is just a part, that opposites are mutually exclusive, that any notion of identity which allows opposites to be identical or a dung beetle to be identical to the Buddha is nothing but a misuse of the term "identity." I noted that an omnicentrist would view such objections as consequences of conceptualizing entities as atomistic and separable units whose connections are merely extrinsic, the notion that an object's identity is constituted by both external and internal relations. Omnicentric holism implies that these arguments, which appear to be appeals to universally accessible and admitted facts of daily experience, are in reality merely interpretations of experience, one-sided focusings rooted in atomistic or unicentric premises. The Tiantai labels for such one-sided focusing are delusion, attachment, affliction—but in the Tiantai system even these delusions are upāyas and in the end identical to enlightenment. This chapter has presented a few of the possible answers to these commonsense objections, and the next chapter touches on several more. The notion of intersubjectivity explicated above is another highly counter-intuitive claim. Our commonsense notion seems to be that my self is my own, and that my beliefs, positions, memories, and identity are something to

which I have unique and privileged access. If each of us is from the beginning everyone else, why do I have my private world of thoughts and memories that is inaccessible to you? Why do I have one passionately held set of beliefs, while you take the opposite stance?

We can imagine what the Tiantai responses to these queries might be. A proponent of all-pervasive intersubjectivity might urge that no element of one's own memories—no word, image, place, person, or even any impulse or valuation or idea—belongs to oneself alone; all of them came from a real interaction, were shared realities of which one's "internal world" is a one-sided trace. Identifying some part of that shared reality as your own is a primal instance of one-sidedness, of arbitrarily establishing borders within what is intrinsically an unbordered totality of relations and experiences. Other aspects of that totality continue to live and develop in other causal chains, in other minds, which thus form a whole with one's own inner stream of consciousness. These internal streams of consciousness, in other words, are not self-sufficient and self-transparent monads. Each has an underbelly that it cannot see, an "unconscious," but this unconscious is not deep within one's mind; rather, it is out there, in the world, in the symbolic network of the community and the other minds twanging along in it. The changes in one's beliefs and identifications over time also indicate the extent to which subjectivity is conditional, provisional, slapped together to meet certain immediate needs. The "I" feeling that went with, say, the advocacy of certain firmly held ideas in one's youth can be transferred to the advocacy of precisely the opposite ideas. To this we may add the profound effect society seems to have on determining the contents and direction of human will and cognition, as well as the psychoanalytic notion of the self as itself a sort of Rube Goldberg contraption thrown together from bits and pieces of introjected loved ones. Indeed, in light of the conclusion in the preceding chapter that the doctrine of inherent inclusion is the most skeptical possible stance and avoids the dogmatic assertion of the exclusive truth of both the internal-relations-only and the external-relations-only view of identity while not adopting a commonsense "some internal, some external" view except in the domain of provisional positing, the burden of proof lies, rather, with the advocates of the commonsense view of the "simple location" of human identity, which makes a much more specialized and metaphysically questionable claim and requires further proof. Perhaps long familiarity with this claim makes us insensitive to its strangeness. In fact, this belief in atomistic identities is probably an

irrational holdover of the long discredited concept of the independent human soul, which is arguably not coherent without a belief in a supernatural intrusion into nature.

But even these one-sided errors are, in the Tiantai view, provisional posits that are also salvific upāyas serving soteriological purposes. In this connection, it is well to recall the performative nature of the Tiantai view of truth, indeed of any omnicentric epistemology. The thought of buddhahood is the thought of a vantage point from which all views appear to be false and all appear to be true. All views are seen to be provisional posits; they are false if taken literally as the only true perspective, but all are true if taken as heuristics leading to the realization of the Three Truths, that is, of the fact that every possible view includes all others, and each is a valid center. To have this thought is to apply this same criterion as well to this thought itself. From this perspective, this perspective is no truer or falser than any other perspective. It must regard even itself as necessarily both true and false and as inherently including every other possible view. Moreover, it is not committed to denying the equal truth of all other positions. It freely admits that any X can be assumed as the center, and that whatever X is chosen will be found to apply everywhere. This, it holds, is true of both itself and its direct negation—say, a purely atomistic, simple location view of human identity and complete value dichotomy. Hence, for those who adopt this perspective, no possible consideration can prove that it is false—for it is already both false and true, and the opposing position is equally true, although also equally false. Its whole point is that its falsehood does not obstruct its truth.

These considerations can perhaps help us understand the implications of the insistence, particularly in Zhili's teaching, on the eternal pervasiveness of intersubjective *ganying*. The initial situation is ignorance, delusion—that is, *gan*, stimulus. The response then reinterprets this original delusion as a precondition for itself, reads its delusion as compassion, and sees as merely provisional the temporal gap between the initial stimulus and itself, the subsequent response. But in "real-time," on the provisional, literal level, the stimulus is the precondition of the response. Enlightenment can function *only* in conjunction with delusion, as its response and complement. The distant future, the mythical day when all have achieved Buddhahood, is then to be envisioned, not as a state in which delusion has ceased to exist but as one in which every act of delusion is explicitly connected to its complementary enlightened response. This is certainly consistent with Zhiyi's original notion of uncompromising mutual inclusion, and one of his "hard sayings" in

the *Mohezhiguan* puts this almost explicitly: "If the defect [evil] does not arise, there is no way to practice contemplation. . . . If the defect eternally arises, this contemplation eternally arises with it."[72] Indeed, a hard saying from the *Fahuaxuanyi* is perhaps even more uncompromising: "The contemplation [performed by prajñā-wisdom] is fundamentally the contemplation of delusion; without delusion there can thus be no contemplation."[73] Enlightenment is not a state in which evil has ceased to arrive, but one in which something else, something that is in itself also a kind of delusion (for "enlightenment" is itself a one-sided determination, if taken literally) arises as well—or, more strictly, a state in which what has formerly been read one-sidedly *as* delusion comes to be read one-sidedly *as* something else as well. Hence the intersubjective premise provides a foundation for the distinctive Shanjia doctrine of the eternal simultaneity of good and evil, even as the subjective states of delusion and enlightenment, as we will examine in more detail in the next two chapters, bringing us back to the question of value paradox.

SIX

Value and Anti-value in Tiantai Thought

The basic principles of Tiantai philosophy—the Three Truths, the mutual inherence of provisional and ultimate truth, omnicentric holism and intersubjectivity—provide important premises for Tiantai value theory, specifically the theory of value paradox. In this chapter, I first develop the value implications of these concepts and then discuss the texts in which Zhiyi and Zhanran explicitly treat the question of evil (Part I). Then, I consider the value theory in Zhili's version of the Tiantai tradition (Part II). This will prepare us to attempt to apply this theory in a summary way to some concrete questions (in the Conclusion).

PART I: GOOD AND EVIL IN ZHIYI AND ZHANRAN

Value paradox can be derived from the basic Buddhist value of "non-attachment." This ultimate value necessarily involves a value paradox since attachment to "non-attachment," as any direct and non-paradoxical assertion of its value would entail, turns out to be an anti-value. The same can be said of attachment to the idea expressed in the previous sentence, and so on ad infinitum. As the following discussion shows, the Tiantai tradition is very faithful to this early Buddhist notion, with non-attachment taking the form of an intricate dialectic for overcoming all subtle forms of bias, a dialectic embodied in the Three Truths. This freedom from bias remains the ultimate value for Tiantai, but several other distinctive Tiantai notions combine to develop and

intensify the value paradoxes inherent in this ultimate value. Value paradox can also be derived (1) from the notion of upāya, (2) from the two-tiered structure of "mind-contemplation," (3) from the inherence of the Three Thousand quiddities in each moment of experience, and (4) from the concept of intersubjectivity. We will touch on each of these sources of value paradox in the discussion to follow.

Value-Paradoxical Consequences of Tiantai Upāya Theory

The notion of upāya naturally entails the other three aspects listed in the preceding paragraph. As noted above, according to the Tiantai tradition, provisional and ultimate truth are equal in value and ultimately identical, on the model of the relation between Provisional Positing and Emptiness in the structure of the Three Truths. Provisional truth, moreover, is the antecedent, the premise, and indeed the cause of ultimate truth, a structure akin to that of the set-up and punch line of a joke. Let us now look in more detail at the specifics of this arrangement, as it impacts on the question of value paradox.

In Tiantai, sentient beings are referred to as the "cause" and buddhahood as the "result" or fruit. The nine realms of purgatory, hungry ghosts, animals, Asuras, humans, gods, Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas, and bodhisattvas are the cause of the tenth realm, buddhahood. These nine realms are, in contrast to the Buddha-realm, evil. Evil, then, is the cause of good. Moreover, these nine realms are not other than the tenth realm itself. The cause is identical to the effect, as the provisional is identical to the ultimate, as the Truth of Provisional Positing is identical to the Truth of Emptiness, and to the Mean. The nine realms are the operation of the Buddha-nature as Conditioning Cause (*yuanyin* 緣因) and as Revealing Cause (*liaoyin* 了因), and the tenth is the Buddha-nature as Cause Proper, the objective fact to be realized (*zhengyin* 正因), which turns out to be nothing but the absoluteness (or, since this implies not being relative to any particular standpoint, objectivity) and non-duality of the Conditioning and Revealing causes. These three types of Buddha-nature qua cause are identical to each other, as are all other Tiantai triads, on the model of the Three Truths. Indeed, these three type of Buddha-nature are just another name for the Three Truths as predicated of the Three Thousand good and evil existents, that is, all the particular characteristics of all the realms from purgatory to buddhahood. As Zhanran says, "The Three Thousand are Emptiness: this is the [Buddha-nature as] Revealing Cause. The Three Thousand are Provisional Posits: this is the Conditioning Cause. The

Three Thousand are the Mean: this is the Proper/Absolute Cause."[1] Hence, as Zhanran says, in a passage summarized earlier:

The cause, that is, the [deluded] minds of sentient beings, inherently includes the Three Tracks, and when this cause produces its result, it is called the Three Nirvāṇas. Cause and effect are no different, the principle being the same from beginning to end. If so, [one might ask,] since all the virtues [of nirvāṇa] are already inherently included in the cause, why don't we just dwell in the cause? It is just that one is confused about this cause itself, and each [being at the position of cause] considers it real in and of itself [i.e., in isolation from the effect]. When you realize the real nature of this confusion, then indeed it is only necessary to dwell in this cause. After long investigation of this cause, the [true nature of] the cause finally becomes manifest, and this is precisely what we call the result.[2]

The result, buddhahood, is just the cause itself, when its true nature has become manifest. There is no movement from one thing to another or replacement of one thing by another involved in the development from cause to effect, from evil to good. Its nature is simply "the Three Thousand inherently included"; this evil is not independent and real in and of itself, but dependent on and inherently included in and including its effect (the good, buddhahood), and vice versa. Moreover, its provocation of this consideration is precisely the means by which it acts as cause of the good, which is nothing but the understanding that it is so—in other words, buddhahood. That is, the overcoming of evil is also included in the essence of evil, and this is precisely what makes it good. As Zhiyi said:

Each moment of the experience of any ordinary being inherently includes all ten realms, and thus they all include the various natures and appearances of evil karma. But precisely this evil nature and appearance are [for this very reason] the nature and appearance of good. Good comes from evil; without evil there can be no good. The overturning of evils is precisely the accomplishment of good. It is like the nature of fire [flammability] inside a piece of bamboo—it is not quite fire itself; thus it dwells there without burning. But when it encounters the right conditions, this fire appears as phenomenon and can incinerate objects. Evil has within it, in the same way, the nature of good, without yet having to be the phenomenon of goodness; when it encounters the right conditions, the phenomenal good appears, which can overturn the evil. There is fire within the bamboo, but when the fire appears, it destroys the bamboo; there is good within evil, and when this good is manifested, it destroys the evil. Thus I say, precisely the appearance and nature of evil are the appearance and nature of good.[3]

Evil is both cause of good and destroyed by the good. Evil has within it the potential to overcome itself, and this destruction of itself is not a calamity

coming from without, but the full expression of its own nature. Moreover, when the bamboo is destroyed, the fire that destroyed it is also destroyed. When evil destroys itself by temporarily producing good, the outcome is not the Good but an overcoming of both good and evil.

The notion that evil can give rise to good and finally to the overcoming of both good and evil is codified in Tiantai in the term "antagonistic seeds" (*diduizhong* 敵對種), the idea that cause and effect may be of opposite value, that evil may cause good. It is the basis of the notion of sentient beings as the evil cause of the Buddha's good, which is rooted in the Tiantai notion of upāya, which in turn is rooted in the structural relation among the Three Truths. The term "antagonistic seeds" comes from Zhanran's subcommentary to Zhiyi's commentary on the *Lotus Sūtra*. Zhiyi's text reads:

The three paths [karma, afflictions, and ignorance] are the seeds of the three virtues [liberation, wisdom, and Dharmakāya]. The *Vimalikīrti-nirdeśa sūtra* says, "All defilements are the seeds of the Thus-come." This makes it clear that the path of defilements has *prajñā*-wisdom in it. It also says, "The five unforgivable sins all create the mark of liberation." That is, from the non-good comes the good dharma of liberation. "All sentient beings are the mark of nirvāṇa and cannot be made any further quiescent than they already are." That is, saṁsāra is the Dharmakāya. This is the concept of contrary seeds (*xiangdui zhong* 相對種). As for seeds of the same type [as their fruits], "every lowering or raising of the head" [in devotional practices] is a seed of liberation; all forms of worldly knowledge and the Three Vehicles are seeds of *prajña*, and the fact that all sentient beings will become Buddhas is the seed of the Dharmakāya.[4]

Zhanran develops this idea of "contrasting seeds," introducing the term "antagonistic seeds":

There are two meanings to the term "seed": first, seeds in the antagonistic sense, as when we say the three [evil] paths are the seeds of the three virtues; and second, the homogenous sense, as when we say that the Conditioning and Revealing causes are the seeds of wisdom and liberation, or that the objective property of Dharmakāya is the seed of its appearance in practice. These are both called seeds because of their ability to produce, to give birth [to their effects]. [Actually, the two are the same; it's just that] if we are taking the emptiness of each one as seed, we call it homogenous, and if we take the clinging to them as the seed, we call it antagonistic. . . . In the Integrated Teaching, the seeds are spoken of as both homogenous and antagonistic, whereas the Separate Teaching knows nothing of antagonistic seeds.[5]

This emphasis on the concept of seeds, with its stress on the notion of cause and effect as different moments in time, seems a far cry from the identity of good and evil. At most, it claims that evil causes good. The same implica-

tion can be discerned in the other metaphorical figures common in Zhiyi's discussions of value and anti-value, for example, H_2O in the form of water and ice or the mind in the state of dreaming or waking.[6] In these metaphors, we have at best one substance that assumes two varying forms without changing its essential nature, but does undergo an actual change of state over time. But what makes the stronger claim necessary is the further Tiantai concept of upāya, discussed above, by which all positions are provisional, all are ultimate, all are both, all are neither. This ensures, first, since all is provisional, that this distinction between the stages, and the implied transformation from one thing to another, is itself merely provisional. As Zhiyi says:

> Ignorance is identical to the dharma-nature; the dharma-nature is identical to ignorance. Ignorance is neither quiescent nor non-quiescent, but we call ignorance the non-quiescent. The dharma-nature is also neither quiescent nor non-quiescent, but we call it quiescent. That is, in comparison to the putative non-quiescence of ignorance, the dharma-nature is called quiescence. . . . Likewise, ignorance is neither insight nor non-insight, but we call it non-insight. The dharma-nature is also neither insight nor non-insight, but we call it insight.[7]

In other words, the dualistic designation of delusion and enlightenment, of good and evil, is merely relative and provisional, and indeed is itself a category belonging to the side of delusion, which is to say, in a Tiantai context, to the Provisionally Posited and to upāya. We find later in the same work:

> Q: Since ignorance is identical to the dharma-nature, and the dharma-nature is identical to ignorance, can we say that when ignorance is destroyed, the dharma-nature is destroyed? Or that when the dharma-nature is revealed, ignorance is revealed?
> A: We certainly can. For in actuality principle has no true or adequate designation; we simply call it "dharma-nature" in contrast to ignorance. When the dharma-nature is revealed, ignorance is transformed into clarity [and thus is also revealed]. When ignorance is destroyed, so there is no more ignorance, then in contrast to what could there be any talk of a "dharma nature"?
> Q: If ignorance is identical to the dharma-nature, once ignorance is destroyed, what does [the dharma-nature] have to be identical to?
> A: It is like someone who doesn't know what ice is, and calls water "ice" and ice "water." But these are only designations; are there really any two things that are identical?[8]

In short, good and evil go together, as provisional designations made in relative distinction to one another and vanish together when provisional designations are transcended—just as when the fire destroys the bamboo, both vanish.

The further hint here that the realization of the good in some sense implies the ultimate fulfillment and realization of the evil, in this context implies the discernment, via the Three Contemplations, of the true nature of any evil object (a concept brought to the forefront by Zhili in his doctrine of "the ultimate dung beetle," to be described below) and also the fact that realization of dharma-nature per se simultaneously brings the true nature of ignorance to light. This point is also important in the Tiantai conception of the mastery of upāya that accompanies the attainment of buddhahood; to overcome the provisional teachings is also simultaneously to master them, so that one can utilize them in teaching others. This goes not only for teachings per se but for all physical and spiritual determinations, all of which, from this perspective, are heuristics. Zhanran and Zhili would later make much of this notion that the Three Thousand, including all determinate forms of evil, are not only what is overcome in the attainment of enlightenment, but that the realization and coming to fulfillment of enlightenment is simultaneously the realization and fulfillment of these Three Thousand specific forms.

This is how the Tiantai notion that "all is provisional" overcomes the cause/effect dichotomy between evil and good. Both sides, as opposed, vanish through expression of their own nature, like the bamboo and fire. But in addition, since "all is also ultimate," the doctrine of upāya ensures that the content of the effect is nothing other than the causes that led to it. Both sides are also preserved when the cause-realizing and cause-overcoming effect is produced. The effect is at the same time the cause; the cause is not replaced by the effect, as quotation from Zhanran's suggests. This fits in neatly with our discussion of stimulus and response in the intersubjective context above.[9] The upāyas leading to the ultimate truth are not just a disposable means toward an extrinsic end. Rather, they are related like the Provisional Positing and Emptiness of the Three Truths. That is, they are one and not one, two and not two. To become a Buddha is not to leave all the evil that led up to it behind. A Buddha who is thus cut off from the non-Buddha is the Buddha of "the exclusive Mean," the Separate, not the Integrated, Teaching. Rather, the Buddha retains all partial evils as his or her own transforming and teaching activity, in the eternal double-visioned dialogue between the deluded and the enlightened.

This, of course, involves the value paradox implicit in the Three Thousand inherently included in each moment of experience. For the Three Thousand emphatically includes both evil (the first four realms) and good (the next four), and the transcendence of both (bodhisattvas), and the transcendence of this transcendence (buddhahood).[10] All are included in each, in their specific

nature as value-laden and in conflict with each other. This is omnicentric holism, which brings all degrees of good and evil, and all attitudes thereto, all manners of relating them and transcending them, together in each particular act. All are mutually entailing.

We can now see how the factors of upāya theory, intersubjectivity and holism, affect the value question. The two-tiered structure of contemplation brings these factors together in the practical realm, for the intersubjective relation of an enlightened response applying upāya in order to enlighten a deluded stimulus, in which both are identical to the entire Three Thousand and hence to each other, is duplicated in the relation between contemplation and its object. Zhiyi elucidates the practical moral implications of his position in striking terms. After citing several scriptural examples of adherents of Buddhism who "practiced contemplation and wisdom within evil" and "attained the Way while having wife, children, and official position," figures who were "more merciful the more they murdered" or "kept only the precepts when keeping only to drinking" or "practiced the Brahman way in the midst of lust" or "were in the right while embracing perverted views," he remarks, "If evils were nothing but evil from beginning to end, these people would eternally remain unenlightened. But since the Way resides within evil, they were able to become sages even while practicing all these defects. Thus we know that evil does not obstruct the Way, and moreover, that the Way does not obstruct evil." This is a strong statement of the transmoral nature of the Buddhist truth, it would seem. But Zhiyi specifies his meaning further:

If a person is by nature highly covetous and lustful, with impurities and murkiness flourishing in him, such that the more he tries to control his passions, the more intense they become, then he should just allow them to take their course. Why? Because if these defects do not arise, there will be no way to practice contemplation. It is like fishing; when the fish is strong and the line is weak, it is impossible to pull it in. But if you can get the hook into its mouth and then go along with it far and near, allowing it to go up and down as it pleases, in no time you will pull it in. Practicing contemplation of one's defects is the same way; the defects are like the fish, the contemplation like the hook and bait. If there is no fish, the hook and bait are useless. And as long as there is going to be a fish, the bigger it is the better. If only you can use the hook and bait to follow it without cease, this defect will soon allow itself to be ridden. For delusional transformation of forms [i.e., Provisional Positing], Emptiness, and the dharma-nature [i.e., the Mean] do not obstruct one another. Why? If defects could obstruct the dharma-nature, the dharma-nature would be destroyed. If the dharma-nature could obstruct the defects, these defects should not be able to arise. It should

be known that the defects themselves are the dharma-nature; when the defects arise, it is the dharma-nature arising; when the defects cease, it is the dharma-nature ceasing.[11]

An ultimate value is clearly implied here: contemplation. Practicing meditation (*zhiguan* 止觀, *śamatha-vipaśyanā*) is always good, not doing so is always bad, no matter what the content is that is being viewed—for contemplation always involves the overcoming of biases, of attachments, either to the object or its negation, either as desire to attain or desire to eliminate. This can be viewed as a form of the Middle Way. As Zhiyi says, "You should neither follow along with your ignorance nor fear it [and discard it]; if you follow along with it, you enter into the evil paths, and if you fear and discard it, there is no way to cultivate the true Dharma. Just use the contemplation to contemplate this ignorance; then the ignorance itself is identical to illumination. Use concentration to concentrate [on] the diffusion; then the diffusion is itself quiescent."[12] And again, "Although [these evils] are identical to enlightenment, they cannot be followed along with; if followed along with, they lead one into evil paths. But neither can they be extinguished; if you extinguish them, you become guilty of arrogant false claims of enlightenment[13] [like the Śrāvakas]. To give rise to illumination and liberation without extinguishing ignorance and attachment is called Bodhi, enlightenment, dwelling in neither self-control nor no-self-control. To dwell in no-self-control is to be a fool; to dwell in self-control is to be a Śrāvaka."[14] This is Zhiyi's position on evil in a nutshell. It is really just an extenuation of his critique of bias of any kind. Just the same advice is given with respect to the good, in this case the joy of meditation itself: "The joy of meditation is beautiful and marvelous, such that delight in it is born, one indulges in its flavor, and the sticky impurity thus increases daily. If you call it enlightenment, you become guilty of arrogant false claims of enlightenment; if you reject and discard it, you completely miss the use of upāya."[15] Both getting lost in any object, good or evil, and ignoring or discarding it, are disastrous—the right thing is to watch, to *guan*. Here we see the function of the two-tiered structure of contemplation. Its object may be good or evil, as long as the contemplation is applied to it. And truly, this is the pivot that transforms everything. To be or have evil but at the same time to see it is good.[16] This seeing, for Zhiyi, constitutes "not-dwelling" in the sense intended above. This seeing is to see with the contemplation of the Three Truths, which destroys any dwelling in either Emptiness, Provisional Positing, or the Mean.

To this extent, then, we have a fixed ultimate value: contemplation. But the

special nature of this ultimate value enables it to undermine itself. Part of the experience of meditation is the gathering up into itself of all that led up to it, or even away from it, as part of itself. The upshot of this "non-dwelling" is the attitude toward upāya outlined above. This means seeing that the deluded stimulus—the object of contemplation—is identical to itself, the contemplation, even as the contemplation refutes or destroys it and hence also preserves it. The stimulus was itself an upāya leading to the response, which is also an upāya responding to precisely this need. The contrast and identity of these two sides have been explained above in terms of the set-up and punch line of a joke, and this applies here as well. Hence we fall back on upāya to overcome this last value dichotomy between the opposites of contemplation as absolute value and absence of contemplation as absolute anti-value. The nature of this value, and its inscription in the Tiantai discourse of intersubjective, mutually identical *ganying* upāya related as set-up and punch line, undermines this dichotomy. The simultaneity of the two sides depends on the application of the Three Truths to moments of time, which are also mutually inclusive and all-pervasive, like any other dharma—a point made a bit more explicitly by Zhili than by his predecessors. This, too, undermines the temporal gap that seems to be posited by the rhetoric of "seeds" and eventual accomplishment of buddhahood in the future; the two sides are eternally already gazing at each other and indeed revealed to be one and the same thing, each one possessing both sides.

For example, when discussing "perverted views" at near the end of the *Mohezhiguan*, Zhiyi, after extensively refuting the views of non-Buddhists and Buddhists alike, indeed, every possible cognitive view of how things are, has this to say:

Before you have seen the errors and problems of all these views, you are frightened of them and anxiously wish to put an end to them. But now that we have seen the manner in which they are all perverted, we must be careful not to put any final end to them. Instead, we must allow them to grow to completion, so they can act as forces assisting the Way; in this way they will surely bring immense benefits. For example, when you have a parasitic worm in your stomach, it is best to first nourish it and make it grow large and white; only then will you be able to purge it with a purgative medicine. Why is this so? Because the people of the world are as stubborn as oxen and horses, and if you simply present them with the pure thunder and lightning of the sound of the Dharma, laying before them the exquisite embroidered brocade, it will be of no use to their hearing and sight, and they will remain embroiled in the five desires as if bewitched. But if they give rise to various perverted views, these will drive out the cruder forms of defilement [by means of these larger, more complex forms]—this is

like raising the parasite until it is large and white. Moreover, the wisdom of the perverted views comes close to the correct contemplation, and on hearing the Dharma they will then be easier to enlighten, as when the purgative is taken. For this reason, it is necessary to nourish the perverted views, and train the mind in them as a pioneer clearing the path [for the Truth]. The Two Vehicles practice the Way only after eliminating false views, but the true Mahāyāna practices the Way without altering the false views in the least. Matching the thieves, destroying the bandits, this is the way the medals of merit are earned. This is nourishing perverted views to serve as one's attendants. . . . Although views are obstacles, the aid they give to the Way is also very great. . . . Once you know that they are indeed false views and confusion, you [possess them] without being swept away in the distinctions they make. Thus the non-Buddhist philosophers first developed their own perverted theories, and then once they heard the Buddha's teachings, they understood immediately, like a fast horse that needs to see only the shadow of the whip. If they had had no false views, even ten thousand axes could not have cut off their delusions.[17]

The topic here is false views—that is, wrong ways of contemplating or the absence of the Three Truths contemplation altogether. Here we see how even the apparently ultimate value dichotomy, "Three Truths contemplation (of any object or mental event, good or evil) is good; the lack thereof (attachment to or views about any object or mental event, good or evil) is bad," is undermined by the Tiantai notion of upāya. False views turn out to be an aid in attaining enlightenment, and an enlightened being retains the ability to enter into these forms of delusion, to engage in dialogue with sentient beings, even to teach them false and deluded views, as aids to further enlightenment. In the course of these dialogues, the enlightened being is both enlightened and deluded, his self is self/other, and the same goes for the deluded listener. When enlightenment does arise out of false views, it entails seeing itself as identical to them, as the punch line reveals that even the set-up was humorous, even though, and indeed because, it was serious. And there as here, this is accomplished by "allowing it to grow to completion"; the set-up becomes funny only when it is attended to carefully for its own sake, when it takes one in, when it is allowed to develop its ridiculous seriousness fully. Similarly, the false views must be allowed to grow to completion, which is itself their overcoming as false views. In this way, even this delusion is itself eternally enlightenment. There is an ambiguity involved in purgation; are these false views eventually washed away? We have already adduced many reasons why this need not be the implication. Below we will see that Zhili's answer is that the "purgation of the false views" means precisely "false views grown to completion."

Some might object that false views, if known to be false, are no longer false views—since one no longer holds a false belief in that case, it cannot be argued that a false belief is given a positive value here. Against this objection, I would point to depth psychology, which allows us to conceive what it would mean to know that a belief is false and nonetheless to hold that belief. Such semi-autonomous belief systems, capable of acting and creating effects in the real world, are known to subsist within the personality and are often at variance with the beliefs held by the dominant or consciously accepted personality. The congruence of this view with the intersubjective resonances of the notion of the Three Thousand inherently present in each moment of experience has already been discussed in the preceding chapter. Thus, if I find I have an obsessive compulsion to wash my hands 300 times a day in the belief that this act has the power to purify me of a guilt I believe pertains to me, I can contemplate this belief, know it is false, and yet allow it to lead to the actions that it suggests. Zhiyi's recommendation would seem to be neither to accept the belief in one's own guilt and purification wrapped up in this act (not to regard it as true that one is guilty and that one can thus purify oneself) nor to attempt immediately to put an end to the act, the feeling of guilt, or the belief in guilt, as autonomous parts of one's personality. Rather, one should go ahead and wash one's hands, and watch and contemplate the act, the feeling, the guilt, applying the contemplations of the Three Truths and regarding these false views as transformed bodhisattvas, temporarily assuming this ridiculous form as a means of educating and enlightening one—or rather, more strictly, each other. This entails the contemplation of their coming into being and ceasing, their impermanence, their Emptiness, their Provisional Positing, and their identity with the Mean and thereby their inherent inclusion of all other dharmas, including their opposite number, their cure. It also entails the intersubjective *ganying* structure and the identity of both sides. Indeed, this can be seen easily here if we consider the two sides as consisting in simply the false view and the same false view known as false. The latter is not something added to the former, but rather the former itself, fully realized and made fully explicit.

Indeed, we can say that the real source of Zhiyi's optimism about the ability of falsehoods to contain their own overcoming, for "the poison to include the medicine" as he puts it, is to be traced to the location of the ultimate value in non-attachment, or, in the Tiantai redaction, in *non-bias*. If non-bias is the good and bias is the bad, then all bads are counteracted by other bads. One-sided views come in pairs and thus cure each other. Evils are cured by evils. Thus a deluded attachment to eternity is cured by a deluded attachment to

annihilation. A deluded attachment to neither eternity nor annihilation is cured by a deluded attachment to both eternity and annihilation. A deluded attachment to only both is cured by the deluded attachment to not only both—at which point the dialectic has come full circle to the Integrated Teaching, where it returns to a restored but transformed eternity, annihilation, and so on, such that these exact same determinations, formerly posited as such by delusion, now view that very delusion as an upāya that is identical to this contemplation, its result, and hence sees and deploys those determinate positions as forms of compassion. A deluded belief in one's guilt is cured by a deluded belief in one's innocence, and vice versa. Belief in both is cured by belief in neither, until the point of the non-exclusive Mean is reached, which reinstates these delusions as forms of compassionate enlightenment. The same process can be applied to any such pair. This is the essence of Tiantai thinking, and the basis of its attention to and emphasis on value paradox.[18]

The Moral Benefits of Inherent Evil and Zhiyi's Critique of Antinomianism

This concern with overcoming bias is behind the vast range of Zhiyi's practical pronouncements about evil. On the one hand, he is not the least shy about eulogizing the great virtues and marvels of evil and its unequivocal identity with enlightenment.[19] With this goes the famous doctrine of the inherent inclusion of evil in buddhahood. On the other hand, he frequently made trenchant criticisms of the antinomian teachings of some of his contemporaries in the Buddhist world. Zhiyi has nothing good to say about evil in itself, or for that matter about good in itself, or, indeed, about anything in itself—whatever is posited must be seen not only to be empty (hence "destroyed") but also to be provisionally posited (hence "preserved"—as something that leads beyond itself). Let us take a closer look at both of these apparently opposing views.

The Tiantai tradition is known for its notion of the inherent inclusion of evil in the Buddha-nature and in the nature of all things. This follows strictly from the mutual inclusion of all things in each other and the assumption that evil has some form of "being."[20] Tiantai writers not only consider this to be true but also hold that this belief has moral benefits and, indeed, that it is essential to moral praxis and enlightenment. In other words, to believe that the Buddha inherently includes evil and that evil is never to be eliminated in the slightest degree, that it is built into the nature of things and even of enlightenment, is a *sine qua non* of progress toward the ultimate good. As Zhiyi says:

If phenomena and principle are considered different, ignorance and confusion will be extreme. And why? It is as if a father and son were to mistake each other for strangers; their anger and violence toward one another would then be great. . . . But if we say afflictions are identical to the dharma-nature, then phenomena and principle are identical, and the suffering and causes of suffering become light. Even if two unrelated strangers regard each other as father and son, their anger and violence toward one another is lessened.[21]

Notice here the implications, first, that the doctrine of the identity of good and evil somehow serves the good, that to regard suffering and enlightenment as one lessens suffering, and second, that this suffering is a sort of violence or friction between the realm of principle and that of phenomena, or between enlightenment and suffering, or between good and evil. This is surely highly counterintuitive. Why exactly does Zhiyi believe his concept of evil as inherent in the nature of things, ineradicable in them, and identical to buddhahood somehow makes a positive moral impact of this kind? In short, what are the salutary moral effects of the notion of inherent evil?

The most obvious and direct way to answer these questions is to consider again the ultimate value of non-attachment, non-desire, and non-bias. Assuming the presence of some form of experience, one may have either a desire to retain and prolong it (greed), a desire to have it disappear (hatred), or a mistaken belief about its nature (ignorance)—these are the so-called Three Poisons. Now considering this experience to be empty is one step toward eliminating greed—but this in itself constitutes a form of hatred and the delusion that one has thereby eliminated the offending presence. The Tiantai concept of inherent inclusion is tantamount to the assertion that this feeling of pain, exactly as it is, is both ungraspable and inescapable. To the extent that it is here at all, it is also, to exactly that same extent, present everywhere in the universe and at all times. It cannot be eliminated or escaped. On the other hand, it is present everywhere only to the extent that it is present here, that is, present as an emptiness, as a hollow, insubstantial provisional positing. It can be neither attained nor relinquished. It is present everywhere but as (to borrow a little Hegelese) a sublated moment (i.e., as a superseded element, which is present but not the dominant determining element of the whole to which it belongs). To conceive it correctly is to recognize that even in its apparent presence here, it is no different from its virtual presence in situations in which it is not obvious. It is always appearing *as* something else, even in its most apparently direct form, and this "as-ness" has no non-arbitrary limits. To the exact extent that it is appearing here as this, it is also appearing everywhere else

as everything else. Moreover, whether viscerally present or not, it is a non-negligible element in the intersubjective exchange of compassionate provisional transformations and deluded attachments that make up the experienced universe of all beings, always serving simultaneously to delude and to cure the delusion that stands opposite to it, forming an eternal ambiguity that cannot but lead both toward itself and away from itself in all directions.

Thus, the realization that all is inherently included in any given evil and that this evil is inherently included in any other possible existent frees one from the evil. Zhiyi is most explicit about this in discussing this notion vis-à-vis the most prototypical, indeed the all-inclusive, Buddhist evil, desire:

> It should be known that the Three Truths are completely present in any act of desire. . . . What does it mean to say all dharmas are reducible to any particular act of desire and can be reduced no further? This act of desire is the entire dharma-realm and the root of all dharmas. When an act of desire first arises, one can be fully aware that it already includes all dharmas. But if the mind is coarse and doesn't know this, then gradually it slides toward [what it perceives as] profit and becomes uncontrollable and begins to perform all these actions in practice.[22]

Zhiyi then specifies all the sins that arise from pursuing the satisfaction of this desire and also all the bodhisattva actions created to remedy these sins. All are inherently included in the initial moment of desire and ultimately prove to be identical to it. If one perceives that all are in principle included in the initial desire, one need not do them in practice. But why? Zhanran's comment, that seeing that all the sins are inherent in the moment of desire makes one fearful and thus extra-cautious not to let them happen,[23] is only half the point, since Zhiyi also points out that the relative "good" of bodhisattva actions are also inherent in this moment of desire. Not only are all good and evil dharmas inherent in this moment of desire, but this moment of desire is inherently included in them as well—it pervades all possible situations.

In Buddhist terms, this moment of desire creates bad karma; it is a sin, because it is painful. To desire is to be in pain, to want to be elsewhere and otherwise. Desire is constituted by an inclination to cancel itself, to move away from the state of lacking and desiring and to arrive instead at the state of having, of satisfaction, in which this painful state of desiring has been left behind. The belief that this is possible undergirds desire. However, when it is clearly perceived that the pain of desire cannot be escaped, even when one moves from the imagined desire to the imagined satisfaction (since this desire, with its pain, pervades all possible situations), there is no longer any motivation to

move from this situation to any other. But this means one no longer has a desire. To accept the desire as truly inescapable, then, is to overcome the desire. All situations are equally pervaded by both desire and satisfaction, by pain and pleasure. Contemplation is the means by which this comes to be directly known and experienced. The paradoxical upshot of this concept of inherent inclusion is that by thoroughly accepting the desire as desire, by not trying to eliminate the desire but by seeing it as all-pervading, as containing all good and evil within it, and as being inescapable, one overcomes the desire. Its full realization is identical to its total annulment—a result that should not surprise us in the context of the Three Truths, which indicate that the positing and the emptiness of any entity are identical.

This works because of the nature of desire as a movement away from itself. But the Tiantai (and pan-Buddhist) concept is that this is prototypical of all existence (i.e., impermanent, painful, and without self), that all is in fact desire in this sense (something that cannot rest content within itself, that moves away from itself, that is constantly in the process of decenterment). All forms of pain and defilement are predicated on this structure, either directly (greed), indirectly (hatred—the desire to have this thing gone), or as its premise (ignorance—the belief that it is possible to achieve fulfillment, or, in a more specifically Tiantai sense, to avoid this thing or to attain it). To know that there is nowhere one could rest any more contentedly than this moment is the precondition for resting contentedly in this moment.

This concept becomes clearer if we take a look at the *locus classicus* of the "inherent evil" doctrine, in Zhiyi's *Guanyinxuanyi*. Zhiyi says that the Buddha-nature, specifically the conditioning and revealing aspects of the Buddha-nature, inherently include not only good but also evil. *Icchantis* (those who have cut off all good behavior, and are thought in some schools never to achieve buddhahood) eliminate good in practice but not in their nature, whereas Buddhas eliminate evil in practice but not in their nature. The good and the evil can never be eliminated—"they are nothing but the dharma-gates of good and of evil; the nature can never be changed." The reason that the *icchantis* can give rise to good in practice again, whereas the Buddhas are free from evil in practice, is that

> the *icchantis* do not comprehend (*da* 達) the goodness of their own nature, and for this reason can be tainted by good, allowing good in practice to arise and cure all their evils in practice. The Buddhas, although they do not eliminate the evil in their own nature, nonetheless comprehend evil and thus can be free and at ease in the midst of evil. Thus they are not tainted by evil, and evil in practice does not arise in them. Thus the

Buddhas no longer give rise to evil, but because they are free and at ease in its midst, they can broadly use all the various evil dharma-gates to transform and liberate sentient beings, using them every moment and every moment being untainted by them. Because they are untainted [by evil, we say] they do not give rise to evil. . . . If the *icchanti* could understand his own good and evil, he would no longer be called an *icchanti* [but rather, a Buddha].

Zhiyi goes on to say that the inclusion of evil in the Buddha's nature is essential if he is to respond to sentient beings by sometimes taking on evil forms, not as a deliberate act of miracle working or effort but as an automatic response, just as images appear in a mirror—these responses must come from something in his own nature. Otherwise his response would be no different from the deliberate miracle working of non-Buddhists.

The *icchanti* does not cut off the good that is the meritorious property of his nature—thus when he encounters the proper conditions, good is brought forth from him. The Buddha also does not cut off the inherent evil of his nature—thus, when instigated by the right triggering conditions, perfumed by the power of his compassion, he enters into the lowest purgatory and takes part in all evil acts, in order to transform sentient beings.

Zhiyi finishes by again asserting that when we say the Buddha does not give rise to evil, we mean that

since the Tathāgata's inherent evil is not eliminated, he can still give rise to evil, but in doing so he comprehends it and thus is untainted by it. He comprehends that the realm of evil is itself the realm of actuality [i.e., the dharma-nature, the absolute], and thus can attain liberation even in the midst of the five unforgivable sins.[24]

That is, taken literally, the Buddha does in fact "give rise to" what are normally called evil acts. We say he "cuts it off in practice but not in his nature" because in giving rise to it in practice, he comprehends it precisely as inherent in his own nature. Hence evil is not adventitious practice, but simply an expression of the nature; "evil as practice" is thereby "cut off," although this does not mean eliminating it from action; rather it is a matter of seeing it as inescapable in all action, since it is (part of) the nature of all acts. This is exactly parallel to Zhiyi's explanation of "discarding the provisional." The provisional is discarded not because the contents formerly called provisional are eliminated, but because the predicate "provisional" is no longer applicable to them, since they are now seen to be ultimate reality itself. Similarly, "evil as practice" is discarded not because one no longer commits acts called evil, but because the predicate "as practice" is no longer applicable: these evils are now seen as as-

pects of the original nature. The evils are characterized by the Three Truths, which means they are all-pervading, inescapable, and unobtainable. Evil understood in this sense is identical to good understood as equally all-pervading, inescapable, and unobtainable.

Here as before, the "ultimate value" is located in comprehension, in the realization of the true nature of the evil as the Three Truths. This is to be understood as comprehending that evil inherently includes all good and that any good to which one might arrive would still inherently include the present evil. The Buddha comprehends that his good and evil can never be eliminated and thus has mastery in the midst of all goods and evils, which he regards as intrinsic parts of himself (and indeed as parts of any dharma whatsoever) not as extrinsic compelling forces. The *icchantis* do not comprehend this and thus are pulled this way and that by forces they consider external to themselves. This comprehension itself is one of the "goods," and once again we seem to face a final dichotomy between this ultimate value, and the ultimate anti-value. But this is overcome by the intersubjective underpinnings of upāya. Zhiyi stresses the importance of inherent evil for the Buddha's compassionate and upāyic transformations to save sentient beings. Because there are deluded beings and because to be a Buddha includes the compassionate determination never to cease in working to enlighten them, evil acts by the Buddha necessarily arise. If there were no deluded sentient beings to be saved, there would be no need for the Buddha to continue to transform into evil shapes to save them and thus no need for his inherent evil. Moreover, since this intersubjective situation is not extrinsic to the Buddha but is an endemic part of himself and of his experience of enlightenment, this capacity for evil must exist in him eternally. He must have within himself both delusion and the enlightenment that cures this delusion, but he remains "untainted" by virtue of his comprehension of the very fact that he is eternally and inescapably in this dialogue with the deluded, for this insight alone can free one from bias, desire, and hatred concerning any particular. The implication here is that there must always be deluded beings and enlightened beings, and that they are forever intertwined in this dialogue—which indeed consists of the single token taken in these two contrasting ways, as deluded or as enlightened.

This conception of enlightenment is quite interesting. We can perhaps go so far as to say that the Buddha's enlightenment must be slightly muddled and confused in order to count as real enlightenment. Pure transparent clarity, untouched by the delusion with which it must compassionately communicate

at all times, would be the buddhahood of the Special Teaching, that of the "Exclusive Mean" or "Exclusive Principle." The structure here brings the *Laozi* to mind; the true enlightenment is that which "holds to" a piece of delusion—but here this is explicitly due to participation in the ultimacy and all-pervasiveness of the intersubjective matrix. Because there will always be deluded and suffering sentient beings, the true Buddha must be willing to suffer the confusion and pain of trying to communicate with them, as part of his own essential nature. This means also that the highest wisdom must always be a bit muddled, must never feel quite perfectly comprehended or comprehensible, must never be quite totalized and self-transparent.[25]

Hence Zhiyi can say:

> If one understands that this devilish phenomenon itself possesses all ten realms and all hundred types of dharmas, in this one moment of experience all dharmas are reducible to the devil. Just as the dharma of "dreaming" inherently includes all the particular dharmas represented in the dream, when one is a devil all are devils, and all these devils are this one devil, so that in the end it is neither the all nor the one. Moreover, when one is a devil, all are devils, but at the same time when one is a Buddha, all are Buddhas, so that without leaving the Buddha-realm one is already in the devil-realm, they are not two and not separate. . . . Thus those of the highest capabilities and sharpest wisdom control their devils and manifest principle by making the devils their servants, not fearing the devils, which then act as firewood feeding the fire [of good]. . . . The Separate Teaching cannot tolerate wrongdoing . . . but the Integrated Teaching rests in it as the realm of ultimate reality. . . . The devil-realm is precisely the Buddha-realm.[26]

Here again, in the mutual intersubjective embrace by which Buddhas and devils regard each other, all are always both. When any participant in the dialogue is a devil, all tokens in the dialogue are expressions of deviltry, but at the same time, when one participant is a Buddha, all tokens express buddhahood. Thereby, deviltry and buddhahood are identical, and one need not fear being in the midst of deviltry or being deprived of buddhahood. This realization removes the desire to be one thing rather than another, which stands at the root of all vexations.

In Zhiyi's condemnations of antinomian Buddhists, the apparent contradiction of the two positions is easier to comprehend. For example, after stating that "evil is no obstacle to the Way, and the Way is no obstacle to evil," in the section on the fourth of the four *samādhis*, that of following one's own will, in the *Mohezhiguan*, Zhiyi puts on his defender of public morality hat:

Q: The other three types of *samādhi* are all followed by a section encouraging practice; why does this one alone have none?
A: When heard by those of inferior capacities and heavy impediments, the doctrine that the six impediments and the [immoral] non-ways are themselves the way of liberation immediately mires them in delusion. If I further encouraged its practice, they would miss the point even more grievously. North of the Huai and Yellow rivers are those who practice the Mahāyāna teaching of Emptiness who grab the snake without restraint. Of them I must now speak. Their teachers had tried the contemplation of good dharmas, but even after long practice they were unable to get anywhere. Thereupon they relaxed themselves and started to practice the contemplation of evil dharmas, and thereby they were able to gain some slight *samādhi* and some small understanding of Emptiness. But since they did not understand the differences in people's capacities and had not understood the Buddha's true intent, they took only this one teaching and from beginning to end taught it to others. After being taught thus for a long time, there were one or two who benefited . . . and took it as realization, saying: "This alone is the truth, and all other teachings are false," thus laughing at those who kept the precepts and practiced good, saying this was not the Way, and solely teaching all people to practice all kinds of evil.[27]

It is essential to note the precise reasons for Zhiyi's objections to the teaching of the practice of evil. He objects to the one-sidedness, especially the lack of understanding of intersubjectivity and upāya, of teaching only the practice of evil to everyone from beginning to end. This relates again to the basic principle of overcoming bias. Zhiyi objects to the bias toward evil as much as to the bias toward good, or toward the transcendence of the two. As he says later, "If there are sentient beings who cannot practice contemplation in evil, the Buddha teaches them that all forms of good are the Way. The Buddha has both ways of talking; why do you now reject good and choose only evil?"[28] Zhiyi objects to the lack of understanding of upāya implied in teaching the same teaching to all and at all times. "They did not understand the differences in people's capacities and [thus missing the whole intersubjective import of the teaching] did not understand the Buddha's true intent."[29] This leads to the further, quite practical consideration: "Those who heard this teaching followed their desires, all believing and following this teaching and abandoning all the prohibitions of the *vinaya*, so that all of them created mountains of evils, thus causing even the common people to look down on them like grass. It was for this reason that kings and great ministers sought to destroy the Buddhadharma."[30]

Behind this objection is the question of the suitability of this practice in Sui China and its practical social result—it hurt the dignity of Buddhism and

endangered its institutional status. In terms of Zhiyi's understanding of the intersubjective dynamics of upāya, this is a valid concern and valid grounds for objecting that such practitioners do not understand the truth of aiming their teachings at the dispositions of their listeners. People may well have been in need of being freed from their moral prejudices. But Zhiyi's point is that the indiscriminate teaching of this notion would do more harm than good, since it would lead to the demise of Buddhism in China. Whether this view was accurate is beside the point. What is important for our purposes is the theoretical justification for Zhiyi's objection to the antinomian teaching.

Zhiyi borrows Zhuangzi's story about Xishi frowning to make his point; when Xishi frowned, it made her even more beautiful. An ugly woman saw this and concluded that frowning was the secret of beauty; she then began frowning, which made her even uglier. The Buddha's evils are like Xishi's frown; as part of the totality of the Buddha, these evils only add to his perfection. But taken one-sidedly as the essence of that perfection, they make these practitioners worse off.[31] Note, however, that it is admitted that the Buddha does in fact "frown"; that is, he commits evils in practice. The value of this evil is changed by its context.

Zhiyi tries another metaphor to make his point. Evil and good are like two paths to the same goal; both can get you to the goal, but one is a much more difficult and treacherous route. The antinomians insist on taking the difficult, longer path, thus subjecting themselves to many unnecessary dangers, and they harm others by teaching them to do the same. Both paths work, and both are appropriate in some circumstances, for beings in certain conditions. The Buddha taught that lust is the Way because he had no choice, knowing that some beings could practice in no other way. His inclusion of this teaching in the Dharma is proof of its depth and compassion and its all-inclusiveness, and hence this antinomian rhetoric is the mark of the highest teaching. But it is insane to teach only this difficult and dangerous path.

Zhiyi makes one more point to bring home the bias of the antinomians. "In addition to all this," he says,

> if we look at their so-called evil practices, we see how biased and askew they are. You say lust is the Way and so embrace all the women you can; but you fail to realize at the same time that hatred and anger are the Way and thus do not go around attacking all the men you see. You just love the delicate and soft tactile sensations and call that the Way, whereas you still fear being beaten to a pulp, and so you believe that that is not the Way. You practice one evil but not the other; one supposedly has the Way, whereas the other does not. . . . This is how to refute the bias of their practices.[32]

That is, an examination of the actual evils practiced reveals not total freedom from bias, which can go freely into evil or good and endure temptations and pain as all empty, but exactly the kind of preference you would see in anyone without insight into Emptiness: the liking for pleasant things and the dislike of unpleasant things. Here again, the root problem is bias. Indeed, the implication seems to be that if evil were practiced comprehensively, this would in fact be proof of its goodness; that, if you will, evil universalized would already be the good. This notion is to be recalled when we consider Zhili's notion of the "ultimate dung beetle" below.

Zhiyi's tone becomes noticeably more strident when discussing this issue—one gets the feeling of defensiveness, even anger, which is very hard to find elsewhere in the works of this astonishingly evenhanded thinker. This may be defensiveness born of fear of being confused with an antinomian teacher himself, based on his own dangerously similar doctrines and thus a painstaking attempt to distinguish himself from them and their dangerous political consequences. It may be simply an atavistic reappearance of Ruist attitudes toward such behaviors. But the tone of the discourse notwithstanding, Zhiyi's theoretical position is clear. Antinomianism is mistaken because of its bias and its failure to understand upāya. Doctrines bearing possible antinomian implications, such as the identity of saṁsāra and nirvāṇa, are in fact the highest of all teachings and the mark of the Integrated Teaching itself. But to teach only the highest teachings is the mark of the Separate Teaching, which fails to understand upāya and to include and glorify within itself even the lowest teachings, the Buddhist precepts, which are aimed at the lowest capacities. The Integrated Teaching includes even these, and indeed, as the whole classification of teachings scheme indicates, this sort of "good" is harder to include than is any evil. We will find Zhili making this amusing point explicitly below: the *Vaipulya* sūtras had already taught the identity of evil with enlightenment, but only the perfect teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra* was able to reveal that even the Śravakas, those ascetic upholders of the precepts, would become Buddhas. Not only is evil good, but even the pigheaded, puritanical good of the worst bigots and monks is also good. To see this, to admit that even the Śravakas might be redeemable, that even good is worth teaching, is to overcome the last and hardest of all biases, and this is the mark of the Integrated Teaching.

Zhanran on Inherent Evil and Practiced Good

In Zhanran, we find traces of what might be described as a cautious reaction against the more radical implications of Zhiyi's treatment of evil. As has been pointed out, Zhanran's restructuring of Tiantai metaphysics is significantly ambiguous on many levels, a fact that set the stage for the Shanjia/Shanwai debates of the Song. In many ways Zhanran represents a departure from Zhiyi, whereas Zhili, further distanced in time, may be viewed as resembling Zhiyi more closely.[33] I would say that this is true on the question of evil as well as on the fundamental metaphysical issues, where I see a less radical divergence. Zhanran was instrumental in elevating the doctrine of the "evil inherent in the Buddha-nature" to the status of the highest teaching, the mark that distinguishes Tiantai from all other schools, and in working through a developed metaphysic focused on this principal insight. At the same time, however, his practical attitude toward evil activities was quite a bit more conservative than that expressed by Zhiyi.

This is often merely a matter of emphasis. Zhiyi maintains both the identity and the difference between good and evil. The metaphor of a dialogue must necessarily allow for differences in emphasis and focus to coexist with the assertion of the identity of the contents of the dialogue for the two sides—the devil version of the devil-Buddha dialogue differs from the Buddha version, although both sides are completely permeated by both deviltry and buddhahood. Zhanran tends to emphasize the division of the two sides when the topic of evil comes up explicitly. This is perhaps a reaction to and a retreat from some of the more radical implications in Zhiyi, or a fear that Zhiyi's way of stating the case may lead to results that could harm the Tiantai cause. For example, in his detailed exposition of the doctrine of mutual inclusion in his commentary to the *Mohezhiguan*, Zhanran stresses:

> The text states that the single Buddha-result inherently includes all ten realms. However, it is not permissible therefore to take the sage's *skandhas* as the same as those of the ordinary being. It is just that the Buddha-result is naturally capable of inherently including these ten realms, but one must never take this to mean that the Buddha's purgatory-realm is the same as the purgatory-realm of the ordinary being.[34]

There is a purgatory-realm to buddhahood, and sin and suffering are included in buddhahood—the Buddha is still a part of the dialogue, not isolated

from the evils of purgatory. But Zhanran stresses that the way this sin and suffering appear from the Buddha side of the dialogue must be kept clearly distinguished from the way the same sin and suffering appear to those on the deluded side of the dialogue—or, more strictly, that the delusion and sin appear differently to the Buddha than they do to the deluded sinner himself. The difference, as in Zhiyi, is that the Buddha fully realizes the principle of delusion and sin (i.e., that it is both ungraspable and inescapable and therefore inherently includes all other quiddities, both good and evil), whereas the deluded sinner does not. If the deluded sinner could truly be a deluded sinner and fully realize his nature qua deluded sinner, he would no longer be a deluded sinner; rather, he would be a Buddha. That is the practical implication of the Three Truths, and we will see it more radically developed by Zhili.

However, with Zhanran the caveats against antinomian implications are no longer merely a way of balancing the picture, preventing biased attachments, and making practical upāyic adjustments to the times, as they are in Zhiyi. Zhanran has a tendency to downplay Zhiyi's notion of the possibility of practicing the Way in the midst of evil or his argument that the Buddha's "not giving rise to evil" means simply "not being tainted by evil, because he comprehends the evil he does in practice as not (mere) practice, but rather as inherent in his own nature," which in practice allows for him still to perform evil actions, or, more to the point, since all who accept the Mahāyāna scriptures must accept that the Buddha sometimes performs actions otherwise called evil, that even delusion itself coexists in the Buddha as part of his enlightenment. The role of evil as practiced, rather than as merely comprehended, and as a method by which to reach enlightenment, rather than only as something manifested after enlightenment, tends to be downplayed by Zhanran. Hence Zhanran, commenting on the passage in the *Mohezhiguan* in which Zhiyi cites various examples from the scriptures of evil practices that turned out to be both practices leading to enlightenment and expressions of enlightenment designed to enlighten others, first quotes the scriptural passage in full, which ends with the Buddha saying, "To commit such transgressions is to attain great merit. And why? Because it was for the sake of benefiting [sentient beings]." Zhanran then remarks, "This is focused on the fact that there is really no transgression in it, since it benefits living beings. When a bodhisattva brings profit to others in this way, we can say that there is good within evil. Thus [Zhiyi] says, 'Only drunkenness, but at the same time only keeping the precepts.' But those who would follow this example must carefully measure themselves."[35]

Even more telling is Zhanran's treatment of the scriptural examples of using lust to attain liberation. He cites not only the story of Vasumitra from the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, which Zhiyi had noted, but also a case in which Ānanda, after criticizing a certain bodhisattva for indulging in transgressive lustful practices, was rebuked when this bodhisattva flew up into the air and said, "Could one who transgressed the precepts by means of lust fly into the air like this?" Ānanda fell to the ground and repented.[36] Zhanran says of this:

This is also using lust as a gate to the Dharma. But those who shamelessly dare to compare themselves to such cases usually claim to be in the realm of the unobstructed or to have interpenetrated at the level of principle. But if they have really attained the principle, they ought to be able to ascend into the air, manifesting great splendor on their surroundings and in their own persons, in a class with the great wisdom of Vasumitra, so that others may see them and become enlightened to limitless Dharma-gates. Even if they are able to display such miracles, one should still ask them, "How did you attain this miraculous power? If it was a Dharma-gate you have realized on your own, what is it called? In the presence of what Buddha did you initially give rise to the thought of enlightenment? How many Buddhas have you made offerings to? At what time in the future are you destined to achieve ultimate *bodhi*? What Buddha prophesized your becoming a Buddha? And what will your name be then, and what will your Buddha-land be like, and how many assemblies will you preach the Dharma at? What will be the names of your attendants? What is the lifespan you will enjoy as a Buddha? How long will the proper Dharma you preach then endure, and how long the semblance of the Dharma?" If he cannot answer these questions, you will know it is only the miracle-working of a demon. The non-Buddhist philosophers and ascetics also have miraculous powers, but with outflows to them, so that when they become attached to these powers the powers disappear. Sometimes the people who make these claims are just shameless liars. If they say "This very body is the Buddha"—well, Śākyamuni has already entered nirvāṇa, Maitreya is not yet born, and you are not a Buddha from another world—so if you are not a demon or a bandit, what are you? If you do not believe there are Buddhas in the ten directions, but instead call yourself the Buddha—this is a very great transgression. Thus we know that such people destroy their own *bodhicitta* and destroy the good roots of others. When [a true bodhisattva] really engages in great upāya, displaying transgression as a method of transforming sentient beings, he does not brag about practicing non-obstruction.[37]

Here we see Zhanran stressing the question of authority and authenticity and thus implying that some sentient beings are really bodhisattvas practicing upāya whereas others are simply deluded. Zhanran has here expressed himself in a way that loses the sense of "always both" found in Zhiyi's works. This is not necessarily Zhanran's final word on this issue, and Tiantai adherents can

always fall back on the claim that this particular passage is itself merely provisional and not the ultimate teaching. But the rhetorical emphasis of the passage is unmistakable: Zhanran is addressing antinomians who do claim to be free of the precepts, citing the scriptures and the principle of non-obstruction. It is crucial to note the difference between Zhanran's attacks on contemporary antinomians and Chanlike claimants to be living Buddhas (prove it, show me your credentials) and Zhiyi's attacks. Zhiyi criticizes such people for being one-sided, for not understand the upāya proper to the time and to their listeners, and thus harming the stature of Buddhism in the empire and misleading their students. He does not reject the validity of this practice itself, nor does he contest that it amounts to a bodhisattva's upāya; he merely rejects its one-sidedness. Zhanran's parting shot is also of interest—the very fact that such claimants justify themselves is a case of "protesting too much," and indeed, if they were really transgressing in order to educate, their revelation of this intention would undermine their own efficacy. However, the scriptural passage Zhanran has himself just quoted undercuts this point; for that bodhisattva did indeed brag about his non-obstruction and thereby humbled Ānanda.

Zhanran goes on to quote an example of a handsome ascetic who is waylaid by a lustful woman who says she will kill herself unless he has sex with her. The ascetic decides, compassionately, that he will give the woman peace and pay the price of breaking the precepts by enduring the torments of purgatory after death. However, when he does die, he ascends to the realm of the gods instead.[38] Zhanran comments:

> The previous examples were of inconceivable transformations of the Dharmakāya [i.e., upāya coming from the position of already attained buddhahood]; this is a case of actual practice, in which there is no transgression because one is benefiting beings. Those who would imitate this monk should consider carefully: if you cannot tolerate even the small sufferings encountered in the world, can you take the pains of purgatory that would come from breaking the precepts?[39]

Here we have a case in which Zhanran wishes to draw the line on the question of intent: the monk in the story was willing and able to endure the pains of purgatory for his transgression, and he acted, so we are told, not out of lust but out of a purely altruistic motive. The ironic result was that he was rewarded. In other words, those who are willing to endure purgatory will not have to, but if those who are not willing, will—a beautiful double-bind that Zhanran underscores. If you can really endure purgatory, then go ahead. But you won't have to, if your motives are pure. But if your motives are pure be-

cause you know, from this story, that having pure motives will get you out of purgatory, your motives are not pure. Still, Zhanran's rhetorical intent is obvious; he wishes to discourage those who would imitate the practice of the monk in the story.

Zhanran concludes his comments on this issue by recourse to the distinction between traces and root; after first noting that "it is difficult to fathom the depth or shallowness of the display of traces in the use of upāya," he points out that some of the examples cited, like the murdering fanatic Aṅgulimālya, appeared to be ordinary deluded people, whereas others, like Vasumitra the prostitute, had long already gained the rank of Bodhisattva.

But although she had long been a bodhisattva, she, too, says that originally she was the wife of an elder and was able at that time to attain liberation in the midst of desire, and thus to see that there was good within evil. If she forever remained an ordinary deluded person, she would not have been able to realize the dharma-gate of liberation from desire. Thus we can know that the story of Aṅgulimālya is also told from the point of view of his traces. If we speak of his root, it must also be true that long ago he was able to attain liberation from murder and other evils, and thus within his upāyic traces he again displayed murder as a Dharma-gate by which to benefit others. Moreover, when we speak of "[upāyic] display," we mean that they display themselves as if they were actually practicing, in order to cause limitless others to no longer practice these evils. Thus even from the perspective of actual practice [of others], there is no harm to principle here. But the people of the world are usually confused about the meaning of upāyic traces and dismiss all the marvelous supreme practices [of the sages] as upāyas. If that were the case, all the practices of the bodhisattvas would be empty delusions. But in fact, it is just because those who really practice evil fall [into suffering] whereas those who repent and reform their evil ascend that the sages display themselves as falling or ascending, so that those who are still at the stage of real practice can repent their evils and follow the good. Thus [Zhiyi's] text says, "Although they practiced all kinds of defects, they became sages." When he says "[the Way and evil] do not obstruct [each other]," this just means that the evils can always be changed: he is encouraging us to practice concentration and insight within evil. It is not permissible to simply indulge in evil and remain forever an ordinary deluded person. The non-obstruction [of good and evil] does not mean one should preserve the evil. Or again, what follows after the claim that "the Way does not obstruct evil" shows that although they have attained the Way, there is still some residual evil remaining.[40]

This passage represents a comprehensive attempt to eliminate any antinomian implications from Zhiyi's alarming statements and indeed to make them the basis for a straightforward elimination of evil. The non-obstruction of

good and evil must not be used as an excuse for allowing these evils to exist forever. Zhanran attempts to do this by recourse to a strict division between upāyic traces and real practice, which, if the analysis of basic Tiantai doctrine in the two preceding chapters is correct, is difficult to defend, and by means of an ultimate goal of actually eliminating evils in the realms of practice while maintaining the inherent evil of the Buddha nature, which appears to contradict both the scriptural sources and Zhiyi's treatment of the same question.

To understand Zhanran's strategy here, we must again refer to his doctrine of "practice" (*xiu*) and "nature" (*xing*). These two terms are key concepts in the preceding discussion, for in effect Zhanran wishes to interpret Zhiyi as saying straightforwardly that evil is cut off in practice but not in nature. This can be seen very clearly in Zhanran's paraphrase of the passage in Zhiyi's *Guanyinxuanyi* about the evil inherent in the Buddha-nature—he carefully inserts the two terms in strategic places to clarify his reading of Zhiyi. Where Zhiyi simply has "he comprehends evil, and so is not tainted by evil," Zhanran paraphrases as "he comprehends the evil in the nature, and so he is not tainted by the evil in practice."[41] As we saw above, Zhiyi, after first saying the Buddha does not give rise to evil, later clarifies that "although he gives rise to evil, he is not tainted by it." He means something far more extreme here, which Zhili will pick up: evil is cut off "in practice" because it is no longer merely practice; it turns out to be actually the nature and hence inescapable.

It is this specification that Zhanran seems to wish to avoid. To do so, he must clearly separate what is true of the nature and what happens in practice. However, this is not so simple, since Zhanran himself establishes the doctrine that "nature and practice are not two" and that

> it is through practice that the nature is manifested, and it is through the nature that practice comes forth. If we maintain the nature, then the entire realm of practice [including both good and evil] becomes the nature; if practice arises, then the entire nature becomes practice. The nature never changes, and the practice is also always just as it always was.[42]

This last phrase especially seems to imply that both nature and practice never change, that the whole range of Three Thousand, and therefore all good and evil, is always present in both nature and practice. Moreover, in this text, as in many other places, Zhanran goes out of his way to assert that "the term 'nature' refers to the three obstacles,"[43] that is, the karma, afflictions, and ignorance, in practice. We should recall here the specific content of the term "nature": on the one hand, it is the three virtues of buddhahood (liberation,

wisdom, and Dharmakāya) when they are still merely potential, still hidden or unmanifest, still merely Buddha-*nature*. Thus manifest evil is the instancing of the good as (merely) nature. But this distinction of manifest and unmanifest cannot be maintained as final, due to the peculiar character of this "nature." In Zhanran's own words: it refers to the threefold Buddha-nature (as Conditioning, Revealing, and Proper causes), and this is just another name for the fact that the Three Thousand good and evil dharmas are themselves Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Mean.[44]

This, too, makes it hard to imagine how the content of the two could ever be distinguished, that is, how practice could be purely good while the nature continued to include both good and evil. Since the nature is just the fact that practice is identical to the Threefold Truth, we may wonder how something could be true of the nature that is not true also of practice. Moreover, the nature is just the Threefold Truth about practice, and this Threefold Truth amounts to an understanding that any given token of practice X is simultaneously X, non-X, and neither X nor non-X, and so on; that is, it has no definitely determinable nature. Thus, it is impossible to say that some token of practice *just is* qualitatively so and so, period. X cannot be just good, or just evil, or both, or neither. Hence it cannot manifest only a part of the total potentiality of the nature; its fixed particularity as X is itself a delusion/upāya functioning simultaneously in a plurality of interpretive systems, a situation that prevents it from settling into any one essence. Hence, it may appear as evil within one interpretive system while appearing as good within another (perhaps subsequent, although it sublates this temporal sequence as a synchronic intersubjective relation) interpretive system, indeed it *must* appear as both. Hence, again, it is hard to see how it is possible to defend the recommendation to be in touch with the whole nature, good and evil and both and neither, inwardly as it were, while outwardly manifesting only what is, according to common Buddhist standards, good. This division between inward and outward or between nature and practice (in-itself and for-itself, to use Hegelian terms) is precisely what the whole Tiantai edifice is aimed at effacing, with Zhanran himself playing a key role.

Zhanran's approach to this problem is to speak of two types of practice, that is,

practice in accordance [with the nature] (*shunxiu* 順修) and practice at variance [with the nature] (*nixiu* 逆修). "In accordance" means to *understand* [my emphasis] the nature and practice accordingly. "At variance" means to create delusions by neglecting

the nature. Although the two mental states of understanding and delusion are not two, their characters, of being in accordance or at variance, are forever separate.[45]

Two things are to be noted here: first, that accordance with the nature is defined in terms of understanding, in terms of comprehension of the nature itself, the Threefold Truth, and of behaving in accordance with this understanding. The commentaries generally agree that this refers only to the Buddha. All the other nine realms do not completely comprehend the nature and hence are instances of being "at variance" with the nature. However, and this is the second important point, this being at variance is still itself part of the nature: "the nature refers to the three obstacles." This is crucial. It means simply that these obstacles and this lack of understanding of the nature are part of the nature that must be understood in order to be in accord with the nature. The at-variance-practice is part of what is revealed, manifested, and comprehended in the comprehension and manifestation of the nature. The Buddha's in-accordance-practice is a comprehension of all the forms of not-comprehending delusion, of practices premised on misunderstanding the Threefold Truth. Only thus can he avoid being the Buddha of the Separate Teaching, who is "only the Buddha," comprehending "only the Mean." Inanimate beings, beings in purgatory, animals, humans, evil practices—these are all the nature itself. But they do not comprehend themselves and have not gotten to the bottom of their own nature (which includes all other evils and goods), and so they are the nature without comprehending themselves to be the nature. Again we have the stress on understanding that we saw in Zhiyi's distinction between the Buddha's evil and that of the *icchanti*. In this passage, Zhanran goes on to say (apparently, for the passage is obscure and there are disagreements about its meaning) that one cannot take the deluded at-variance practice to be the comprehending in-accordance practice just because they are both manifestations of the nature and in that sense not-two. Rather, one must "temporarily" (*yi qi* 一期) distinguish deluded from comprehending and create forms of practice that are predicated on direct awareness of the nature.[46] The early Shanwai reading has *yi qi* 一其, meaning "to take as one," resulting in "One must take the deluded and comprehended as one and thereby create practices predicated on a direct awareness of the nature." This is just the opposite meaning, and yet it amounts to the same thing, since "the nature" to be comprehended is precisely the non-duality of delusion and comprehension.

Zhili compares this "temporary" division of Zhanran's to the relation between sickness and medicine; delusion is sickness, comprehension is medicine. Both are one-sided, temporary measures, but the one-sidedness of the one

cures the one-sidedness of the other. Once the sickness is cured, both are discarded.[47] The bias toward the "good" is thus really just a remedial measure aimed at the previous bias (attachment) toward the "evil." Thus is the biased attachment toward good in practice supported, in spite of the fact that it, too, is a discriminating attachment ultimately at variance with the all-inclusiveness of the nature. Nonetheless, this one-sided practice leads to greater comprehension of that all-inclusiveness, since it remedies even narrower prior attachments (to pleasures, positivist views, and the like). Moreover, by the Tiantai concept of upāya, this curative process is also an inherent part of the nature, part of what is comprehended by the in-accordance practice. In the end both are equally deluded.

In practical terms, however, this seems to amount to a unilateral recommendation of practices conventionally recognized as good, defined specifically as the Six Perfections of bodhisattva practice (alms-giving, discipline, forbearance, diligence, meditation, and wisdom).[48] As we can now see, this can perhaps be justified if we recall the real referents of "good" and "evil" in this context; "good" means "accordance with the nature, which is attached to neither good or evil, equally including both as mutually identical via the Threefold Truth." That is, the ultimate value of non-attachment has a built-in paradoxical tendency that undermines any value dichotomy at the same moment as it establishes it. Nonetheless, Zhanran's mode of expression, when he writes about antinomian practices, tends to obscure the dialogic, self-other mutual implication we saw in Zhiyi, and indeed, that this may well have contributed to the further development of this tendency among the Shanwai thinkers, just as Zhanran's ambiguous treatment of the status of mind led to the Shanwai position that mind inherently includes all dharmas, whereas matter does not. Zhanran's way of stating the case seems to argue for a mental "keeping in touch with" the full nature of good and evil, an internal comprehension that both good and evil are inherent in any instance of practice, but (perhaps upāyically) an outward effort to perform only conventionally recognized good actions, knowing these are also actually "inwardly" identical to evil. Zhiyi, on the other hand, had spoken variously of "using false views as one's helpers," taking evil as the "big fish" object of contemplation, and the Buddha "giving rise to evil without being tainted by evil" and asserted that "the Way does not obstruct evil, and evil does not obstruct the Way," all of which allow for the performance in practice of conventionally evil actions, even as forms of practice prior to any final Buddhahood. It remained for Zhili to restore, emphatically and unmistakably, the uncompromising mutual inclusion of good and

evil as much as matter and mind that had first appeared in the works of Zhiyi, as the halves of an intersubjective *ganying* relation between two sides revealed to be identical to each other and to the whole, as in the set-up and punch line of an upāyic joke or the mutual contemplation of moments. It is to Zhili's work that we now turn.

PART II: ZHILI'S CONCEPT OF VALUE PARADOX

We are now at a point where we can approach Zhili's concept of value paradox. Zhili, in the polemics to establish his reading of the Tiantai tradition, on the basis of the uncompromisingly intersubjective vision discussed in the preceding chapter, further underscores the concept of evil inherently included in the Buddha-nature, which had putatively originated in Zhiyi and had been made central by Zhanran. Zhanran, as we saw above, seems to back away from the more radical practical implications of this doctrine. Zhili's project can be read as an attempt to bring to uncompromising fulfillment all the implications of intersubjectivity found in Zhanran's reading of Zhiyi, while undercutting and classifying as merely provisional pronouncements his mind-only, nature-origination, and evil-eschewing tendencies, which were picked up by the Shanwai writers. It is the polemics with the latter that allow Zhili to develop these ideas to their fullest.

The rhetorical emphasis on this idea in Zhili's writings can be gauged from this well-known passage, in which Zhili stresses the importance of the inherent inclusion of evil:

> It should be made known that our understanding of "identical" [in interpreting scriptural passages stating that anti-value (saṁsāra, *kleśa*) is "identical" to value (nirvāṇa, *bodhi*)] is forever different from that of all the [other] teachers. This is because [for us] it is not a matter of two objects joined together, nor of two sides of something turned over. Rather, to be called "identical," precisely this entity [before us, just as it is] must be completely [the other] (*dangti quanshi* 當體全是). And why? Affliction and saṁsāra are manifested [lit., practiced] evil (*xiu e* 修惡); their whole substance is the Dharma-gate of inherent evil (*xing e* 性惡). Hence there is no need to cut off and excise them, nor to turn them over. Since the other schools do not understand inherent evil, they need to turn evil into good or cut off evil to realize good.
> [Q.]: In that case, why not say "Affliction is identical to affliction," and so on? Why do you speak of enlightenment and nirvāṇa at all?

A.: Truly it is not a separate meaning; it is just because inherent evil [a provisional posit] is all-penetrating and all-fusing [the Mean] and quiescent [empty], that it itself is given the names *enlightenment* and *nirvāṇa*. These names are set up [for this inherent evil] from the point of view of the ultimate truth. . . . Now we speak of "cutting off" from the point of view of this identicalness; so there is nothing to be extinguished. We speak of "enlightenment" from the point of view of this identicalness; so there is nothing to turn over. Afflictions and saṁsāra are the dharmas of the Nine Realms. Since [the teaching] is only called perfect if the Ten Realms mutually inhere and contain one another, how could the Buddhas destroy or transform the nine [other realms]? Only thus can [the Buddha] be said to "have comprehensive mastery within evil" and only then can it be said that "The realm of the devils is itself Buddha." Thus the perfect teaching's cutting off, realizing, delusion, and enlightenment are spoken of only with respect to [subjective] taint (*ran* 染) [i.e., attachment] and purity (*jing* 淨), not with respect to [objective] good, evil, purity (*jing* 淨), or impurity (*hui* 穢). Since the other teachings do not understand that the (Buddha-)nature inherently possesses all Ten Realms, they lack the Integrated [Teaching's] comprehension of cutting off and enlightenment.[49]

Here Zhili emphasizes the importance of inherent evil and mutual inclusion as the signature of the Tiantai school, touching on the themes of the identity of value and anti-value, and the all-pervasive, all-fusing, ineradicable evil that is itself the Nature, the main themes of his doctrine of evil, as we will see below. He stresses that the identity of value and anti-value is not to be construed as the relation between two entities joined together (as, perhaps, in the harmonious complementarity of the folk understanding of Yin and Yang), nor as two sides of a single thing, like a coin that may be turned to show heads or tails (i.e., inseparable and of one substance, but arranged so that only one or the other may appear at any given time), but rather such that both are always present as each, and each is the other precisely as it is without having to change in the slightest. This is analogous to a token that has opposite meanings in two semiotic contexts, as do all the words and gestures in a dialogue. Moreover, given the constitutive status of intersubjectivity in the set-up / punch line *ganying* structure obtaining between all moments, both contexts are always functioning simultaneously. This gives us a way of understanding how the presence of X can be expressed as precisely its own absence or negation.

Structurally, however, this passage introduces a motif that appears designed to solve some of the puzzling dilemmas accompanying this doctrine; namely, the two levels pertaining to practice, one in which evil is cut off and good realized, and another in which there is nothing to be cut off or realized

and all Ten Realms, including all forms of evil and good, are immutable and interpervasive. Zhiyi's concepts of "discarding the provisional" and "not giving rise to practiced evil"—both cases involving a negation that is no negation, which negates only the predicates "provisional" and "practiced" while maintaining the content that had previously been so described—suggests how this doubleness is to be understood. The provisional is discarded only in the sense of being understood to be ineradicable; it is seen to be more than merely provisional, contingent, or conditional—to be absolute and all-pervasive. In this way its provisionalness is indeed discarded. But this ploy is not as simple as it first appears. To understand this (and its relation to the claim that inherent evil is itself the all-interfusing inherent good, nirvāṇa, Dharmakāya), we must return to the question of intersubjectivity.

The Intersubjective Underpinning of Ineradicable and All-pervading Evil as Identical with the Good

Zhili's version of intersubjectivity is distinctive for its explicit insistence that even subjective taint and subjective purity are non-dual, that these two subjective states are themselves identical, as implied in the notion of dialogue developed in the preceding chapter. Generally, as Mou Zongsan points out,[50] Zhili uses the pair *ran/jing* 染淨 to designate *subjective* purity and taint, and *gou/jing* 垢淨 or *hui/jing* 穢淨 to specify *objective* purity and impurity, as seen in the passage above. This seems to define two contrary levels of experience, one in which evil persists and the other in which it can be eliminated, with non-attachment being the meta-value.

However, the problem of non-duality cannot be solved so easily as Mou seems to suggest. It will not do to attribute the non-duality purely to the objective realm (saying that it is neither pure nor impure in itself, but can be either) and allow subjectivity to be considered dualistically as always *either* tainted *or* pure. The Tiantai writers are quite clear in extending non-duality also to the *ran/jing* pair and thus to the subjective realm and even to the two pairs of terms: *ran/jing* is identical to *hui/jing*. To sort this out, let us look at another passage in Zhili's *Zhiyaochao* that utilizes this tactic, the one on which Mou seems mainly to have based his comments:

Q.: Every moment contains all one hundred realms and thus includes both purity and impurity (*you hui you jing* 有穢有淨). Why does [Zhanran] now say they are all pure?

A.: All the Dharma-gates of purity and impurity previously discussed are inherently included in principle. Regardless of delusion or enlightenment, these remain unincreased and undiminished. They are just what we call the good and evil inherently included in the nature (*xing shan xing e* 性善性惡). The reference here to purity and taint (*ran jing* 染淨) is made with respect to the distinction between the bias of the passions and principle (*qingli* 情理). If one clings [to the fixed divisions], due to the bias of the passions, then both the pure and the impure are tainted 淨穢俱染; seen according to their principle, the pure and the impure are both pure 淨穢俱淨. But each moment of deluded taint inherently includes all Ten Realms [thus including both delusion and enlightenment, both this purity and this taint]. Since all of these freely interpenetrate, we say all of them are pure.[51]

The division between objective and subjective is not to be taken to mean a reference to two distinct and mutually exclusive realms, which would be ridiculous, given the Tiantai view of the relation between subject and object. Every moment of experience can be viewed either as subject (as the incorporator and creator of qualitatively other moments of experience, as a "center") or as object (as incorporated into and created by qualitatively other moments, as "periphery")[52] All Ten Realms are from the beginning both objective and subjective, as they would have to be in the context of the pan-Buddhist concept of karma. They are conditions dwelt in by creatures subjectively so constituted as to create and perceive them as such. Hence it would be more accurate to say that *ran/jing* refers to the whole Ten Realms considered under the aspect of subjectivity, especially Buddhist praxis (the overcoming of attachment to any fixed divisions among these Ten Realms), whereas *hui/jing* refers to these same ten realms but with a focus on their "objective" aspect (which here can only mean seeing them as existent facts, as unchangeable aspects of the original nature, as ever-present possibles haunting every actual).[53] One can change; the other cannot. Subjective and objective here are thus nothing but the famous pair *suiyuan* 隨緣 and *bubian* 不變 (following conditions and unchanging),[54] *both* of which are applicable to all things or, better, to *xiu* 修 (practice) and *xing* 性 (nature). On the simplest level, it is said that practice can change (good and evil on the level of practice can be cut off), but the nature cannot (inherent good and evil can never be cut off). On this level, we have here merely a gloss on Zhiyi's famous concept of "cutting off [afflictions, delusions, etc.] without cutting them off" 不斷而斷—they are cut off in practice but not in nature, as is consistent with some of Zhanran's more conservative passages. As we saw, however, this was not the implication of Zhiyi's original formulation. There, to cut off evil in practice meant to see the evil

performed in practice as actually belonging to the nature itself, and therefore to be not just practice but the nature itself. One does not give rise to evil in practice because evil is always already there, uncreated and indestructible. It cannot be "given rise to" in practice at all. Zhili restores this sense of Zhiyi's, for in Zhili's system each term covers the entire totality of all that exists and can exist. Each term designates the entire Three Thousand. As Zhili states:

> Practice means what is cultivated and created, that is, the Three Thousand as transformation and creation. Nature means what originally exists and is never changed, that is, the Three Thousand as inherently included in principle. . . . Outside of practice there is no nature; outside the nature there is no practice. They destroy and absorb [interpenetrate with, melt into] each other. . . . All dharmas can be discussed as either practice or nature. . . . Although there are two types of practice, at-variance and in-accordance with [the nature], all practices are nothing but manifestations of what is inherently included in the nature. . . . Each and every practice, karma, cause, effect, self, other, although it comes to completion through the mediation of practice, is nothing but a manifestation of the Three Thousand qua the nature's meritorious properties. . . . Although the entire nature becomes practice [when we take practice as the reference point for a given discussion], it never for a moment lacks the properties proper to the nature, that is, to be constant and unchanging. . . . Although all practice becomes nature [when we take the nature as the defining point of reference], it has never for a moment lacked the properties proper to practice, that is, to be constantly and forever transforming and creating. . . . Thus we know that both "practice" and "nature" refer to the whole Three Thousand.[55]

The transformation and creation of the Three Thousand in "practice" are eternal; they never cease. Even when evil-in-practice is "cut off," according to Zhili, the Three Thousand (including both good and evil, delusion and enlightenment) are replete not only in nature but also in practice itself. Even in practice, to be cut off is identical to not being cut off, and practice remains completely identical to nature. Suffering and ignorance, as part of the Three Thousand, have always existed and will always exist, not only in nature but also in practice.[56]

Where does this leave us? According to the doctrine of evil inherently included in the nature, all errors in perception, all subjective suffering and karma, are themselves inherent in the nature—all practice is nothing but the nature. We have just seen, in addition, that all Three Thousand, including all forms of delusion and the consequent realms of purgatories and hungry ghosts and all the rest, are forever manifesting as well. Even the manifestation can never be "purely good." However, it might be thought that this holds out the

prospect that a particular practitioner—precisely because he realizes retrospectively that all his *previous* errors were inherently included in the nature of reality, forever imperishable and moreover constitutive and necessary to his very enlightenment concerning this fact (via insight into upāya and ultimate truth)—could *himself, in the future*, be only enlightened and not deluded on the subjective level. That is, while allowing that evil must always be manifested and even that it had to be in his own past, he could perhaps, upon becoming enlightened, leave it to others (and to his own past benighted self) to be the necessary and inherent deluded part of the Three Thousand, while he himself is the enlightened part, equally necessary and eternal, who teaches and guides them.

This prospect, however, is made impossible by the two further Tiantai doctrines. The first is the non-duality of self and other, understood in the sense of what I here call "intersubjectivity." We need only recall the passage from Zhili, quoted in Chapter 5, about the impossibility of attributing stimulus or response definitively either to self or other. Any action, apparently coming from either the enlightened or the deluded side, is actually performed neither by self, nor other, nor both, nor neither—and can equally accurately be described as being performed exclusively by self, other, both, or neither. This undermines any possibility for the enlightened being to maintain his subjective experience of enlightenment while letting others be the deluded ones. Indeed, the Tiantai position would seem to be that this falls short of true compassion, which entails one's involvement not only in suffering but even in the delusion and guilt that are inextricably connected to it. Since there must always be someone somewhere doing evil and suffering, merely eschewing it oneself would be not only self-delusive (one cannot enforce a border of selfhood that could keep this evil out) but also useless, the bad faith of a "beautiful soul" who turns away from the fact of his own ineradicable involvement in the evils of the world. The only way this ineradicable evil and suffering can be handled is by involving oneself in it, accepting it and adding to it some additional things that may recontextualize and transform it. Someone somewhere is always doing evil and suffering, and that someone must always be you.

The second Tiantai concept undermining any possible dichotomy even of subjective states attacks the *temporal* distinction presupposed in any such concept of enlightenment—that the enlightened being "was" previously deluded but "is now" enlightened. Indeed, the whole doctrine of inherent inclusion is directed against this notion (as seen in the notion of original enlightenment

understood as the non-duality of cause and effect, the whole dynamic of upāya and ultimate truth, the "non-duality of the beginning and the end,"[57] etc.), as is the insistent use of the temporal concept of "the present moment (*yinian* — 念, *chana* 刹那, *kṣaṇa*) of deluded experience" as that from which one's own ultimate ("future") enlightenment is not separate. Recall also the rewriting of the concept of temporality implied in the Tiantai theory of upāya. The effect is nothing but another, more complete reading of the cause, as the punch line is a new perspective and interpretive frame that allows an additional, contrary reading of the set-up. In moving through time from cause to effect, then, one is actually never leaving the initial spot from which one started. The original moment is simply becoming more itself, becoming more and more fully penetrated and comprehended in an ever greater number of ways.

Zhili puts the temporal implication of this doctrine quite directly and unmistakably: "Without moving from the present instant of thought, one is able to perform the 3,000 transformations of the past, present, and future exhaustively. This moment of experience is precisely the entire dharma-realm; how could it ever come to an end?"[58] This moment never ends; but this does not mean that there is only this one moment, the eternal present, and that other moments, past and future, are just illusions. All of Zhili's "only X" statements must be understood in the same sense as his doctrine of mind and matter. According to Zhili, the proposition "there is nothing but mind" does not mean that there is only this one mind and that all other thing are just illusory appearances in that mind. Rather, all minds are equally real in all their qualitative difference, but they are also equally all-pervasive, so that no mind or thing has an end. Each mind, each object, is thus "all there is." Thus any mind is the only mind, and indeed any sensation or piece of matter is equally the only thing there is; any determination chosen as a starting point pervades all times and places and is the substratum into which all else is reducible. Here the same logic is applied to the temporal dimension. All moments are equally real, but none of these moments ever begins or ends. There are in fact no such things as discrete and separate moments at all.[59] Every "moment" is different, and every "moment" is "forever" (*chang*). This mutual penetration as omnicentric mutual reduction to one another, not their elimination or reduction to single timeless present, is what constitutes their oneness. This means that my previous subjective impression or experience of delusion and my present experience of enlightenment are equal in never having begun and never having ended, and thus in pervading each other. Hence each must be both delusion and enlightenment.

These two doctrines, however, are two ways of saying the same thing. That is, the relation among these never-ending, mutually embracing moments is also to be understood on the model of the irreducible intersubjective relation. A particular moment of delusion can be redetermined to have been a part of enlightenment by being so viewed by a subsequent moment. And indeed, moments are always viewing each other,[60] incorporating one another into themselves. These moments of experience are not windowless monads closed off from each other; each one takes into itself and as itself all other moments, all that ever has existed or will exist, such that each moment is all there is. They are not to be considered free of definite borders merely because they are empty in the blank contentless sense advocated by the Common Teaching (where Emptiness is more genuine than Provisional Positing), nor in the sense of mere transcending of all opposites of limit and limitlessness, separate from the two delusional extremes and all other deluded differentiations, as indicated by the Principle Only (or Exclusive Mean) of the Separate Teaching. Rather, they are themselves sentient beings constitutively involved in a mutual regard from the beginning, in which they both enlighten and are enlightened by one another, while also constantly infringing on and terrorizing one another for ignorant selfish motives. Each moment can transform all other moments by seeing them as aspects of itself. Each moment of enlightenment and each moment of delusion are situated in an eternal mutually transforming dialogue. They are tied together by compassion and selfishness, taking on various forms in order to be seen by one another, and this harmful and salvific interaction is what they are in themselves. Each moment is at the same time both a bodhisattva to all other moments and a deluded recipient of the bodhisattva-esque pedagogic pyrotechnics coming from those other moments. Hence the nonduality between two moments of time is again to be understood on the intersubjective model and vice versa.

It is thus that Zhili attempts to avoid a duality between good and evil (enlightened and deluded) mental states. Zhili's vision of inherent evil is not, for example, to be reduced to some sort of claim that although (as the Mahāyāna scriptures amply attest) a buddha or bodhisattva may "provisionally" perform actions conventionally considered evil, he does so with the enlightened subjective intent of saving sentient beings, whereas the ordinary deluded evil man intends only selfish acts, such that this difference in mental state constitutes the difference between the apparently evil-doing bodhisattva and the truly evil man (a claim sometimes detectable in Zhanran, as we saw above). For if intersubjectivity is constitutive of all thought and action, a thought or action be-

longs not to any one agent only but rather to the whole interactive network and to each agent considered separately. In fact, the evil man's ignorant and ill-intended actions, and his ignorance and ill-intent themselves, are equally the bodhisattva's own actions, as described above. The stimulus is the response; both are the entire dharma-realm.

The constitutive environmental field of the Buddha also includes the evil man committing evil with no intent to do any good, in a state of pure ignorance. So the other, with his ignorance, is part of the objective realm in which the Buddha or bodhisattva sees an expression of his own enlightenment. The evil actions are at the same time evil (genuinely evil and ignorant) and enlightening. Karma is upāya, and upāya is ultimate truth. An evil man with no intent to do good of any kind, such as those who beat up the Bodhisattva Never-disparage,[61] is nevertheless a bodhisattva himself working his way, by that very action (albeit, perhaps through the detour of purgatory and repentance), toward inevitable buddhahood and the eternal endeavor to enlighten all beings. And this cause is itself identical to its effect, a compassionate transformation that is therefore already enlightening and benefiting all beings—including the Bodhisattva Never-disparage. Another example would be Devadatta, who is depicted in the *Lotus Sūtra* as teaching a former incarnation of Śākyamuni that sūtra out of purely selfish intent (he says, "If you do not cross me, I will preach it to you," and thereupon the king who will later become Śākyamuni becomes his personal servant, providing for all his personal and material needs), and who subsequently commits evil acts for zillions of years. Nonetheless, Devadatta attains Buddhahood from this act. Zhiyi specifies of Devadatta that

> approaching his death he had the evil thought, "I vow to harm you [Śākyamuni] in all future lives, in mind and word, as I do today." All such things are the great master's mastery of skillful means and manifesting and transforming, "practicing incorrect paths to penetrate the Buddha-path." All sentient beings have different capacities and thus different ways of entering the Way. Sometimes evil, sometimes good, they propagate the Way and benefit beings.[62]

Even the purest and most unadulterated evil intent, a vow to cause only harm, turns out to be an upāya. For the evil man's evil is never viewed only by the evil man himself, who regards it as having no good intent. It is also part of an exchange with enlightened beings, who see it as good—as a stimulus, as an upāya, as a Buddha-seed. The evil man's opinion that he has no good intent has no privileged validity, since his action does not really belong exclusively to

himself. His intent is not owned by anyone or anything, and this means that no one can determine its character, good or evil, once and for all. The Buddha's opinion that this having-no-good-intent is itself an upāya is equally valid. A Buddha, indeed, is just someone who is able to work these ownerless intents in such a way as to squeeze a manifestation of buddhahood out of them.

Here, again, the argument has a performative dimension: it is because someone (some moment) has been enlightened that all beings (moments) are enlightened. By saying this, by understanding this idea, by positing the concept of a buddha inherent to our own being who sees us as buddhas, we are making it so—for the moment one is thinking this thought is itself an enlightened moment.[63] The ignorance of all other moments becomes simultaneously wisdom by virtue of the wisdom of this moment in seeing it as such. But there is a final twist—this wisdom is the result of their unseeing unwisdom. That is, precisely by being exactly what this delusion must exclude to be itself, enlightenment is included in it, posited by it. Delusion and enlightenment gaze at each other eternally. To delusion, enlightenment is a form of itself, another separate position. To enlightenment, delusion is a form of itself, an interpenetrating part of its own being. Enlightenment means delusion-enlightenment; delusion means enlightenment-delusion. The contents of the two are identical (i.e., the entire dharma-realm, the entire conversation itself), but given a different qualitative quiddity by a change in relative emphasis or focus (which is determined by one's "position" in this dialogue, a differentiation that is itself simultaneously an instance of *both* deluded clinging and/or enlightened upāya).

In sum, no moment of experience can ever be positively, in itself, irrefutably, either enlightened or deluded. Hence Zhili adopts the definition of "inconceivable," which in Tiantai terms is also equivalent to "marvelous" and "absolute," given in the *Dazhidulun*: all these terms mean, fundamentally, "undecidable" (*bujueding* 不決定).[64] Since no moment ever ends, each moment is always susceptible to further revisions, to incorporation into subsequent moments, which are not to be regarded as extrinsic additions but as elaborations of its own self-nature, its Three-Thousandness. The case is a bit like the Whiteheadian idea of "objective immortality": the nature of any experience, act, intent, or thing is always yet-to-be-determined, open to further developments. Its qualitative quiddity as thus and so is never decided once and for all. So a moment of murderous rage or all-consuming lust may later be incorporated into a moment of enlightenment, which, looking back on to it and seeing that moment as an aspect of itself, will regard it as enlightenment, as a goad to

the production of the present enlightenment, an upāya that acts as a set-up to the punch line of enlightenment, which is thus equally enlightened, in a state of non-duality between this contrary provisional goad and the eventual outcome. Likewise, this very moment of enlightenment may later come to be seen as a moment of delusion. What is more, it is always already simultaneously engaged in the gaze of every other moment of experience (none of which ever begins or ends), each of which interprets it in its own image, as an element in the symbol system and environmental field belonging to this other moment, which thus casts its own meanings over every other moment at all times. All the various moments and their interpretations of each other happen at once, as it were. As Zhiyi had already repeatedly said, "When one is Buddha, all are that Buddha; when one is a devil, all are that devil."[65] When I am a buddha, all other forms of experience, including devilish intentions, are seen as upāya bringing about this Buddha-result. When I become a devil, even my previous or future buddhahood are just aspects of my deviltry. As Zhiyi says, "Every dharma can be destroyed and refuted; every statement can be turned over."[66] Not only can be, but always must be and is, as each is simultaneously seen from every possible angle, by every possible unending moment of experience, all with equal validity. This situation, with its multidirectional stimulus/response and self-unaware transformative all-pervasiveness, is (among other things, of course) a way of indicating the eternally, omnipresently, and constitutively intersubjective nature of all possible experience, and it is this that makes possible the doctrine of simultaneous enlightenment and delusion.

A reasonable response to all this might be,: this is all well and good, but since all this business about the non-duality of self and other and of past and future are known and experienced only by the enlightened, the same subjective dichotomy emerges again. Even if in some mysterious sense the enlightened experience both enlightenment and delusion at once, the deluded certainly do not experience both at once, and it is precisely this "not experiencing both" that we mean by delusion. Now, this "not experiencing both at once" is precisely what the enlightened do not experience, since they are happily experiencing both; if they were experiencing both, they would not in fact be experiencing both. This consideration is of great importance. Although this simple proof of the self-contradiction of the proposition "delusion is enlightenment" would normally count as irrefutable evidence that it is a false claim or nonsense, here it is the very mark that guarantees the truth of the claim. For it is here that we come to the Möbius strip–like limit where we can see that this reversal continues indefinitely, that when we press either claim to the limit, it

leads into the other. The claim "enlightenment is one with delusion" always leads back to this self-contradiction, forcing us to separate the two, since enlightenment includes this insight into the relationship between enlightenment and delusion that delusion does not possess. This again calls forth the same considerations again: enlightenment means the understanding of the oneness even of its own understanding of the oneness of itself and delusion and the deluded ignorance of this fact. And at the same time, delusion is then seen to have always posited this enlightenment as precisely what it excluded: it excluded the outside-of-itself that would also include it, since it could conceive determinacy only on the basis of some level of mutual exclusivity. This again leads back to the same objection, on this newly defined level.

This back and forth from inclusion of the other to the renewed exclusion of the other on the meta-level never ends, however many orders of abstraction we care to pursue. But it is just this situation that is eternal, which is designated by the expression "not two and yet two." The duality is just as essential as the non-duality, and the distinction between the two just as eternal as their unity. Indeed, it is just this eternally irreducible duality that is known as "inherent evil" (*xing e* 性惡)—which, as we know, is identical to "inherent good." The good exists here only in the two-tiered structure of contemplation: it is always a response to a pre-existing evil, a prior distinction, that opens this distinction in order to include it. There is no punch line, and hence no humor, without the seriousness of the set-up. As Zhili says, referring to the terms "eternal" and "transient" (synonyms here for value and anti-value):

> If you say that that which is flowing and transient cannot be called eternal, this is a biased view of the passions. For the dharma of "arising" is eternal because it is identical to the nature, and the same is true of the dharmas of "dwelling," "changing," and "perishing." This "eternity" of being identical to the nature is in reality neither eternal nor non-eternal; it is beyond thought and discussion. The term ["eternal"] is one-sided but the meaning is all-inclusive [Integrated]. Thus, we can say also that any instance of arising or perishing is itself the Middle Way, and that there is nothing but arising, or nothing but dwelling, or nothing but changing, or nothing but perishing.[67]

That is, the term "eternal" is always to be understood as meaning both eternal and non-eternal, and either and neither. The same goes for "enlightenment"—it must always be understood to imply both enlightenment and delusion, and either and neither. The solution to this infinite regress lies precisely in its acceptance: rather than saying that these two claims are incoherent, since they each imply the contradictory other, we say, since each of these two claims implies the contradictory other, they are each simply alternative ways of indicat-

ing the whole, which forever ineradicably includes this distinction and contradiction as well as this oneness. Indeed, this is the whole point of the Three Truths, the non-duality of unity qua Suchness (Emptiness) and all differential marks (Provisional Positing).

Nevertheless, it is possible to give some indication of how this experience of simultaneity and non-duality of enlightenment and delusion, though indeed "known" only by the enlightened, is in a sense "experienced" by the deluded. The distinction between experience and knowledge here is to be understood in the sense presupposed, for example, by all phenomenological descriptions of experience. A constantly operative but preconscious structure of experience is brought to reflective awareness by means of the phenomenologist's painstaking account of what all of us are undergoing every moment. Only in this way does the previously fuzzy or background element become not only effective in structuring our experience but also clearly focused in its own right as an object of thematic awareness.

To attempt such a description, let us go back to Zhili's definition of purity as "interpenetration" (*hurong* 互融). Interpenetration must be understood on the model of the Three Truths developed above. X appears as various forms of non-X, and vice versa. It never appears otherwise, and since this principle is universally applicable, there is no limit to the non-X's in whose form X can appear. Love appears as cruelty, as kindness, as palpitations of the heart, as the subjective arisal of a set of images, as chemicals in the bloodstream, as valentines. These things also appear as love; hence love and these things interpenetrate. But hatred can also, under the right conditions, appear as these things, and neither love nor hatred can ever be found to appear except as some set of other things. Indeed, as happens often enough both inside and outside romantic novels, love, looking back at former hatred, realizes that this hatred itself was just an expression of itself. It is perhaps even less rare for hatred to realize that previous love was just a deluded form of the now realized truth, hatred. Precisely the same tokens of experience, and even their interpretations as love or hatred, are read in these two contrary ways, when two contrary centers are set up. In this sense, love and hatred too interpenetrate, in spite of being eternally opposed to one another.

Zhili says that the word "purity" refers to this kind of interpenetration. Therefore, to say purity and impurity are both pure means that purity and impurity interpenetrate. But this then means that interpenetration and separation (non-interpenetration) interpenetrate. This ugly sentence may be considered a translation of Zhili's statement into a kind of formal logic. It is a

shorthand way of restating the paradoxical circling just described. The question is, How is it possible for separation to interpenetrate with interpenetration? That is, we start with a sentient being who, because he subjectively regards the Ten Realms as separate, considers his present state (evil) absolutely distinct from the state of the Buddhas (good). This belief is precisely what defines his state as being deluded and evil rather than enlightened and good. Delusion is to think that delusion and enlightenment do not interpenetrate—which means, thinking that the two subjective states of regarding as separate and regarding as interpenetrating do not interpenetrate, that each is simply definitively what it is, period. But in what sense may we say that "regarding as separate" is not separate from "regarding as interpenetrating"?

Again, perhaps we can have recourse to the example of a dialogue. In a dialogue between two parties, one party may recognize that everything he says is conditioned by the party he is addressing, whereas the other does not. The second party believes that what he says is exactly what he means, what he would say to anyone, and that his words have in themselves a single unambiguous meaning understood in the same way by all. He regards the meaning of his statement solely as something with the once-and-for-all quiddity of an objective existence, a meaning that belongs exclusively to himself and to which he has privileged access. He does not regard what he says as being determined by the person he happens to be addressing at the moment, or indeed by the virtual presence of all other potential addressees. He believes the realms are separate (his meant-worldview has nothing to do with the other's meant-worldview).

Zhili's doctrine amounts to the claim not only that this person is mistaken in this belief, but also that this belief itself is one of the parts of the worldview about which he is mistaken, and indeed, that in enunciating it he is also implicitly enunciating the opposite view. In fact, his belief that all his beliefs have nothing to do with the other's beliefs is conditioned by the other's beliefs, and his statement of this belief states the opposite belief at the same time. Imagine that someone came into the room and declared to the assembled company that his present words were not addressed to anyone and had nothing to do with anyone but himself. One of the persons in the room might point out the fact of speaking at all implied an address to someone, a desire to he heard, as did his presence here, and that the use of language per se implied an intersubjective connection. To state "I don't believe that communication exists" is to state that one does believe communication exists. If someone comes into the room and said, for example, "I am not taking a position that contradicts any

other position." The answer would be, "Yes you are, and so am I." Both are taking a position, and yet they are also right to say that they are contradicting each other. The two are in conflict, and yet they also agree; they state opposite things and yet state the same thing. In one sense one is true and the other is false, but in another both are true. And in just that sense both are false as well, for their claim to be in contradiction is thereby refuted. That is, the "true" statement "since we are both taking a position and addressing someone, you are wrong" is also false, for the other statement is in another sense not wrong, since it implicitly states the truth. The truth of the reply too is a merely provisional remedial truth, dependent on the (merely provisional and refuted) falsity of the statement that it refutes, a statement that this response recognizes to be implicitly stating the truth. Since that false statement is true, it does not need to be refuted, and so the refutation is also false. Both are true and both are false, and yet they are opposed to each other and also saying the same thing, bringing us back again to the endless circling that is true if and only if it is false and vice versa.

The belief in the separateness of separateness and interpenetration, in other words, is itself a response to interpenetration and even an expression of the belief in interpenetration.[68] Enlightenment appears as delusion; interpenetration appears as separation. Separation is one more form of interpenetration. The easiest way to see this point is perhaps simply to recall the semantic commonplace that "separation" is relative to "interpenetration." That is, "absolute" is relative to "relative." To think one is to think the other—and this itself is the meaning of interpenetration. Thus we can say, as I paraphrased Zhili's statement above: the mental act of subjectively regarding two things as separate and non-related is itself already a species of the larger class of mental acts of regarding things as relative to one another, as non-separate, as interpenetrating, for this is the only way to "regard" at all, to attribute a meaning of any kind, including the meaning "separate." At the same time, and just as essentially, regarding as interpenetrating must be contrasted to regarding as separate, and in this sense must separate itself from regarding as separate. Hence regarding as separate in reality both regards as separate and regards as interpenetrating; regarding as interpenetrating also regards as separate and regards as interpenetrating. Hence each one is both, and the two are identical, by virtue of their very opposition.

But this is to be understood not only logically or semantically but also, perhaps more fundamentally, intersubjectively. Rather than speaking of how the meaning of terms in the symbolic system of language always depends on their

difference from and negation of all other terms in the system, a situation that after all depends on and reflects the intersubjective context in which it operates, we can understand this simultaneity of interpenetration and separation more directly via the commonplace example of, say, strangers sharing an elevator. The fixed stare at the floor or door, away from the other passengers, is obviously a way of regarding, interrelating, and communicating. This separation from them not only is thoroughly determined by the unbearable closeness and interpenetration into which they have been thrown (a kind of denial or even *Verneinung* of their de facto relationship with one another, in the Freudian sense) but also serves as one further exemplification and continuation of this communicative relation, each one *telling* the others not to communicate with her. Separation is here an instance of interpenetration, both in its cause (motivation) and in its effect. It is simply an oddly deceptive form of interpenetration. Only this simultaneity of both sides, one that interpenetrates in the form of interpenetration and one that interpenetrates in the form of separation, each equally essential, completes the dialogic picture, allowing for the simultaneity of delusion and enlightenment.

Thus subjective taint is subjective purity, whether that taint consists in the mistaken view that there is a dichotomy between taint and purity or between any other pair of opposites regarded as separate. To regard any such pair as separate is to be tainted, and this taint is always also a form of purity. This does not mean that there cannot be a difference between the beings (moments) who overtly regard as separate (i.e., who regard as interpenetrating only in the indirect and non-apparent form of "regarding as separate") and those who overtly regard as interpenetrating (as in a dialogue, one side may believe that to believe something, including this, is a form of relation to his interlocutor, whereas the other may not, a situation that does not prevent both these opinions from expressing belief in the relation to each other). However, in so doing, both are "regarding as interpenetrating," and both are "regarding as opposed." The latter is simply stressing "the interpenetration that constitutes regarding as separate"; the former focuses on "the regarding as separate that constitutes interpenetration." Thus is the interpenetration of interpenetration and separation, the non-duality of non-duality and duality.

Zhili's claim can be understood as an assertion that all experience essentially is like two people talking to each other in this sense. One (knows that he) knows he is talking (responding and making stimuli) and the other, although he also knows it, since he is saying it precisely by denying it, does not know that he knows it (he does not explicitly recognize his intersubjective

stimulus and response as such, although they are operative and discoverable in his subjectivity). Moreover, even the cognitive claim "they are separate" turns out to be readable as *meaning* "they are interconnected" and vice versa.

Zhili's most complete statement on this simultaneous presence of two opposite subjective states, this eternal copresence of duality and non-duality, together with their eternal and equally essential differentiation, is as follows:

Q.: The perfect principle is subtle and marvelous, is neither pure nor defiled, and involves neither appropriating or rejecting. But now the *Visualization of Amitāyus Sūtra* [a Pure Land text] sets up [the opposition between] pure and defiled and calls on people to adopt one and reject the other. Since this violates the marvelous principle and is not the highest vehicle, how can you call it the cultivation of the mind and marvelous contemplation that reveals the real-mark [absolute reality]?
A.: In interpreting the teachings, if you seek the sense according to [the literal meaning of] the names, you will get the point not even once in ten thousand tries. But if you can fix the meanings of the names according to the sense, in ten thousand tries you will miss the point not even once. This is truly because the names used within [Buddhist] principle and without, in the Lesser and Great Vehicles, in the gradual and the sudden, are all quite similar sounding; so it is necessary to determine their position by examining their aptness or divergence from the point. Thus [the different meanings given to the terms] "Emptiness" and "the Mean" are what we use to distinguish the Small Vehicle from the Great Vehicle, and we further use "gradual" and "sudden" to distinguish between the Separate and the Integrated teachings, so that there is not the least confusion of the meanings of the terms in question. Only then can these doctrines be used as the basis of contemplation.

Thus our school uses six phrases to judge the ways in which the meanings of these terms differ and coincide. These are [two senses in which] they refute each other, [two senses in which] they cultivate one another, and [two senses in which] they are identical to one another. Since there are two senses for each of these three categories, we get a total of six phrases. Now let us use these six to judge where these teachings differ.

First, we must distinguish the different meanings that lie behind the use of the same terms. [There are four different meanings for the phrase "neither pure nor defiled" 不淨不垢.] That is: non-Buddhists have the conception of annihilation that is "neither pure nor defiled." The Two Vehicles have the realization of Emptiness that is "neither pure nor defiled." The Separate Teaching has the [Dharma]-gate of "the Exclusive Mean" which is "neither pure nor defiled." The Integrated Teaching has the principle of the "hidden treasury" [i.e., the inherent repleteness of all possibles, both pure and defiled, in every actual] which is "neither pure nor defiled."

There are also four different meanings for "purity." The non-Buddhists cling to purity based on likes and dislikes. The Two Vehicles have the realization of the purity of cutting off delusion. The Separate Teaching has the [Dharma-]gate of separating

from all taint and gradually becoming pure 離染漸淨. The Integrated Teaching has the principle of sudden purity that is identical to taint 即染頓淨.

Once we are clear on this, we can go on to discuss the sense in which "purity" and "neither pure nor defiled" refute one another. The "sudden purity" of the Integrated Teaching refutes the "neither pure nor defiled" in the senses conceived by the non-Buddhists, the Two Vehicles, and the Separate Teaching. At the same time, the "neither pure nor defiled" of the Integrated Teaching is set up to refute the other three conceptions of "purity."

As for the sense in which they cultivate one another: the first three conceptions of purity are cultivations [that lead to] the Integrated Teaching's "hidden treasury which is neither pure nor defiled." At the same time, the first three conceptions of "neither pure nor defiled" are cultivations [that lead to] the Integrated Teaching's "sudden purity that is identical to taint."

As for the sense in which they are identical to one another: the Integrated Teaching's "sudden purity that is identical to taint" is precisely "the hidden treasury that is neither pure nor defiled." The "neither-pure-nor-defiled hidden treasury" is precisely "the sudden purity that is identical to taint." Now the marvelous contemplation we speak of here is to contemplate the four Pure Lands in their identicalness to the tainted mind. In thus reflecting on the Quiescent Light [Pure Land], how is there any difference from "the secret treasury that is neither pure nor defiled"? . . . You need to understand that "pure" here means to be free from "purity" and "affliction," and thus the Pure Land here is pure in the sense of manifesting the principle of the equality between purity and affliction. This is what is meant by a doctrine in which the name is biased, but the meaning is perfect. It is only because the receptive capabilities of the listeners have a strong tendency to renounce the impure that it was appropriate to use the concept of "purity" in the sense of making pure of [free of] all characteristic marks. Thus here "purity" and "neither pure nor impure" are not in conflict with one another.

Moreover you should know that if appropriating and rejecting are brought to their ultimate (*qu she ruo ji* 取拾若極), they are not any different from neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting.[69]

The first thing to note here is that both the "purity" and the "neither pure nor impure" of the Integrated Teaching were originally polemical in nature, aimed at refuting the "neither pure nor impure" and "purity" of the lesser teachings, respectively. This situates us once again within the concept of upāya as the condition for all determinations whatsoever, that is, for the ontologically fundamental status of intersubjectivity. When the Separate Teaching, for example, says "All things are manifestations of the Exclusive Mean, which transcends the two opposite extremes of purity and impurity," the Integrated Teaching refutes this by saying, "The Mean not only transcends but also includes the extremes, and either extreme is identical to the Mean. Moreover,

pure here means to be free of definitive attachment to either purity or impurity, or to neither; it means their interpenetration. Hence the impurity is itself pure, and hence we can assert purity."[70] When the Separate Teaching says, "Purity is the realization of this Mean, which transcends the tainted attachment to the two extremes," the Integrated Teaching replies, "The hidden treasury includes in its nature both the tainted attachment to the extremes and the Mean that transcends and includes them. It is biased neither to the subjectively pure (which transcends objective purity and impurity—realization of Emptiness) nor to the subjectively impure (which separates and clings to either purity or impurity—realization of Provisional Positing)." Again, the purpose of the assertion of any position at all is purely remedial and intersubjective; it is a corrective to the bias of the previous position and thus can be stated whichever way takes best aim at the phrasing of the previous bias.

Because of the Tiantai notion of upāya and the ultimate non-duality of the provisional and the ultimate, these previous biases are means that lead to the realization of the final refutation—precisely because they provoke this refutation and the further refinements it brings, just as a deluded stimulus provokes a compassionate enlightened response. The mistaken notions of neither-nor are what produce the Integrated truth of Pure, and the mistaken notions of Pure are what lead to the Integrated truth of neither-nor. This follows the set-up / punch line structure of the relative and absolute marvels, which posit by means of exclusion. This is the sense in which the two "cultivate" one another.

In each of the teachings prior to the Integrated, there is always some concept of *both* what transcends pure and impure (good and evil, value and anti-value) and *also* of some value that is pursued. However, in each of these teachings, these are two separate concepts. That is, the non-Buddhists have a concept of nothingness that is value-neutral; they also have a concept of pleasure or moral good that is to be pursued, but for them these are two completely different things. The Two Vehicles have a notion of Emptiness that transcends all value duality but also embrace a program of destroying delusion in order to realize it; value concepts are used to get beyond value concepts, and the ends and means are unintegrated. The Separate Teaching posits the Mean that transcends and includes both extremes of any dichotomy, but again it also posits the realization of this Mean as a desideratum that must be attained by eliminating the undesirable misunderstanding about this fact. In each case, these are regarded as two separate, even opposed concepts, a sort of unresolved contradiction. These, however, lead in a criss-cross manner to the Integrated version of their opposites. Deluded purity leads not to the genuine, In-

tegrated purity, but to the Integrated neither-purity-nor-impurity; deluded neither-nor, on the other hand, ends up revealing the Integrated purity. The real meaning of deluded purity is the true neither/nor; the real meaning of deluded neither/nor is the true purity. But since the latter two are identical, all the previous contrasted concepts turn out to be identical to one another as well, precisely because each fails to be what it claims. On each level, what is said (or apparently led to) and what is meant (or what is really led to) are opposed, and the latter turns out to be just the other, suppressed half of the unresolved conflict. It is only in the Integrated Teaching that these two extremes, which always exist, are seen to be one and the same.

It is in this peculiarly Tiantai criss-cross manner that we get the non-duality between "purity" and "neither purity nor impurity." These are simply two ways of saying the same thing. For "purity" here means "free from the bias toward [a lower order of] purity or impurity." But this is also self-referential; the two ways of putting the case are mutually corrective. Within the Integrated Teaching itself, to cling to the "purity" way of putting the case is corrected by the "neither/nor" way of putting it, and vice versa. We must be able to see them as identical. Moreover, by the non-duality of provisional and ultimate (which is itself an expansion of the bilateral simultaneity of the *ganying* dialogue, the non-duality between the stimulus and its response), this also means that either of these ways of putting the case is identical to all the previous positions they refuted and is thus identical to all the forms of "taint" embodied in these biased subjective positions. Once the Integrated Teaching has dawned, the necessity of positing the opposed "neither/nor" and "Pure" of the lesser teachings, as well as the hidden unity of these two opposites brought about by the failure of both claims, is realized.

This brings us back to the "breaking off of afflictions that is also not a breaking off." In the sense that they are refuted, they are "broken off," and one is in this sense "pure" of these taints. But in the sense that their refutation was due to their own intrinsic nature and not something separate from themselves, and in that the refutation forever includes in itself the positions it refuted (so that they can be—and always already are—used in interaction with deluded sentient beings, as provisional teachings that are ultimately identical to the ultimate truth in that they lead to it—since self-praxis and teaching of others are one), the taints themselves are never broken off; one is neither pure nor impure vis-à-vis these taints.

From this, we can see the irony of Zhili's critique of other understandings of the "identity" of delusion and enlightenment, namely, the Zongmi/ Shanwai

position summed in the proposition attributed by Zongmi to Huike, "There has never been any delusion; it has always been enlightenment," which Zhili ridicules as amounting to the claim, not that delusion is enlightenment, but simply that enlightenment is enlightenment, that one side exists and the other does not,[71] which serves as the foil for the exposition of Zhili's notion of truly "sudden" identity between the two in the passage that opens this section, *dangti quanshi*. On the surface, this Zongmi/Shanwai teaching is much more sudden and immediate, much more obvious a sense of identity than that put forward by Zhili. It has no use for the upāya structure, the seeming waiting around to achieve buddhahood and then retrospectively seeing its causes as identical. Rather, it simply asserts that the undetermined perceptivity of the mind, as it is functioning at this moment, is precisely what enlightenment is; there is no need to go anywhere to get to it. For Zhili, however, this eliminates precisely what is crucial, the real contrast between the two sides, delusion and enlightenment, which for him is precisely what constitutes their identity. This is like saying, "We don't need set-ups anymore, they aren't humorous anyway, let's get straight to the punch line." But going around saying just the punch line, although it seems like a much more sudden way of getting to the humor, actually gets to no humor at all. Without the serious set-up to be reinterpreted as humorous by the punch line, the punch line, too, loses its humor. Delusion qua delusion is necessary for enlightenment to be enlightenment, and both sides must always be present and effective within each.

Thus Zhili at the end of the passage quoted above is able to make the startling claim that to adopt and to reject are themselves no different from being beyond appropriating and rejecting, just as the neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting (neither-purity-nor-impurity) of the Integrated Teaching is no different from its appropriation of "purity"; all these terms are dependent on their relation to the refutation, derivation from, and identity with the same terms as used in the other teachings. If one is able to see the way they are inherent in the very nature of things and in each other, as set-ups to punch lines, even the appropriating and rejecting of the other teachings are themselves the neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting of the Integrated Teaching and vice versa. To adopt and to reject (be tainted, biased) are identical to neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting if one sees them as opposed to and in dialogue with the "pure" enlightened neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting. It acts as this stimulus precisely because if we consider this delusion closely, trying to regard it just as delusion and not in any relation—as stimulus or otherwise—to its own negation, enlightenment, we inevitably fail. It turns out to be appearing

this way because of certain presupposed contexts constituted by apparently other quiddities, which themselves are in just the same situation, needing further contexts to determine them. All these contexts just appear here as this biased separation. To get to the bottom of it means to fail to get to the bottom of it, to realize that it falls out its own bottom, that this very quiddity, unchanged, is equally readable as all other quiddities, and that this rereading is not something added to the original reading, but is already what reading per se is. This means one is at the same time biased (choosing one thing over another) and not-biased. Again, this can be applied at any meta-level of abstraction.

As Zhili puts it elsewhere,

> In substance, appropriating and rejecting are no different from non-appropriating and non-rejection, and in function too they operate simultaneously. Thus we may speak of three types of Dharma-gates: the Dharma-gate of appropriation, the Dharma-gate of rejection, and the Dharma-gate of neither-appropriation-nor-rejection. These are also just the Dharma-gates of the three poisons, which inherently include all dharmas. . . . Whatever one takes pleasure in is what is appropriate to one, is what one may practice, and is what one will be enlightened by (*suile suiyi suixiu suiwu* 隨樂隨宜隨修隨悟).[72]

Since each thing is all things, to choose or adopt one thing is in fact to choose all things. Hence nothing has been chosen, and no choice has been made. To choose all things is also to reject all things; for a choice of one thing is always a rejection of something else, and since each thing is all things, to reject one thing is to reject all things. Hence nothing has been rejected, and no rejection has occurred. To choose or to reject is thus to neither-choose-nor-reject. Moreover, since both (purity and neither-purity-nor-impurity, appropriation-and-rejecting, and neither-appropriation-nor-rejection, bias and non-bias) are happening at every locus, any can serve as the locus of Buddhist practice and enlightenment.

Zhili is therefore perfectly free to say, in certain situations, that delusion is to see the world wrong, via the biased attachments and passions (*qing* 情), and enlightenment is seeing things after this *qing* has been overcome. Thus, one should strive to eliminate passions and subjective bias. This seems to affirm a simple objective/subjective split, in which the objective reality is purely good, but one can see it either wrongly or rightly. He can speak, that is, in terms of the Dharma-gate of choosing and rejecting and advocate choosing some things and rejecting others. This is because he regards this as something that, when fully understood, is identical to neither-choosing-nor-rejecting. Hence he can

also affirm that the biased attachments (*qing*) themselves, since they are also existent objects in that objective world (that is, *ran* 染 as well as *hui* 穢), are intrinsically pure. This purity does not mean they are not tainted or impure. Rather, it is precisely because they are truly and forever tainted that their taint is inherently included in the nature, that they are always at the same time pure. Indeed, this taint is pure because of its conflict with purity, just as the proposition "This viewpoint is unrelated to any other" is related to other viewpoints precisely by contradicting and distinguishing itself from them, or just as the set-up is funny because it is serious in contrast to the punch line. Bias or definitiveness (which are, for Zhili, the same thing) is a form of unbiasedness and interpenetration. To be biased is to be determinate, and to be determinate is to be indeterminate. To be always determinate qua indeterminate and vice versa is to be unbiased. As Zhili says elsewhere,

> Mind and matter are in their entity not two, but in the realm of biased passions (*qing*) they are firmly held to be different. If you want to refute the biased passion that firmly holds them thus, you must push it all the way to the end (*xutuidaobianji* 須推到邊際). If you realize that that [this biased passion] depends on the treasury of the principle, there are no dharmas that need be abandoned [N.B. they are refuted (*po* 破) but not abandoned (*yi qi* 遺棄)—seen as empty, but not non-existent]—rather, by means of this [biased passion, *qing*] the perfection [*yuan* 圓, integrated interpenetration] and eternity are manifested. Why try to get far away from it?[73]

Precisely because the biased attachment is a denial of interpenetration, the interpenetration of the nature is revealed by it. Just because it is serious, it is funny. Just because it is a delusion, it is a stimulus, and just because it is a stimulus, it is an upāyic transformation-response, and just because it is simultaneously both sides of this dialogue, simultaneously deluded and enlightened, it is ultimate truth. Just because X is appearing, it is appearing as something else, and therefore as anything else, and therefore appearing everywhere and in everything. Just because it is provisionally posited, it is empty, and the Mean, and not the Exclusive Mean. Hence, as Zhili puts it, "How could differentiation be different from non-differentiation?"[74]

To sum up, the "objective" or "unalterable" aspect referred to above (*jinghui, jinggou, xingshan xing'e, shijie jinghui jujing* 淨穢，淨垢，性善性惡，十界淨穢俱淨) means, as a first approach, simply the unalterable fact of potentiality to be any other thing, which is always present in any given thing. The objective purity and impurity belonging to the nature, on this first level, are "possibles" that always haunt any given actual. They refer to the fact that any

given X is always and forever susceptible to further determinations of its nature, that it is always possibly readable as something else, or its opposite, pure or impure. It can never be made pure or impure once and for all; it is from the beginningless beginning to the endless end in a state of interpenetration (*rong* 融). This applies equally both to physical objects and to subjective modes of experience. The subjective sense of taint as opposed to purity (*ranjing, qingzhi ze shijie jinghui ju ran* 染淨，情執則十界淨穢俱染) would then refer to the delusion of either/or, the biased passion that everything has to be either one way or the other. This would also involve the implicit or explicit belief that this moment of biased passion must either realize that this ineradicable possibility of turning over inheres in it itself (in which case all the various moments would to it be equally pure and interpenetrating, since this means interpenetrating with the enlightened at all times), or not realize it (in which case they are all equally clogged, stuck, deluded, even in the realms of enlightenment, which if clung to in this way become a form of delusion, karma, and bias).

But this is merely how this moment appears to itself, so to speak. It has no privileged status over the way it appears to a subsequent moment, for the concept of mutually isolated moments has already been refuted. Thus all is illusion, and at the same time all is reality, as Zhiyi says repeatedly. There is nothing but the way moments appear, either to themselves or to other moments, and no way to fix any of these appearances as a standard over the others. At the moment when all things seem to me to be aspects of buddhahood, they are so. At the moment when they all seem to be aspects of deviltry, they are so. And yet they are not so, for these moments incorporate and regard each other, and their vision of each other is of equal validity as their vision of themselves. Moreover, to appear as one or the other is itself a way of appearing as both, just as the expression of the disbelief in communication expresses the belief in communication. The "objective purity and impurity" refer simply to this inescapable bothness.[75]

But to speak merely of "potentiality" is misleading. Any given moment is always already being actively experienced as something else in the experience of some other member of the total intersubjective network, whose experience it must take into account in constituting its own experience. Indeed, it is always already being experienced as *all* Three Thousand other things, since three thousand qualitatively different perspectives are always seeing it. For since no moment ever begins or ends, any moment that ever sees it is always seeing it. To realize this is to know not only that this realization can always

turn into non-realization, and vice versa, but also that my present moment of realization is also already, in its appearance to the deluded beings with whom I am always conversing (which is precisely as true and as false as its appearance to myself, and indeed constitutes that appearance), non-realization. To not realize this is to think that at this moment I simply am either pure or impure, am happy or sad, am good or bad, am deluded or enlightened. But this delusion itself is always redetermined by being viewed by and incorporated into another moment, a moment enlightened to the interpenetration of these opposites and therefore also to the non-duality of provisional and ultimate, the non-duality of stimulus and response, the omnipresent salvific transformation of bodhisattvas into states of ignorance, and so on.

In other words, the intersubjective premise, which views even the relation between two moments of experience separated in time as essentially no different from the intersubjective mutual regard of two sentient beings, and the all-pervasiveness of any moment of time that goes with this overcome the temporal dividedness that would allow the seed or cause to simply "be" evil or deluded and later to "become" or "lead to" an opposite but equally unmixed state of good or enlightenment. The mutual regard means that each side of the equation is always both sides, not only potentially or objectively, but even actually and subjectively. Thus this delusion that one must be either deluded or enlightened can come to be seen to have always also been a form of realization of the fact that it was never one or the other (hence its anxiety, its suffering, its impermanence—these were themselves forms of immediately realizing the constant undecidable redefinition of this moment, expressions of separateness that at the same time express interpenetration). And yet it was the unawareness of its sameness with enlightenment that made it also different from enlightenment. Delusion and enlightenment differ in being the same and are the same in differing. They must always be perfectly opposed and perfectly identical. And so on ad infinitum. The aim of contemplation, as Zhili understands it, is to see this going on everywhere and forever, that any position can be correct as an upāya and that no way of stating the case stands up forever, that all is true and all is false, that every experience is enlightened and every experience is deluded. It is to posit 假 and negate 空 at the same time 中, at every level of self-reference and every order of abstraction. Such is the unchangeable dialogue between delusion and enlightenment that constitutes our being: there can be never be a final conclusion about who or what any thing is.

The Ultimacy of the Dung Beetle

Such a position, needless to say, has far-reaching metaphysical and ethical implications. The purpose of this section is to make them more explicit. A handful of slogans are traditionally associated with Zhili and the Shanjia movement—"contemplation of the deluded mind [as opposed to the Pure Mind]" (*wangxin guan* 妄心觀), "the principle in the Separate Teaching also follows conditions [and hence this is not what distinguishes the Integrated Teaching]" (*bieli suiyuan* 別理隨緣), "the poison of Principle is the evil inherent in the Buddha-Nature [and hence can never be eliminated]" (*lidu xing'e* 理毒性惡), "physical form-only [not just mind-only] inherently includes all dharmas" (*wei se ju yiqie fa* 唯色具一切法), "the phenomenon as such is universal [rather than phenomenon being synonymous with particularity and principle with universality]" (*shizong* 事總), and "the ultimacy of the dung beetle" (*jiujing jieqiang* 究竟蛣蜣). All of these are intimately connected to the matter at hand, but I focus here on the ultimacy of the dung beetle, for this little-understood notion is probably the quickest and most efficient way to see what is most distinctive in Zhili's thought and what is really at stake in it. In it we find a full exposition of the notion that "if we get to the bottom of," if we fully realize, push to the extreme or all the way to the furthest reaches, or dwell deeply in (*qushe ruo ji* 取捨若極, *xu tui dao bianji* 須推到邊際, *shenzhu* 深住) delusion, appropriation and rejection, bias, discriminative thinking, we will see that these are identical to non-bias, to the Mean, to buddhahood.

The *locus classicus* for this doctrine is found in Zhili's discussion of the "Six Identities" (*liuji* 六即) in the *Guanwuliangshoufojing shu miaozongchao*. The Six Identities are one of the ways Zhiyi balanced his view of value paradox. Sentient beings are "identical" to the Buddha, and evil is "identical" to good, but at the same time they are not identical. That is, there are six levels of identity between them, and both their sameness and their differentiation are to be given equal weight. These six identities are:

1. Identity in principle: the objective fact that all things are Buddha; that whether they know it or not they are of the nature of enlightenment. Buddhahood at this level is still pure unrealized potentiality, inherent in all things.

2. Identity in name: certain beings hear the doctrine, "You are identical to Buddha," and if they believe it, they are identical in name; they have this cognitive knowledge of the principle that all are Buddhas.

3. Identity in contemplation and practice: after accepting this doctrine, these beings become Buddhists and practice the Buddhist path and make progress toward manifesting this inherent potential Buddhahood.

4. Identity of semblance: further progress into the ranks and levels of Buddhist mythology.

5. Partial realization: the highest ranks of bodhisattva practice.

6: Ultimate identity: becoming an actual Buddha in practice.

Now in both common sense and Zhiyi's versions, this doctrine posits a straightforward path of progress from deluded sentient being to enlightened Buddha in which the deluded being realizes an inherent potential. All things are identical to Buddha in principle. After practicing the Buddhist path, they will fully realize this identity, and all will then be Buddhas and no longer the evil, deluded sentient beings they began as (Zhanran's understanding, so it seems at times, of the ineradicability of evil in buddhahood is that the evil or deluded side becomes merely potential). The final stage of ultimate identity—buddhahood—then becomes the full manifestation of the true nature of all things. In terms of value and anti-value, this amounts to saying, "All anti-value is really identical to value, but this value is hidden in it and merely principle. But when these evil things practice the path, they can shed the outer semblance of anti-value—their sin, suffering, and finitude—and reveal their true nature, goodness, and enlightenment, either eradicating delusion or permanently relegating it to an unmanifest or sublated state as inactive potential." Zhili, however, will not have any of this. This is not consistent with the rest of the Tiantai teachings as he reads them. Instead, he gives the following exegesis of the Six Identities:

First we express the Six Identities with respect to the term "Buddha." . . . "Buddha" is Sanskrit, meaning in our language "awakening." . . . This is the highest fruit, the ultimate enlightenment. . . . There are six forms of identity with this enlightenment. "Identity" means to be just this (*jizhe shi yi* 即者是義). . . . All beings, both ordinary and sagely, are entirely nothing but this enlightenment. Although they are entirely thus, they differ in the marks of their causes and effects, their levels of delusion and enlightenment, and thus the six types [of degrees of identity] are used to distinguish these phenomena. . . . But if one does not understand the inherent taint and inherent evil of the original nature, then one has to definitively cut off and destroy all taints and evils; how then can you speak of them as being completely identical to [enlightenment]? . . .

Q.: When you say that all ordinary and sagely beings are completely identical to the

Buddha, do you mean identical to the Buddha you yourself will become in the future or to the Buddha which Śākyamuni has already become?
A.: The essence of these two Buddhas is the same. Thus the realized Buddhas are precisely the Buddhas of the inherent natures of sentient beings. When one is deluded, all are deluded; when one manifests all manifest. Thus the Six Identities can be predicated between one's own present body and mind and both the Buddha one will become and the Buddha others have become.

Aside from the insistence on the cutting off that is no cutting off and the emphasis on inherent evil, this is an unsurprising reading of the Six Identities doctrine: all beings gradually manifest the buddhahood that has always been implicit in them. But here Zhili throws his surprise punch:

Moreover, you should know that the meaning of the Six Identities is not restricted to identity with the Buddha. The progressive realization of all false and real beings, from the Three Vehicles, gods, and humans all the way down to the lowest dung beetle and the bodies and minds of those in purgatory must be distinguished according to the Six Identities. This means to be a dung beetle in principle, to be a dung beetle in name, and so on, up until one reaches the level of ultimate identity to the dung beetle. Since the text is now discussing the founder of the teaching, it distinguishes these levels as they apply to one's identity to the Buddha. But this is a way of telling us that all Ten Realms are the nature of principle, none of them is not the entire dharma-realm, and each one of them is immutable. Thus the progression from the identity of name on not only reveals buddhahood but at the same time manifests equally the other nine realms. Reaching the accomplishment of the final fruit, all Ten Realms are ultimate. Thus the Six Identities must be understood as applying [not only to the levels of one's identity to the Buddha but also the levels of one's identity] to the dung beetle and all the others.[76]

With this, Zhili has completely changed the implications of this doctrine. What becomes increasingly manifest in the course of practice is not just one's inherent buddhahood, but also one's inherent dung-beetlehood, purgatory-hood, evil-hood. The same of course goes for Asura-hood, animality, hungry-ghost-hood, human-hood, deva-hood, Two-Vehicles-hood, bodhisattva-hood. All these become increasingly manifest as one progresses. The nature that we increasingly manifest in the course of Buddhist practice, then, is not just buddhahood; this would be the Buddha of the Separate Teaching, only-principle, only-the-Buddha. As Zhili says elsewhere, "The 'substance of the nature' refers not to the 'one nature' [i.e., the one Buddha-nature]; it means, rather, the Three-Thousand-nature."[77] This Three-Thousand-nature, the

unchangeable inherence of all Three Thousand distinctions and finite determinations, is sometimes called Buddha-nature, sometimes the mind-nature, but these are merely partial designations to make a pragmatic point about our current praxis. Since "Buddhas, sentient beings, and the mind" are identical, it would be equally correct to call this nature "the sentient beings nature" or, in particular, "the dung-beetle nature." Practice makes one's inherent buddhahood more and more apparent and functional; but it also makes one's inherent dung-beetlehood more and more apparent and functional. It is not the case that Buddha equals principle (nature, noumena, God) and that all differentiated finite forms (suffering and evil, the principle of individuation, delusion) equal phenomena, in which the latter cover up their true nature, buddhahood, the principle of their being. The latter position is common to many forms of mysticism and to what Tiantai calls the Common and the Separate teachings. Zhili characterizes this teaching as follows:

The practitioner of the Separate Teaching, from the beginning of his practice, believes that his present awareness is the eternal Middle Way Buddha-nature; following the categorization of the teachings, we call this view "the Exclusive Mean." It is entirely good and pure and does not include in itself taint or evil. Although it has no taint or evil, since its nature is numinously aware, it happens to give rise to forced cognitions, and this gives rise to the appearance of external objects. Discriminations are then made about these objects, leading to attachments to self and other, and thus the never-dimmed awareness gives rise to perverse views and thoughts. Since the taint and evil present in it are not inherent to its nature, they are said to exist as transformations and creations derived from following along with conditions. Since these transformations and creations are not originally part of the nature, such views and thoughts are not identical to the pure Middle Way and must be definitely destroyed. Hence the idea of "identicalness" [between value and anti-value] does not work here. Thus they cannot [like proponents of the Integrated Teaching] say [the entire universe is] nothing but attachment, or nothing but false views, or nothing but physical form, or nothing but a particular fragrance.[78]

The Integrated position is that the universe can be characterized in terms of any given quiddity and as exclusively that quiddity, if all that it is to be that quiddity is fully realized. In the present case, the Integrated Teaching is that the entire universe is nothing but dung-beetlehood. In contrast, examples of the view of the Separate and Common teachings are the undifferentiated Brahman that stands at the foundation of all differentiated beings in some forms of Vedantic philosophy, Spinozistic substance, or even, in some readings, the Mādhyamika Emptiness, of which nothing can be predicated and

which is free of all determinate marks—or which simply is the freedom from any determinate marks, for in this context it amounts to the same thing. Spiritual progress in this case is a progression away from the limitations of finitude toward the undifferentiated transcendent essence of, or truth about, all. As Meister Eckhart says: "Any flea as it is in God is nobler than the highest angel in himself. Things in God are all the same: they are God Himself."[79] God himself means that which is the same in all beings, and in realizing this inner essence, they become nobler than any being is in its separate phenomenal self. The implication here is that the attainment of the "sameness," this godhood of any individual thing, is tantamount to an overcoming of its particular differences.[80] The Shanwai position, like Eckhart's, is close to the commonsense notion that Buddha and "ultimacy" are convertible terms. A dung beetle cannot be ultimate, since ultimacy involves the overcoming of dung-beetleness in favor of buddhahood.

Zhili, on the other hand, allows for the ultimate dung beetle. It is not the case that realization is a process of moving farther and farther from the determination of dung-beetlehood and toward the determination/indetermination of buddhahood. Rather, the dung beetle's problem in its unrealized state is not that it must overcome dung-beetleness but that it has not completely manifested or realized what it is to be a dung beetle, The unrealized state may be described as a form of denial or avoidance of the truth of its present being, what it is to be a dung beetle, in both knowledge and function. If it can function even more "dung-beetlishly," this will be enlightenment. For to truly be a dung beetle would be to see that being a dung beetle is being Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Mean, and thus identical to all Three Thousand determinations, that the entire universe and each of the Three Thousand are in fact nothing but the quiddity of dung-beetlehood, that is, what it really is to be a dung beetle. And what is it, according to the Tiantai teachings, to be a dung beetle? To be a dung beetle is to be all the various forms of non-dung-beetlehood *as* the particular form of dung beetle. To do this thoroughly would be to see that dung-beetlehood can and does infringe on all possible acts, that every possible mode of being, including humanness and buddhahood, are expressions of dung-beetlehood, that one can be a dung beetle *as* any of these other things. It need not limit its specific dung-beetleness to only its most habitually obvious forms, like rolling balls of dung. One can roll balls of dung in an infinite variety of ways; all other actions are forms that rolling balls of dung may appear *as*. To be a dung beetle is to not be a dung beetle (Emptiness), while provisionally being posited as a dung beetle

(Provisional Positing); moreover, not to be a dung beetle is to be provisionally posited as a dung beetle (the Mean). This means to see this provisional positing equally and simultaneously as a deluded stimulus and as an enlightened and enlightening response to that stimulus, belonging exclusively to no one side of the exchange and without nullifying the contrast between the deluded stimulus and the enlightened response with which it is revealed by the latter to be identical, since this contrast is precisely what constitutes this identity. When one is a dung beetle, all are dung beetles; the specific quiddity dung beetlehood pervades all times and places. But this means that all things are aspects of dung beetlehood, which means that all forms of non-dung-beetlehood (and enlightened responses to dung-beetlehood, negations of its immediacy) are also aspects of dung-beetlehood.

It is the assumption of naïve positivity on the part of the dung beetle, its practical belief that it is simply dung beetle in an in-itself mode, a dung beetle as opposed to not a dung beetle, its limiting of the expressions of the specific experienced quiddity of dung-beetlehood to a narrow habitual few, its (bad) faith that it is just what it is, that constitutes its ignorance. The dung beetle's current practical interpretation of its own behavior (rolling around in dung, molding it into balls, and eating it), qua unreflective premise to its actions in this case (assuming that it lacks reflective self-consciousness and the ability to hold cognitive positions with respect to propositions), is to see it as something that pertains only to itself, to which it has privileged access, which has one meaning that it alone is privy to, which stands in unresolved contrast to all that is non-dung-beetlehood, and which is always either painful or pleasant, interpreted in only a single hermeneutic context. When the dung beetle has reached the stage of ultimacy, its behavior—still rolling around in dung and eating it, along with his "previous" deluded assumptions about it—will appear to the beetle rather as also enlightened responses to this deluded suffering, as punch lines to its set-up, which stand in contrast and identity to it. That is, it will be the same content, but posited in intersubjective ideality and hence belonging to no one in a definitive immediate way. Precisely as the negation of all other determinacies, it will be seen as constitutive of them, as included in them, as expressed by them. This means that the dung rolling and so on are performed also by all other agents and by none, such that all other behaviors of apparently other agents (Buddhas, Śrāvakas, devas, humans, predators, hungry ghosts, beings in purgatory) are also equally this behavior and not this behavior, and both and neither, and none of the above, salvifically in all directions. The dung beetle will see that its present understanding is just one more

form of rolling dung and eating it, in no way different from the more literal forms, which also were never just rolling dung and eating it *simpliciter*. Philosophy, enlightenment, virtue—these, too, are legitimate expressions of eating dung, which can be read just as directly and viscerally as "dung eating" as the earlier form, given the broadened perspective they themselves provide. The more realized the dung beetle becomes, the more full of dung-beetlehood the universe comes to appear to it; the universe is precisely dung eating expressing itself in an infinity of forms.

The same goes for other beings. Our problem is not only that we do not see that we are identical to the Buddha, but also that we do not see that we are identical to the dung beetle. We have therefore a too limited notion of what it is to be "ourselves" or to be doing "this." To progress toward enlightenment is to progress simultaneously toward the realization of both of these identities. This may be called a radicalization of—or at least a making explicit of the radical implications of—the doctrine of the inherent inclusion of the Three Thousand quiddities. Enlightenment means not the overcoming of evil so as to manifest good but the full manifestation and realization of both good and evil. This manifestation consists in a realization of their mutual identity and the immutability of both. Neither can ever be eliminated, both have been there from the beginning, and neither obstructs the other. Indeed, to fully be one necessarily implies also being the other. The impression that they are separate or opposite is simply a result of not thoroughly getting to the bottom of them. This is not because both are some third neutral thing, but because what they are is something that is simultaneously all Three Thousand possible determinations, including whichever they had previously appeared to be, serving simultaneously as stimuli and responses, as set-ups and punch lines, to each other, and belonging exclusively to no single interpretive frame. Each and every moment of experience that has been read as dung-beetleish must also be readable as buddhaish, or tableish, or roller-skatingish, or cappucinoish, and vice versa.

A particularly vivid exposition of the implications of this way of thinking can be found in the works of the great Ming dynasty Tiantai exegete, Ouyi Zhixu:

To violate the nature is to accord with ignorance, and to accord with the nature is to violate ignorance. Thus "to violate" can be called evil, but it can also be called good; and "to accord" can be called good, but can also be called evil. In terms of identity in principle, the one word "good" applies to [lit., entails] all Ten Realms, since, in the case of the dharma-realm of the three evil paths, they are "good" in the sense that they

accord with their father, ignorance; they are filial to their mother, greedy attachment; they venture not to steal wisdom; they remain aloof from the wives and concubines of Dharma-joy; they create no verbal karma in the Buddhadharma; they are free of greed for the goodness of Buddhist principle and phenomena; they are free of anger toward the afflictions of false views and thoughts; they are wise in creating confusion and karma; and so on, until, in the case of the Buddha-realm, he is good in the sense of not murdering the truth of the Mean, not clinging to his own mind [hence not stealing], not attaching to appearance and desire [hence not being lascivious], not speaking any non-ultimate dharmas [hence not lying], having no greed for provisional good and no hatred of the two extremes, thereby comprehending the Three Truths.

Moreover, the one term "evil" equally applies to all Ten Realms, since, in the case of the three evil paths, they are evil in the sense that they kill, steal, and so on, and in the case of humans and gods, they are engulfed in the evil of being confused about the principle of the True [i.e., Emptiness], although they may not perform any phenomenal evils; in the case of the Two Vehicles, although they neither perform phenomenal evils nor are entrapped by the evil of being confused about the principle of the True, they are mired in the evil of confusion about the principle of the Common [i.e., provisional truth]; in the case of bodhisattvas, although they lack these forms of evil, they have the evil of being confused about the principle of the Mean. In the case of the Buddha, although he may be free of phenomenal evil and the evil of confusion concerning any of the Three Truths, he has in abundance the evils of murdering his father, ignorance, and so on. Thus we know that both good and evil inherently include all Ten Realms. . . . Thus from the purgatories up to the highest bodhisattvas, all are completely within principle but unable to put it to use. This is called being identical to the Buddha in principle, but it can also be called being identical to all Ten Realms in principle and can also be called being identical to good, or to evil, in principle only.[81]

Zhixu is here being faithful to Zhili's concept of the Six Identities. Enlightenment means realizing one's identity not only with the Buddha but with all sentient beings, and more important, with "evil" per se—or, for that matter, with any other quality. All would be found to apply to everything in just the same amusingly casuistic metaphorical way Zhixu elucidates here for the qualities "good" and "evil." At present we have not fully realized even our evil fully enough. The Buddha, who is so unfilial that he kills even the ground of his being, ignorance, is the only one who has really executed what we are feebly enacting in our own unfilial behavior. Likewise, everyone is being "unfilial" or "thieving" or "lascivious" in some sense or another. The Buddha does all this in a Buddha-like way, which turns out to mean to do it with the realization of its all-pervading character, to no longer regard it as merely one quality among others. That is, to do anything in a Buddha-like way is simply to do it more thor-

oughly in this sense. If I am experiencing the quality of, say, my own murderousness, I can see that this very quality is inherently identical to the Buddha-quality, as well as the Asura-quality, the deva-quality, and so on; without changing it in the least, it can be realized as a constituent in these various contexts that qualitatively changes as its horizons of relevance expand or contract.

The point here is really the same as that expounded in regard to the Mean: try as hard as you might to specify the feature of this quiddity that makes it what it is, it is always something that can apply equally to any other quiddity, if viewed in a certain way. Evil, you say, is disobedience, violation of the ground of one's being, pain-causing to someone dear? But all these things apply to everything done by everyone, in some sense or other. If this is really true of *any* feature of this quiddity, if it *always* applies equally to all others, then any further attempts to specify what makes it this rather than anything else—a particular combination, a certain context, a specified object—yields the same result. Any quiddity can be what is appearing *as* these things, and these things can be appearing *as* any quiddity.

This is why Zhili lays such stress on the doctrine of inherent evil (*xing e*), or the evil inherent in the Buddha nature, for only this makes the particular evil determinations themselves the whole Absolute. Zhili effectively summarizes his understanding of this doctrine as follows:

> The Nine Realms, in comparison to the Buddha-realm, are called evil. . . . The one term "inherently included" fully reveals the guiding principle of our teaching. Other teachers are aware that the nature inherently includes good, but they are baffled by our teaching that it inherently includes evil as well. . . . What is inherently included in the nature can never be changed. . . . Both good and evil are inherently included in the nature, and whatever is the nature interpenetrates with everything.[82]

This is a fairly standard reading of the doctrine, but with a succinct condensation of its real import for Zhili: to call something identical to "the nature" signifies that it is (1) unchangeable and (2) interpenetrates with everything. To assert that evil or any other particular thing is inherently nature means that this evil can never be changed and that it interpenetrates with all other things. Any entity qua nature is that entity seen in its ineradicability and interpenetration. Since evil is ineradicable and interpenetrating, every place and every moment involves it; hence even in the locus of the good, evil is present, and vice versa.

Each evil phenomenon is identical to the nature, and it may thus be called inherent evil. Since to be identical to the nature means to pervade all times and

places, this evil pervades and is pervaded by all the Three Thousand dharmas, penetrating even to the Buddhadharmas that respond to and negate it. Hence it is a "transcendental marvel," a glorious wonder, in its own right. Indeed, the Buddha is only the Buddha due to his realized identity with the other nine realms; hence, he could not cut them off without destroying his own nature and ceasing to be the Buddha as understood by the Integrated Teaching. They are eternal parts of the essence of the Buddha himself, who can never eliminate his inherent evil. Each of these parts contains the whole, and hence every evil dharma is itself, just as it is, the Absolute. Along the same lines, Zhili states:

> If you do not understand the meaning of the evil inherent in the nature, how can you understand that the Three Poisons are themselves the Three Contemplations? . . . The poisons of the principle-nature all pervade everywhere; thus they are called "great." . . . If ignorance and the other poisons were not identical to the nature, how could they be inexhaustible like space?[83]

Ultimacy means all-pervasiveness, in both time and space, but this must be understood in accordance with the teaching of mutual pervasion; each conflicting and differing quiddity pervades everywhere, even its opposite. To penetrate to the level of the nature is to realize this mutual pervasion, which reduces not to a featureless oneness but, rather, to an intersubjective plurality. To become anything thoroughly is to become a Buddha, that is, to become fully everything else, each particular differing thing. The more you become yourself, the more you become everyone else. This goes for each individual experience as well, and this is the thrust of Tiantai meditation. The more fully you experience this breath or any other moment of mental experience, the more you try to isolate and determine exactly what it is, aside from the expression that is being expressed here as breath, the more it interpenetrates, because of the intrinsic impossibility of this attempt. The same holds for all other quiddities, including the special quiddity known as buddhahood, which is derived as the negation of the observed forms of existence (suffering, impermanence, selflessness) and of their one-sided negation (the Two Vehicles). All the quiddities remain in this pervasion. Any of them is everywhere—the dung beetle is forever rolling balls of dung on the surface of every star, the ocean is tying its shoe, for the quiddity "ocean-ness" and the quiddity "shoe-tying" interpenetrate, since each is identical to the unchanging nature and is expressed in everything and at all times, and thus both are eternal and all-pervasive. In practical terms, both the obstruction (evil) and what is obstructed (good) are mutually pervading, hence each is inherently both obstruction and obstructed,

both good and evil, both stimulus and response, not in the sense of possessing two contrary sides or two combined parts, one good and one evil, but, rather, in that the whole entity exists in two alternative contexts at once and thus in its entirety always has these multiple meanings.

This must be carefully distinguished from the Separate Teaching's understanding of the case:

The advocates of the Separate Teaching say that the Dharmakāya is covered up by delusion because they do not know that the nature of original enlightenment inherently includes the meritorious properties of taint and evil, and so they think that taint and evil are not the two meritorious properties [of wisdom and liberation]. Thus for them, all the twofold [subjective and practico-inert] dharmas within delusion—the delusion of the Separate Teaching, of the Common Teaching, karmic and phenomenal consciousness, afflictions, karma, the Three Vehicles, and the six mundane paths, all the transformations of the world—are not the two Buddha-natures [as the Revealing and Conditioning causes], and since they are not themselves the Buddha-nature, they become delusions with the definitive (*ding* 定) ability to cover [up the Dharmakāya]. On this view, the original enlightenment of the Dharmakāya creates all the above deluded dharmas by following along with tainted conditions, and thus they say [the Dharmakāya is] covered up by delusion. But it must be understood that when we speak of "covering up" [in the Integrated Teaching], it is not like mud covering up an inanimate stone; that would merely be like the covering up of the principle of the Buddha-nature understood as the "Exclusive Mean." This would be like a purely good person (*chun shan ren* 淳善人), who does not possess in himself the ability to perform evil actions, but is forced by an evil person to commit various evils. In that case we could say the good man has been "covered up" by evil. . . . For the Integrated person [*yuanren* 圓人, i.e., a practitioner of the Integrated Teaching], it is otherwise; for he knows that original enlightenment inherently includes the nature of taint and evil and comprehends that tainted and evil practices are themselves precisely the two Buddha-natures. Therefore for him all the various forms of delusion are, right there and then, exactly as they are, nothing but the Buddha-nature as Conditioning and Revealing causes. How could the Buddha-nature cover up the Buddha-nature? It is as [Confucius said]:[84] "The Exemplary Man is not a utensil"—he is capable of both good and evil (*junzi bu qi shan e ju neng* 君子不器善惡俱能). If he performs evils together with evil people, he is only manifesting his own inherent capability—[his true self] is not covered up [or distorted] by this.[85]

Zhili's striking claim for the practical implication of the doctrine of inherent evil is that to be capable of both good and evil is superior to being a purely good person. The Buddha-nature as Cause Proper, about which one is deluded, is the same as the Buddha-nature as Conditioning and Revealing

causes, which is what was deluded and what blocked this apprehension. Thus with realization, both the good of enlightenment and the evil of delusion become fully manifest at last, as the true nature of both set-up and punch line become manifest when the latter is revealed. When this occurs, whichever side one appears as, it is both. Hence one is able to be truly good or truly evil, for the nature of this "truly" is that these are one and the same thing.

Comparison to Zhiyi and Zhanran

This represents a significant departure from Zhanran's understanding, in which goodness in the realm of practice seemed to be prized and the doctrine of inherent evil served only as a buttress to create this pure goodness on the practical level, with evil relegated increasingly to pure sublated potentiality or utilized in practice only by a Buddha *after* enlightenment. To be sure, like Zhanran, Zhili believes that an understanding of this doctrine is an irreplaceable aid to moral cultivation:

> When the two virtues [prajñā-wisdom and liberation] are still in the state of [mere potential] nature, they refer exclusively to delusion and karma, that is, the practices of good and evil that are inherently included in the nature. If one now can realize that at-variance practice is completely and inherently included in the nature, [it will be seen to be] interpenetrating and marvelous just as it is right here and now. . . . This function pervades all, and evil function, too, is not lacking from it. Because this [evil function] ultimately accords with the nature, it is itself able to produce good and destroy evil. Thus the understanding that tainted and evil functions are themselves the nature can be used as the most efficacious way to eliminate evil.[86]

However, this rhetoric is ambiguous: to "eliminate evil" means for Zhili to progress toward the state of "able to be good, able to be evil," rather than merely the progressive elimination of first-order evil. We may say that it entails a positing of meta-value as "able to do either, unbiasedness"—again the emphasis is on the quality of interpenetration. Elimination of evil in this sense means to eliminate bias, in practice as well as in principle. More specifically, this means to overcome the bias that evil is somehow less a part of the nature than is good, or to see evil as merely adventitious and hence escapable in practice. To eliminate evil in practice means to see practiced evil as actually pertaining to the nature, not to mere contingent practice. Even if it turns out, as I will argue below that it does not, that the concrete behavioral contents labeled "purely good" by Zhanran are precisely those labeled "able to be either good or evil" by Zhili, this shift in labels would bring with it radical structural and

theoretical consequences. Zhili, that is, condones evil behavior, both as an abstract category and in practice, in a way that Zhanran quite often does not and that Zhiyi is very careful about.

The difference between Zhanran (or at least the tendency in Zhanran picked up and emphasized by the Shanwai) and Zhili on this issue can be seen by comparing their comments on Vasumitra the prostitute, one of Sudhana's mentors in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, described as manifesting a feminine form pleasing to each type of sentient being so as to "free them with respect to the realm of desire." We recall Zhanran's stern warnings about such cases, cited in the preceding chapter. Zhili, on the other hand, says:

> To speak of "freeing them with respect to the realm of desire" is the aspect in-accordance [with common practices of Buddhist definitions of "good"]. To speak of "manifesting a feminine form pleasing to each type" is the aspect of at-variance [with these common practices]. Desire is an affliction; therefore we must speak of getting free of it (*li* 離). But desire is a Dharma-gate; therefore we must speak of dwelling within it (*zhu* 住). Freedom from it is precisely dwelling in it; there is nothing but freedom from it, nothing but dwelling in it; the freedom is deep as the dwelling is deep; the freedom reaches the ultimate as the dwelling reaches the ultimate (*jili jizhu weili weizhu lishen zhushen liji zhuji* 即離即住，唯離唯住，離深住深，離極住極).[87]

Zhili extends the evenhanded treatment characteristic of Tiantai thinking even to this meta-level; evil, like anything else, is both a Dharma-gate and an affliction, and both, and neither. It must be eliminated, but that goes for any posit—nirvāṇa, Buddha, good as well as saṁsāra and evil. All such things, if considered substantial as objects of clinging, must be overcome. At the same time, all of them, evil included, must be practiced, for all of them are Dharma-gates.[88] All of them must be provisionally posited, and all of them must be the Mean, that is, fully realized. Hence, here again, we have the rhetoric of bringing to the ultimate; like the dung beetle, desire must be "deeply dwelt in," brought to its ultimate limit, fully realized as such, and this will entail bringing one's freedom from it also to the ultimate, in accordance with the upāyic *ganying* structures elucidated above. One is free from it as a quiddity that appears *simpliciter* in one particular time and place, belonging to one agent, which is then expressed in a finite number of forms. But this means dwelling in it more thoroughly, for this freedom is accomplished only by seeing that it appears as everything else as well, that there is no such quiddity *simpliciter* prior to the various forms as which it is expressed, and that moreover this quiddity

is therefore absolutely inescapable. One has dwelt in it and realized that it is equally everywhere; that every apparently other quiddity is just another form in which it appears, is in response to it, is stimulating it, is redefining it, is redefined by it, is created by it, is creating it; that it is a means to all other quiddities as ends and an end to all other quiddities as means, and that these ends and means are just two ways of viewing one whole. To be free of it is to have it more deeply and thoroughly than one had it before. Desire as a finite thing is overcome only by desire as an infinite thing. To be free of it as a mere something among many other somethings means to dwell in it as something identifiably expressed and present in every other possible quiddity. Once that is done, there is no longer any need to escape from it or destroy it; desire itself turns out to be buddhahood, liberation, purity, and so on. Every other quiddity is appearing here as this desire—either as its components or as its contexts, which are equally components and expressions of this quiddity of desire, equally marked by it, in accordance with the set-up / punch line structure. In the same way, this desire appears everywhere else as every and any other quiddity. This explains also, as briefly noted above, the efficacy of this contemplation as Buddhist practice; to see desire in this way is no longer to have any desire about it, either to escape it or embrace it. Acceptance of desire has accomplished the original Buddhist desideratum, freedom from desire. In the realm of practice as in the realm of the nature, good and evil have equal rights; both are to be practiced, and both are to be overcome.

We see here again the dialectic of purity and neither-purity-nor-impurity outlined above, and of appropriating and rejecting and neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting. To fully (Integratedly) "dwell in" the deluded forms of "purity" assumed by all the lesser teachings is to be free from it, to realize Neither-purity-nor-impurity (in the Integrated sense). To fully dwell in the "neither/nor" assumed in the lesser teachings is to be free from it, to realize purity in the Integrated sense. To fully realize appropriation or rejection is to be free from them, to realize neither-appropriation-nor-rejection in the Integrated sense. To fully dwell in and realize evil is, by the same token, to be free from it, to realize the good, and vice versa.

A similar divergence between Zhanran and Zhili can be found in regard to the question of whether these evils are real or merely illusions created for the benefit of sentient beings. Zhanran was concerned with distinguishing whether such acts were done by already accomplished bodhisattvas or by beginning practitioners and with establishing the authority by which such acts were performed. Zhili, on the other hand, in discussing the illusory use of

tortures and executions to inspire sentient beings to change their ways, another incident from the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*, has this to say:

> Anger and hatred are used to bring things under control—this is the aspect of being in-accordance. They cause agony in the punishment of crimes—this is the aspect of being at-variance. Anger and hatred are afflictions and thus must be brought under control. Anger and hatred are Dharma-gates and thus must be practiced. Since being in-accordance and being at-variance are non-dual, one must be biased toward neither the control nor the practice of these evils. This is to be understood in the same sense as the previous example concerning desire. However, since desire is pleasant, it is genuinely manifested so as to receive beings and lead them to freedom from it. Anger and violence are painful; thus they are manifested as a merely illusory show in order to adjust others and lead them to freedom from them. But if the causal capacities call for it, it is also appropriate to kill, if benefit can be derived from this. . . . Thus illusory and real can manifest each other; in the cases of ignorance and desire, illusory manifestations can also be used. Once you understand that in-accordance and at-variance are identical to one another, you need not be restricted either to illusions or to real acts.[89]

Here again we see the thoroughness of Zhili's evenhandedness: all such acts are to be both practiced and eliminated (and these two are to be seen as non-dual) and can be either real or illusory as the occasion demands.

Indeed, it is in this sense that Zhili wishes to understand all forms of practice. He says of Avalokiteśvara, for example, that he "sees that all sentient beings are afflicted by the sins of the Three Poisons and also that they wish to fulfill the Dharma-gates of the Three Poisons. Thus he compassionately vows to make sentient beings free from the sins of the Three Poisons and at the same time to make them fulfill the virtues of the Three Poisons."[90] A meta-value of "sins and virtues" is posited here, but this does not lead to a stable non-paradoxical separation of levels—on the contrary, due to the particular definition of value here (interpenetration) this same paradox could be continued on the new meta-level as well, since dwelling in X and freedom from X are the same thing. The two sides will always both fall apart and come together.

It is this line of thinking that is manifested in Zhili's doctrine of the dung beetle. Like everything else, the quiddity of the dung beetle must be fully realized, and this means, by the Three Truths, to be thoroughly practiced and to be overcome, for these are one and the same thing. To see them as such is to see the dung beetle's ultimacy.

This ultimacy forms a kind of meta-value: for anything, good or evil, to be fully realized, brought to its ultimacy as the nature, is good; for it to be inade-

quately realized, is bad. "Fully realized" has an ontological dimension. It means becoming truly what it has always implicitly been, and this consists also in knowing itself as such, and in extending the function and characteristics peculiar to this particular being to all possible states, such that all are experienced as expressions thereof.

In other words, to be anything thoroughly, universally, unbiasedly ("Integrated"ly) is meta-value. The problem when you hate or lust is that you do not do it thoroughly enough—not all of you is lusting toward or hating all possible existences, such that any possible occurrence is seen as an expression of this hatred or lust. What is sought is the thoroughly realized, ultimate, universal lust, hatred, ignorance, dung-beetlehood. Anti-value, universalized, is value. This idea is also traceable in Zhiyi. Zhili's teaching can be considered a faithful emphasizing and extension of Zhiyi's teaching, taking this side as primary. For example, in the *Fahuaxuanyi*, Zhiyi tells us that in a certain sense the Śravakas (in Chinese, *shengwen* 聲聞, literally "sound-hearers") of the Tripiṭaka teaching are not yet *true* Śravakas. To truly be a "sound-hearer," one must have reached the fully realized position of the Integrated Teaching, as the *Lotus Sūtra* says: "We are today finally true 'sound-hearers,' for now we have made the 'sound' of the Buddha path 'heard' by all." The same is true of the arhats, which means literally "worthy of offerings": they truly fulfill their definition only when they reach the full realization of the ultimate teaching. Then, they say, we are now at last truly "worthy of offerings." Our previous claim to be so was a misunderstanding; or rather, we said more than we thought we meant at the time.[91] As in Hegel, what they say and what they mean differ, and the truth lies in what they say rather than in what they mean. They speak the ultimate Integrated Teaching without realizing it. All that is necessary, then, is to take their words literally, more literally than they do, allowing them every possible implication, applying them universally to all contexts and in all directions; then they will turn out to have been speaking the ultimate truth and practicing the highest good all along. The same goes for the Three Poisons: in the *Guanyinyishu*, Zhiyi speaks of the Great Greed, Great Hatred, and Great Ignorance (bringing to mind Mencius' dialogue with King Xuan of Qi, advising him to expand his greed, lust, and so on; see *Mencius*, 1B3–5):

All sentient beings are to be called those with too little greed, hatred, and ignorance. And why? They only hate the pains of the three evil paths of existence, are greedy for the pleasures of the human and divine paths. The Two Vehicles only hate

saṁsāra and are greedy for nirvāṇa—this is what is meant by too little [hatred and greed]. The bodhisattva is otherwise; he not only takes joy in seeking one type of Buddhadharma, but searches everywhere for unspeakably many Buddhadharmas, like the sea consuming all the rivers, and still is never satisfied. [This is his great greed.] Not only does he reject saṁsāra, he also rejects nirvāṇa. This is his great hatred. . . . Great kindness, great compassion, the four gatherings, the ten powers, the *samādhi* of fearlessness, liberation, supreme *bodhi*, purification of Buddhalands, and deliverance of all sentient beings—this is the path of appropriation, the great greed. All dharmas empty, nothing existing, not dwelling, not clinging, prajñā like a great conflagration destroying everything so that nothing can be retained . . . language and thought cut off, *bodhi* beyond the four propositions, nothing attained, nothing realized—this is the gate of renunciation, the great hatred. The Middle Way is neither appropriation nor rejection, neither hatred nor love, neither annihilation nor eternity, not coming or going, unborn and undestroyed, like an image in a mirror, invisible and yet seen, seen and yet invisible, neither visible nor invisible, free of the two extremes and thus unspeakable, so that Vimalakīrti remained silent—this is the Middle Way, the Great Ignorance.[92]

The Bodhisattva's great greed far surpasses the petty, not-yet-fully universalized or realized greed of ordinary folk. When greed, hatred, and ignorance fully realize themselves, reach their ultimate, become universalized, they are identical to meta-value. Lust and greed as usually experienced are anti-values because they stand at only one place and face only one direction, and are expressed only in a limited number of ways; they are not yet universal lust and greed, the lust for the omnipotence and omniscience of buddhahood. Hatred for the deluded is only negation and destruction of some things, not of all, including itself, and ignorance is still too clear about itself, has not yet become all-inclusive and self-referential so as to overturn even its own sense of standing on a solid ground from which to doubt or be confused. Realization of the inconceivability of everything, including knowing, constitutes the Great Ignorance that is buddhahood. Once the intersubjective point that it is impossible to stand firmly in any one position applying any operation only in one direction is grasped, however, this greed, hatred, and ignorance extend from all to all, and this is what constitutes the highest good.[93] Universalized clinging clings also to freedom from clinging. Universalized hatred destroys also hatred. Universalized ignorance effaces the clarity even of delusion. All partial applications of the poisons are revealed to have been upāyas training one for the ultimate universal deployment of the same, that is, buddhahood.

Comparison to the Shanwai

It is this side of Zhiyi's teaching that Zhili brings to the fore in his doctrine of the dung beetle's ultimacy: the evil must be fully realized, and this simultaneously entails its overcoming. The simultaneous progression of these two is what practice consists in; practice is not the creation of something new or other apart from the initial evil situation but the manifestation of its own nature. One of the main differences in emphasis between Zhiyi and Zhanran seems to be that Zhiyi allows evil to be used as a form of practice, whereas Zhanran, like most of the relevant Indian scriptural passages themselves, tends to allow it only as a manifestation of an already attained enlightenment—the latter being attained, presumably, purely through practice of the good. Evil is ignorance of the fact that itself, like the good, is inherent in the nature, whereas good is the realization that both itself and evil are inherent in the nature, but this realization is accomplished only by the good. This doctrine thoroughly tames the notion of inherent evil and (since for all we know the definitive possession of enlightenment is a mythical notion) renders it devoid of any practical consequence.

We see something of the same dynamic in the disputes between the Shanwai and the Shanjia interpretations of the doctrine of inherent evil. As is only too easy to forget when seeking to understand this debate, the Shanwai writers also accept Zhiyi and Zhanran as authoritative and thus not one of them denies the proposition "Evil is inherent in the Buddha nature." They pay lip service at least to these words, as even the Huayan patriarchs Fazang and Chengguan did now and then;[94] the issue, then, is not this slogan per se, but how it is understood.[95]

A good way to get a handle on the issue is to apply the litmus test of the dung-beetle question. From what we can gather about the Shanwai position, as represented, for example, in Xianrun's view as quoted by Renyue in the *Juemoshu* (for the express purpose of refuting it in defense of Zhili, be it noted), the Shanwai object to the concept of the ultimate dung beetle and hold that practice consists in gradually eliminating the *practiced phenomena* of evil and deluded dharmas like the dung beetle, while retaining and perhaps perfecting the *nature* of these evils alone.[96] This evil nature is included by buddhahood and is to be applied in non-deliberate creation of salvific upāyas in the form of dung beetles and other evil forms after enlightenment has been attained perhaps, but not in being the dung beetle to the utmost degree. Xianrun allows that the Buddha would not mind being called a dung beetle

since he has overcome anger, but the implication is that this is not only wrong but karmically disastrous for you.[97] It could perhaps be argued that the Shanwai are simply defining "buddhahood" here as "ultimacy," which would be consistent with the Shanjia position that realization means understanding the ultimacy of all things. But Xianrun's specification of the meaning of buddhahood undermines this reading. The Six Identities indicate the identicalness of all beings (including, of course, the dung beetle) to buddhahood, which Xianrun characterizes specifically as the Three Comprehensions, the Five Eyes, the Ten Powers, the Four Fearlessnesses, and so on, These are the specific wisdom and powers traditionally attributed to the Buddha. The more practice proceeds, the more these powers will become manifest; on the other hand, the specific practices of the dung beetle—rolling around in and eating dung, for example—will be increasingly effaced. The Shanjia response, as we have seen, is that what becomes increasingly manifest is not only the acts of buddhahood but equally the acts of dung-beetlehood.

Still, it could be argued that the Five Eyes and the Ten Powers, since they are referenced to the comprehension of all beings in delusion and the realization at least of their nature, mean precisely all those specific forms qua ultimate. This proposition in itself would, I think, be acceptable to Shanjia adherents. But it remains one-sided and misleading, from the Shanjia point of view; it effaces the equal validity of the two sides, reducing the set-up, as it were, to only humorousness and thus undermining the even-keeled intersubjectivity of the upāyic stimulus and response. Both Shanwai and Shanjia assert that evil and good are inseparable and always present in the nature, and that one or the other of these is manifest at any given time in practice. But the Shanjia also assert that it is equally true to say that both good and evil are always functioning in every instance of practice. This apparent paradox is nothing mysterious; it means simply that either way of stating the case is equally justified, that neither can be granted exclusive ultimacy. It is not that the Shanjia deny the Shanwai notion that in one sense there is a big difference between the enlightened version of dung beetlehood and the unenlightened version and that only one of these is functioning at a time. It is just that the Shanjia regard this assertion as only half the truth; it is equally true to say that there is no difference, and that both are always present and functioning also in practice. Both of these need to be asserted in tandem, as inseparable and ultimately identical, to avoid a misleading depiction of the situation.

Indeed, there must always be a genuinely evil and ignorant stimulus to call forth the response that transforms and reinterprets it. The Shanwai position makes "inherent good" the power that is able to overcome "practiced evil"; the process is one-way and irreversible. They cannot say that evil has the efficacy to overcome evil or even to overcome good as definitive and fixed (i.e., as a form of evil); the efficacious agency resides on one side only. This conception strips away the legitimacy of the moment of true confusion and evil intent, seeing the whole picture *only* from the already realized, already responded to, and already reinterpreted position (rather than always also from this position and the viewpoint that both positions are one and the same). From the Buddha's side, of course, the dung beetle is nothing but the Buddha, and the Buddha understands himself as the perfect fulfillment of the nature of the dung beetle. But in the Shanjia dialogic vision, we can never speak of the Buddha's side only. If any specification at all can be made, since all these specifications (deluded and enlightened) are relative to each other and hence upāyic, then both must be made.[98] From the dung-beetle side, the Buddha, too, is dung-beetlehood, and the Buddha of the Integrated teaching is one who regards himself thus as well.

A similar issue can be seen to be operating, at a subtler level, in the dispute over the "poison of principle" (*lidu* 理毒). In his commentary to the *Sūtra of the Dhāraṇī That Invokes Avalokiteśvara to Dissipate Poison and Harm* (*Qing Guanyin pusa xiaofu duhai touluoni jing*), Zhiyi had delineated the forms of "poison and harm" to be eliminated: (1) the poison of phenomena (*shi du* 事毒), natural evils that one might encounter, which the magical power of the *dhāraṇī* was to dissipate; (2) the poison of practice or behavior (*xing du* 行毒), that is, Buddhist moral evil, such as afflictions and delusions; and (3) the poison of principle, which Zhiyi defined as referring to the fact that "the dharma-realm is unobstructed; hence even when untainted, it is also tainted (*wuran er ran* 無染而染)—this is the poison of the principle-nature (*lixing zhi du* 理性之毒)."[99] Zhiyuan, representing a later, modified Shanwai position, interprets the last of these by utilizing Zhili's own reading of the passage in Zhanran's *Shibuermen* (Ten gates of non-duality) discussed in the previous chapter: the poison of principle refers to the case in which "the dharma-nature and ignorance together create all dharmas everywhere," which he interprets as meaning that "the entire principle-nature in that case becomes poison"—that is, the poison manifested in practiced and phenomenal evil, both moral and natural, or in other words, the fallen world as we know it. This tainted world is itself the principle-nature, but since its nature

is to have no fixed dwelling place, it is perfumed by the ignorance that is equally just the lack of any fixed dwelling place, and it manifests as the phenomenal world of suffering. Manifested evils depend on this principle-evil as functioning in one's own incorrect understanding of principle, such that it becomes poisonous, a noumenal source of evil.

The poison of principle, however, can be eliminated; it consists in "contemplating all dharmas as nothing but mind, such that [as Zhanran says] 'the essence of the tainted is pure.'" In our deluded state, the dharma-nature is read as suffering; but by seeing that what is being thus read is itself the nature, here identified with the "mind" in the usual Shanwai fashion, it can be read rather as purity. Although Zhiyuan specifically says this involves a "contemplation" (the viewing of all as mind/nature, and hence actually pure), he goes on to say that the elimination of the poison of principle differs from the elimination of the poison of practice in that it is not connected with wisdom and the cutting-off of delusions (specific actions and mentations). Rather, it has to do only with the realm of principle per se, without any separation of subject and object, without the assumption of any particular perspective on this principle such as would be produced by always being at a particular stage of practice. It is just the fact of the matter that principle includes confusion, here understood simply as non-dwelling, or the eternal, ineradicable susceptibility to confusion, to manifesting taint (dwelling in some clinging particular form) in spite of being untainted (non-dwelling). This is the "poison of principle." The elimination of this poison refers to the fact that this confusion is nonetheless a manifestation of the ability to be tainted of the dharma-nature, which remains untainted in spite of being tainted. To see this untaintedness in the midst of the tainted world, as its very nature, is to eliminate the poison of principle. This, he claims, has nothing to do with one's actual practice. It is just a statement about the structure of principle, about the untaintedness that is principle but that, as non-dwelling mind-only, expresses this purity by means of its mirror-like ability to reflect any content, even taints. Hence to see this as the reflected taints is the principle as poison, and to see it as the reflecting untaintedness is the elimination of this poison of principle. Zhiyuan claims that this poison of principle is not the same as "inherent evil," which can never be eliminated.[100]

Zhili points out the contradiction between the claim that this is just something that is so about principle itself and Zhiyuan's statement that it involves "contemplating" this principle in a certain way;[101] the first claim would eliminate the perspectivism of "truth" and hence the even-keeled rela-

tion of delusion and enlightenment. On this reading, enlightenment is purely right and delusion purely wrong about what simply is so. As Renyue says, defending Zhili's position against Xianrun's defense of Zhiyuan's position, this makes "delusion and wisdom definitively what they are [as one thing rather than another] (*huozhi que'er* 惑智確爾), [such that the progression between them involves] unquestionable increase and decrease."[102] For Zhili, on the contrary, neither the deluded nor the enlightened view is simply so, and this is precisely why cultivation is necessary. For anything to be so, one must contemplate it in just that way, and this contemplation always simultaneously involves the opposite subjective state, as stimulus and upāya bringing this contemplation forth, in full intersubjective interpenetration. Indeed, it is due to precisely the form of this interpenetration that this view is called the "enlightened" one.

Zhili's point is that the poison of principle and its elimination are also questions of practice, not mere facts. However, the good practices that eliminated the poisons of behavior (*xingdu* 行毒) are then looked at again, from the perspective of the Integrated Teaching, and seen to be identical to principle and to the evils they remedy. This is what allows these same practices now to be characterized as the poison of principle. Hence, Zhili stresses the "uncreated" (*wuzuo* 無作) nature of enlightenment (it is not some new thing separate from the delusion, which has just now come into being to eliminate this delusion, but rather the reinterpretation of the delusion itself; hence it is always present) as the mark of the Integrated Teaching. The evils turn out to be identical to principle, and hence it was they, not something else, that developed into the goods that destroyed them.[103] It is not that principle involves no particular practices; elimination of principle is, rather, a way of describing what is seen when the phenomenal practices one was already doing are looked at as inherent to principle (as unattainable, ineradicable, and all-pervasive). Although Zhiyuan says the principle inherently includes confusion, his statement that the elimination of that poison concerns only principle, rather than a specific practice or contemplation, suggests that the principle and dharma-realm about which this confusion is confused are themselves basically pure, mind-only as the True Mind, an objective purity about which one may be either confused, seeing it as tainted and poisonous, or not confused, in which case the poison is seen, correctly, to be gone. It is an expression of purity to be susceptible to taint, but it is not the case that specific taints are inherent to this purity and ineradicable from it as such. As Zhili says, this falls short of the Integrated understanding of

the identity of value and anti-value, the simultaneity of subjective delusion and enlightenment:

We see the difference between different types of identicalness by means of whether or not inherent inclusion [of all determinations, including evil ones, is involved]. And why? If the dharma-realm about which one is deluded does not in itself inherently possess the three obstacles [karma, affliction, and retribution] and has these three obstacles only because of [one's own] tainted [understanding, *ran*], then even if we speak of the nature following along with conditions, the taint and delusion are still considered self-sufficient (*zizhu* 自住), and the poison and harm are creative of something new. To go back to the source, the three obstacles must be destroyed, and thus the meaning of identicalness is not complete. This cannot yet be called the poison that is identical to principle and the nature, and thus this doctrine belongs to the Separate Teaching. . . . If, however, the dharma-realm about which one is deluded originally and inherently includes the three obstacles, which *manifest* because of one's tainted [understanding, which is itself inherently included therein], then the taint and delusion are dependent [on the nature itself], and the poison and harm create nothing that was not already there. When one returns to the source, the taint and poison are still there as always. Only this perfects the meaning of identicalness. . . . Thus we should know that the substance inherently possesses the three obstacles, and when it gives rise to the function of the three obstacles, this is still functioning in accordance with substance. . . . In the Integrated Teaching, since inherent evil has been explained, delusions of view and thought, large and small, are poisons that are identical to the nature. This being the case, these poisons themselves are that which is capable of overcoming and destroying [poisons]. Since the poisons are what can destroy poisons, they can be absolute just as they are—where is there any differentiation between that which destroys and that which is destroyed, that which traces and that which is traced? Poison and harm are identical to the Mean, all dharmas are reducible to harm, the negating and positing awareness of it are mutually identical.[104]

Here Zhili stresses that the afflictions and other evils, in that they are identical to buddhahood and other affliction-conquering dharmas, contain in themselves their own overcoming. Since they themselves are identical to the entire dharma-realm, they extend and operate everywhere and hence poison not only others but also themselves. Poisonousness is expressed just as much in the overcoming of poison as in any other harm. It is just as present in buddhahood and bodhisattva upāyas as in tigers and bandits. What any moment does to other moments is also what other moments do to itself. This conception can be traced back to Zhiyi's comparison of evil to a piece of bamboo, which includes in its own nature the potential for fire (good),

which, when manifested, in fact consumes the bamboo; moreover, when the bamboo is gone, the fire also vanishes.[105] In practical terms, there is no need to search for something outside afflictions to overcome them. In meditation, one concentrates on the deluded mind itself, not by contemplating it by means of or in terms of Pure Mind, but merely to see what is as yet only implicit in this suffering, the true nature of suffering, which becomes manifest through the practice of concentration. What is implicit in this suffering and delusion is the Three Tracks, grounded in the Three Truths. When fully manifest, these Three Tracks are called Dharmakāya (absolute reality), *prajnā* (wisdom), and liberation. When the full range of their implications is still implicit, they are called *duḥkha*, delusion, and karma. In either case, the entire sequence of implicit and explicit states is inherent in each, and the final stages, when fully explicit, are not to be understood apart from the early implicit ones or from the entire process of revelation of what had been implicit. That is, this talk of "implicit" and "explicit," after being provisionally posited, must then be opened up to reveal its ultimacy, namely, that all moments are always intersubjectively interfused and hence constantly modifying and rewriting each other, so that every possible token already has every possible meaning. To put it in a deliberately paradoxical formula, when *duḥkha*, delusion, and karma become what they have always been, they are Dharmakāya, *prajñā*, and liberation. When the dung beetle becomes himself, he is a Buddha as well as everything else. According to Zhili, only this relationship between phenomenal suffering and ultimate liberation can be called a relation of identity.

Another important issue in Zhili's critique of the Shanwai understanding of the poison of principle is its implications for the understanding of the doctrine of inherent evil. Zhiyuan says the two are not identical, because inherent evil cannot be eliminated whereas the poison of principle can. What, then, do these two terms mean for him? It seems that the "poison of principle" here means the Exclusive Principle (the true nature of all things, the Three Truths) in the state of being (mis)perceived as poisonous, or, at best, principle in its poisonous state, after having transformed into poison. The point of Buddhist practice then is to eliminate this illusion, to see this as a manifestation of purity, thereby transforming principle back into the state of purity and eliminating this poison. As Xianrun makes clear, this means that practice is entirely a matter of "practiced good," which is to arise not from inherent evil but from inherent good. Xianrun says, "Since [you, Zhili] have made clear that the function of the elimination of poison at the level of prin-

ciple is a practice arising from the nature and is thus called a practice that is identical, this is the three causes of buddhahood as practiced virtues, so their essence is inherent good; how can you say their essence is inherent evil?" Renyue responds: "This is deeply impermissible. You mean to say that that which is eliminated is the evil and that which does the eliminating is the good. . . . [If this were so,] then delusion and wisdom would be definitively what they are . . . and our whole teaching of identicalness would become futile."[106] What, then, is inherent evil, which even Zhiyuan and Xianrun admit can never be eliminated? As we saw in the case of Zhanran, it is relegated entirely to the side of enlightenment; it has no function in the practice leading to enlightenment but is solely something the realized Buddha makes use of in his post-enlightenment endeavor to transform into evil forms to transform deluded sentient beings.[107] It cannot be cut off, for it is built into principle; but it has no legitimate function at all until enlightenment occurs. Prior to that, it must be carefully suppressed, for the practitioner is not yet strong enough to utilize it.

The first Shanjia objection to this, however, is that, to begin with, inherent evil can be said equally to be cut off or not cut off. As we saw before, both "dwelling in" and "being free from" are always occurring even in practice and are identical to each other. The elimination of practiced or manifested taint consists just in the realization that all practiced taint is itself inherent taint and hence there is no separate practiced taint at all. That is, to see it as inherent is to eliminate it as contingent, which means both its elimination ("free from"—as a contingent thing among things) and its deeper entrenchment in the very nature of things ("dwell in"—as the absolute Mean itself, which pervades all times and places). This is what it means to cut off practiced taint: "The essence of the taint is itself empty, and this empty essence is what is called destruction of suffering; this is the sense of 'cutting off.' On the other hand, the essence of the obstructions is itself a meritorious property; hence it does not need to be turned over or extirpated; this is the sense of 'not cutting off.'"[108]

What underlies this point is another of Zhili's distinctive Shanjia proclamations, namely, the idea of the "phenomenon as universal" (*shizong* 事總) elaborated in the *Shibuermen zhiyaochao*. There, Zhili opposes the Shanwai and Huayan equation, on the one hand, of *li*, principle, with *zong*, the universal or totalizer and, on the other, of *shi*, phenomena, with the differentiated particular (*bie* 別). Zhili claims instead that principle and phenomena must be understood as having both universality and particularity. In both cases,

the differentiated particularity refers to the Three Thousand quiddities. In terms of phenomena, it is these Three Thousand as conditioned arisings, as things that arise in one time, place, and condition rather than another, that are created by a particular set of practices rather than by another. In terms of principle, these same Three Thousand are all-pervasive, ungraspable, inescapable, and mutually interpenetrating. For the contemplator, the universal that functions as the totalizer of both the Three Thousand as conditioned and the Three Thousand as interpervading is this present transitory moment of phenomenal experience, and the contemplation has succeeded in realizing the marvel when these two, apparently different, Three Thousands are seen to be identical. The universal that totalizes both is therefore a phenomenon (*shi*), namely, this present moment of experience itself.[109] That is, for Zhili, principle is *ju*, inherent inclusion or entailment. This in turn means the inescapability, the unchangeableness of the thing, as well as its unattainability, and also the identity between these two—the Three Truths. This indicates both what unifies things (they are all everywhere, and have the same nature) and what differentiates things (this nature is inherently differentiated into the Three Thousand, none of which can be blurred out of existence, all of which are always present everywhere), and it ensures that these are one and the same act. This *li* is opposed to *shi*, which means transformations, creations, conditioned arisings—things qua their becoming, their conditionality, their contingency, as decentered and impermanent, as substanceless, as done by some partial agent, as created, as intended, as owned, as local context determined, as a function of greed, hatred, and delusion—that is, not as differentiation or particularity as such, as the Shanwai would have it, but as partiality. It refers to what appears as something that could also not be, is not inherently everywhere in the form of its ungraspability, and hence is bound up with attachment, delusion, desire and suffering. Principle is thus inherence, that is, these same Three Thousand things qua their unchangingness and their readability as all others and their ambiguity, their ineradicability, their inescapability/unattainability, and hence their necessity and their universality in the literal sense. The identity of principle and phenomenon means here not only that the whole is the parts and each part is the whole but also that their conditionality/becoming per se is their necessity per se.

The universality of each phenomenon thus means not only that all things are unified as this phenomenon but also indeed as and by virtue of its very phenomenality as such. All things are present in it as part of its pragmatic

concern, its *umwelt*, its background, as its opponents, as what threatens it, as what it is avoiding, as what it is seeking, as "negative prehensions," as vague horizons, or as explicitly excluded. This moment of experience is, in other words, partial, deluded, greedy, hateful, interested, and attached, and hence it "takes a stance" on and embodies an attitude toward all other entities. The universality of principle, on the other hand, means that this very phenomenon is thereby readable as all other phenomena and vice versa. The identity of these two opposite forms of totality, which is Zhili's final position, thus means that taking an exclusionary or opposed attitude toward all other X's or being full of anxiety about their loss or taking a biased stance toward them on the assumption that they are contingent and in need of clinging or aversion is the very mode of their being readable as X and X being readable as them, their mutual inherence. To be opposed to X or attached to X is to be readable as X. The mode of totality of phenomena (the biased attitude toward all others) is the form in which the totality of principle (mutual inherence) functions. For Zhili, this means (1) the all-pervasiveness of their unity/order/value/ruliness, (2) the all-pervasiveness of their differentiation/disorder/particularity/valuelessness/unruliness, and (3) the all-pervasiveness of the second-order identity between these two—the Three Truths once again. Principle always includes both this unity and this differentiation, at any level one cares to focus. Principle is what makes phenomena unified, but it is not their unity or even that in or as which they are unified. But it is also what makes them differentiated, and what makes these two aspects identical.

In a sense, we have here an overcoming of strict immanence on any level—principle never appears alone or as such. But this is also true immanence; there is no internal dualism, in which we would have one part of the concrete whole (*li*) pitted against another (*shi*). It is not that it is "never alone" in that it is composed of *shi* as its *bie*, its members or parts, but, rather, that the principle that unifies always appears as a particular biased phenomenon that unifies all others. The clearest example of this *shizong*, which Zhili adduces as the preferred object of contemplation, is the mind as ordinary cognition, which unifies and differentiates all Three Thousand quiddities precisely in its contingent, changing, owned, partial, and ordinary function. My greed unifies the world around greed, as expressions of it, rivals to it, obstacles to it, challenges to it, contrasts to it; the impure mind as such pervades, as Zhanran puts it. But in so doing, it demonstrates that this can be done only because all these things revealed thereby to be functions of it have the same nature, the nature of Three Thousand-ness. Hence it also

unifies these Three Thousand as necessary, as readable as its own nature, ineradicable and all-pervasive. This also means to see these things as permanent, blissful, free, and beautiful—as nirvāṇa itself.

Zhili's point, then, is that deluded contingency is itself the required impartial necessity. It is the contingency, finiteness, partiality, greed-hatred-delusion, that accomplishes the unification of all, the all-pervasiveness. This all-pervasiveness is necessity, value, the accomplished contemplation that equals liberation. So the credit for accomplishing this all-pervasion goes to the *shi*-ness, phenomenality, as such. But once this merit is seen in *shi*-ness, this *shi*-ness is seen *as li*-ness. So in this sense the credit goes to *li*-ness. This almost brings us back to the idea that *li* simply designates the merit of bringing about all-pervasiveness as such, which is the Shanwai position. But what is left out of this simplification is the crucial point, namely, the Möbius strip function of the contemplation of *li* and *shi*. To contemplate *shi qua shi* ends up being the contemplation of *li*. The contemplation of *li* qua *li*, however, ends up being the contemplation of *shi*. To dwell in something, as Zhili says, is to be free from it. So at every level the two do indeed break apart again, and the merit goes to the *li* side or equals simply this going to the *li* side. *Li*, we may say, is also the fact that this Möbius strip structure always applies. And it is this notion of the relation between principle and phenomena that allows Zhili's understanding of what is meant by cutting off phenomenal taint: "The essence of the taint is itself empty, and this empty essence is what is called destruction of suffering. . . . On the other hand, the essence of the obstructions is itself a meritorious property; hence it does not need to be turned over or extirpated."[110]

The second Shanjia objection to the Shanwai reading of inherent evil is that evil can be utilized as practice too, not only after enlightenment. In fact, it must be: there is simply nowhere else to begin. Even supposedly "good" practices such as Buddhist contemplations are just as deluded as anything else. As Renyue says, if the beginner is told to contemplate "Principle" or "Buddha" or the "Absolute" this is for him just one more deluded notion, another form of clinging, bias, and evil. If not for the curative power of evil—all evils—this evil, too, could never cure.[111] But since evils do cure, since they are identical to the Mean, to the entire dharma-realm, and thus to their own overcoming, this evil, too, can cure. Hence Zhili's response is not the Zen neither/nor, which says, "Both moral practice and evil are no good; just give up all such nonsense, and that is enlightenment." Nor do we have what is implied in some Huayan works: "Here is the truth about things—they all

interpenetrate in all these various ways; think about this real hard instead of all those deluded notions you've had up to now, and that will be enlightenment." Rather, he gives us a thorough both/and, echoing and intensifying a problem that already plagued the early Daoists, and provides an answer: Go ahead and do "good" deeds (for example, the contemplations recommended in the *Visualization of Amitāyus Sūtra*), but do them as forms of contemplating the Three Truths and hence of destroying them (if they work for you as ways in which to intensify concentration and hence destroy themselves, then they are appropriate means for you). Note well, however: these Buddhist practices are evils, just like any heresy or worldly indulgence. In our present state of mind, any concept, any practice, any tricky formulation, is just a more sophisticated form of attachment, delusion, and suffering. But this evil called Buddhism, like all evils, has the power to bring enlightenment if used properly. Zhili indicates the way of using them properly, but he also makes it clear that any other way will also work. That is the poison of principle. "Truth" is poison, just like "falsehood"—but because poison is principle, it can heal. So go ahead and pursue and contemplate idiotic and evil things like truth, virtue, purity, God, the Pure Land, Buddhahood—or, if you prefer, equally idiotic and evil things like lies, profit, wickedness, affliction, demons, rape, murder. When any of these contemplations succeeds, when you fully realize what it is to be *any* quiddity at all, the poison will have overcome itself. At that point, all forms are both transcended in their original mode as merely practiced and even more fully what they are; they are then more deeply entrenched in reality, seen to be identical to the nature, expressed as every possible other, expressive of every possible other, eternal, ultimate, all-pervasive, all-inclusive, and salvific, like the Buddha or like the dung beetle.

Objections and Responses

There would seem to be a contradiction here: Does not Buddha mean enlightenment, as Zhili said in the very passage in which he affirmed the ultimacy of the dung beetle? So to be a Buddha is to reach this realization, and it is this nature of realizing that is manifested in the process of realization. If this realization further consists of fully manifesting all the various finite forms as they truly are, then this is what buddhahood is, and it is still buddhahood in particular that is manifested in the course of progressive cultivation. Therefore buddhahood still maintains a privileged position, and Zhili's position makes no sense.

In one sense this objection is justified. But precisely because it is justifiable and unavoidable, it brings us back to the Möbius strip described earlier, which is precisely where Zhili wants us to be. Indeed, the crucial point is the way Zhili wants the Tiantai rejection of the doctrine of the Exclusive Mean, or only buddhahood, to be understood. That is, the Buddha that is revealed or realized is precisely the Buddha as understood in the Integrated Teaching, and that Buddha is "not only the Buddha," the being who has realized "not only the Mean." The Buddha is not only the Buddha because to manifest him is equally to manifest the dung beetle and evil and the sufferings of purgatory. Only this fully accords with the basic Tiantai doctrine of mutual inclusion. The Buddha of the Exclusive Mean, toward which deluded beings are supposed to progress by gradually overcoming their finite embroilment in either of the two extremes (Emptiness and Provisional Positing) is itself contradictory, for it is both the universal as such (the undifferentiated infinite, the underlying substratum of the Nine Realms, free of their predicates and therefore not really an additional realm but merely the "truth" of the other realms) and a particular (the universal as opposed to the particular, the infinite as opposed to the finite, for whatever has something outside itself to which it can be opposed is thereby finite and particular; the Tenth Realm as opposed to the other nine; the transcendence of Nine Realms).

But this contradiction, like all good dialectical contradictions, is solved not by the addition of some solution but by the dropping of an illusion about the solution, namely, that it lies outside the problem itself. The solution consists merely in accepting this contradiction itself as constitutive of the case, of drawing these two sides together and no longer trying to maintain the claim that this Mean can exist independently of or above the extremes. The Mean itself thus becomes posited explicitly as "not the Exclusive Mean." Even the Mean overcomes and deconstructs itself like all finite or determinate things. This makes explicit the simultaneity of universality and particularity that is unsuccessfully suppressed in the doctrine of the Exclusive Mean. The Mean is both the universal as opposed to the particular and, as a necessary consequence, itself a particular, finite part, which in turn confers this same double status on all other finite, particular parts, just as the *Lotus Sūtra* "opened the provisional to reveal the real," showing that the double status of provisional/real applied also to all previous teachings. Since it is relative to the provisional and possesses a definite form and determination

("real") in contradistinction to something other, the real itself is also provisional and hence also shares this double status. Once this Mean has been grasped, all the parts come to share the status of being paradoxically universal and particular, whole and part, infinite and finite; what was in the previous teaching a contradiction about the Mean alone has now become universalized as a paradox applying to all possible existence and indeed grasped as the indispensable condition of any existence. The Tiantai name for this state of things is the Three Truths. Thus the dung beetle, too, is the Three Truths, and this Three Truths are what is revealed by realization, not what is cut off or destroyed. Hence the dung beetle is revealed and manifested by realization, rather than cut off or destroyed by it.

We may state the same problem from the side of delusion, especially with reference to the category of "ultimate (thorough, universalized) ignorance." For it would seem to be part of the nature of the dung beetle to know nothing about the Three Truths or about its own identity to or instantiation of its nature (which is the Three Truths, the identity to all quiddities in their particularity, unattainability and ineradicability). That is precisely what makes it a dung beetle, according to the Buddhist conception of karma. How, then, can we say that this nature—the nature of being ignorant about its own nature—is what becomes more extensively realized and active in the process of enlightenment? One way to approach this problem is to stress the nature of "Great Ignorance" as the unknowableness of the Middle Way, as Zhiyi does in a passage cited earlier. We may think of this in terms of the dialectic of interpenetration and separation discussed earlier. Only the Buddha is truly "deluded" and truly lives up to what "delusion" claims to be. Unlike the rest of us, he is not just emptily claiming to be deluded. This is because interpenetrating response is what truly fulfills the notion of separateness, for "separate" really means interpenetrating. But this leads us, perhaps even more centrally, to the pervasiveness of the intersubjectivity that Zhili wishes to assert. The Buddha realizes his identity with the ignorance of the dung beetle, and this means seeing this ignorance both as karmically determined ignorance and as an upāyic manifestation of wisdom, in the context of the upāyic dialogue. In one sense an asymmetry persists here, and Zhili has no need to deny this. When he asserts that all Three Thousand determinations are immutable, this is also an assertion of the difference between the Buddha's condition and that of any given sentient being. But Zhili wishes to stress the other side as well. As in all antinomies, the Tiantai

position is to balance them on a needle-sharp both/and. The symmetry goes with the asymmetry in this case, due to the unusual nature of the content of this particular ultimate meta-value, and the way this impacts on the subordinate instrumental values.

The exact structure of this precarious and difficult balancing of levels, and the value paradox it entails, can be better understood in terms of the intersubjective structure discussed above. The dung beetle is in eternal dialogue with buddhahood. The eternal and immutable intersubjectivity of the nature that is to be realized and manifested would be lost if this Buddha were only Buddha, only enlightened, only the Mean. It must be, rather, a particular focus on an eternal dialogue between enlightenment and delusion, a dialogue that necessarily includes both sides, one as foreground and the other as background. The principle that is realized in enlightenment has replete within it this interaction of good and evil, and both sides become more and more manifest as this principle becomes more manifest. At the final stage, all of them, in their particular names, forms, sufferings, finite bodies, delusions, and evils, may equally be described as ultimate.

Here we find Zhili's solution to the necessary antinomies mentioned repeatedly above. Dung-beetlehood is to be dwelt in and to become free of, always both. This "always both" is to be read in the manner described above: as a single token that, unchanged, stands posed in two contrary contexts at all times, a gesture in the dialogue between delusion and enlightenment that is always a part of the world of each and thus in its entirety means two opposite things at once. It is both an unadulterated chunk of ignorant suffering and karma and a salvific upāya wisely designed by an omniscient and compassionate Buddha in his virtuoso repertoire of transformations. The dung beetle qua ignorant animal who knows nothing about his identity with Buddhas and all other sentient beings is what one becomes free from. But the dung beetle qua upāyic transformation into just this ignorant form, just this set-up, and is dwelt in eternally, an unchangeable part of the enlightened world and its activity. But these are one and the same dung beetle, without the slightest change in any particular of either body and mind. It is just that this same token of mind-body is always in two semiotic contexts at once. Thus it is that Zhili can say that the more you dwell in it, the more you are free of it. To "transcend" it and to "realize" it are one and the same process. This constant bothness is what is meant by the Non-exclusive Mean, which denotes the fact that any token is always both transcended (empty) and

realized or dwelt in (provisionally posited as a salvific upāya), and that either of these is always both, such that a reference to either one alone is an adequate way to indicate both. This is the sort of universalization of evil that equals good, and it may be applied to any content whatsoever, however evil or good from any given perspective—for indeed, any content qua content is evil, until universalized in this manner, at which time, without having changed in the slightest, it is good. There is always some perspective, as Zhuangzi noted long before, from which any given token can be regarded as either good or evil, and none of these perspectives is negligible or escapable.

A further ambiguity is to be noted here. This conception of identity and buddhahood simultaneously exalts and debases the individual as compared to the Buddha. On the one hand, spiritual progress no longer has to be conceived as the dropping away of one's individual characteristics; rather, it is a fulfillment of them. On the other hand, the nature of these characteristics is conceived in terms of their absolute self-negativity and self-overcoming, such that in actual fact you have never really been the person you purportedly are; only the Buddha knows how to be you. Hence Zhili can say of the king of devils, as we shall see in more detail in a moment: "When Mara is called king of devils, this is the case of a name that has no reality to it, since he does not have the power to integrate all and be free and at ease [within his own evil].... The *Brahmajāla* and *Lotus* sūtras are preached by the true king of devils . . . for 'king of devils' and 'the enlightened one' are two names for the same thing."[112] Mara, who claims to be king of devils, is not really the king of devils—the true king of devils, the one who truly realizes the notion of deviltry, is the Buddha. The same goes for the dung beetle or for you. You are not the real you; the real you, the one who truly realizes the notion of youness, which is the Threefold Truths and the identity between you and the negation of you, is the Buddha. In this way each individual is elevated to the position of total dominion over all creation and is divested of even the slightest right to exist as such; dependence on the authority of the realization of the Buddha is total.

The solution to this antinomy is to be sought in the same way as the previous one. Once again we have the Threefold Truth. In the aspect of Emptiness, not the slightest thing is established (total negation of your individuality); in the aspect of Provisional Positing, all particulars, as separate, as deluded, as unequal, are established (your particular place as you are, above some and below others); in the aspect of the Mean, each thing is the absolute, the ultimate, the culmination, principle, unifier, creator, explainer,

opener, and ruler of all. The entire Tiantai edifice is built on seeing this threefold situation not as a problem but as the solution, seeing the three aspects not only as in conflict with one another but also as identical to one another.

The basis of this claim is that the sense that there is a difficulty with this contradiction arises from an incomplete comprehension of the simple principle of dependent origination; some rarefied as yet unrefuted bias or concept of self-existence or own-being remains in the functioning of one's habitual conceptual apparatus. More specifically, the error lies in a failure to appreciate the constitutively intersubjective nature of any identity—no one can be at only any one place in the intersubjective network but must always be everywhere, facing in every direction, always both the provisional upāyic deluded stimulus and the enlightened response. And it is here that we see that the "nature of being ignorant of its own nature" is precisely what becomes more fully manifested in enlightenment. For the problem is not ignorance, but the fact that ignorance has not gone far enough, that there are still some things "known," left unproblematic, felt to be certain, incontrovertible, unambiguous, and clear.

The Buddha's wisdom is just another name for Great Ignorance, which extends the failure to know what's what universally, instead of keeping it restricted to a finite range that pivots on some implicitly posited certainties. Or, if we take the strict Buddhist definition of ignorance as the erroneous imputation of selfhood or substance, the failure to comprehend Non-self and Emptiness, is not the Tiantai doctrine of "Inherent Inclusion in the Nature" (*xingju*), or the Three Thousand quiddities the universalization of ignorance per se? The ignorance that imputed substantial own-being to certain things is overcome by in effect imputing it to all things—not only to those privileged quiddities that qualified as dharmas but to every aroma, every sight, every attribute, every shimmering momentary appearance. Each of these things comes out of "Nature Inclusion" as completely substantial, ineradicable, and self-determining, and stands as an ultimate reality that determines the condition of other quiddities, which then serve as its own attributes and expressions. The Buddha's wisdom, in the Tiantai understanding, is simply to embrace the delusion of self-nature, the failure to understand Emptiness, for each and every possible quiddity, not only for some. In this sense, only the Buddha is "truly" ignorant, or truly realizes the ignorance about his own nature that is characteristic of the dung beetle.

Hence, we can say that the nature of the dung beetle as such is what is revealed, not effaced, in enlightenment.

Zhili's Practice of Evil

Zhili's teaching seems to make a place for the committing of "evil" acts (however defined) by Buddhist practitioners, both as forms of cultivation (Dharma-gates) and as upāya to enlighten others, a degree of leeway that is present but muted in Zhiyi and that is carefully suppressed in Zhanran. However, with rhetoric of this kind, there is generally a considerable degree of ambiguity, especially when dealing with such slippery referents as the Tiantai definitions of ultimate good and evil (definitions that are always self-referential and self-canceling and that tend to bring in meta-levels through the back door), that cannot be resolved without an appeal to actual behavior. We might justifiably feel that Zhili can be taken seriously at his word only if we know him to have practiced evil himself or to have praised it in others in concrete cases. Fortunately, the historical record provides us with such a case—the case cited at the very beginning of this work—and this will serve as a final consummation of our discussion.

Zhili did in fact propose to commit an act that he himself admitted to be evil according to the Buddhist faith he embraced. We must not be misled by the fact that the "evil" in this case took the form of fanatical Buddhist devotional activity, rather than, say, rape or murder. The important point is that Zhili himself, when challenged, freely admitted that he was knowingly committing a sin.[113] Indeed, the logic behind his defense of his sin might be paraphrased: "Forgive me, for I know what I do." Zhili, to twist a statement about Confucius in the *Analects*, "knows it must not be done and thus does it," and this knowing is precisely what makes the sin a form of the good, while not eradicating in the least the fact that it is also, always and forever, a sin.

Zhili's sin is to have a preference for one thing over another, the cardinal sin in the Tiantai tradition and in much "elite" Buddhism in China. He wants to burn himself alive in order to be born in the Pure Land. To prefer the pure to the impure is delusion, ignorance, sin. Yang Yi (Yang Danian), the great supporter of Linji Chan in the Song court, decided to dissuade him from committing this mad act. He eventually succeeded, it would seem, after the high official Ma Zhijie, because of Yang's reputation as a writer, asked him to write a memorial for his, Ma's, father. Yang agreed and in return

asked that Ma take the case to the emperor himself. Ma did so, and the emperor responded by bestowing the official title *Fazhi dashi* on Zhili and ordered that he remain in the world to propagate the Tiantai teachings. The sequence of the events in question is a little hazy in the existing records, but it seems plausible that Zhili's threatened suicide blackmailed the imperial court into granting him official recognition and into extending official patronage to the Tiantai school. In this case, to assume the worst-case scenario for the sake of argument, he held his breath until the authorities caved in to his demands—a little personal glory, substantial material support for his temple, and a great propaganda coup for Tiantai as a school. Zhili was in a sense a terrorist who was also his own hostage.

We can be certain that more is going on here than meets the eye and equally sure that we cannot know exactly what it is. It is not entirely out of place to speculate what else was disturbing Yang Yi, besides his professed pious concern that the world would lose such a learned and virtuous Dharma master, especially since the legitimacy of self-immolation was well established in Chinese Buddhism, as all the parties concerned well knew. Those so inclined may suspect, with good reason, that implicitly at stake here were the interests of the state (Zhili's self-destruction was an impressive challenge to the sovereign authority of the emperor, a way of slipping out of the nets of officially sanctioned authority, a way of tearing through the normal parameters of social order without a chance for any kind of reprisal on the part of the forces of social justice, not to mention a defection from the emperor's nation to that of Amitābha) or of particular sectarian concerns at court, in particular the influence of Chan masters, whose fire might have been stolen by this public spectacle. This speculation need not detain us here. It is certain, however, that Zhili himself had several ulterior motives, or at least was willing to be seen as having them, for he says so explicitly. Part of his motivation was to do some propaganda and drum up financial support for the Tiantai cause. Another part, so he says, is to satisfy an obscure longing that has repeatedly occurred to him of its own accord, whose meaning he himself is only guessing at. This open avowal of his multiple motivations and of the completely benighted and unenlightened nature of all of them demands close attention. The manipulative aspect of the act is of great importance and must be kept in mind as we proceed with this account of the struggle between Yang Yi and Zhili over the nature of sin.

Before Yang Yi got the emperor involved, he tried to convince Zhili to remain in the world on the basis of doctrinal considerations, mainly from the

point of view of his own Linji Chan affiliations. Yang pointed out to Zhili that to prefer the Pure Land to this impure one was just another attachment, a biased preference, and hence a sin, indeed the root of all sin. Zhili responded not by denying that this preference for purity is a sin or by downplaying its importance as sin by appealing to any literal merit-making accruing to devotion to the Pure Land per se. He freely admitted that he was planning to commit a sin. His defense was that he would fully realize his sin.

[1] You say: "If you cherish preferences [for the Pure Land over this world], this is to give rise to attachment and dislike, which leads to a mind that appropriates [some things] and rejects [others], and thereby to the belief in subject and object." The arisal of my sin is indeed as you say. But the way in which this sin establishes meritorious properties should also be mentioned here. Generally speaking, preferences and appropriating and rejecting are good at leading to sins and also at accomplishing great deeds. Thus Aśvaghoṣa took them to be the basis of the first stage of enlightenment. Zhiyi called them the gradual method of the Pure Land. Vimalakīrti made heretical opinions and attachment his assistants. Manjusri used greed and anger as his power and faculty. All these show that the use of these [sins] depends on the person, that there is a way to ride them. . . . [2] Just realize that the Pure Land is nothing but mind, and the impure land is also identical to the nature, and then precisely dislike is non-dislike, and preference is non-preference [for you are not actually preferring any one partial real to another]. . . . You speak of my seeking eternal bliss. But this kind of rejection and appropriation are in substance no different from non-rejection and non-appropriation, *and in function, too, they always operate simultaneously*. These can be called three types of Dharma-gates: the Dharma-gate of appropriation, the Dharma-gate of rejection, and the Dharma-gate of neither appropriation nor rejection. This is also just the Dharma-gates of the Three Poisons, which inherently include all dharmas. . . . Because all dharmas are empty, the impure is completely rejected; because all dharmas are provisionally posited, the pure is completely appropriated; because all dharmas are the Mean, there is neither rejection nor appropriation in this. . . . [3] Thus I now will reject my impure body and seek the Pure Land I prefer. . . . But in the cultivation of the mind there are ten thousand possible practices and many different doors through which to enter into the Way. Whatever one likes is what is appropriate to one, and is what one may practice, and is what one will be enlightened by (*suile suiyi suixiu suiwu* 隨樂隨宜隨修隨悟). Who would dare to limit the expanse of the sky with a viewing tube? [4] It's just that since I was young I have had this ambition, and now that I am old and decaying, having passed through many experiences, this thought constantly comes to me of its own accord, with ever greater intensity. No doubt it comes from a vow I made in a former life—how could I dare not carry it out . . . ?[114]

I have inserted numbers in this passage to indicate four separate and important points. In the section marked [1], Zhili makes his basic defense, giving his general view of the use of evil in practice. Evil in the Buddhist sense means partial attachment and desire. In keeping with the Tiantai insight into upāya and the set-up / punch line structure of the relation between provisional and ultimate truth, in which all particular determinate practices count as provisional (and hence also as ultimate), Zhili asserts that yes, his proposed action is evil and deluded in comparison with ultimate truth and thus on equal footing with all other sinful states from purgatory to the highest level of bodhisattvahood. Indeed, it is characteristic of Tiantai polemicizing that it must always accept the arbitrary definitions of the interlocutor, for there is never anywhere to start except from some arbitrary and biased prejudice. Hence Zhili can say in effect that this act, like any act, is evil, if you choose to so define it, and you have every right to so choose. However, like all these evils, this evil is simultaneously an upāya and hence, if viewed from the proper perspective, also a means to realization and hence, by the punch-line principle, itself "funny" or ultimate or Good. Zhili, in effect, accepts Yang's position as an upāya and then sets out to "open it up to reveal the ultimate."

The section marked [2] jumps to the meta-level. From the ultimate standpoint, that which you are preferring and that which you are rejecting are one and the same thing. Each one pervades everywhere and includes all others; so when you appropriate the desired thing, you are also appropriating the non-desired thing, and when you are rejecting the non-desired thing, you are also rejecting the desired thing. In each case you are dealing with the whole. The desired thing is the whole as this desired thing; the non-desired thing is the whole as this non-desired thing. Indeed, this is precisely what constitutes the folly of choosing one over another. But by the same token, Zhili uses this to assert that there is therefore no folly to this folly—for you have not in fact appropriated or rejected anything after all. You thought you were being one-sided and only choosing one of the two alternatives, but in fact, whichever one you picked up, you picked up both—so what bias was there? First-order evil (appropriation and rejection) is thus no different from first-order good (non-appropriation and non-rejection). As discussed above, when the choosing is "dwelt in" to its ultimate point, realizing its nature qua choosing, pushed all the way to the bottom, it is seen to be equally present everywhere, even in non-choosing and non-bias. Having a preference is expressed as all these things. Impartiality is an expression of having a prefer-

ence; having a preference is likewise an expression of impartiality. In either case the whole (having a preference/impartiality) is present, with one side manifest and one side tacit. Hence the appearance of appropriating and rejecting one thing in contrast to another is not ultimate.

But in a Tiantai context this does not mean they are illusions and hence negligible; rather, they are upāyas, Dharma-gates, compassionate intersubjective exchanges leading to mutual enlightenment in all directions. It is this Tiantai substructure that makes it possible to claim, not only that the two are identical in substance (*ti*), but also the distinctively Shanjia view that they are also always simultaneous in function itself, as against the more common Buddhist and non-Buddhist view that value and anti-value, while perhaps identical in substance, differ in function. The two functions always appear simultaneously; both sides are always and everywhere functioning. Whenever you are choosing one thing, you are choosing everything, and hence you are always also not-choosing. But the opposite is also true: when you are not choosing, you are also choosing—indeed, on the simplest level, you are choosing not to choose, as opposed to choosing, among other things (and strictly speaking, in choosing anything, even not-to-choose, you are choosing everything else as well). Either way, your act fails to be just what it thinks it is. The function itself cannot be determined definitively as one or the other once and for all, due to the unceasing intersubjective mutual regard of the moments of enlightenment and delusion in the joke-like structure of provisional and ultimate.

Indeed, Zhili explicitly connects this with the structure of the Three Truths here. Choosing and not choosing are mutually identical since the two extremes are identical to the Mean. Earlier in the same letter he iterates the simultaneity of the three functions as well as the three substances in the case of the Three Truths: the Truth of Emptiness functions not only as a negation but also as a form of positing and as a form of overcoming the dichotomy between negation and positing; the same goes for the other two truths, *mutatis mutandis*. Zhili says here that rejection of the impure is always going on, inasmuch as all dharmas are always being rejected by every act, whether explicitly an act of rejection, appropriation, or neutrality. Similarly choosing of the pure is always going on, since every act chooses all dharmas. Moreover, in both these acts, neither-appropriating-nor-rejecting is going on, since all acts ultimately neither appropriate nor reject any specific single dharma, for precisely the reason that these two opposite operations are always going on equally everywhere. In the context of Zhili's system, we could

of course also say that impurity is always being chosen, purity always rejected. It is simply that Zhili's present practice, the upāya currently operative relative to his own narrow and biased attachments, proceeds in this way, for reasons to be described below.

Zhili continues in the section marked [3] to make a surprisingly explicit statement of the pluralistic frame behind his claim, being more generous than is necessary and hence perhaps establishing his commitment to a tolerant interpretation of this teaching about evil (which, despite appearances, could also be interpreted quite otherwise, as we have seen). Zhili states that the sin he is proposing just happens to be one that appeals to him, something that he finds pleasure in. It is by no means a categorical imperative for all. It just happens to suit his own idiosyncratic taste, and what suits one's taste is what one should practice and what one can be enlightened by. There is absolute equality among Dharma-gates, and their practice is a purely individual matter that must be decided on a case by case basis. Others might choose completely other methods.

In the section marked [4], Zhili expands a bit on this, giving an interesting account of exactly how he happened to choose this particular course of action. It is the opposite of a rational decision. Nor, as Zhili describes it here, can it be described as religious in motivation. It is not a question of prudence or duty. On the contrary, Zhili describes this notion as something that simply appears to him of its own accord, a strange obsession or compulsion, an idea he has had for reasons unknown to him since childhood; he speculates that it must be the result of some prenatal vow, which he will therefore honor. Indeed, elsewhere in the same letter he states that even the efficacy of this practice to lead specifically to rebirth in Amitābha's Pure Land is due only to the nature of the original arbitrary vow; in fact, all lands and all principles will become equally manifest and available at the moment of the self-immolation. This respectful attitude toward a persistent irrational urge is worthy of careful attention, since it has potentially far-reaching ethical implications, the consideration of which, however, I will postpone to the conclusion of this work.

Zhili has already gone pretty far in defending his planned evil. But Yang Yi was still unsatisfied; he asserts that such practices are devilish, and the passages in the scriptures describing them are preached by the king of devils. This would appear to be an attempt to "Zen Zhili out" and sets the stage for a confrontation between Chan and Tiantai that was perhaps what Zhili was attempting to provoke in the first place. Yang Yi asks three follow-up ques-

tions, all of which are imbued with typical Linji iconoclastic rhetoric. The first question asks, of Zhili's description of the Pure Land with its jeweled trees and golden streams, who experiences this experience? This sort of *who* question, throwing the question back to the one who is asking the question, is quite common in Chan works. Zhili answers with reference to the standard Tiantai doctrine that every subject and every object is inclusive of all subjects and objects. The third question is a paraphrase of an old *gongan*. Yang Yi asks, in a similar spirit: You speak of the sensation of fire as the Dharma-gate of asceticism, but when the kalpa-ending fire burns the whole cosmos, who will be the one perceiving the sensation of ultimate bliss? Zhili answers that of course no definite person will receive the ultimate bliss when he immolates himself, nor is there definitively *no* person receiving ultimate bliss at the time of the world conflagration.

It is the second question and answer in this sequence that are of especial interest in the present context. Here Yang Yi tries the Chan tactic of discrediting all reliance on written teachings and sacred texts. Zhili had quoted a number of sūtras as precedents for his planned self-immolation. Yang Yi suggests in effect that he is letting himself be turned by the *Lotus Sūtra* rather than turning the *Lotus*, as Huineng puts it in the dialogue with Fada in the *Platform Sūtra*. All written discursive doctrines qua doctrines are nothing but teachings of the devil. This ill-advised tactic is the set-up for Zhili's most eloquent and extreme defense of the goodness of evil.

Zhili has no problem with the devil. He does not dispute the rhetorical Chan claim that all written teachings and, by the same token, all Buddhist institutions, are works of the devil. But acceptance of this fact allows him to reveal the concealed dualism in Chan iconoclasm and at the same time make room for the existence of devilish phenomena like the organized religion of which he is a part, without denying its diabolical nature. It is here that he makes the claim that there is no devil but the Buddha and no Buddha but the devil. We are now in a position to interpret the passage in question.

What difference is there between the Buddha and the devil? What inequality is there between the correct and the incorrect? Truly, it is because from the beginning the perfect principle possesses the natures of both the Buddha and the devil that they are not two and yet two, [two] and yet not two. According to different karmic conditions [this principle] may manifest either as the Buddha or as the devil; since the original natures of the two are merged together from the beginning, *how could their manifestations be any different from one another?* Thus in the Integrated and Ultimate Teaching, speaking in accordance with the nature of all things, the quiddity of

the demonic realm and the quiddity of the Buddha-realm are said to be one quiddity, not two quiddities. Hence we are able to assert that *other than the devil there is no Buddha, and other than the Buddha there is no devil* (*mo wai wu fo; fo wai wu mo* 魔外無佛，佛外無魔). This is also to say that as long as there is one who is a devil all are devils, and as long as there is one who is a Buddha all are Buddhas. All these manifestations may be called the entire dharma-realm; each pervades and permeates everywhere as one body. Therefore any one of them can be called king, since each one is the imperial meeting place that brings together all other dharmas. So to give rise to the view that there is any superiority or inferiority between the Buddha and the devil is naturally a perverse thought and not the proper way to contemplate.

From the beginning, the devilish phenomena have always been glorious wonders. They are like the house of a wealthy man, filled with the seven types of treasures; the ordinary man is like a blind man therein, whose turnings and movements are so obstructed by them that the treasures harm him. The Two Vehicles are like people with a fever, seeing these jewels to be ghosts, tigers, dragons, and snakes; they run away from them in fear. The gradual bodhisattvas are like someone looking around in the dark; they see the treasures but not clearly. It is only the practitioner of the Integrated and Sudden teachings who sees them decisively as the seven types of treasures from the beginning and freely uses them, and the Buddha is one who is perfectly unobstructed in doing so. Thus the devil is the whole dharma-realm; the devil is the king of the Dharma. The devil is what is present everywhere at first merely as principle—this is the identity [between all things and the devil] on the level of the essential nature shared by all things. The beginning student is identical to the devil in name. The five ranks are the contemplation and practice level of identity with the devil. The rank of the ten faiths is identity with the devil at the level of similarity. The Dharmakāya bodhisattvas have identity with the devil at the level of partial realization. Only the perfectly enlightened one is at the level of ultimate identity with the devil.

Only at this last level is the principle and phenomenon of the devil-dharma fully penetrated and exhausted to the bottom. Only then can one unify and integrate all things in the universe within the realm of the devil and be free and at ease there; only one who does thus is worthy of being called king of the devils. You should understand that although Mara is called king of the devils, this is a name without any reality behind it, since he is unable to be free and at ease and unify and integrate everything. . . . This being the case, how can there be any doubt that the passages from the *Brahmajāla* and *Lotus* sūtras [I] cited are spoken by the true king of devils [i.e., the Buddha]? For "king of devils" and "the enlightened one" are two names for the same thing. In the same way, Indra, with his thousand meritorious properties, has a thousand names, but we do not for that reason say that the preaching of "Indra" [personal name] is different from the preaching of "Kauśika" [Indra's family name].

What you now call the preaching of the king of devils not only is no different from the preaching of the Buddha but is even able to deeply reveal the Integrated Teaching. And why? Because the perfectly Integrated Teaching is not integrated in isolation; it is, rather, that each and every partial and incorrect dharma is itself perfected and integrated [through it] (*yuan bu zi yuan, nai pian xie zhu fa yi yi jie yuan* 圓不自圓，乃偏邪諸法一一皆圓). The *Lotus Sūtra* pulls open and illuminates the Hīnayāna teaching, revealing it to be the king of all teachings. How could it then fail to pull open and reveal that devils and heretics are also the king? It is just that since devils and heretics are easy to open up [revealing their true ultimacy], it had already been explained in various Mahāyāna sūtras, whereas the Hīnayāna teachings are difficult to open up, and the *Lotus Sūtra* made a special point of open them up separately, in accordance with this difficulty. For example, in the *Avataṁsaka sūtra*, when the Heat-conquering Brahman throws himself into the fire so as to educate people, this is to use nothing but a heretical practice; or when the prostitute Vasumitra used tainted desire to attract sentient beings, this was utilizing nothing but a dharma from the devil's net [as a means to enlightenment]. If they had not dwelt deeply in the dharma-realm of devils and heretics (*shen zhu mo wai fajie* 深住魔外法界), how could they have helped countless sentient beings to attain *samādhi*? This is what is called mastering the way of the Buddha by practicing improper ways.

Moreover, since my present project, of burning the body and cutting off fingers, is helpful and in accordance with my practice, "the sacrifice of body, life, and wealth" [which the *Lotus Sūtra* calls the true support of the dharma] will be beneficial to both our wealth and to the dharma. Since all phenomena are reducible to and converge in [heretical] asceticism, it is the entire dharma-realm [just like any other possible practice or fact]. Thus, since the Buddha and the devil are one in essence, proper and improper Dharma-gates [i.e., methods of practice] interpenetrate from the very beginning; this is called perfect morality [lit., "keeping of the precepts"], and the skillful means that are inherent in the essence of the truth (*tinei fangbian* 體內方便). How could this not be so of the devil's preaching? In this way, not to be afraid or surprised while hearing the devil's preaching and overcoming one's attachment to the Buddha are good ways to start practicing the Three Contemplations.[115]

Zhili is here taking basic Tiantai doctrine to its logical conclusions, something no one had previously dared to do quite so explicitly. If each thing is all things, it obviously follows that the Buddha is the devil, and vice versa. Moreover, if all things are nothing but any given thing, in its particular quiddity, if all quiddities are wholly reducible to any quiddity chosen at random, the conclusion that there is no devil other than the Buddha, and vice versa, is unavoidable. It is just a special case of the already accepted dictum that there is no anything outside of anything else, and that indeed all are

nothing but any one of them chosen at random. Zhili is just consistently applying this to all entities and with relentless symmetry not creating special exemptions or exceptions for the category of buddhahood, which stands on equal footing with all other provisional/ultimate determinations.

One of the distinguishing marks of Tiantai thought is the self-reflective moment, in which the same technique that has first been applied to given material is then turned around and applied to the technique and the applier of the technique themselves, as when, after the contemplating mind has refuted the substantial existence of all its objects, it turns around to refute the substantial existence of itself and of its refutations.[116] Zhili is doing the same thing here, taking to the meta-level what everyone admits applies to the first-order relation and insisting that this same point is valid for all possible meta-levels to which the inquiry can be raised. So the Buddha is none other than the devil, nothing but devilishness, and the devil is nothing but the Buddha. It is not the case that the Buddha is also partially the devil or has devilishness also within him, and vice versa; every particle of the Buddha is the devil, and every particle of the devil is the Buddha. As in the dialogic example given above, we have the simultaneous situation of a single semiotic token in two meaning-contexts. Moreover, it is not just that the substance of the two is the same, arising in different situations. The two functions themselves are always both operative, for as long as there is any one devil, the devil-meaning context side of the dialogue exists and casts its meaning over all tokens, and the same goes for the Buddha side. Each pervades everywhere, through all points and moments, ineradicably. Each one is a marvel, a glorious wonder, permeating and interpenetrating everywhere. Hence each is the king of all, the defining point that determines the quiddity of all others, the imperial meeting place of all other dharmas.

As this passage continues, we see again the other level of this radical egalitarianism of all possible states; for even hierarchy is given equal rights. Some know that the evils are holy, and some do not. The Buddha knows it perfectly. Here we see the notion of the Six Identities used with respect to the dung beetle applied to the devil: the dharma of deviltry is also becoming increasingly manifest and increasingly realized as practice proceeds. The Buddha is one who has been able to realize fully this identity with the devil that characterizes all things. The devil is unable to really be the devil—only the Buddha can do so. In this sense, although the quiddity "devil" and the quiddity "Buddha" are equal in value, it is also the case that the so-called devil, whoever regards himself as the devil in practice, has imperfectly real-

ized the quiddity of deviltry (and all other quiddities) and hence is inferior to the Buddha, who has realized it. The devil sees his devilishness as limited, as belonging to a finite realm, as applying only to a certain scope and standing in irreducible contrast to all that lies outside it, for example, all forms of good. The Buddha "dwells in" this evil, seeing that this very quiddity of evil is equally discernible everywhere, eternal and ineradicable, appearing even as goodness, and vice versa. Once again, however, we must not be confused by this sudden shift of levels. At the next step, the same egalitarian attitude can be reapplied to this new hierarchy, opening it up to reveal its ultimacy. Even "not realizing that the evils are gems" is an evil that is itself a gem. It always has both meanings, is always rewritten and re-evaluated to mean both value and anti-value, a token that simultaneously has both meanings, constantly viewed by all other moments and hence incorporated into their meaning systems. We must recognize here an irresolvable copresence of equality and inequality, in a loop of constant convergence and constant separation—which is precisely what Tiantai refers to as the Truth of the Mean.

This dismissal of the phenomenal devil (or any particularly manifested evil state) as not fully realizing the essence of evil is not taken by Zhili to mean that the particulars of these evil quiddities are to be dismissed as belonging only to the level of these imperfectly realized phenomena or as having to be avoided in practice, as the Shanwai position asserts. Since the functions of the two are always simultaneous, always present, and always interpenetrating, either function entails both. It is crucial to Zhili's use of this doctrine to defend a planned evil action as part of his own practice that the functional, practiced evil is also omnipresent and also an efficient means of Buddhist practice. The pre-eminent position of the Buddha as he who has truly realized evil does not entail the claim that this perfectly realized evil is devoid of the qualities of evil as we know it. Zhili is not claiming that when evil becomes "eminent" in the theological sense, the specificities of ignorance, greed, and hatred fall away from it, so that it is unrecognizable as what we call evil. On the contrary, as Zhili said in the previous passage, both the substance and the function of the two are always both in operation. The same principle is at work when Zhili asserts that, since the Buddha and the devil are one in essence, their functions are also interpenetrating and that the preachings of both are equally valid and enlightening—"proper and improper Dharma-gates interpenetrate from the beginning." He does not claim, for example, that since the Buddha and the devil are one in essence, the devil's preachings, as a misunderstanding of that common essence, are to

be disregarded or reabsorbed solely into the Buddha's teachings, or that the devils teachings are invalid because they are based on a misunderstanding of the devil's own essence, and therefore negligible. He does not say, "If you want to really practice evil, the only valid way of doing so is to practice what we have hitherto called Buddha-practices and good, for these are the only true evil." This would be "returning all to one side," to the Buddha side—the Exclusive Mean. Rather, the evil practices and teachings of the devil are themselves salvific, and it is one of these that Zhili plans to practice himself, just as was done by the idiotic heretic and the promiscuous prostitute in the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra*.

Zhili calls this "the skillful means or provisional teachings inherent to the essence of truth," and again it is helpful to think of the set-up / punch line structure in understanding this. The evil practices are upāya, that is, set-ups to the great punch line of enlightenment, which will reveal them to have been hilarious all along, while remaining solemn and evil and coarse and in eternal contrast to enlightenment.[117] They, like the dung beetle, need only be fully realized as what they already are, as salvific provisional posits that are also empty and the Mean, as responses to their own stimuli, as specific quiddities that pervade all times and places, to be themselves the ultimate. As stated in the previously quoted passage, "Whatever you take pleasure in is what is appropriate to you, and whatever you practice is what will enlighten you." These evils have only to be practiced qua evil, but practiced thoroughly, to be soteriologically effective. It must be understood how this is both different from (it is more thoroughgoing) *and* the same as (it is just the quiddity of evil itself, applied to all possible cases) the naïve form of evil.

Any possible practice or attitude, then, can be a valid form of practice, and what is more, all are valid forms, since all are redefined by the moment of enlightenment, and that moment is always going on. As Zhili says, "Each and every partial and incorrect dharma is itself perfected and integrated" through the copresence of the Integrated Teaching and practice in its vicinity. As we saw in Zhiyi's description of the contemplation of evil, meditative practice necessarily has a two-tiered structure. The Integrated Teaching never functions alone; as with any quiddity, nothing is the Integrated Teaching *simpliciter*. It always presupposes some other deluded or incorrect content of which it manifests the perfection, which it makes integral, just as all quiddities integrate all other quiddities into versions of themselves. This is because no moment coincides with itself, has a determinate set of borders, or can be conceived in terms of any finite matrix; each is a function of a for-

ever untotalizable intersubjectivity. To put it simply, no moment or set of moments can form an atomic unit that is separable from any other moment or set of moments. This is simply a consequence of the Three Truths.

Why then choose one behavior over another? For Zhili, an inexplicable compulsion served as an adequate reason. Zhiyi once answered this question by simply noting that some paths are quicker than others; all will reach the goal, but some will arrive sooner than others (in terms of their own relative apprehension of temporality). The choice of enduring (or regarding yourself as enduring) your suffering for a longer or shorter time is yours.[118] In another place, after stating that every moment of experience places one in one of the Ten Realms, he simply says that the practitioner should choose which he wishes to follow.[119] Zhili restates his reason for appropriating this particular path here by the more conventional assurance that in his own case this course will help his practice.[120] Again, it is in keeping with general Tiantai hermeneutics to keep both these interpretations in view at the same time. It is at once a senseless compulsion and a purposeful step in a course of cultivation.[121]

Indeed, since anything thoroughly practiced brings enlightenment, Zhili chooses his own obsession, which he will presumably be able to penetrate thoroughly due to the intensity of his involvement with it and its hold on him. Zhili wishes to burn himself to death. He is impelled to do this for reasons unclear to him; they do not derive from any objective preferability for this course of action over any other. His partial, biased attachment is as absurd and unjustifiable as any other, and like any other it can be redeemed only by complete realization of its nature in practice as well as theory. Again, both sides, the senseless and the purposive, are inescapably copresent, everywhere at once. The prospect of burning to death, a senseless and sinful preference that cannot be justified on objective grounds, engrosses him; however, at that moment, engulfed in flames, Zhili tells us, "The four Buddha lands are all suddenly present as this mind, such that the place of enlightenment of all Buddhas all appear in that place; it is only in accordance with my particular vow that this will necessarily lead to rebirth [in Amitābha's Pure Land]. Thus Zhiyi said, 'The mind in *samādhi* at the point of death is itself the Pure Land; the motion of one moment of thought is the time of rebirth in the Pure Land.'"[122] At the moment of death, all Buddhas and all principles appear, if contemplated in accordance with the Three Truths. Even the particular effect of being reborn in Amitābha's Pure Land is the result of the baseless vow and inclination of this particular bias. With

respect to its karmic effects in the ultimate sense, this act, like any other, is an act of the all on the all and hence leads everywhere at once. Even the putative effect of being born in a particular pure land is just part of the initial inexplicable prejudice, a free and baseless choice, another instance of evil, karma, and limitation, as which the good, liberation, and omnipresence will be manifesting.

The final implication is that it is necessary to sin, to be biased and attached, all the way to the bottom. Be the devil if you must, but be the devil thoroughly, and you are thereby being the Buddha. This does not necessarily mean simply "Do not waver!" More to the point, the implication is that if you do waver, then waver all the way to the bottom, fully realize what it is to waver, and then, once again, you are being a Buddha. Or, if you find yourself not getting to the bottom, not fully realizing whatever it is your doing, then "not fully realize" thoroughly. If you can see the quiddity of "not fully realizing" or "wavering" expressed everywhere as the Three Thousand other quiddities, and these Three Thousand expressing themselves as it, such that it is, while remaining unchanged, itself, the others, both, and neither, there will be no need to transcend or leave behind this quiddity of "not fully realizing" in order to "realize." And so on ad infinitum. In this way, with such a determination of the content of ultimate value, you will certainly find that you have always been executing the ultimate value, and at the same time, you must strive with all your might to realize it, it is never something definitively executed once and for all, and its execution can never be other than its non-execution. This, it seems to me, is the meaning of Zhili's rhetoric of value paradox.

As I said above, we should not be misled by the fact that Zhili's "sin" is to be attached to Buddhism, to the Pure Land, to Buddhist repentance and ritual. We are now in a position to integrate this strange fact into its doctrinal environment, and grant it its true significance. In classic Tiantai fashion, Zhili's self-immolation is simultaneously a ridiculously sincere religious act, a coolly cynical publicity stunt designed to manipulate the imperial court, and an opportunity to propagandize for his sect. The gap that Tiantai struggles to bridge is not that between good and evil but that between good-evil and beyond-good-and-evil. Indeed, the problem is that by its own standards, Buddhist institutions and practices are as deluded and sinful as the practices they seek to overcome. This is precisely the issue that is highlighted by Yang Yi's statement that the sūtras with their establishment of doctrines, rituals, institutions, and so on, are works of the king of devils, for from the doctrinal

perspective that defines sin as bias and attachment to any particular determinate forms, this is an unavoidable conclusion.

Zhili is planning his self-immolation, another bit of Buddhist foolishness, just as he has been performing foolish Buddhist rituals all his life and living in a foolish, sinful monastery. For Zhili, there is no sense in denying the benightedness, bias, attachment, restrictiveness, and distortion entailed in all such Buddhist monastic behavior and indeed in all behavior of any kind. It is indeed the prescription of the king of devils. But the Tiantai upāya doctrine, together with the mutual identity structure of the Three Truths on which it is founded, allows him to regard this as no obstacle to the continuous practice of this folly. Indeed, the justification of all other types of sinful and foolish behavior are side-effects, or appendages, to the primary goal of justifying the type of sin and foolishness in which Zhili has lived his life—Buddhism. The entire Tiantai justification of evil can thus be seen as a way to make Buddhism qua institution palatable to Buddhism qua doctrine, and Zhili's self-immolation is another step in this process. The biggest sin Zhili has to justify is "Buddhism" itself. Hence it is not surprising that he was moved to justify not only already committed sins, which is one possible interpretation of some of the older Tiantai treatments of the role of sin as a trigger for repentance, but also of ongoing sins, sins to be committed in the future again and again, sins that are built into the fabric of reality and can never be left behind, sins that pervade all times and places. One such sin is Buddhism itself, which Zhili intends to practice eternally and to propagate widely. For the sake of this supreme delusion and folly, he found a way to justify the equally pathetic folly and sin that constitute all the rest of human activity.

SEVEN

What's So Good About Evil: Conclusions and Implications

We have now achieved at least a tentative solution to the problem posed at the beginning of this book. Zhili's claim that there is no devil besides the Buddha and no Buddha besides the devil, that is, that there is no anti-value besides value and no value besides anti-value, has been our focus throughout. It is my hope that the reader can now understand both what motivates this claim and how it is possible for it to be part of a moral system, albeit a very unique and distinctive one, rather than (or as well as) undermining all morals and values. We have studied the presuppositions of this claim in two Tiantai doctrines: the omnicentric holism embodied in the doctrine of the Three Thousand quiddities inherently entailed in every moment of experience and the concept of constitutive intersubjectivity as a mutual inclusion of perspectives, which can never be reduced to one side only and in which each side is equally the whole. Both these features serve as underpinnings to the Tiantai tradition of value paradox, culminating in Zhili's most radical position. Before bringing this work to a close, I wish to make some observations about the philosophical implications of this Tiantai tradition and point to the significance of Zhili's value theory for any future ethics that would endeavor to take its premises seriously and build a view of human activity and valuation that takes its insights into account.

Before doing so, however, we must consider an obvious question: Does Tiantai thought deserve to be taken seriously? Given the obvious fact that

this line of thinking developed in a particular cultural milieu, apparently on the basis of some wildly mythological premises, can we even begin to talk about what it could mean philosophically outside that context? In particular, two features stand out as questionable for the modern reader with no prior religious or ideological affiliation in trying to take this system seriously: the presuppositions of the existence, first, of a state called "buddhahood," to which any number of superhuman abilities are attributed, and second, in some sense or other, of a multitude of successive births and rebirths, displaying a continuity of "karma," that can be construed as telling a single tale and that constitute a single sentient being's practice. Let us first briefly examine the implications of these two doctrines and the extent to which they are essential to the other Tiantai ideas expounded above.

As I have noted in the course of this work, certain features of the Tiantai notion of "buddhahood" make it moot if not meaningless to ask "whether" there is any such thing as a buddhahood. Among these are the non-intentional nature of a "buddha's" activities; the non-discomfirmability of the mode of being called "buddhahood" with respect to its actions, its consciousness, and its being (in that it is defined as precisely that which would equally be expressed as the opposite of itself without ceasing to be itself and that it can be expressed *as* its own absence); the inherence of buddhahood in deluded states and the assertion that it cannot exist independently of them; and, perhaps most important, the structural description of buddhahood as self-verifying in the sense of being performative, such that to think the thought "buddhahood" is to have buddhahood present. This was also expressed as equivalent to the punch line of a joke, whose humor, in the case of buddhahood, is guaranteed by the facts that actually all moments are punch lines and that this is performative humor, of the kind that one might witness, say, when someone laughs at the mere thought of the *possibility* of something being perceived by some possible consciousness as humorous. The sense here would be that there is something quite funny about the notion of humor, the notion that certain things could evoke violently pleasurable responses, that it is imaginable that the present innocent occurrence, which might seem perfectly ordinary and serious to oneself, could be viewed by someone else, with wildly different expectations and habits, as humorous. This "possibility of there being someone else who could see it that way" ends up equaling "I am seeing it that way right now"; the thought that someone might find this normal incident funny makes me burst out laughing—this thought is itself funny.

Perhaps the notion of enlightenment can be understood in a similar way: the Tiantai premises seem designed to allow for a situation in which to merely imagine someone who would see, for example, all things implicit in each particular thing and all views intersubjectively viewing and redefining each other is to view and redefine all things thereby. To put it a bit more explicitly, if one were to be asked, "Is there anything you are not certain of?" it would be impossible to answer, "I'm not sure." If one is not sure, then one's answer is "yes." It is empirically doubtful that anyone would be able to answer this question with a definitive "no." The considerations developed above about "appearing" always necessarily being predicated on something unknown that is not appearing would rule out such an answer. Thus, nothing in particular must be known (or even asserted) to be really there for the proposition "There are some things we don't know or are not sure of" to be established. Even to wonder about this is to have established it. But if there is anything we are not sure of, by the holistic premise taken to its ultimate conclusion, there is nothing we can be quite sure of. The unknown elements may reveal something about the parts we do know that changes their identity. The Tiantai notion of enlightenment may be seen as amounting to no more than this. It is the principle of "opening the provisional to reveal the Real" *itself*, not some particular real that might be revealed thereby. Hence, to simply establish that things are not necessarily what they appear to be, to entertain any form of "meaning" whatsoever—not even to "believe" or "establish" it, but even just to understand or imagine what might be meant by this—is already to have established the operation of the principle of "things turning out to be otherwise than they appear." If someone says, "there is a meaning to these things, which I will tell you later," he has already established and revealed this meaning. This may be regarded as a sort of Tiantai amendment of the Cartesian *cogito*; the true conclusion to *dubito* is not *sum*, but "therefore all things are interpretable in terms of, and as, other things." But this will have to be rigorously proved in a later work.

What about karma and rebirth? A close examination of the importance of the notion of infinite metempsychosis in Tiantai may be helpful here. This can be done without trying to justify metempsychosis as a belief, although for all I know it may be true, and indeed, more plausibly, it may be that it is neither true nor false, that it is one valid way among others (to be, as it were, very "Tiantai" about it) of reading a particular structural similarity between life stories separated in time with no observable causal interaction. This would make it one among many interpretations (another being, e.g.,

chance), between which there is no ultimate way to decide which is most valid for all possible uses and contexts. Perhaps each of these interpretive perspectives will be most useful in different cases, depending on the purposes of the discussion at hand. Be that as it may, as we have amply seen, the true significance of metempsychosis for Tiantai thought, given the nullity of any use of the scheme as a straightforward retribution mechanism in this context and the assertion of the legitimate forgetting of past lives as a form of their continuity (metempsychosis does not necessarily entail any sort of claim about lucid presence of past-life memories of any kind in present conscious thought), lies in providing what might be called the "availability of infinite horizons" of meaning for every token of experience.

Given the premises of the Tiantai system, the real impact on present experience of the notion of beginningless and endless metempsychosis is not to comfort one against the threat of extinction (that is putatively accomplished by other means here) or to promise moral balance but to posit a literally infinite number of alternative narratives of which this present life, and any portion of it, may be read as a part, each of which bestows on this part a different meaning, significance, value, and indeed identity. What I am doing here now is a part of an endless number of different stories, and each of them makes this moment of experience something different and allows it to read out as some other quiddity in accordance with the holistic principles developed above. Given the prospect of literally infinite rebirths, my sitting here typing these words is at the same time, for example, a wild rebellion, a quixotic bit of nostalgia, a heroic struggle, a fiendish plot, a cowardly retreat, a senseless repetition, and so on. The significance of this act changes with its incorporation into various narratives and there are an infinite number of contexts into which it legitimately fits.

But this establishment of infinite horizons of relevance, and hence infinite meanings for every token, is perhaps established on purely philosophical grounds, having nothing to do with metempsychosis, in the Three Truths. It may be that if a particular concept of death could be proved to be true, this would prove to be an obstacle to the infinite horizons claim. But as long as we are not sure if death spells either extinction or a single particular eternal destiny (in the Tiantai system, these two alternatives amount to the same thing) in some sense that would exclude this from being just another kind of context (and it is hard to imagine what this might mean), the pure possibility, the non-knowing itself, of unspecified outcomes and premises is enough to guarantee infinite meanings—and in all seriousness one can be

confident that no such proof, on either side of this question, is likely to be forthcoming. This consideration is obviously structurally parallel to that applied to the question of enlightenment above.

Along the same lines, it could be argued that, as Schopenhauer said of the idea of metempsychosis, these notions are "philosopheme[s] natural to human reason, and resulting from the forms of that faculty,"[1] which perhaps serve as something like Kantian regulative ideas, ideal limits and built-in presuppositions that function not as descriptions of how things are but as conditions for the intuitive apprehension of the necessary structure of practical activity. This consideration might be especially pertinent in considering not only the question of metempsychosis but also the ethical implication of that doctrine which perhaps poses the greatest problem to a modern interpreter: the conflation of suffering and evil. This is simply assumed in all Buddhist systems, but it is just the opposite of what common sense tells us about the empirical world. However, in line with the notions of intersubjectivity and evil developed here, it might be argued that in fact the very pleasure of evil proves that it is also pain, that one would not enjoy committing evil unless one could viscerally apprehend that someone was suffering because of it, and this someone, in Tiantai terms, is also yourself—otherwise it's no fun. The universe, to put it succinctly, is sadistic as well as masochistic.

This is not to deny that the Tiantai writers really did believe in, for example, metempsychosis or the existence of Pure Lands or the future attainment of universal buddhahood as a state of omniscience and omnipotence in a very serious and literal sense—to the extent that this term can be applied to anything in their ontology. These things were regarded by the thinkers in question as "existing" in just the same sense as this table in front of me exists, as empty, to be sure, but also as provisionally posited, and as the Mean, no more nor less real than any other posited entity in experience. After all, the Tiantai writers are "religious" in the worst sense of the word—sectarian, dogmatic, observant believers, reliant on textual authority and mythical premises. We need not, however, regard their philosophy as standing or falling with this belief. Does the fact that they had beliefs we regard as false mean we must regard all their beliefs as false (as certain understandings of holistic principles would seem to imply)? This issue is actually quite complex and applies in varying degrees to any past thinker—strictly speaking, I would say to any other human being—whose ideas on any given subject we endeavor to take seriously, assuming that we do not share all of that person's beliefs. Communication of ideas, or the acceptance of ideas originating in

someone else, is not made impossible by the fact that the two communicants do not share all the same beliefs; this disparity is the indispensable precondition of communication. Without it, nothing is in fact "communicated" from one side to the other, since everything is on both sides already.

But put simply, the question is, Do the Tiantai mythological assumptions stand as necessary premises to their other ideas, or are they as relevant as, say, Plato's false beliefs about the relation between the sun and the earth to his ethical ideas? The problem, in my opinion, does not admit of a straightforward solution, since the relation of premises to conclusions is not always as neat and clean as philosophers sometimes like to represent—and this point I do regard as a consequence of some of the holistic principles developed here. Nonetheless, I have tried to show, in the foregoing analysis, that the ideas that have formed the special focus of interest here are not necessarily premised on these questionable notions, and indeed they were not the primary support adduced by the writers in question when discussing or writing about these matters. The support for these doctrines, in the explicit arguments of extant texts, primarily takes the form of the broadly philosophical considerations I have outlined above, although obviously the Tiantai writers made no distinction between what is philosophically self-justifying and what is dogmatically affirmed by scripture.

However, in a certain sense, all this is of merely academic interest; for the ultimate aims of this project, there is no need for such elaborate strategies. My approach is primarily pragmatic and experimental: I just want to see what will happen if we try to get some new ideas out of all this. If they turn out to be "true," well, all the better. If not, however, we might also say, as Henri Lefebvre said of an essay of Schelling's, that all this "is certainly not true, but is none the less very important for the truth," interpreting this remarks as Slavoj Žižek does:

> The point is not to reject what is not true in Schelling, the false ('obscurantist', 'theosophico-mythological') shell of his system, in order to attain its kernel of truth; its truth, rather, is inextricably linked to what, from our contemporary perspective, cannot but appear as blatantly 'not true', so that every attempt to discard the part or aspect considered 'not true' inevitably entails the loss of the truth itself—there is no way of throwing out the dirty bath water without losing the baby.[2]

This is an issue intellectual historians must learn to treat very subtly, and perhaps a sort of double vision, of precisely the kind described at length in the foregoing discussion of Tiantai ideas, would be of great use in expanding

our working definition of "truth" in such a way that it need not so quickly exclude all "falsehoods."

The preceding remarks are aimed at legitimating an approach to the modern person-in-the-street intellectual. But we might also anticipate even more powerful reservations about trying to draw philosophical conclusions from these texts from hardcore Buddhists themselves. As I noted briefly in the Introduction, the aims of this project are clearly not precisely those embraced by the Tiantai writers themselves, and this has an obviously has an effect on the types of conclusions we draw from their works. The Tiantai concepts of the inherent all-pervasive Three Thousand, the intersubjective *ganying* operative in upāya, and the evil inherent in the Buddha-nature are designed as parts of a comprehensive program of Buddhist praxis. They adduce these ideas not simply to argue a philosophical point but to pursue pragmatic and soteriological goals, as we have seen. The general theory of upāya in Tiantai necessitates the preaching of different doctrines in different intersubjective contexts, and it is likely that the preachments on the goodness of evil would come only on the basis of long practice and acquaintance with the goodness of good, which would generally serve as its premise. In one sense, then, good Buddhological common sense would say that it is illegitimate to take the doctrines of evil out of this matrix, even if they bring with them a few straggling roots of holism and intersubjectivity as well, and introduce them into a general philosophical discussion to interact with general non-Buddhist ethical reflection at the very end of the twentieth century.

Two responses may be offered to this objection. The first is that this work may be taken as a contribution to general scholarly inquiry, situating itself within the norms of non-Buddhist philosophical speculation. As such, it acknowledges the limits of its presuppositions, along the lines sketched in the previous paragraphs, and attempts to make a thought experiment accordingly. We take what premises we can fit into our present worldview and disregard the rest of the Buddhist baggage. We try to make these premises fly on their own terms and see their implications in the alien airspace in which we personally happen to breathe and have our being. Then, like good scientists, we sit back and watch what happens and record the results. This is our business, if we wish to do so. We are like animals who come along and eat the fruit off a tree, utilizing whatever elements of the fruit happen to be nutritious to the type of organism we are. We need not have worry about the intentions of the tree when it produced the fruit.

But from within the Buddhist context, at least the specifically Tiantai context, we can offer another justification. The doctrine presents itself differently in every intersubjective situation. Each can be legitimate, and indeed, in at least one sense, each *must* be legitimate and indeed salvific. A different focus is appropriate to each of these contexts. In the present context, or in some future context into which this work may someday fall, perhaps, the value-paradoxical doctrine is what needs to be propounded, at the expense of the other, more traditionally primary aspects of the teaching. We can "open up" the previous situation in solid Tiantai terms: the animal eats the fruit thinking it is serving its own present interests, but in fact this, too, is one more way in which the tree is expressing its "original vow." Thus, after all, are the seeds spread, after the animal has pilfered what it can from the fruit and walked its way, dropping the mutilated remains to the soil. Perhaps a cure is needed right now for a particular type of moral prejudice that has attained so thorough a hegemony that it is not even noticed anymore: the belief in antithetical values. But more to the point, there is in principle no misconstrual of Tiantai doctrine that is not in accord with Tiantai doctrine's own notion of its inconceivable ability to assume an infinity of forms and yet continue to function as itself in all those forms, given the infinity of contexts that will necessarily apply to each case. If we are twisting Tiantai doctrine to suit our present needs, then, this twisting itself, like all upāyas that misrepresent things, is perhaps one more example of an evil that itself expresses the Tiantai truth. And the Tiantai truth is simply that there is no other truth but these twistings.

Metaphysical Implications

Simply in the course of seeking to understand the bizarre value paradoxes that form the focus of this study, we have unavoidably been forced to learn a lot about their metaphysical and epistemological premises. Omnicentric holism and intersubjectivity may serve as rubrics for these premises, and these two in turn may serve as premises for one another. From another perspective, value paradox can be seen as the premise and the others as the conclusion. So what kind of metaphysics and epistemology do we get when we choose value paradox? We have a picture of a universe in which all parts contain the whole, all are self-moving, all are inseparable, all revolve around each one, all qualities are copresent everywhere not just as bodies but as

perceiving perspectives. Even their subjective cognitive errors or viewpoints regarding that whole of other views, from the presumed sluggish dark of the inanimate to the putative omniscience of imaginary beings, is at the same time the copresence of all other subjective views and authorized as a legitimate and objective form of the expression of each of them and of the whole. Being is here conceived as exchange, interpellation, and mutual perception, and truth as completeness and lack of bias toward any particularity of viewpoint. In the self-referential omnicentrics of Tiantai, this last proposition also applies to the particular viewpoint of "unbiasedness," or the view of the whole itself per se, which counts here as one more biased point of view as opposed to the other, smaller biases. To be is to be *as* something else, and therefore to be is necessarily to be *as* everything else, and for everything else to be is to be *as* this. To be is to be completely dependent on other things, completely devoid of a specifiable self. It is also to be absolute, to be the sole independent variable in the universe, the self-moving power that defines all things in terms of itself, creates all, leads to all, and is the conclusion and end point and meaning of all. These two aspects, in this vision, are just two ways of stating the same fact about what it is to be anything at all.

One implication of this view for ontology and epistemology, alluded to in passing at the end of Chapter 5, has to do with the concept of *time* in the context of the Tiantai notions of inherent inclusion and "opening the provisional to reveal the real," or transformative self-recontextualization. The Tiantai system, as Zhili struggled to show in his polemics against the Shanwai notion that only mind, not matter, inherently includes the Three Thousand, is not an idealism. Nor is it a materialism. If an idealism reduces all to mind and materialism reduces all to matter, Tiantai thought proclaims *mutual* reducibility. All things are indeed reducible to mind, including matter; but, according to Zhili at least, all things are equally reducible to matter, including mind.

The implications of the system may, however, be said to span the most notorious and extreme conclusions of *both* idealism and materialism. Like an unflinching idealism, it is able to claim that everything that appears outside or everything that appears to happen to one, to impinge from an external source, is in reality already a part of oneself and inherently included in oneself, and hence not really external at all. With rock-ribbed materialism, however, Tiantai claims that there is an indelible split in every subject and every mind, that it is non-transparent to itself, that it is permeated through and through with otherness and alien forces, and that this "beyond" which lurks

at the basis of all selves is beyond any subjective grasp, and moreover ineluctably undermines the subject's beliefs that it knows what it is really doing. There is an outside world; indeed, there are infinite outside worlds, and there is an outside world to every outside. Whatever single-valenced outside world one might posit as reality has an outside to it that rewrites its quiddities. No single thing succeeds in sealing itself off from the overflow into a "something more," which is not only always impinging on it but also undermining and redefining its identity.

It should be clear by now how the Tiantai system allows these extreme points of idealism and materialism to meet and, indeed, to be alternative ways of saying the same thing. This is, in a nutshell, the import of the Three Truths doctrine. But this convergence is the basic principle that solves many of the problems on which both materialisms and idealisms usually founder. In the case of idealism, for example, the problem is the arrival of new, unexpected experiences: you are walking along whistling a tune, and suddenly you are hit on the head by a falling rock, etc. How can this be "just yourself," a manifestation of your own mind? Yogācāra would perhaps say that it is your own doing, your karma; the recalcitrance and obstruction, the violation of your present interests, that you experience as external matter is in reality the *past*, your own former deeds, previous mental and volitional acts that are now finished and serve as obstacles against which the present butts its head. This move of replacing "outside world" with "the past" is relatively easy to grasp, and it makes clear some of the intrinsic relations between the notion of time and the question of idealism.

But how could you further say, as Tiantai does, that all is complete within oneself at any moment, that being hit on the head by a falling rock was always inherently included in, say, strolling along whistling? The answer lies in opening the provisional to reveal the real. One reveals a new hermeneutic that shows that the old text we had formerly understood in a certain way *also* means this other thing, without changing it in the least: the previous moment was the text under the old interpretation; the next moment is the text as seen under the new, "opened" interpretation. The blow on the head is the punch line that reveals the meaning that was always already going on in the set-up of strolling along whistling. You come to see that strolling along whistling a tune was an upāya and that what it really meant was (also) getting hit on the head with a rock (and all other phenomena). "Strolling along whistling" (Provisional Posit) is also "non-strolling-along-whistling" (Emptiness) and the identity of these two—the fact that non-strolling manifests

as strolling and vice versa, and that all quiddities are reducible to either. That is, "strolling along whistling" turns out to be composed of, posited by a temporal sequence of, and manifested in semantic contrast to various forms of "not-strolling-along-whistling," all of which, in Tiantai logic, amount to the appearance of these things *as* "strolling along whistling." These very same myriads of quiddities appear also as "getting hit on the head," when it appears and its nature is sought; once again, it is a multitude of "non-getting-hit-on-the-heads" which are here appearing as it. Not only is each among the constituents, that are appearing as the other, but also, as one among this multitude, each is, by omnicentric premises, the other itself, the central quiddity that defines and absorbs all the others. Hence "getting hit on the head" merely reveals what "strolling along whistling" always already was all along. Nothing external to the former has emerged; it has simply been "opened up" to reveal a further reality about it. It is in this sense that there is nothing outside the mind or any given moment of experience.

In other words, the peculiar Three Truths definition of what any quiddity's own "self" is, the coinciding of inner and outer that is, as the Mean, its own essence, realigns the problem of idealism and materialism completely. The "mind" outside of which there is nothing is no longer simply mind; it is also inherently not-mind from the beginning. Mind never appears as mind *simpliciter*; in looking for the quiddity "mind" one ends up finding a multitude of heteronomous quiddities that are all appearing as this mind or this present mental state. The same goes for the matter than which there is no other in materialism and the opposite problems that tend to haunt materialisms (e.g., the status of the posited thing-in-itself beyond thought as an internal object of thought, "matter" as an abstract product of thought itself, which is not found as such anywhere in experience, inexplicability of subjectivity and self-reflexivity, disavowal of perspectivist multiplicity on the model of singular objectivity) dissolve for just the same reason. Matter as non-sentience is always already, precisely by being insentient, sentient, as the somber set-up is humorous by remaining forever somber, as long as even one punch line (instant of sentience) has appeared in its midst. Matter as such is non-matter, as mind as such is non-mind. Every instance of mind can be seen to be appearing as some kind of matter, just as every instance of matter can be shown to be appearing as some form of mentation. The two quiddities, "mind" and "matter," in other words, appear only *as* one another, as is the case for any quiddities whatsoever. Only on this premise can we say that "all

is matter" or "all is mind," and that these two propositions end up meaning exactly the same thing.

In this connection, we might also recall the discussion of the Will to Power earlier in this book. There I suggested that the Will to Power was inherently paradoxical and thus not to be understood as identical to a Will to control, since loss of control is necessarily also be among the objects of its willing. Here we see a way to understand this willing to lose control. Again, it is rooted in a concept of an identity between selfhood and otherness that does not entail the unilateral appropriation of all objectivity—and hence anything beyond our immediate conscious control or desire—into the narrow confines of the self. The Tiantai principle is that both sides equally appropriate each other. As Bruno Petzold insightfully put it long ago, in Tiantai, the world is rational because the world is identical to the mind, but equally the mind is irrational since the mind is identical to the world.[3] Life is senseless and incomprehensible, because it always overspills the boundaries of any one self or quiddity it appears as or the interests of any self it manifests as, but equally, life is from top to bottom an expression of the deepest self of any such self and hence completely and transparently comprehensible. Life is chaos and life is control, and life is the will to chaos and the will to control or, better, the will to chaos *as* the will to control, and vice versa. Neither of these is to be stressed at the expense of the other.

This point of view entails a rewriting of the concept of causality, and indeed of time itself, entirely from the standpoint of opening the provisional to reveal the real. We may think here of Spinoza's conception of the relation between cause and effect: "For, in reality, the knowledge of an effect is nothing else than the acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause."[4] Zhanran says more or less the same thing in the section on cause and effect in the Ten Gates of Non-duality: there is in reality no motion from cause to effect; rather, the situation is a more and more complete knowledge of the cause, such that one dwells there in the same "place" throughout the whole process. This undermines the contrast of cause and effect and hence any one-sided or absolute division between them.[5] "Knowledge" in the Tiantai tradition means contemplation of identity with the Three Truths, and this is what time is viewed as: a more and more complete penetration of any given moment in the process, to see how it inherently includes all other subsequent and previous moments. In this sense, the initial moment never ends, and the subsequent moments never begin, as we have discussed above. In

other words, time is transformative self-recontextualization. Time is the continual breaking of a wave of punch lines; each moment is a punch line with respect to its own past and to all other moments. This, strictly speaking, is what it is to be a moment of time: to be a punch line in the Tiantai sense, something that rewrites all other moments as versions of itself, precisely in their contrast to and exclusion from itself. And indeed, it is this alone, outside of Buddhist mythology, which guarantees the arrival of a punch line that will transform everything: punch lines never stop arriving and transforming everything, that is what all experience is. This is precisely what we mean by the word "time."[6]

This sheds some light also on the relation of Tiantai praxis to ordinary experience. For pragmatically, the Tiantai practice of Three Truths meditation, the contemplation of each moment of deluded experience, retrospectively, is the process of seeing that that "previous" deluded moment being contemplated has never actually ended, that it has just been recontextualized, "opened up," to reveal itself also as this moment of contemplation, which indeed is what is doing the recontextualization. This is why I described time as transformative *self*-recontextualization. Time is always this kind of opening up and reinterpretation of the causes in the past, and the specific meditational practice on delusion is just another, more comprehensive, version of this process that is always occurring.[7] Every moment, even moments that punch-lined their own pasts in a deluded way, can be *further* punch-lined by a future moment in such a way that their "previous" deluded punch-lining precisely as such turns out to be an enlightened punch line. Each moment is an interpretation of all other moments and always stands susceptible to further re-interpretations, interpenetratively, back and forth. Since no moment ends, since each pervades all moments, meanings even of the meanings already given are always still in play, reversible and multivalent.

Indeed, if we wished to formulate the Tiantai notion of the structure of time in its three dimensions, the Three Truths spring readily to hand: the past is Provisional Positing, what appears as completed, non-negotiable, and fixedly determinate. The future is Emptiness, pure ambiguity, possibility, ungraspability, casting its uncertainty back over all that has preceded as well, the constant threat of the disaster and destruction that will cancel all that has been set up. The present, the locus of the integration and reinterpretation, the interpenetration and mutual reducibility, the ever-occurring punch line itself, is the Mean. On Tiantai premises, each of these three would also have to turn out to have the specific characteristics of each

of the other two as well, and this, I would argue, is precisely what we do find when we examine the structure of time as we experience it.

This is relevant to another perennial philosophical quandary, the question of free will, which may have occurred to some readers upon encountering this talk about "all things being inherently included in the nature from the beginning," although it is a not a question that seems to interest Tiantai theorists themselves. Nonetheless, from our present perspective, there is perhaps a problem with inclusiveness: it seems we must either sacrifice particularity or free will. That is, if all Three Thousand are included in each moment and are there from the beginning, either this "Three Thousand" refers to some sort of universal, a sort of template of all possible forms such that no matter what you do or what particular you happen to stumble into, the same Three Thousand are still equally present and unchangeable; or, if we really mean that this very moment of experience in all its unique particularity is included in the nature of all things from the very beginning, there is of course no free will or choice. Both of these are in a way accurate, but again we must refer to the indeterminability and the application of perspectives, as discussed above. What we must understand about inherent inclusion, then, is that the nature of any given present condition inherently includes not only the whole sequence of everything that has ever "actually" happened[8] in practice (*xiu*) but also equally the exact opposite of this sequence, the background of possibility behind every moment in the actual sequence. Inherent inclusion includes both the "actual" fact of the matter and the "possible" that is its opposite. This is actually another way of stating the point that no moment ever ends—since it still has not closed off, its nature is not yet determined. Thus it is not caused by something other than itself (Bergson makes a similar point in his early work). It is still "doing" its cause.

By the same token, since X is non-X, determinism falls apart. Determinism refers only to the realm in which we see only X as X. A causes B, B causes C . . . X. But if A is non-A, B is non-B, X is non-X, and all are the whole alphabet, once again we have self-cause, and the freedom comes in the sense that I can see what I'm doing now either as X or as non-X, or both or neither, and so I am not determined to X. In this sense, "inherent inclusion" includes both "Bill Herakleitos Smithers is chuckling to himself as he recalls a remark made by someone on the bus two days earlier as he drinks a Horlicks at 12:22 P.M., September 30, 1995," and the opposite of all these specific, unique conditions, as well as any other possible specifications. It is in this sense that we can say all is free (which of these possibles will be *xiu* is up to

you; that is, it is up to any presently operating deluded perspective) *and* that all is inherently included from the beginning.

This consideration allows us to take up another question that has been lurking in this discussion from the beginning, and which we have answered in passing above: What is it that makes one thing appear in *xiu* (manifest practice) rather than another, given that all possibles are always present in any instance of it? Why does this thing here appear as this rather than anything else? The simplest version of the Tiantai answer is perhaps: while deluded, because of ignorant clinging, karma, and desire; when enlightened, because of compassion—compassion coming from every direction and toward every direction. As we have seen, however, these two mutually inhere. The delusion is the stimulus that brings forth the response of compassion, and each then turns out to be itself and the other, as in the set-up / punch line structure. From the ultimate perspective, only compassion would be a reason to be or do one thing rather than another. But in the Integrated Teaching, this means also seeing that this is what one has been doing all along—that the deluded clinging was itself compassion, that that is the reason the deluded are one thing rather than another, and that the compassion is structurally dependent on the eternal preservation of the delusion that triggers and defines its particular form. To see this, it is only necessary to understand, as we have also discussed in some detail, that one is oneself already "other people"—what one did to alleviate one's own pain (when one was selfishly pillaging and so on) was done to alleviate pain. Given the lack of a substantial self, everything you have ever done has already been done out of compassion for the suffering of some not-you sentient being, namely, "yourself." Hence selfish desire is always already compassion. Moreover, what is it that makes one continue to live after one realizes that life and death each are equally really life/death, what is it but compassion—for mom and dad, for the people around you, for the deluded death-fearing sentient being who is you, your past, and present? The implications of this line of thought for human freedom and human subjectivity perhaps deserve further development, a point I hope to take up in a future work, among many of the others briefly touched on above.

Epistemological Implications

As I suggested in Chapter 2, omnicentric epistemology differs most radically from atomistic or unicentric epistemology in that it does not start with the

assumption that there is simply one way reality is, that any one viewpoint, even the universal viewpoint of the whole qua whole, is correct, and all others are mistaken. Included in this view, epistemologically, is the positive value placed on error and delusion: any falsehood, "brought to the ultimate," is the truth. The method of reaching "truth," then, is not to eradicate falsehood but to take any falsehood at all as the starting point and develop it as far as it will go, for then it will be seen to entail every other possible view. It does not need to go outside itself, as it were, to reach all the other perspectives. To be noted here in passing is the importance of this category of "development." This category tends to brings with it the attendant notion of "degrees of expression," which, as we noted in Chapter 2, is one of the standard tropes of oligocentrism, one that is abundantly instantiated in early Ruism. Indeed, all omnicentrisms seem to have some need of this category, which allows for the claim that when any perspective is "fully developed" and thereby comes to "express itself as itself fully," it encompasses and coincides with all other perspectives. From the point of view of each, all the others are merely more indirect and more undeveloped versions of itself. This oligocentric trope becomes an aspect of omnicentrism when it is (1) viewed as provisional, so that even this difference of degrees of expression is viewed retrospectively as necessary for a fuller expression (as in the Tiantai system, in which the unconsciousness that one is a bodhisattva is itself a bodhisattvaistic upāya); and (2) when it is reversible, that is, when it is applied on all sides and in all directions, so that not only are A and B imperfect expressions of C, but C is equally an imperfect expression of either A or B, whichever is chosen as the orienting beginning.[9] Any starting point will do, and none are dismissed as simply false. Rather, all are preserved unchanged, indeed fully realized, to the end. As we have seen, when any randomly chosen "center" (reference point) succeeds in being pushed as far as it will go, so that all other phenomena can be explained in terms of it and as aspects of it, it loses its character as that particular X as opposed to any other. It is everywhere and nowhere, and the quiddity "X-ness" continues to pervade all times and places in this self-negated, universalized form, retaining, however, the name and character of this particular X as one form in which it has and is perceived in the unbeginning and unending all-pervasive intersubjectivity of the whole. Its success in showing that all things are aspects of it has thus proved not so much that all things are forms of X but that all things are so closely interconnected that all things can be viewed as forms of any given X at all—that is, that the center is everywhere, and that each and every quid-

dity is both center and periphery, both explainer and explained, both includer and included.

This reversibility and interpenetration are also what distinguish this position from doctrines of relativism. No perspective that is simply itself to the exclusion of all other perspectives, even its direct negation, can be a closed system. All of them are implicitly each other, and this allows them to communicate with one another and develop into one another. Each perspective defines the world in terms of itself and indeed cannot be gainsaid by means of any extrinsic standard. But this "itself" has no fixed borders or ultimately determinable character; it breaks apart and is refuted not by the imposition of some other perspective but simply by further developing its initial perspective to the bottom, which always ends up including its own negation. The confronted other who appears as completely incompatible is in fact another aspect of oneself, the side that has been repressed or hidden, that has been cunningly appearing all along as oneself. This may be regarded as a clue to the problem of incommensurability and a prospect for the solution to the vexing conundrum of relativism and dogmatism. That is, the intercommunication of completely incompatible viewpoints can take place not because both refer to a third, objective world but because each is the hidden aspect of the self of the other. Here we no longer need a "view from nowhere" to overcome a completely self-constrained subjective perspective. Omnicentrism is neither objectivism nor subjectivism.

Involved in this notion of truth is its own character as performative: this view of truth is itself a perspective. It is a perspective, however, that includes a meta-view of all views as interpenetrating with one another such that each is both relative (hence invalid as *the one* center, which would have to exclude any other possible center) and ultimate (hence valid as *a* center) Hence, it must view itself in the same way: as something that, even when it appears false in terms of another perspective or in conflict with that perspective, cannot fail to be true and ultimately compatible with all other apparently contradictory perspectives, like any other view, and therefore need not fear being proved false from some other perspective. This means that this doctrine serves both as a justification of any possible ideology and as a critique of any possible ideology. All are justifiable, but none are exclusively justifiable. They are correct when they say their master-signifier (Marxism, feminism, ecologism, fascism, democracy, egoism, altruism, all is water, all is fire, etc.) can explain everything, and even that it cannot be disconfirmed by any conceivable evidence, but they are wrong if they think that the same would

not be true of any other master-signifier and that they are not identical to their ideological opponents. The limitation of our biases is overcome not by the impossible act of jumping out of our own head and seeing things from an unbiased perspective; it is overcome, rather, by developing this bias itself to its ultimate conclusion.

Such are a few of the metaphysical and epistemological consequences of the ideas recounted in this book that correspond more or less to the Tiantai doctrines of omnicentric holism and constitutive intersubjectivity. But there is another theme—value paradox. It is all well and good for us to go on about evil this and evil that, but what would this notion imply if seriously applied to the human problem of evil? What does it mean on a practical level? Or, to put the question another way, Why would anyone want value paradox? What good is it? What are its advantages (a question, by the way, that cannot be posed without assuming a focus on the value-dichotomous frame)? It is time for us to make a few thought experiments and connect a few dots.

Ethical Motivations and Implications

At various points along the way I have considered some possible objections to the unusual premises of Tiantai. I have tried to mollify the antipathy that we may expect from common sense toward paradoxical notions such as omnicentrism and all-pervasive intersubjectivity—claiming in effect that the commonsense view is itself a questionable and dogmatic outgrowth of unicentric or atomistic assumptions, at least as greatly in need of justification as the apparently more paradoxical positions I have been trying to elucidate. But surely the greatest outrage to common sense lies not in these relatively esoteric questions but in the whole idea of value paradox itself. Indeed, our cynical modern common sense dictates that where philosophical systems are involved, the ethics come first, and the metaphysics are brought in later to support them. To put it in terms of the Nietzschean perspective that began our considerations of this issue and from which this common sense of ours perhaps derives, "the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown. To explain how a philosopher's most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to ask oneself first: what morality does this (does *he*—) aim at."[10] If this is true, the value para-

dox would come first, and these metaphysical visions, with all their aesthetic splendor, are brought in as ways to justify them. But why would anyone want value paradox? The reason that immediately springs to mind—as a license to practice evil—is strangely devoid of resonance in the cases we have considered. For although Zhili, as I have gone to great lengths to show, does admittedly practice evil, he certainly cannot be described as a model of wild decadence and sin, in contrast to certain antinomian sects in Western religious history or even with some literary figures and poets. So what might these value-paradoxicalists have stood to gain?

Probably the most general, and thus least informative, answer is that these thinkers were eradicating a kind of cognitive dissonance with this strategy. This is not to be confused with the problem of theodicy; none of our thinkers was obliged to justify the ways of a presumed perfect beginning, or explain why an original perfection went awry, or prove that evil is really to the greater glory of God, at least not literally. In the Tiantai case, where some such motivation might have been suspected, we have another problem altogether. Zhili and Zhanran make clear that there was never any prior state of pure original enlightenment from which delusion arose and that the term "original enlightenment" is to be understood only paradoxically. There is no need to defend the teleology or utility of evil in this sense, for it is not only the case that the world is rational and works toward a planned and benevolent purpose—quite the contrary. Hence the usual objection to the justification of evil in unicentric and heterocentric theologies—that even if some evil were needed to provide a contrast to the good or provide the foil in the best of all possible worlds, it would not be needed in the ridiculously excessive proportions in which we actually find it, and so on—does not apply here. For the Tiantai thinkers, the world is always both a sea of senseless, uncoordinated suffering and a perfectly placed and ingeniously devised heuristic, constantly open to both readings and indeed requiring both readings. Either one of these interpretations alone always proves incoherent and ends up, if fully developed, bleeding into the other one; neither despair nor faith can sustain itself alone. Too much evil thus does not present a problem here, and an attempt to smooth over this problem did not motivate this desire to see evil as a set-up for good.

Nonetheless, a related problem does exist here: What are we supposed to do with all this evil and suffering? It's all over the place, after all, and once one is attuned to the many subtle disguises it can assume or has defined it in such a way as to see it permeating all possible activity, indeed seemingly able

to feed itself off of our virtues and flourish all the more, how are we to proceed? How is good of any kind possible at all? If we must throw out all the evil, we have to throw out almost everything—isn't there a less wasteful way to go about this? The precondition for the doctrine of inherent evil may thus be said to lie in the apprehension of the pervasiveness of evil and the impossibility of any dualistic attempt to extirpate it or, in the more extreme version of Zhili, in the view that evil is our very being. Given this insight, the only choices are to give up living or to find some positive function for the evil and suffering. The sentiment and the motivation here are perhaps something like those expressed by Nietzsche in a letter, quoting Emerson: "Unless I discover the alchemists' trick of turning this filth into *gold*, I am lost. I have here the *perfect* opportunity to show that for me 'all experiences are useful, all days holy, and all humans divine.'"[11]

But this doctrine of the inherent inclusion of evil, as we have seen, comes in several different versions. The practical implications and advantages of the Zhanran and the Shanwai versions of the doctrine are perhaps more readily comprehensible than those of Zhili's more radical version. This moderate position is a bit more positive about the role of evil than, say, the straightforward pantheistic or panentheistic systems or the "nature-origination" position of the Huayan tradition, which, as we noted, can also occasionally say evil is included in the Absolute. But there, it means as one more element indifferently encompassed by a transcendent Good, which is designated as such just because it is the foundation of all possible existences, good or evil, and able to encompass all without losing itself.

What we have here, as in the *Śūraṅgama Sūtra* and early Chan, is an *immanent* or *subjectivist* version of the privation theory of the good, based on "experience" rather than "being." Anything that is experienced is "good" to the extent that it is experience, and anything that manifests is good in that manifestation is good, although the determinate content of what manifests may be an "evil." The evil thus arises from the good and remains in a certain sense an aspect of the good (its reality is nothing but that goodness, the Pure Mind, etc., through and through), but in another sense it is not (what it takes itself to be, the determinate form being manifested, may be an "illusion," something with no real being of its own, which therefore has in fact never really manifested and hence is not good). This is structurally identical to the objective or transcendent privation theories of theism discussed early in this book; whatever really exists is the good and comes from the good, insofar as existence itself is good and God is the source of good/existence, and

indeed whatever exists is thoroughly nothing but the good; everything that is really there is completely good. But certain quiddities (particular free volitions) end up being only illusory beings, not real beings at all, and hence not good.

All this need have no immediate implications for practice. It can simply assert that the practices conventionally designated as good are those that lead to the realization of this all-encompassing state. The Shanwai position may be caricatured as assuming this position as well, calling in the notion of inherent evil only as a function that this encompassed or appropriated evil takes on after enlightenment is achieved. Zhanran's position may perhaps be seen, for all its ambiguity, as including one pro-evil move beyond this. He seems to advocate progressively "good" practice as the only way toward enlightenment (he does perhaps allow, somewhat grudgingly, for occasional exceptions). But he regards this goodness not only as "arising from" the previously existent evils, in that, literally speaking, these were originally all that existed,[12] but also as the underlying nature of these evils, at least in the sense of a potential inherent within them, another quiddity that is readable in them.[13] The further advance he makes is that he also considers progress toward the good to be to some extent dependent on what we would now call "staying in touch with" one's own evil. In other words, Zhanran urges us to behaviorally become more and more good, but internally not to relinquish the growing understanding and manifestation of the true nature of our own evil side, its intensity, extent and ineradicability—such practice leads to true good, to effective mastery of both sides. We may think of the dictum from the *Laozi*: "Know the white, but hold to the black."

This sort of notion is familiar to us not only in the realm of depth psychology (where a knowledge of one's own dark impulses allows one not to be controlled by them) but also in the arts. We may think of the harnessing of unruly passions by the sedentary novelist exploring the psychology of evil. In both cases we have tame and respectable behavior combined with perfect sensitivity to the horrors of the dark side of the human personality; the awareness and imaginary exploration of these horrors, not their performance, is exactly what provides the mastery that allows the former. It is the presence of the evils, in their merely potential (imaginary, virtual, mental) form, that is the basis and raw material for the good, which reworks this potential and gives it a new qualitative effectiveness in actuality.

In a certain sense, moreover, this restructured or bound form of evil is a fuller expression of it than it was in actual practice; it shines with greater

distinctness and articulation, for only the good (here, the Three Truths contemplation) has the power to make explicit (precisely as a [mere] object of knowing), and hence it is made "more manifest," in a sense more real, by being included in the good.[14] In this view, "good" is the includer, the center, and evil is the included, the periphery; as Flaubert said, the novelist must live like a bourgeois in order to be wild in his work. The evil is a necessary part of achieved good, but it must be brought into the unity of this controlling center first; it is what is bound, not what does the binding; it is included but does not include. It is the object of practice, not excised or even transformed necessarily, but introduced into a new context, one that is defined by the unifying work of good. In the Tiantai case, this means primarily the contemplation of it qua the Three Truths. This particular view on these evils causes them to vanish qua evil or qua practice, although the same content is also preserved in a glorified, benevolent form, as a fully realized part of the inherent nature.

From our present vantage point, we can perhaps gain an understanding of what would be attractive in this view by psychologically experimenting with it. In some obscure way, it does seem that when an evil, either natural (suffering) or moral (transgression), manifests, it can be overcome by dwelling in it, by fixing the mind on it to bring it into maximum clarity; somehow it self-destructs when the ordinary unconcentrated attitude that avoids and resists it, jumping away to something else, is replaced by the endeavor to "stop" within it, to burn through it with one's stare or make it blossom with one's contemplative sunlight, letting it be itself to the utmost, as if it had been preserved in its original putrid form only by the flitting and looking away and the fear of the ordinary rejection of pain, or as if its evil resided in this resistance. Or perhaps it is like an image in a Magic-Eye 3-D diagram, which appears only when it is *not* looked at directly; once you focus on it directly as foreground, it vanishes. The "concentration" here is the contemplation of the Three Truths, the arisal of Good, which has as its object and complement the evils that it causes to vanish or transform. The post-enlightenment evil acts of the Buddha, in this context, may be compared to a father teaching his son to throw on a rainy day by tossing a ball to him in the house, an act strictly forbidden by the house rules he has himself established. He has the mastery to control the throw and to limit its practice indoors only to those times when it is appropriate and has a heuristic value; a practitioner who tried to justify his own evil by reference to the Buddha's evils is like a son who claims he should be able to play ball in the house too. The point is that

the latter would presumably be unable to ensure that no damage would be done and that he himself would not become addicted to this practice; he does not yet have "mastery" of his own evil, as Zhiyi put it. The Buddha, on the other hand, has retained his evil in its bound, glorified, useful forms—to be used in relating to someone who does not yet have this mastery.

Zhili does not reject this position, indeed it is the foundation of his own view, but he takes two further steps that effectively open up this provisional view to reveal what is for him the real. In Zhili's view, this expansion of good to embrace all the evils, pushing this good to the utmost so that it encompasses and masters all times and places, good and evil, is one Dharma-gate among others; the same effect can be achieved by pushing evil itself to the utmost, so that it pervades all times and places. This is his first step. A person who is just beginning the contemplations should not seek an arisal of good that contemplates this evil from without. Rather, the evil itself is to come fully into focus, to see all other things as expressions of itself and itself as an expression of all other things; this equals the arisal of the contemplations. This focusing is to be conceived as the removal of external interference rather than the addition of some further quality of "good" or "wisdom" to the original evil. Or, better, it is just a broadening of the horizon in which evil is viewed. But in any case, the poison itself turns out to have accomplish this end. For in the aggressive urge to pin down and destroy the object of the contemplation, do we not have hatred? In the endeavor to grab hold of it, to make it yield bliss and buddhahood for us as a good capitalist investment would, do we not have lust and greed?[15] The contemplation itself is nothing but the further development of the evils it is contemplating. At the end of this process, when the contemplations have succeeded, they are seen to be none other than the original evil that engendered them. As Žižek puts it, "So it is not sufficient to assert that Reason is nothing but 'regulated madness': *the very gesture of regulating madness is stricto-sensu mad.*"[16] This is simply the extension of omnicentrism to the meta-level of the concept "evil" itself. This, of course, was implied in places by Zhanran as well, which is what allows Zhili to establish this view as the orthodox Tiantai position. It makes use also of the set-up / punch line structure of upāya; when opened up, the set-up itself is funny. The evil itself was the contemplation that was to come from it and destroy/transform it.

Thus far we have something akin to the Emersonian faith that "evil is good in the making," that "the first lesson of history is the good of evil. Good is a good doctor, but Bad is sometimes a better."[17] Zhili's next step, however,

is of crucial importance, although it appears to be quite subtle: even when the evil has completed the process of becoming itself fully, it may still be called "evil" per se. It becomes not only, for example, truly "dung beetle" but even truly "evil" as such. What evil itself always meant, as the opposition and obstruction to good, is what this evil now is. It does not change into good as the result of this "expansion"—it unifies and redeems all precisely in its role as extension of "evil" per se. However one might define evil, precisely this will be found to be what is deepening, intensifying, and manifesting in all times and spaces as all other forms and thereby being identical to enlightenment and the overcoming of evil on its own and any other definition. This is true no matter to what level of abstraction one chooses to append a definition of evil. If I define evil as particularization or as bias, it is precisely particularization or bias that will be found to self-overcome, to pervade all quiddities ineradicably, and to be identical to buddhahood and all other quiddities. At the final stage of practice, this particularization or bias will be *more* manifest, *more* apparent, *more* inescapable and palpable, than it had been at the beginning. The same is true however I define evil—as harming others, as rebellion against the source of being, as breaking an implicit social contact, as incomprehension of the Three Truths, as greed-hatred-ignorance—precisely this is what practices, what overcomes itself, *and* what becomes more and more manifest and present as practice proceeds, to salvific effect. But more than this, it will be precisely in its character *as evil* that it does so. That is, given the general definition of evil as "precisely whatever contravenes or prevents the good, however defined," evil per se is what practices, and what becomes increasingly manifest. The very failure to become increasingly manifest and thereby have a salvific effect, in other words, is what practices and what becomes increasingly manifest, to salvific effect.

To understand this, we must recall our discussion of ineluctable intersubjectivity: the element of deluded response is never lost, and it is always identical to the enlightened response to it. Both perspectives must be retained by the Buddha or any moment of buddhahood, which rewrites all other moments and is in turn always being rewritten back by all other moments. This means both that it is precisely as evil, as suffering and frustration, that it can trigger its response (which, of course, turns out to be just itself recontextualized, and recontexualized by itself—to be just itself, which was always contextualizing itself, recontextualizing itself), and that what "evil" or obstruction turns out to mean in this context is realized only by this final all-pervasive form, since "to regard as interpenetrating" represents the

fulfillment of "to regard as separate" and vice versa. Or we may say that after greed, hatred, and delusion have been expanded into wisdom and compassion, the latter are still just as completely greed, hatred, and delusion. Moreover, they are greed, hatred, and delusion not only as contributing to the good or all-inclusive but also as cut-off from the good and unresolved. They must always remain transparently opaque, as it were; their opacity to buddhahood must always be disclosed to buddhahood, for buddhahood here means the vision of both these alternative interpretations simultaneously and an insight into their mutual identity, via the constitutive intersubjectivity of all possible experience. Only in buddhahood is this opacity to buddhahood fully realized.

The literary equivalent here is no longer Flaubert but, rather, Henry Miller or Charles Bukowski, assuming for the moment that their self-presentations are more or less reliable. It is the mere writing down of their life, the purely formal act of transferring the sordid, selfish, venal details of their existences into the universal medium of language, that transforms it, "redeems" it, makes it a thing of beauty that contributes to the cultural heritage of the human race. This does not require that they live a "good" life or that they have exclusively good intentions or that in their writings they offer a justification of their evils (à la Sade or even the later Henry Miller—always to a disappointing effect; the strategy of such figures, if forced to theorize, is usually to adopt a neither/nor naturalism—there is neither good nor evil; I'm just being natural—which inevitably robs their work of its main interest). Rather, it is enough to make it universal, publish it, put on display just as it is, for whatever is universalized, even hatred and selfishness, is *ipso facto* a compassionate bodhisattva act for the salvation of all beings.

We may put Zhili's position as follows: if we fully realize any particular, if we take any beginning all the way to the end, if we start out in any direction and just keep going, we will get to the universal, we will arrive everywhere, without having left our starting place. Any X, brought to the ultimate, equals the total set of X and all non-X's. But this everywhere, since it is equally every possible quiddity, can then be called by the name of any particular, can be characterized by whichever starting point it began as. In itself it has no name, has no character in particular, as it is equally anything. Thus if it is to be called anything at all, even "no name" or "no character in particular," or "neither this nor that," it is equally valid to call it any this or any that, universal evil or universal good, or both or neither. Furthermore, the

ineradicable intersubjectivity of the situation necessitates that all these appellations always remain in force.

In effect, then, Zhili radicalizes the doctrine of "inherent evil," which is really quite easily domesticated and made harmless, with his claims of the ultimate dung beetle, of the poison of principle, and, most explicitly, the straight assertion, cited above, that "whatever one likes is what is appropriate to one, and this is what one should practice and what one will be enlightened by." By taking these steps, Zhili gives us a doctrine with a new set of practical implications.[18]

We can see already some of the advantages that might come with this view. For one thing, we may view it as a way to avoid the "castration" involved in extirpation, in Nietzsche's sense; a bodhisattva must be an artist with consummate mastery of all forms, and this richness can only be achieved by developing rather than destroying the original passions. With this goes the intersubjective prospect of compassion, which will never be perfect if one is safely good while the others, whom one would help, are evil. This is a way of circumventing a particularly Buddhist problem, which may be one reason these value paradoxes arose most explicitly in a Buddhist context. That is, the Buddhist presupposition that "suffering" and "evil" are basically the same thing means that compassion cannot be the sharing only of suffering; it must also involve the sharing of evil, for these are in fact one and the same.

Value paradox solves another specifically Buddhist dilemma: the fact that once all forms of greed, anger, and delusion are defined as evil, all constructive activity as well, including not only secular or cultural activities but also Buddhist practices themselves, are discovered, upon close scrutiny, to be based on exactly the same evils. That is, the extreme subtlety and obsessive intricacy of the Buddhist examination of motives and mental processes could lead to the terrifying realization that all action is evil. Value paradox would then be the only way to avoid giving up everything—aside from the early Chan approach that, in line with the neither/nor reading of the *Laozi*, recommends the impossible abandonment of all activity (all meaning, all value), including the good. Zhili's further step of making the evil itself the includer and asserting that it retains its character as evil even at the ultimate stage may be viewed as aimed at solving the problems of hypersensitivity to evil and the necessity for a thoroughgoing compassion, respectively. This may be seen as entailing a claim that the neither/nor "Chan" approach is impossible.

And indeed, we see here an echo of the Mencian response to the Mohists; the unicentric ethics of the latter, and this is true also of any universalist first-principle type of ethics, can in this view be nothing but hypocrisy, which is moreover doomed to failure. Private interests cannot be abandoned for the public good without a psychological violence or hypocritical play-acting, unless the latter is seen as an outgrowth of the former, despite their opposite valences in the final scheme of things. The apparent success of any ethics founded on universal principles that are supposed to appeal to an impartial and disinterested reason will then turn out to be nothing but a bias in favor of one perspective, the "private" interest of the whole, or, to put it more concretely, of the government or society.[19] From our current vantage point, it is perhaps not difficult to imagine the sort of price that will inevitably be paid for such a success. Thus, just as both Confucius and Mencius allow private family sentiment a primary place as the only possible source of morality, although it may be "immoral" from the perspective of the common good, Zhili asserts that the contemplations are themselves refined forms of the original evils to which they respond. And indeed, this may be seen to entail also an affirmation of a somewhat more pluralistic and flexible approach to the specific moral demands, not only in theory but also to a significant degree, as we have seen, in practice.

To some extent this is also a universal ethical problem. As Raymond Smullyan puts it,

> For whose sake should I become unselfish? For other people's? But if I am selfish, why on earth would I care about the welfare of others? On the other hand, if I am not selfish and do care for the welfare of others, then I do not need to become unselfish, since I already am. To put the matter otherwise, if I feel like acting selfishly, no argument for unselfishness can possibly appeal to me, and if I don't feel like acting selfishly, no argument is necessary.[20]

The only way out of this dilemma would be to divide the human personality into two parts, selfish and unselfish, and to make the latter conquer the former. Many may by now feel that this dualistic hypothesis, which assumes that the good part is somehow devoid of those evil tendencies, rather than a new, self-referential, sublimated or expanded form of the same impulses, strains the limits of credulity, since it seems to require the imposition into nature of some wholly unselfish drives—traditionally thought to come from a divine and pure otherworldly realm. Moreover, it tends not to stand up to close psychological scrutiny of actual human motivation, wherein "selfish"

motives can usually be discerned within and as "unselfish" acts as well. Such a stance also presupposes a fixed definition of good and evil; if one side of the personality extirpates the other, what happens if the environment changes and the formerly bad part is precisely what is needed? It seems more plausible that all "parts" of the personality have occasions within which they are harmful and some within which they are helpful, however these may be defined. Moreover, the rapid changes in the living environment of the human animal in recent times, in line with the presently prevailing evolutionary picture of man as an organism called on to adapt to his environment, make this practice of throwing out part of our personality, assuming hubristically that we know now what will be good for all times to come, is not only naïve but, it could be argued, actually dangerous.[21]

Perhaps we can see here also a response to a problem that has long plagued moralists, namely, the fact that moralizing does not work. That is, on top of all the problems with non-paradoxical morals listed above, they do not get the job done; no one actually succeeds in getting rid of his or her evil passions. I mean this not only in the Daoist sense—the counterproductivity of value rhetoric and sermonizing, its tendency to create exactly the opposite of the desired effect—but also that most of the time, as Saul of Tarsus put it, even the most sincere moralists find that "the good which I would do I do not." Zhili's position, in spite of all the use it makes of the notion of universal buddhahood, is not incompatible with the pessimistic premise that no one ever improves—or more strictly, that one cannot simply improve or not improve or that it is not necessary to improve in order to improve. Thus, in typical Tiantai fashion, two extremes are avoided: the extreme of pure faith doctrines (Luther, Shinran), which say no one can improve himself, and naïve ethical idealism. As in the former, the idea of ever attaining pure goodness is to be abandoned—but this abandonment is itself then defined as true purity and goodness, as decisive progress, for this failure itself is the realization that all states interpenetrate, that the more you realize your buddhahood, the more you realize your dung-beetle-hood. So there is still something to be done, something within your own power—to fail thoroughly! Even this could perhaps be admitted by some forms of the *tariki* (other-power) doctrines. The further twist for Zhili is that this failure, this inescapability of the poison, is seen to be the work of the poison itself, that this salvation coming from seeing your utter powerlessness to achieve the good is the work of your own (evil) power and precisely qua evil is itself the good.

Such a view has advantages in its alleviation of a problem that has become central to moral reflection only in the past century or so: the feeling of guilt considered not as part of the solution but as part of the problem. It should not surprise us that this doctrine would arise in tandem with an oversensitivity to guilt feelings. As I said above, it is precisely because Zhili (and Zhiyi) sees guilt in every possible activity of a living being that he has no choice but to push the claim that sin itself is good; otherwise there would be no good. This again creates a paradoxical middle position: one is still to feel guilty about one's sins (*vide* Zhili's enthusiastic practice of repentance rituals), but at the same time one is to know that both one's sins and one's guilt feelings are, on the one hand, all-pervasive and inescapable and, on the other hand, salvific. We do not even have to feel guilty about our guilty feeling. It could be argued, moreover, that this is the only way to deal with guilt. Trying to extirpate it with well-meaning, enlightened scientific rhetoric has proved an abject failure—like any other negative feeling or passion, it seems astonishingly resistant to extirpation. But, as Laozi says, if you want to shrink it, first expand it. Zhili provides a way out, by making your guilt pervade all times and places and seeing it simultaneously as a salvific upāya. One need no longer feel so bad about how bad one is, or about how bad one feels about it.

One more point might motivate value paradox: the oppression that seems to be perpetuated in the name of the "good"—that is, the problem of ideology or value preachments as a mode of oppressive social control. This certainly seems to be an important motivation for such rhetoric in the case of Daoism; not only is the preaching of goodness counterproductive, but it is also one of the tools by which "great robbers" secure their possessions. In the Tiantai case, things are more ambiguous. On the one hand, it sometimes seems as if value paradox serves precisely the opposite function; namely, it serves the state, due to the otherworldliness and extremity of the Buddhist definition of good. For example, Zhiyi recommends the contemplation on evil for Buddhists who are forced to serve in the king's army. Here they will be called upon to transgress the precept against killing. Rather than have them protest this policy on the basis of a moral scruple, Zhiyi assures them they can practice just as well in the midst of this evil.[22] Indeed, this may be considered one motivation for such rhetoric in the Tiantai case; it actually makes Buddhism less threatening to the state and the moral status quo. The doctrine effectively nullifies any possible social use for Buddhism, although there may be a kind of ironic barb intended in Zhiyi's assumption that

serving the king necessarily involves "evil." On the other hand, in the purely theoretical realm, there is great concern over the tyranny of the "good"—in the form of opposition to attachment to any particular level or stage, attention to the harm done by taking any standard as absolute, and of course in the ultimate epistemological undercutting of any fixed standards entailed in the theory of provisional and ultimate. The insufferable self-righteousness of the good and the just, who dichotomize right and wrong, and place themselves on the side of right and impartial truth and their opponents on the side of wrong and biased passion, is severely undercut by this move. No possible view is not also a kind of bias and a kind of truth. It is arguable that such a position is less susceptible to abuse in the hands of "great bandits" who know how to steal even doctrines, and perhaps also less likely to permanently scar those who get hit by the wrong end of it, half convincing them of their own miscreancy and perhaps motivating them to self-destructive acts of perverse rebellion against anything that stinks of "goodness."

These aspects of Zhili's ethical perspective are compatible with what may be called a humanistic perspective. But it is also essential that we face the anti-humanistic consequences that may come with such a position; we should not be surprised that a man who extravagantly planned his own public self-immolation should be closer to, say, Georges Bataille than to John Stuart Mill. Only by engaging with the frightening aspects of Zhili's thought, after all, will we challenge our assumptions. How, for example, could this ethical position be applied to a cannibalistic serial killer?[23] How is "killing and eating strangers" to be extended to pervade all times and places? How can that be considered ethically desirable?! The first step in answering these questions is to ask how one of us who is not killing and eating strangers should regard someone who is.[24] An adherent of Zhili's views would answer: as identical to ourselves. The moral significance of this "Thou art that" lies not only in having compassion for the victims but even more so in seeing that the oppressors are ourselves. This would mean not only seeing that the serial killer has a "soul," just like us—a pure transcendent soul obscured by the unfortunate delusion that it is a desirable to kill and eat people—or that, like us, he is an aspect of the all-encompassing substance of all or playing some mysterious role in God's great plan. Rather, it also means that we have serial murder and cannibalism, as specific evil phenomena, with all their concrete tendencies, beliefs, and behaviors, inherent in ourselves from the beginning, and that they can never be eliminated. Moreover, we need not eliminate them; rather, we must learn to develop them fully—for only by

this means will we truly overcome them, in the sense of developing them into simultaneously the response to and the contemplation of themselves.

By the same token, if I am a cannibalistic serial killer who is converted to Zhili's Tiantai, what should I do? First, I should not strive to discard my tendency to kill and eat strangers; rather, I should contemplate it as identical to the Three Truths—either while doing it or while wishing to do it. Zhili considers this to be the true basis of morality. Why? If my contemplation is successful, I will see that this tendency to kill and eat strangers pervades all times and places—including not only the sea and sky and all the books in the library, but also the moral injunctions against murder, the wrath of the police, the electric chair, the suffering of the victims, the bereavement of their families, and, most important, the preaching I have heard about the Three Truths and my current practice of the same. All of these, it will turn out, are nothing but killing and eating strangers. In all of them I can discern the ecstatic thrill of severing a head and licking out the brains, which, it turns out, was never any specifiable quiddity *simpliciter* but was always having to express itself as some things not itself and hence can now express itself as any and all things that are not itself. At the same time, while enjoying myself gnawing on someone's liver, I can discern in this act also the infinite sorrow of the victim, the rage of the authorities, my remorse in the electric chair, and my terror at death, as well as the placid expanses of infinite space, someone tossing a Frisbee at a picnic, a monk's cell, the white hills of Africa. And I would experience these not as separate thoughts alongside this experience but as identical to it, as the same token recontextualized (by a recontextualization that is always already being accomplished by the original token itself); refracted through a different lens, the contrary quiddities are experienced simultaneously and as one and the same sensation.

To be thoroughly a cannibalistic serial killer (that is, to experience serial killing qua the Three Truths, the nature qua serial killing, serial killing as pervading all times and places) is no longer to be only a serial killer but also to be us, "good" non-serial killers who see serial killing as evil and suffer therefrom. Knowing that it is evil is to see its constitutive relationship to non-serial killing, that is, to various forms of good, in its specific relation of opposition. Now this means that I can fulfill my desire to kill and eat strangers whatever I am doing—I am never doing anything else. In sitting in meditation, in doing good deeds, in playing the banjo, I am "really" killing and eating strangers. But this means I need no longer choose only one form

of this murder to find satisfaction for my desire to murder. I need not literally and actively murder. To be a serial killer is to be in a struggle with and identical to non-serial killing, just as to be the set-up to a joke is to be both serious and funny. I am always on both sides of the exchange, through the pervasiveness of the intersubjective. On the level of empathy, I am also the suffering victim; to kill is also to be killed—and vice versa, to be killed is also to kill and thus to be treated to that enjoyment. Hence to be thoroughly the murderer, I must be both. "Thoroughly" thus also means to know that serial killing is evil and suffering from the other point of view, that of the victim, who I also am. I can be a true serial killer also by being a saint.

Let us make the example more explicit. The serial murderer / Tiantai acolyte would ask himself: What is it I'm doing when I'm slicing off a head and enjoying licking out the brain? What is the X I am desiring when I am desiring this? In contemplating these questions, the serial killer might ruminate as follows (the choice of ruminations is fairly arbitrary; any would equally serve the purpose). I am transgressing. I am breaking a flow of normalcy. I am scandalizing. I am undermining. I am severing the crucial part. I am touching the inside. I am dismembering the ruling part. I am feeling the secretion of saliva and the emergence of a sensation on my tongue. I am avenging myself. I am experiencing a penetration into another. And so on. But each of the quiddities appearing here as the quiddity of cannibalistic decapitation can also be found appearing as any other quiddity—for example, that of buddhahood. It is transgressing—the normal order of delusion. It is breaking a flow of normalcy—the karmic continuance from time immemorial. It is scandalizing—the accepted norms of mortal life, desire, pleasure, all of which look on in horror as I attain buddhahood. It is undermining—the habitual flow of behavior. It is severing the crucial part, it is touching the inside, and so on. The same analysis can be continued for each of these terms: What is penetration into another? What is transgression? What is revenge? Each of these will be revealed to consist of other quiddities, which will also be found operative in any other quiddity, either as components (transgression is the exertion of the individual will in defiance of a collective rule, with the promise of painful consequences) or as contexts (transgression is a certain relation to the law—this law posited equiprimordially with the transgression, and thus also something that is appearing here as transgression; the law is part of what is doing the enjoying of the transgression).

This infinite progression is what eliminates the feeble abstractness and

metaphoricality that may seem to accrue to this sort of analysis. It can also proceed in the opposite direction. What is buddhahood? Enlightenment, liberation, eternity, joy, and the like. But cannibalistic decapitation is also all of these: disclosure of what lies inside the head of another, liberation from social constraints, eternity as the inexhaustibility of the lust to kill, joy as the pleasure of tongue on brain. Some may object that none of these components or contexts is the visceral experience of murder itself; they are just what it falls apart into when subjected to an abstract or conceptual questioning that is originally external to itself. The murder itself is not reducible to anything else in this view; it is a pure, depthless quiddity that is just itself and about which, strictly, nothing can be said and to which no universal qualities can be attributed except in a general and inherently falsifying sense. Needless to say, this intuitionist or "pure sensation" concept of experience, and the dualism between experience and conceptualization it implies, is something that all the arguments in this book must be understood as refuting and rejecting, as I hope to show in more detail in a later work. Hence, fulfilling cannibalistic decapitation means to see this operating everywhere, even and especially in apparently contrary types of behavior.

However, and this is where Zhili's position is most shocking to common sense as well as to Shanwai adherents, enlightenment may or may not involve ceasing to murder. It will mean that I no longer kill "compulsively," as it were; I will no longer see the literal act of murder as the only way to murder. Meditating or dancing the mambo are equally ways to be a murderer. However, this does not mean I will *necessarily* stop killing; on the contrary, I simply recontextualize my original murders, seeing them as expressions of universal acts of bodhisattva compassion performed for the sake of all beings. I now murder in order to create more enlightenment and liberation for all beings (including myself as factical given), as provisionally posited in my environment. This would seem to create constraints; there are few circumstances in which murder and cannibalism are just what is needed by the total intersubjective network as focused in this particular moment. On the other hand, from the perspective of enlightenment, all acts of murder are seen as both karma and as upāya; that is, as both harmful (self-perpetuating traps of habituation and suffering for all concerned) and as causes of enlightenment, which turn out to be what enlightenment itself is.

The same, of course, goes for all the sorrow and corrective measures that come in the wake of these murders. These, too, must be seen as both karma

and upāya—that is, the Integrated form of enlightenment must also be deluded and hence include also the ignorant attempts to eliminate murder and outrage over its very existence. These are, in addition to being limited delusions and karma, legitimately enlightened and enlightening forms of upāya. The sentiment here echoes that expressed by Walt Whitman: "Evil propels me and reform of evil propels me / I stand indifferent / My gait is no fault-finder's or rejecter's gait / I moisten the roots of all that has grown."[25] Both the evil and the opposition must be brought to full growth, and this entails their being seen as one and the same. Our realization of the serial killer in ourselves is dependent on this Ping-Pong structure. The serial killer I see myself to be is seeing himself also to be the potential victim of the serial murderer I am, without either of us ceasing to be killer or victim. Indeed, our murderousness or victimhood is realized only in this identity with our own negation, as the dung beetle's identity is fully realized in his own self-overcoming as some particular, specifiable, localizable identity.

Does this imply an optimistic belief that the serial killer must eventually fall to the authorities, that on a practical level good will triumph over evil, that, in effect, all will become Buddhas? Yes and no. On the one hand, the realization that murder pervades all times and places will, according to Zhili, free one from the need to murder, and indeed, this "big" evil, which no longer needs to kill all the time, is precisely what is usually called good. We may think here of the cynical anarchist trope that the government is just the biggest criminal in the land. The petty criminal haphazardly grabs what he can; but to fully realize himself, to dominate and transgress more successfully, he must evolve into the crime lord, who in turn controls and annihilates all the other petty criminals. Larger and larger such organizations control and destroy the smaller ones: the biggest of these organizations is the state, which squashes the smaller mafias. The process of developing and expanding its own essence to a greater and greater field entails the implementation of those rules of "justice" and "order" that seem to contradict it. Or, perhaps, we may say civilization or morality itself is the biggest such organization of crime. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, speaking of the hard-boiled private investigators in old-fashioned detective stories:

> Morality is the darkest of conspiracies. . . . The one who works for the defense of the law, in the name of the law, in order to restore the reign of the law . . . [is] the greatest adventurer and law-breaker, as a person in comparison to which it is the criminals themselves who appear like indolent petty bourgeois, careful conservatives.

. . . The only true transgression, the only true adventure, the one which changes all other adventures into bourgeois pettiness, is the adventure of civilization of the defense of the law itself.[26]

The criminals are conservatives; they are just doing what their forebears in the animal kingdom did; they rebel a bit against the rules, but not against the fundamental egoistic rule of the jungle, the order of wolves and tigers. Morality takes this same gesture of destructive rebellion and universalizes it, self-references it. We are now to rebel even against ourselves, against our nature as beasts of prey—this is the ultimate development of our cruelty and violence.[27] In this line of thought we can see the optimistic side of this doctrine—the universalization of evil necessarily equals what we usually call good.

However, Zhili provides a further turn of the screw even more offensive to the pieties of our value-dichotomous tradition. The point just made above can be construed to mean, and even Žižek is open to this interpretation, that once this ultimate extension of evil is accomplished, this ultimate, all-pervading form is henceforth the only legitimate form of evil. All the other, particular forms are to be excluded in its honor.[28] This would imply that whatever is still in the apparent form of evil cannot be "real," thoroughly realized evil (civilization, morality, buddhahood, etc.). The doctrine of the dung beetle indicates that this is not Zhili's belief. He does not say, for example, "The true form of deviltry and heretical asceticism is Buddhism." Rather, he tells us emphatically that both the teaching of the Buddha and the teaching of the devil are the ultimate truth, that both "always function simultaneously," that both may be practiced, and it is necessary both to become free of and to dwell in every kind of evil—otherwise we have an Exclusive Mean. In other words, name your poison: for they all have the miraculous property of destroying poisons. And in doing so, they remain "dwelt in" qua poison as such. On the simplest level, they remain to serve as upāya for others (as is suggested by the scriptural form of this doctrine, for example, in the *Avataṁsaka*), pervading all times and places.

But the crucial thing here is that the intersubjective point means that we are the others ourselves, and no one is definitively deluded or enlightened. These evils upāyas are for our own benefit as much as anyone else's, and it is ourselves we are always having to wake up with them. There can no longer be any question of justifying by intention or an inner/outer split (we outwardly do the evils, but inwardly we know we do so for the sake of awakening other beings, while remaining enlightened ourselves). Our continual

practice of evil, even in our private realm, is an upāya by which we endeavor to enlighten ourselves. They serve as set-ups that derive their efficacy from delivering a punch line only by being genuinely unfunny, by being genuinely, ignorantly, maliciously, covetously evil. Only the punch line brought about by this genuine contrast, by the all-pervasion of these evils as evils, can reveal that this unfunny evil is rereading itself as hilarious good and therefore that the latter is also everywhere.

This can perhaps best be understood if we recall that, in Zhili's view, the dynamic of Good as the realized and self-overcoming form of Evil can also be reversed. For it is equally true that murder is, and has always actually been, a form of (all other states, including) compassion and love. When the murderer satisfies his lust for blood, is he not having mercy on, giving tender loving care to, the vicious, bloodthirsty animal whimpering inside himself? Or, if we like, when he kills and eats his victim, he is satisfying an unconscious urge of a more complex kind, for example, to compulsively repeat a display of strength to satisfy a demanding macho imago of his father, or to "clean his plate" to please the solicitous imago of his mother, or what have you. Here again we have an act of love, even filial piety; he is making a pious offering to a sacred authority. His murders were thus always acts that inherently include the Three Thousand, not only greed, hatred, and delusion, not just human warmth and the deva-like pursuit and enjoyment of pleasure, but also the Two Vehicles (the desire to put an end to passion, to be free from the torture of the repetition of the same cycle of need and satisfaction), and the self-sacrificing compassion of the bodhisattvas (for in the obsessional pursuit of satisfaction, the ego of the murderer even endangers its own life). Which of these this token of experience, the murder, will be interpreted as depends on the dominant perspective at the time.

Hence, when the contemplation that expands the original evil succeeds, showing that greed and lust are everywhere, even in the apparent compassion of the bodhisattvas and eternity of the Buddhas, it at the same time shows that pure love and selfless devotion have always permeated all one's activities, including this murder. The contemplation is complete only when both of these appear equally. Hence there is no need to change or renounce the murder, even when we have seen that its universalization or actualization consists of its self-overcoming into Goodness. We are back in the realm of all-pervasive intersubjectivity, which pivots on the notion of compassion—compassion for the serial killer and for the victim—and the notion that we must regard both as manifestation of compassion for the other. Compassion

is the reverse form of delusion; each of these two simultaneously functions as the one determinant that focuses the all-encompassing nature into the appearance of some particular quiddity. The murderer is determined specifically as a murderer for two reasons: (1) he is deluded and hence suffering, and (2) he is a bodhisattva compassionately appearing in this form to enlighten all beings. Both always apply simultaneously. Zhili says that we must both become free from and dwell in all forms of evil, and that these are one and the same act. This act is the realization of the Three Thousand quiddities in each moment of experience, by virtue of which the murderer will become free of "murder" construed as suffering, that is, as something of which he knew the genuine nature and about which he thought he could draw accurate conclusions, regarding it as one thing among others, as the opposite of giving life, as an expression of hatred only, as destructive only, as satisfying only to himself, etc. This same act of freeing himself also allows him to dwell in "murder" as all-pervasive, eternal, necessary, inescapable, and fully present in all acts of compassion and enlightenment, just as they are present in it—in short, as the compassionate essence of all, which can manifest in any given instance as literal murder as well as anything else.

It is crucial that we understand the implications of this double-sidedness and the way in which a thing's realization is also its self-overcoming, such that to fully dwell in it and to become free of it are one and the same thing. We may think here of Žižek's reference to

> the well-known paradox of saying about some non-X that it is 'more X than X itself' (for example, about some skinflint, 'He's more Scots than the Scots themselves'; about a loving stepmother that she is 'more motherly than the mother herself'; about a fanatical Janissary that he is 'more Turk than the Turks themselves') . . . as X which is fully realized as X is 'more X than X itself', and so *no longer X*. . . . The supreme case, the case which is the very exemplar of this paradoxical reversal, is the *signifier* itself: as soon as we enter the symbolic order, the 'thing' is more present in the word that designates it than in its immediate presence.[29]

Elsewhere, he puts this question

> in terms of the Hegelian opposition of In- and For-itself: in so far as an object is 'in itself', it is *not yet* fully itself, has not yet found itself, achieved its self-identity; however, it can become 'for itself' only via a decentering *reduplicatio*—that is to say, the price of achieving full self-identity is that the object in question is *no longer* just itself but itself *plus* a supplementary re-mark which is essential if self-identity is to be accomplished. The opposition In-itself / For-itself thus involves the paradoxical logic of a failed encounter, the splitting of identity into a 'not yet' and a 'no longer'.[30]

In Tiantai terms, the thing is not itself until it is "re-marked" in the context of the Three Truths and successfully contemplated as such—but then it is no longer only itself as originally conceived—or, more precisely, as one original believed oneself to be exclusively conceiving it—for it turns out one was thinking more than one meant to think about it. However, this is achieved by going further into it, rather than away from it. It occurs by applying the Three Truths, which amounts to trying and failing to see it just as itself and none other. The more you try to separate X from all that is not-X, to get at the pure unadulterated X per se, as itself and none other, the more it turns into its opposite; the more dung-beetlish you try to become, the more you include the Three Thousand. As Žižek puts it, "in what appears as 'external circumstances' in which is actualized the Notion of [for example] a house, yet another Notion is already at work, which is no longer that of a house although it corresponds to the house more than House itself."[31] That is, the other things in the world, apparently external to dung-beetle-hood or evil, which allow it to exist (e.g., various forms of opposition to it, or of good, benevolence, compassion, which circumscribe and permeate it) are actually more dung-beetlish than dung-beetle-hood itself. Evilness per se, the failure to see X as all-pervasive and the biased clinging that results, is itself what is all-pervasive in the form of its opposite, and what becomes more and more manifest as its opposite, interpenetration, is more fully realized.

The *word* is the ultimate form of this. As Žižek says, it presents the pure quiddity and therefore no longer that thing. The thing is not itself because it is not the word, the pure essence, the quiddity as distinguished from all others. But the word is not the thing because it is the thing more than the word is, and because it is no longer a thing at all, but a word. Indeed, this applies to awareness as such, in the sense that by knowing something we must posit it as an object, hence separate ourselves from it, hence become free of it; in this way, to know ourselves thoroughly, to see ourselves clearly, to completely dwell in ourselves, is to be free of ourselves, step back from ourselves, and transcend and overcome ourselves.

In the Tiantai case, this is the function of the cultivation of contemplation qua Three Truths, the clear meta-value throughout all of this, as the means of thoroughly being whatever you are. But this can reflectively apply back onto anything, including ignorance of the Three Truths or living on the surface or wavering or failing to penetrate things to the bottom.[32] That is, it is possible even to "waver" thoroughly—retrospectively.[33] But this retrospection is more than mere retrospection, for the previous moment in

fact has not yet ended, it is still going on, it is always locked in the intersubjective mutual regard with other moments and perspectives that reinterpret it. The retrospection, that is, is itself constitutive of that upon which it retrospects. The original moment of wavering is identical to the Three Thousand, including this moment of retrospection upon it, this dwelling within it. The contemplation of the Three Truths, combining the dwelling and the freedom, corresponds to Žižek's description of the "In-and-For-itself":

> 'For-itself' remains caught in the reflective illusion according to which its gesture of *reduplicatio* merely 'remarks' (ascertains, takes note of) some pre-existing In-itself; the 'In-and-For-itself' occurs when this illusion is dispelled, i.e. when it becomes clear that the reflective *reduplicatio* retroactively 'posits', brings forth, the In-itself which gets lost with the entry of reflection—it is the (reflective) loss itself which constitutes the lost object.[34]

There was no self-subsisting "wavering" as some particular quiddity exclusive of all others prior to the realization of it as all-encompassing in its retrospective contemplation.

So there is a sense in which even Zhili allows that something does indeed change with enlightenment, and this has consequences for how we are to imagine one's own personal practice of this contemplation. As long as the murderer is contemplating things in terms of the Three Truths—that is, as long as he maintains the perspective on the Three Thousand that organizes them all into a whole that may be read as expressions of buddhahood—he will "be free from" and "dwell in" in the way explained above. Although he may view his previous murders, committed while provisionally assuming other perspectives, as enlightened upāyas, the compulsion to murder will be made moot as long as he remains in the grips of that perspective, contemplating things in terms of the Three Truths. He will not, except under almost unimaginably special circumstances, continue to murder while in this state, while this contemplation is the dominant focus of his Three Thousand. We can expect to see his actual behavior change to that extent. However (ignoring the question of backsliding and what he might do when his concentration on the Three Truths is broken),[35] in observing the behavior of others (and this means "all other moments of experience" including "one's own"), we are in no position to know whether these exceptional circumstances apply or not, or whether he or she or it knows something we do not.

Moreover, due to the intersubjective dynamics of the Tiantai system, it is never just one way or the other. These circumstances never simply "apply" or

"do not apply"; it is never simply a case of "knowing" or "not-knowing." As Zhou Enlai said when asked whether the French Revolution was a good thing, it is too early to tell—except that here it is always, constitutively, too early to tell. That is, we will never know whether Hitler or Gandhi is "actually" a bodhisattva or not. There will never be a time when all the consequences of their acts are tallied, nor is there any final perspective from which to do so. Those consequences are constantly being rewritten from the perspective of every new moment of experience undergone by anyone. The same goes for their intent as well. As we said above, no one has privileged access to the meaning of his or her acts; that meaning can always retrospectively be changed into an instance of compassionate bodhisattvaness or deluded deviltry. Precisely the same thing applies to our own past, and future, experiences and actions.[36] In fact, it is not the case that actions simply are or are not bodhisattvas and expressions of enlightenment or vice versa; they are always capable of being (interpreted as) either. The same can be said for our passionate revulsion toward the murderers and our struggle to destroy or curb them and of our admiration and emulation of the saints. But instead of thinking we are right and they are wrong, for example, we are to recognize that this belief is one more delusion, one more evil, but one that it is our present lot to realize to the utmost, since, like any other evil, it is simultaneously an upāya.

It is in this sense, then, that Zhili, developing certain tendencies in Zhiyi, recommends *knowingly* doing evil. That is, to take false views as one's attendants or to perform heretical practices enjoined by the devil, not in the ignorant belief that one is acting rightly, not in the belief that there are no such things as good and evil, that all actions are blameless and equally value-free, but, rather, to do evil while knowing that it is really wrong—but also, for that very reason, that it is really right and really both and really neither. This is based on the belief that to do evil knowingly is a way of overcoming evil, while preserving it in a new, glorified form; it is a way of sublating evil. This is, of course, predicated on a particular concept of "evil." "Knowingly" here means to know that evil is identical to and inherently included in the nature, and thus that it is identical to good and to neither-good-nor-evil. This evil is, however, at the same time evil, in the sense of being *opposed* to the good. This simultaneity is made possible, as described above, by the elaboration of the Threefold Truth into the doctrine of upāya, which brings with it the joke-like structure of set-up and punch line and the simultaneity of subjective states of the intersubjective dialogue. It is these two structures that ulti-

mately make possible this doctrine of knowingly doing evil qua evil. Indeed, if it is not known as evil, it is useless to do it. On the meta-level, then, evil is only really bad when it is thought to be good. But once evil is known to be evil, it then really is something good. When one further comprehends this, one knows the evil to be both evil and, so comprehended, to be good. Thus the original "regarding evil as good," which was the meta-level evil, is here redeemed—it too turns out to be good. This is another instance of the set-up / punch line structure of upāya, which both retains and overcomes the contrast between good and evil, between provisional and ultimate, between anti-value and value.

Astute readers may have noticed that the methodological principles and rhetoric adopted in this study bear a marked resemblance to some of the contents under discussion. One more gesture of correspondence may be added. I, too, am willing to concede that, now that this work leaves my hands and tumbles out into that mysterious virtual space of the intersubjective network, I must relinquish any claim to know more about what this work means than anyone else, or indeed, to know what I have really thought and said here. I believe I have accomplished some of what I set out to do, and that perhaps some paths have been cleared here and there, at least for me, through what I formerly experienced as somewhat dense and entangling thickets; I have learned a lot in the course of this project. But what this is really all about—that is something I must wait to find out, something I now must listen for. I can conclude this work with no higher hope than that someone out there reading this someday—and this can, of course, also include some future moment of "my own" experience—may be sufficiently jangled by it to blurt out to me its true significance.

Reference Matter

Notes

For full author names, titles, and publication data for works cited here in short form, see the Bibliography, pp. 455–64.

Chapter 1

1. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 15–16.

2. I use this term, rather than "value-opposite" (Johnson, *Modes of Value*) or "disvalue" (Mukerjee, *The Dimensions of Value*), because it seems more unambiguous to me, and because I wish to define it relativistically, as the antithesis of *any* given set of values, whatever they might be, rather than as the opposite of some putatively real objective value per se, as these writers seem to mean by these terms.

3. Nietzsche himself is quite explicit that his own campaign is against the antithesis of good and evil but not at all against the antithesis between good and *bad* (i.e., non-moral negative value, sickness, weakness, etc.) In a late work he defines "good" as "all that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man," and "bad" as "all that proceeds from weakness" (*The Antichrist*, from *Twilight of the Idols and the Antichrist*, p. 115). It is clear that he wants to see this antithesis recognized and preserved, and the ultimate relationship between *these* value poles, i.e., whether this "good" originates in this "bad" or vice versa or what, is a live question in Nietzsche interpretation.

4. Here I am following Simpicius's interpretation.

5. The Old Testament tends to treat both good and evil as coming from God, although it is far from a unified document doctrinally. The New Testament, possibly influenced by Persian ideas, tends to be more consistent and introduces an absolute value dichotomy between God and Devil, with an eternal heaven and hell, the sheep and the goats, the wheat and the tares, the saved and the damned. The con-

tents of good and evil have been redefined ("sinners" are among the good if they join the Christian program and repent), but the relation between good and evil is an absolute and implacable hatred. In the strict sense, I would claim, neither testament develops a full theodicy per se. Evil either just is from God (with no explanation) or is from the Devil and will be punished.

6. For a detailed discussion of these themes, see Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, pp. 234–39. The more dubious claim that "paradox is a characteristic of normative Judaism" is advanced by Lelyfeld, *The Unity of Contraries*.

7. For both German idealists, this assertion is premised, first of all, on a particular understanding of the function of the copula of judgment or on the only possible meaning of the predicate "same," which is here understood as in all cases making explicit the inseparability of two things that are already determined as different. The assertion of sameness is thus to be understood as simultaneously asserting difference. Good and Evil, then, can be called "different" or "the same" with equal justice, and in either case both assertions are implied—another claim we will find shared by the Tiantai writers.

8. That is, Evil is the Will knowing itself as the universal per se, and using the understanding as a particular that serves as a means and defines its particular ends, which fills in the content of this universal form, which is Selfhood. Good, on the other hand, is this Selfhood overcome, "retrieved from activity to potentiality," as Schelling puts it. It is the union of this first union, which is human Selfhood itself, with the Understanding as also explicitly universalized, which is now the actual Existence established on the potentialized Ground of Selfhood. This union is precisely Love or Spirit and preserves the Evil of pure Selfhood but in purely potential form.

9. I am here summarizing Schelling's argument, as I understand it, in his middle-period essay *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters* (1809). For a complete translation, see Schelling, *Of Human Freedom*. Another complete translation, by Hayden-Roy, can be found in Behler, *Philosophy of German Idealism*.

10. See esp. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 464–78, particularly section 780; and Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pp. 157–86.

11. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 472.

12. This is especially obvious in the case of Schelling. In the final pages of the essay cited in note 8 to this chapter, he explicitly calls for the total elimination of Evil or the final separation of Good from Evil. It is clear that what he really means is the final and total relegation of Evil (Selfhood) to a present but merely potential state. Nonetheless, he cannot avoid phrasing this conclusion as a value dichotomy, perhaps in accordance with the New Testament rhetoric that begins to creep into the essay at this point, which decisively favors a final value dichotomy and eschatological separation of Good and Evil. Schelling's view bears some resemblance to Zhanran's understanding of the "Evil inherent in the Buddha" in Tiantai thought, and in both

cases the practical value paradoxes are very much effaced. In the end, the ethical consequences are easily reducible to a value dichotomy, albeit one that allows a psychological role for evil impulses, individual selfhood, and the power of the passions.

13. It commonly plays a role, for example, in the justification for capital punishment in China, e.g., in the doctrine of balancing kindness and punishment (*de* and *xing*) as aspects of the Kingly Way in texts such as the *Zuozhuan*. The "evil" act of slaying is transformed into something good in the service of a "good" ideal of order; what is from a lower-order perspective evil is from this perspective instrumental to the good in certain circumstances (i.e., as performed by the rulers, rather than by bandits, etc.).

14. For example, in the case given in the previous note, slaying per se would not have the predicate "evil" attached to it; this predicate would be reserved purely for a particular set of intentions, consequences, or other contextual factors surrounding the act, so that in itself killing could be either good or evil, with these two terms, as pure concepts, therefore kept perfectly distinct.

15. A second question is: What is the meaning of rhetoric that repudiates, to whatever degree, the Standard Values? Typically, but not always, these values, especially if they are meant to appeal to the assumed values of the community for the purposes of effective proselytization, include some or all of the following: being is better than not being, possessing much is better than possessing little, living is better than dying, health is better than sickness, success is better than failure, strength is better than weakness, being loved is better than being hated or ignored, and so on. These are what I call the Standard Values. In addition to these, we often but not always find the following: action is better than non-action, fame is better than obscurity, wealth is better than poverty, persistence is better than transience, beauty is better than ugliness, and so on. Since any new system of thought or worldview that wishes to convince must do so by appealing somehow to the Standard Values, in the form in which they exist in prevailing contemporary community of listeners, the question of the relation between the new system's values and the Standard Values presents itself. Does it merely repudiate the form of the Standard Values prevalent in contemporary society, by means of an appeal to the Standard Values themselves, in a purer form, or is there another mode and motivation for the repudiation of Standard Values?

16. Ziporyn, "What's So Good About Evil," esp. pp. 95–346.

17. T46.900b–901a.

18. See Frege's "On Sense and Meaning."

19. Or more strictly, one subject-object, which is thereby self-canceling in both its putative "oneness" and putative "objectivity." As we shall see, Zhili insists that this one object is not definitively one (hence, "the three thousand") nor a definitively marked object; but this is the consequence of the basic Tiantai extension of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness into the Three Truths, to be discussed at length

below. The simplified formulation used here is meant to answer only to the expository purposes of the present point.

20. For an illuminating capsule discussion of this issue, see Munro, "The Yang Hsien-chen Affair."

21. The closest to such a claim that I know of may be in the doctrine of Nicholas Cusanus, who is one of the more radical unifiers of opposites in the theistic tradition. But he still stops short of asserting a perfect symmetry between the finite and the infinite, and evil is considered somehow outside the system of unities, as an antithesis to the principle of unity itself. See Nicholas of Cusa, *On Learned Ignorance*, esp. pp. 94–100.

22. But, of course, Hegel wants to avoid a dichotomy as his ultimate value and anti-value, perhaps the Idea and Nature or Reason and Unreason, and goes quite a ways in working toward that goal. Still, I would argue that he fails in the end, although a full exposition of this point is beyond the scope of this Introduction. Hegel's real shortcoming is still to be sought in his insistence on the *unique* validity of this particular "center," Reason. He is aware of the danger of this and makes a valiant attempt to fend it off in the *Phenomenology*. There, the attempt is to show that any possible standpoint of natural consciousness, anything short of reason itself, will devolve via its own self-realizations/breakdowns into reason itself "by an immanent dialectic," as the cliché has it. The claim is that the extraneous standard of reason itself need not be brought in to produce these transitions. They are accomplished simply by the self-application of the standard avowed by the standpoint in question, its necessary and inherent attempt to accord with its own Notion. This is what Hegel claims to be doing, but it is highly debatable that this is what is happening in the *Phenomenology*—especially in the earliest sections, on sense-certainty and perception. The mere fact that the whole thing is being discussed, that we are already in the realm of language and its "divine power," is a point against this claim. It is arguably only in this sense that "necessary" and "inherent" and "its Notion" can play a part in the proceedings. These are retrospective determinations translating into the language of Reason what was manifested originally as something else. (Of course, in a Tiantai sense, this retrospective sense can itself be constitutive, by virtue of the uncloseability, the ineradicable yet-to-be-decidedness, that pertains to the previous moment, just as it pertains to any quiddity whatsoever.) Another objection would be the mere fact that there remain consciousnesses in these standpoints that persist in not recognizing the supposedly immanent transitions. Hegel has ready answers to both these objections—the necessity of language for self-consciousness, given its provenance in intersubjective encounter, as well as the possible meaninglessness of the idea of "translating into the language of Reason"—Hegel will say that there is no other language, that language as such necessarily turns out to be the language of Reason. The other point can be answered by noting the ambiguous position of the Absolute Knower as encompassing these finite standpoints even in their

finitude, and therefore by no means calling for their abolition or for all nature and animal consciousness to become *immediately* absolute knowing—they are *mediately* absolute knowing already, due to their presence as moments in absolute knowing. Both these counterassertions can be granted, if we wish to give Hegel the broadest possible benefit of the doubt. It is clear at least that he has by no means made short shrift of sense-certainty or perception, or anything else he takes up in the body of the text, much less whatever is treated in the *Logic* and thereafter; they are given as thorough and illuminating an exegesis as one could hope. And yet we end up with an omnicentrism of reason that is pragmatically quite unicentric, with very far-reaching unicentric consequences.

I believe the reason for this can be found in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, where we find what is really being excluded by Hegel's approach. It is not immediate experience, or the particular, or non-totalizable dissemination of some kind that is left out. It is, rather, Hegel's constant contempt for "edification," "dreaminess," "laziness," "monotony," and so on that signal what is being excluded here. It is these alternative *discursive methods* that Hegel evidently considers completely unable to reveal themselves to be really reason or, rather, which can only do so one-sidedly. Reason can reveal itself in them, can reveal that they were always actually nothing but it, but they cannot reveal reason to be a form of themselves, even after this magical power of reason and its complete identity to them have been revealed. That is: these things, like anything else, are actual only to the extent that they turn out to be Reason—expressions of Reason in its self-emptying or in its own self-blockage or breakdown qua *Verstand*. But "being precisely Reason" in this case does not mean that "it has all the characteristics possessed by the quiddity 'Reason'" per se—i.e., the characteristic of being that which is expressed in everything by means of its own constitutive impossibility, or that which everything is to the extent that anything is actual. Hegel does attempt to assert this of the standpoints taken up in the main body of the text, in the sense outlined above. But he will not do that for the alternative methods of exegesis—laziness, edification, unseriousness, etc. (for if all are in their actuality nothing but Reason, all are certainly *methods of exegesis*!), which simply cannot be used, even after the advent of Reason, to reveal themselves *as* all other quiddities. The complete reversibility of the final position is, as it were, blocked from the beginning by this work ethic; in spite of all his precautions, we end up with the impression that whereas Reason reveals itself in the very form of its absence in, say, the Unhappy Consciousness, the contrary is not fully true; the Unhappy Consciousness does not reveal itself via its absence in Reason; its all-encompassingness is not restored by the final triumph of Reason in Reason's own breakdown. Writing from the final standpoint, Hegel still sees nothing of value in "edification," in "monotonous formalism," in "finding only dreams," in "intuition," in "immediacy," in "laziness."

It may be argued in Hegel's defense that he simply finds no value in these things

for undertaking the project at hand, which requires a different approach, or that he is simply opposing a dangerous countertrend of the historical moment in which he wrote. But this is not only belied by his tone here; it cannot stand up to fully omnicentric scrutiny. Hegel's omnicentrism is perfect in every detail of its exposition, with the exception of this inability to recognize itself methodologically in its opposite, in lazy, unserious, intuitive, immediate, dreamy, monotonous edification. We may perhaps be forgiven for saying that Hegel's dialectic is perfect *in itself*, or in principle, in all its theoretical pronouncements, but not *for itself*, not in its own self-aware execution. Hegel should be able to start again at the beginning and see laziness as what is being revealed by every other form of consciousness, or better, since "seeing" something "revealed" is arguably precisely the activity of reason, he should be able to *live* laziness as the meaning of all other possible quiddities. But this sort of possibility is excluded in the first few minutes of the game and never restored. Even Krug's pen is beneath Hegel's notice, and it is no wonder that laziness and irresponsible thinking do not stand a chance.

23. T46.899b.

24. T46.900c–901a.

25. For the purposes of this study, I will not take up the interpretation of Huisi's thought and the question of how much of Zhiyi's final system has its origin there, not only because of the probable spuriousness of a large part of Huisi's extant corpus (i.e., the *Tashengzhiguan*), but more importantly because it is not directly relevant to the subsequent Tiantai tradition, which took Zhiyi as the measure of orthodoxy; whatever of Huisi's thinking was adopted by Zhiyi, in whatever form, is what mattered for later Tiantai thinkers, who only read and interpreted Huisi's works in context of Zhiyi's later system.

Chapter 2

1. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, p. 86.

2. I have borrowed this example from Žižek's brilliant exposition of the Lacanian concept of the "quilting point." See *Sublime Object of Ideology*, pp. 87–89; *For They Know Not What They Do*, pp. 16–20; and *Indivisible Remainder*, pp. 214–16.

3. Žižek, *Sublime Object of Ideology*, p. 87.

4. We may think here of the Kantian categorical imperative, which demands that all other persons be treated *not only* as means (periphery) *but also* as ends in themselves. This gives us a picture of all persons as ends in themselves, but also as means—an intriguing ethical form of omnicentrism.

5. For the sake of completeness and to avoid any misunderstandings, I should spell out the connection between these considerations and the Tiantai teaching of inherent inclusion and the Three Truths. I have just shown that any center ends up being both the most meaningful and the most meaningless term in the system. Its

totalizing meaning corresponds to the Mean, its meaninglessness to Emptiness, and its character as some specific starting point (e.g., "Marxism" as opposed to "feminism") corresponds to Provisional Positing. The doctrine of inherent inclusion seeks to preserve the specific starting points with all their differences, in spite of the fact that at their ultima they all end up meaning all-and-none. This is possible essentially due to the doctrines of intersubjectivity and compassion in Tiantai, which mean that both sides of the process must always be in operation. Even after this interpenetration is accomplished, it is *always* possible to speak of everything in terms of Marxism, or feminism, or fascism, or democracy, rather than being forced into a final situation where all we can say is "everything means everything."

6. Intersubjectivity is to be understood here in the sense introduced into Western accounts of human subjectivity by Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), especially but far from exclusively in the famous Master-Slave section so important to Marx, in which was embedded the dialectical claim that a self-consciousness can be constituted (come into being) only through the mediation of (at least the belief in) another self-consciousness. For an influential semi-modern account stressing the intersubjective aspect, see Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, esp. pp. 3–30.

7. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Thing, passim.*

8. I follow Hegel on the nature of the quantitative here: "Arithmetic is an analytical science because all the combinations and differences which occur in its subject matter are not intrinsic to it but are effected on it in a wholly external matter. It does not have a concrete subject matter possessing inner, intrinsic, relationships. . . . It is the antithesis of the Notion. Because of the indifference of the factors in combination to the combination itself in which there is no necessity, thought is engaged here in an activity which is at the same time the extreme externalization of itself, an activity in which it is forced . . . to combine elements which are incapable of any necessary relationships. The subject matter is the abstract thought of externality itself. As this *thought* of externality, number is at the same time the abstraction of the manifoldness of sense, of which it has retained nothing but the abstract determination of externality itself . . . number is the *pure thought* of thought's own externalization" (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 212–13; Hegel's italics, my underlines). To conceive things quantitatively is in this sense to conceive them apart from any necessary contents or relations, as an abstract manifold of blank self-subsisting units.

9. Aristotle on form might perhaps been seen as an attempt at intrinsic relation—but undermined by being defined as essence, as "this thing's being what it is," which limits the inquiry to the relations *within* each thing (fixing it at the highest level within discourse, as will be discussed below) and ending at each thing's simply being what it is, apart from *its* further relations to those outside it.

10. Donald Munro has noted this basic difference in orientation, and the present work can be viewed as an extension of this observation. See *The Concept of Man in Early China*, p. 52: "A comparison with Platonic thought should illuminate the over-

riding behavioral concern in the early Confucian doctrine. . . . Plato said that the universe was held together by the Good. He never described the Good exactly, but it seems clear that it involved the principles behind a mathematical order. Pythagoras had contended that number holds the world together, and Plato's Forms are like numbers."

11. Xunzi, "Quanxue pain" (1), in Li Desheng, ed., *Xunzi jishi* (hereafter *XZJS*), p. 5.

12. Translation from Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, p. 373.

13. Xunzi use of the term to describe the spontaneous relation of the sense organs to their objects is similar to Mencius' description of the senses, discussed below. See "Zhengming pian," *XZJS*, p. 506: "What is harmonized from what is inborn and feels and responds when the quintessence joins with external things, what is so of itself without deliberate effort is called the Nature."

14. It should be stressed again that this does *not* entail any ignorance of the difference between animate and inanimate realms. Indeed, Xunzi himself elsewhere notes those differences and specifies the animate as having this quality: "Whatever is born between heaven and earth *that belong to the category having blood and breath*, there is none without awareness, and whatever has awareness loves its own kind. For example, whenever a great animal or bird loses its herd or companions, before long it will return to search for them" ("Lilun pian," *XZJS*, p. 445). The fact that this characteristic is the fundamental and as it were most intuitively comfortable way of explaining phenomena does not mean that one cannot distinguish between groups that do this most paradigmatically and others in certain rhetorical contexts; indeed, in this context the animals are a larger category than the one Xunzi really wants to discuss: mankind. The argument is that a human being, too, as an aware creature with blood and breath, behaves in this way. Less obviously interrelating entities were not relevant in this context. When attention was turned to such entities, however, this category of spontaneous social grouping (of which there may be many types) was simply what was available, and deviations from it had to be explained in terms of it.

15. To give a striking example of the latter, consider Tao Yuanming's famous line, "Xin yuan di zi pian" 心遠地自偏 usually translated, "When my mind is remote, the locale is naturally / of itself out of the way." The sentence is understood as a conditional statement, in which the first phrase is the condition or cause of the second. And yet this result follows "naturally," which is to say, literally, "of itself." When X happens, Y happens of itself. This can be explained away by assimilating it to our accustomed notion, i.e., that the connection between the two is "natural law," that it must be. But the sense here is rather that the locale "responds" by becoming "out of the way" in response to this change of heart. There is a magical transformation here; when this changes, that, by itself, also changes immediately.

16. See Munro, *Concept of Man in Early China*, pp. 96–116, for a fuller discussion of model emulation as the primary method of learning. Munro contrasts his notion of model emulation to the idea of virtue as *manas*; in the present discussion, my aim is

to show that model emulation can account for the *mana*-like effects of virtue. Basically this is all an expansion of Munro's statement: "There is no need to explain *te* as *mana*-like potency, since its power of 'magnetic attraction,' which is usually cited to support the *mana* thesis, can be explained in other terms. However, the fact that people are attracted to *te* is still enormously important, even when explained in nonmagical terms" (ibid., p. 109). For our present purposes, however, the *content* of *de* is irrelevant; the important thing here is that what makes *de de is* this magnetic effect, based on the social fact of emulation.

17. For an English translation, see Legge, *The Shoo King*, pp. 92–151.

18. Qian Mu, *Hushang xiansi lu*, p. 20.

19. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, pp. 1–2.

20. Ibid., pp. 16–17.

21. Ibid., p. 17.

22. The term "focus and field" is derived from Hall and Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius*, esp. pp. 237–47. I retain their model without, however, necessarily committing myself to all their applications; in their work this model is assumed to be somehow primary and fundamental, rather than seen as a direct transcription of the homely notion of human sociality, as I treat it here. Moreover, the evidence cited by Hall and Ames is so scanty as to leave much of the concept's content undetermined.

23. To give a more or less random example, from a more general context: "[The true king's] benevolence spreads high over the world, and thus there is none who does not feel intimate to him [lit. "take him as a parent," *qin* 親]. His righteousness spreads high over the world, so there is none in the world who does not honor him" ("Wangzhi," *XZJS*, p. 172). A reciprocal response to the ruler's virtues is assumed.

24. Again, see Munro, *Concept of Man in Early China*, pp. 96–116, for a detailed discussion of model emulation (hence the intersubjective context) as an explanation of the *mana*-like power of *de*.

25. "Da ya," III.iii.VI.1; my translation (cf. Legge, *She King*, p. 541).

26. Donald J. Munro, "The Family Network, the Stream of Water, and the Plant," in Munro, ed., *Individualism and Holism*, p. 264.

27. "Zhounan," V. (Legge, *She King*, p. 11).

28. "Zhongyong," 25.

29. Simply remove God and we have the "post-modern" decentered universe of mutual references, a holism which however fails to cohere into any whole.

30. Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, pp. 70–90.

31. Qian Mu, *Zhongguo sixiang shi*, pp. 5–6.

32. Elsewhere, however, Qian offers another illuminating description of his use of the concept of the "center." In an essay entitled "Good and Evil," ("Shan yu e" 善與惡), which has many resonances with ideas found in the present work, he describes cyclical processes as moving between two opposite poles, such as day and night or good and evil, and then notes: "Wherever there is a circle or a pendulum

range, there is what can be called a center. This center is not on the two sides, nor anywhere outside, but rather lies within. A pendulum swing or a cyclic progress never actually comes to rest at that center, but the center is always there and is always still and solid as a center. It is as if the center were controlling the motion. The ceaseless and infinite motion seems eternally to be under the command of the center, completely controlled by the center, and thus we can say that it is perfectly moving and perfectly still, perfectly changing and perfectly constant. . . . Ruists want to point out a fixed center in this infinite cyclical back and forth, and they call this center the 'innate tendency' or 'one's nature.' . . . 'The Good' is what we call the constancy in this eternal change, the center in this unceasing motion, this relatively easily grasped and known innate tendency or direction. Good is just the constant tendency of this motion. . . . Whatever is separated from it by a great distance is called bad. Good is just the center of this motion; evil is nothing but going beyond it or not coming up to it. . . . Although human affairs also go through endless transformations and never stay the same, there is a constancy or a center to them. If you try to separate yourself from this constancy or center and just move straight forward, you will find that it is impossible. For example, peace and struggle are phenomena that arise alternately in human life; they usually form a cycle, a back-and-forth, moving from peace to struggle and then from struggle back to peace. Within this process, too, there is a center or a constancy. Struggle must search for peace, and peace must resist struggle (that is, must not be afraid of struggle). So peace, which is close to struggle, and struggle, which is close to peace, are both capable of continuing, and both can be called good. But struggle that is far removed from peace and peace that is far removed from struggle are both far removed from the center, and so neither can form a constancy or attain any continuity. Going too far and not coming up to it are equally bad, and both of these can be called evil. Evil is just what cannot be constant. The same is true of sickness and health. Usually people think a healthy person is free of sickness, but in reality if there were no sickness, how could there be the work of metabolism, assimilating and excreting? The function of excretion is a type of sickness that is not far removed from health (and hence is good). The same is true of work and rest; to rest so much you can no longer work is evil and not good, and to work so much you can no longer rest is equally evil and not good. But people usually think of life as positive, death as negative, peace as positive and struggle as negative, health and work as positive and sickness and rest as negative, and then they start thinking that the positive side is good and the negative side is evil. But according to the theory we are developing here, as long as evil approaches close to good, it is no longer evil, and indeed, if good is too far removed from evil, it is no longer good" (Qian Mu, *Hushang xiansi lu*, pp. 42–44).

33. Hall and Ames (*Thinking Through Confucius*, pp. 216–39) also enunciate the idea of omnicentrism, especially in their discussion of *de* 德 They take *de* to be "a selected perspective on the whole[. I]t is elastic and can be extended through inte-

gration to overcome any presumed disjunction between part and whole, and in this sense, embraces the entire complex of existence" (p. 220). *De* is "the determinate focus" of a field of existing things, which calls forth alternative wholes. This conception owes much to both Huayan Buddhism (which they cite) and Whitehead, and it is doubtful, to say the least, that this is what *de* "means." The examples from the early literature given to support this interpretation are woefully inadequate. Nonetheless, Hall and Ames enunciate the concept of omnicentrism quite well here, as well as pointing out its distinctive features within Ruist and Daoist thought (i.e., variability of the intensity of foci, and the varying influence of particular pivots: perhaps the word should be "oligocentrism"), and even, in passing, noted its connection with the view of "the classical Chinese philosopher" that "the world of particulars is 'alive' in the sense that they are aware of and hence 'feel' or 'prehend' [Whitehead giveaway!] other particulars in their environment" (pp. 225–26). I would replace "alive" with "social," but clearly the ideas of the present work are attempts to extend and clarify something similar to what Hall and Ames have pointed to here—a contribution for which we have reason to be grateful.

34. Since developing this terminology, I have come across only three explicit expositions of what seem to me to be close approximations of omnicentric holist ideas, other than that of Qian Mu quoted above, among modern writers. One is in Slavoj Žižek's Lacanian re-reading of Hegel, in all his books; another is in Charles Fu's (Fu Weixun) notion of "holistic multi-perspectivism" as a characteristic of Sinitic Buddhism, as developed, for example, in *Cong chuangzao de quanshixue daoi da sheng Fo xue.* The third case, the most questionable, would be in the theoretical works of the Gestalt movement—both the experimental Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka and the proto-New Age Gestalt therapy of Frederick Perls and Paul Goodman, which, in spite of its present state of disgrace as a defunct megeneration fad, deserves closer serious attention as a theoretical construct. See Perls, *Ego, Hunger and Aggression*; and Perls, Hefferline, and Goodman, *Gestalt Therapy.* The idea of a whole in which all the parts are *in some sense* identical to or inclusive of the whole can be found adumbrated in many works of speculation, from Plotinus and before to Emerson and after, but usually in a vague manner and restricted to a limited realm of application. Still, it is interesting to note how often some form of the idea "the whole is present completely in all the parts" is invoked to solve thorny problems, only to be watered down or constrained to a strictly determined sphere, since on atomistic or unicentric premises there is no way to make sense of it.

35. For example, if we posit science and democracy as the desiderata, we may well conclude that atomism has the greatest validity; the scientific revolution in Europe seems to have leaned heavily on assumptions that are broadly "atomistic" in the sense developed here, and this has created machines that are efficient. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that democratic political theory has a better chance of surviving on the basis of an atomistic conception of the individual as separable from society

and basically self-sufficient. If we wish to create a totalitarian regime with maximum centralized law and order, on the other hand, a unicentric worldview may prove most useful. But the belief in the desirability of these goals is itself arguably an outgrowth of these same premises. Omnicentrism provides a third alternative to these two possibilities; the goal of this work is to see what kind of desiderata and consequences accompany this view, just as science or law and order are paired with the other two views. In the practical or sociopolitical real, of special interest here is the possibility of an alternative to atomistic individualism and unicentric collectivism: the possibility of an *omnicentric individualism*.

36. An interestingly similar and dissimilar conception, developed with respect to the field of psychology, can be found in Graham Parkes's discussion of "psychic polycentricity," as opposed to "monocentricity" (see his *Composing the Soul*, pp. 251–72).

37. It is surely notable, too, that this Good, in its hyper-determinacy, as the condition of all determinacy, vanishes, in Plato's account, into indeterminacy, an indeterminacy that is supposed to stand at the opposite pole from the indeterminacy of pure Non-being, the failure to accord with any Idea whatsoever, which marks the leftover matter in Plato's universe. The undecidability between these two is, I would suggest, the hidden reservoir of value paradox in the Platonic tradition and the way to get out of this metaphysic by going all the way through it (in Tiantai terms, the "opening of this provisional to reveal the ultimate").

38. Or at least to living beings; for our present purposes, it makes little difference, and indeed, as we have seen, it makes even less difference in the case of the Chinese thinkers discussed here.

39. I by no means wish to suggest that the object of desire is arbitrary, as this assumption that desire per se is primary might suggest; on the contrary, there must be a principle for determining *what* in particular is set up as the desideratum. It may be convenient to think that beings desire to compensate for what they find themselves to be lacking, that the direction of their conation is toward what they feel themselves to be deficient in. This can be thought of initially in terms of a Platonic eros, an urge toward completeness inherent in all finite beings (or in the Hegelian equivalent, the dialectical self-overcoming toward the [true] infinite inherent in all finite forms). However, this does not yet explain much, since all finite things "lack" almost everything—they are deficient in a million different ways, if an absolute standard of plenitude is applied. There must then be some singling out of a particular dimension of deficiency, a prioritizing of this particular lack as demanding immediate compensation. This could be approached, for example, through the fascinating labyrinths of the Lacanian *objet petit a*, or perhaps through a more concrete conception of a crypto-Darwinian adaptation of an organism to its environment, physical and social, whereby a being's disharmony with its world alerts it to an awareness of which of the virtues valued by that particular situation or community it happens to be lacking, inspiring it to adapt itself accordingly, consciously or unconsciously, setting up

this antithesis of its spontaneous self as the quintessence of value for which it must strive.

40. *Liezi zhushi*, chap. 4, p. 70.

41. The same idea is stated in a somewhat different poetic idiom in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*: "Where I found a living creature, there I found will to power. . . . And life itself told me this secret: 'Behold,' it said, 'I am that *which must overcome itself again and again*.' . . . That I have to be struggle and becoming and goal and conflict of goals: ah, he who divines my will surely divines, too, along what *crooked* paths it has to go! Whatever I create and however much I love it—soon I have to oppose it and my love: thus will my will have it" (*Thus Spake Zarathustra*, pp. 137–38). Nietzsche here indicates the self-conflicting and paradoxical "crooked" paths that follow from his conception of will to power.

42. "He can be shallow or deep, float or sink, twist or go straight, speak or be silent (*Ke qian ke shen, ke fu ke chen, ke qu ke zhi, ke yan ke mo* 可淺可深可浮可沉可曲可直可言可默). Heaven is not constrained to one season, nor earth to one kind of profit. Likewise, man has not only one kind of affair" ("Zhouhe pian," in *Guanzi jinquan*, p. 23).

43. To give just one of many examples: "Dao can be weak, can be strong, can be soft, can be hard, can be Yin, can be Yang, can be dark, can be bright, can encompass heaven and earth, can respond boundlessly" ("Daoying xun," *Huainanzi*, juan 12, p. 1). A similar idea appears on the first page of the work, at the beginning of the "Yuandao xun," although it is worded less compactly: "If you set it vertically, it fills heaven and earth; if you set it horizontally, it fills the four seas. . . . Expanded, it covers the six ultimate points of space; contracted, it does not even fills one's fist. It is compacted but capable of stretching out, dark but capable of brightening, weak yet capable of being strong, soft but capable of being hard" (ibid., juan 1, pp. 1–2). Similar passages appear in other works of roughly this period, such as the *Wenzi*, the *Yinwenzi*, and the *Lüshi chunqiu*.

44. In the cosmic setting, the *Liezi* begins with an even more exemplary instance of this both/and structure: "All this things are accomplished by non-doing. It can be yin or yang, soft or hard, short or long, round or square, live or dead, hot or cool, floating or sinking, the *gong* tone or the *shang* tone, emerging or submerging, black or yellow, sweet or bitter, evil-smelling or fragrant (*Neng yin neng yang neng rou neng gang neng duan neng chang neng yuan neng fang neng sheng neng si* 能陰能陽能柔能剛能短能長能圓能方能生能死, etc.). It knows nothing and has no ability, and yet there is nothing it doesn't know, nothing it is unable to do." ("Tianrui," *Liezi zhushi*, chap. 1, p. 11).

45. Ziporyn, "What's So Good About Evil."

46. Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, p. 101.

47. A similar notion of the relation between being and value can be found, applied to the most basic and most universal levels, in Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*,

pp. 143–46. Indeed, for Sartre as for the Tiantai thinkers, value as such is posited by the very failure of being; this failure in effect guarantees the arisal of the former. Hence in the Tiantai case, all things are determined as existing in the inescapable presence of permanence, bliss, and so on precisely because they are impermanent, sorrowful, and so on.

48. "The first shall be last" of the Gospels is an example of such a doctrine, and it remains a characteristic tactic of Western revolutionary thinking to this day. A slightly more interesting case can be found in Nietzsche's "transvaluation of all values," which on one level seems to simply replace "good and evil" with "good and bad," in which the former good equals the latter bad, and the former evil equals the latter good (what slave values call good—meekness, mildness, altruism—is called bad by master values, and what the latter call good—power, playful cruelty, deception—is called evil by the slave values). On another level, however, Nietzsche sometimes indicates a monistic underlying structure whereby, among master values, the "good" can grow out of the "bad" (self-mastery and creativity as a sublimation of unruly will to power, greed, lust, cruelty), which sometimes also allows that the slave values are themselves useful to the growth of master values (e.g., the doctrine of the need for adequate enemies, the suggestion that Christianity helped bring forth Nietzsche's own doctrine by providing such an enemy). Such forays into value redefinition in Western history serve as a useful point of contrast with the Chinese thinkers under discussion; as I have suggested, it seems to me that, with the notable exception of Hegel and his followers, the revolutions in thought have tended to leave the structure of the value/anti-value relation untouched, concentrating instead on redefining the contents of these terms (perhaps precisely the opposite is true in the Chinese case: there was greater consensus about what was valuable and what was not, whereas the issue of their relation became the focus of ingenious innovation). Even today, our most radical thinkers seem to cling to a dualistic axiology; the place of evil may be played by logocentrism, metaphysics, fascism, sexism, racism, oppression, government, or what have you; in most cases, we are given revolutionary rhetoric suggesting that this evil, however conceived, is to be extirpated; it seems that, for us, to have insight is to suggest a revolution, and this always involves getting rid of something, rather than transforming its meaning by recontextualizing it into a new structure, incorporating it, developing it in new directions, perceiving its identity with its opposite, and so on. The viability of the latter options is something I will be interested in evaluating in the course of this book.

49. Moreover, each value perspective, no matter how limited, purports to embrace the whole world and evaluates all possible actions from its own point of view; the lower the level, the more abstract, exclusive, and tunnel-visioned this will perhaps seem (e.g., imagine X's evaluations of some political policy; the question would be: How does this affect inhalation?). As the levels get higher and more inclusive, a more subtly nuanced set of judgments becomes possible.

50. Polanyi cites, for example, the case of an experiment in which the utterance of certain syllables by a subject was coordinated with electric shocks. The subjects instinctively began to avoid using any words containing the pain-triggering syllables, although they could not say which syllables these were. Once the subjects' attention had been focused on the pain only—the explicit dimension—they were unable to specify which cues they were avoiding—the tacit dimension—although their actions displayed recognition of these signs and their meaning.

51. For a full explication of Polanyi's notion of "tacit knowledge," from which these examples are drawn, see Polanyi and Prosch, *Meaning*, pp. 22–45; and Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, pp. 3–25.

52. Or at least, to be more exact, "a standard to which [one] attributes universality" (Polanyi and Prosch, *Meaning*, p. 44).

53. Ibid.

54. It is not surprising that this is regarded as an aesthetic ideal and thus ideal for persuasion within the limits of the art of rhetoric. Consider, for example, of Whitehead's use of the category of "contrast" and its role in aesthetic satisfaction.

55. For a discussion of the pre-eminent concern of Ruists for the behavioral implications, rather than cognitive truth claims, of statements, see Munro, *Concept of Man in Early China*, pp. 51–58; and *Concept of Man in Contemporary China*, pp. 26–27. On the absence of fact/value distinctions in classical Chinese philosophy, see also Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, p. 29 and *passim*.

56. Hansen, *A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought*, pp. 51–53.

57. Ibid.

58. Eno, *Confucian Creation of Heaven*, pp. 10–11, 171–74.

59. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*. In this context, we may think of Confucius' description of himself at the age of 70.

60. For a discussion of the concept of expression in Chinese cosmology, see Black, *Man and Nature in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fuzhi*, pp. 13–37.

61. Flew, *Thinking About Social Thinking*, p. 151.

62. For a particularly obvious example of this, see Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, the diagram between pp. 48 and 49.

63. Other factors in the development of paradox as a persuasive and pervasive form in Chinese rhetoric build on and add to those just discussed, but they require a more detailed and concrete treatment. See Ziporyn, "What's So Good About Evil," chap. 3, "Parallelism and Polarity."

64. One example of how the concept of levels has been employed by previous scholars is A. C. Graham's claim that the *Laozi* posits a level of stable good and bad within whose framework reversals of position and value operate, and this higher level is never challenged or deconstructed (see Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, p. 231). But is it possible to conceive of a system such as that of the *Laozi* without introducing a stable level of unchanging value? Could this perhaps be simply a construction

convenient to a modern interpreter, trained in Aristotelian logic and a basically reductionistic scholarly orthodoxy? It seems worthwhile to attempt a reconstruction of how this system could work without such an assumption; I believe this can be done by recourse to some of the dialectical and holistic conceptions discussed in this chapter.

65. See Hsu, *Rugged Individualism Reconsidered*, for an anthropological analysis of the attributes of this system. Hsu notes that continuity, inclusiveness, authority (exercised on and by all members), and asexuality, traits endemic to the father-son relationship, come to characterize other social relations as well in (contemporary) Chinese society. I would push this claim one step farther: not too surprisingly, these traits are abundantly evident in classical Ruism and thereby come to characterize the typical relation to and among objects, nature, concepts, periods of time, and so on in the indigenous Chinese philosophical tradition as a whole, with extremely extensive consequences.

66. See Ziporyn, "What's So Good About Evil."

67. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, I refer readers to my dissertation (ibid.); I hope to return to these issues in an expanded form in future work.

Chapter 3

1. Passages like the following, for example, are quite common in the Pali scriptures: "Ananda said to the Lord: 'Half of this holy life, Lord, is good and noble friends, companionship with the good, association with the good.' [The Buddha replied] 'Do not say that, Ananda. It is the whole of this holy life, this friendship, companionship and association with the good'" (*Samyutta Nikaya*, in Ireland, *An Anthology from the Samyutta Nikaya*, p. 71). Here the endeavor to be with the good (however understood) and not with the bad is defined as the very essence of the Buddhist teaching.

2. See, e.g., the passage on the Four Truths from the *Mahā-satipatthāna-sutta*: "And what, monks, is the Noble Truth of the Origin of Suffering? It is that craving which gives rise to fresh rebirth, and, bound up with pleasure and lust, finds ever fresh delight, now here, now there—to wit, the Sensual Craving, the Craving for (Eternal) Existence and the Craving for Non-Existence" (trans. from Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, p. 128).

3. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 181–82, quoting from the *Satipatthana* (The saint's power) in the Pali canon: (On the accomplishment of the four Foundations of Mindfulness) "If he should wish: 'May I dwell perceiving the unrepulsive in the repulsive,' he dwells perceiving the unrepulsive. If he should wish, 'May I dwell perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive,' he dwells perceiving the repulsive. If he should wish, 'May I dwell perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive as well as in the repulsive,' he dwells perceiving the repulsive. If he should wish, 'May I dwell perceiving the un-

repulsive in the repulsive as well as in the unrepulsive,' he dwells perceiving the unrepulsive. If he should wish: 'Avoiding both (considerations), as unrepulsive and as repulsive, I shall dwell in equanimity, mindful and clearly comprehending,' he dwells in equaniminity towards that (object), mindful and clearly comprehending." Thera adds the following note (p. 207): "These five modes of perceiving things as repulsive, etc., and the mastery of these modes, are called in Pali *ariya-iddhi*, 'noble magic' or 'the power of the noble ones (the Saints).' They are a kind of subtle 'magic of transformation' by which habitual emotional attitudes can be changed at will, or replaced by complete equanimity. An equanimity that has gone through this training has, indeed, stood the severest test. By that training full control of emotive reactions to one's environment can be achieved, and complete independence from the influence of habits and passions. As indicated by the name of that training, 'That Saints' Power', perfection in it can be attained only be the Accomplished Ones, the Arahats. But earnest attempts in practising it, will be of great benefit to anyone who can muster the required determination. Previous experience in mind-control will, however, be indispensable, and therefore, our text mentions first the practice of Satipatthana. It is, in particular, the Contemplation of Feeling and the distinction between a perception and one's reaction to it . . . , which are important in this context." The passage can also be found in *Samapasadaniya sutta*: "And what is the 'Ariyan' supernormal power? Here a monk, if he wishes: 'Let me abide with the disgusting not feeling disgust," can so abide, and if he wishes: 'Let me abide with the non-disgusting feeling disgust,' he can so abide" (trans. from Malshe, *Thus Have I Heard*, p. 424). Here, the attempt to see "impurity, impermanance, non-self" is clearly not a form of seeing through a false illusion (purity, permanance, self) to the truth behind it (impurity, etc.), but rather the overcoming of a one-sided habit that sees only the value *or* only the anti-value in an object, rather than seeing both at once or either at will. The object itself is neither value only nor anti-value only, nor indeed something to which neither value nor anti-value can be applied. At points like this, Pali Buddhism sounds very much like Tiantai Buddhism, which itself holds that Hināyāna Buddhism contains Tiantai teaching, if interpreted correctly (if "the provisional is opened up to reveal the real," in which case, "the dharma of the Sravakas is the king of all teachings").

4. Trans. from Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, p. 126

5. This provenance of Tiantai value paradox is perhaps most obvious in the *Mohezhiguan* section on the contemplation of evil in the Four Samadhis (T46.17b–21b.), but it is structurally present as a presupposition for the entire Tiantai attitude toward evil.

6. Payutto, *Good, Evil and Beyond*, pp. 17–21.

7. Ng, *T'ien-t'ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika*, p. 35. No part of writing this book has caused me more trepidation than the necessity to sum up the subtleties of the current interpretations of the Mādhyamika, and to do so, as it were, *in passing*.

At length I have decided to present the aspects of Mādhyamika thought that are directly relevant to my topic without attempting to give a full account of what the Mādhyamika was or was not in its own right or as a whole. Needless to say, when I resort to quoting authorites, as I am doing here, it is also a way of saying that I basically agree with their analysis of the primary sources and with their conclusions on the matter under discussion.

8. Trans. from Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, p. 40.

9. Robinson himself cites Nāgārjuna's refutation of the concept of identity and then comments: "In these passages, it should be noted, Nāgārjuna is discussing identity as an absolute, which he rejects because the concept of identity is definable only in relation to difference, and that which is not self-sufficient is not absolute. An absolute identity would be immutable. However, neither total identity nor total non-identity can be predicated of two things which stand in a relation to each other. This is not a denial of the concept of identity, but simply a denial that identity to the exclusion of difference, or vice versa, can be attributed to anything existential" (ibid., pp. 51–52). If nirvāṇa and saṁsāra are "existential" to Nāgārjuna, then, he should not be willing to assert that they are identical to the exclusion of difference. Zhiyi would follow Nāgārjuna in this; the Three Truths are designed to ensure that identity and difference are given equal value, i.e., that the two opposites are "neither the same nor different," as Nāgārjuna puts it. But in any case, it is clear that Nāgārjuna does not allow that both saṁsāra and nirvāṇa are equally real and different, and that a paradoxical identity exists between these two real contrasted entities (which is what is really at stake in the Tiantai case). His position seems to be that there is really only one truth, variously perceived. As T. R. V. Murti puts it, using his somewhat more substantialist vocabulary: "The transcendence of the absolute must not be understood to mean that it is an other that lies outside the world of phenomena. There are not two sets of the real. The Absolute is *the reality* of the apparent (dharmānām dharmatā); it is their real nature (vāstavikam rūpam). . . . The absolute is the only real; it is identical with phenomena. The difference between the two is epistemic—subjective and not real. In full accordance with this, Nāgārjuna declares that there is not the least difference between the Absolute and the universe" (*Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, pp. 232–33). This would be equivalent to the position that Mou Zongsan and indeed the Shanwai thinkers see in Tiantai, even in Zhili, namely, that objective defilement is absolute and ineradicable, but subjective apprehension of it is dichotomously either tainted or pure, i.e., that "when deluded, it is all *kleśa* when enlightened, it is all *bodhi*." We shall dispose of this interpretation below, by means of the concept of intersubjectivity as deployed in the Tiantai texts.

10. Ng, *T'ien-t'ai Buddism and Early Mādhyamika*, pp. 154–55. Ng's translation of the same passage is: "Saṁsāra is nothing essentially different from nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is nothing essentially different from saṁsāra." Also: "The limits (*koti*) of nirvāṇa are

the limits of saṁsāra. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest differenece whatever."

11. Ibid., p. 160.

12. Ibid., pp. 161–62. The same is found in *Dazhidulun*, T25.298c-299a.

13. Ibid., p. 165.

14. See Robinson, *Early Madhamika in India and China*, p. 46.

15. Ibid., p. 65.

16. I refer to works such as the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra* and especially the *Sarvadharma-pravṛtti-nirdeśa sūtra* (*Zhufawuxingjing*), often quoted by Zhiyi, which *do* explicitly state that "defilements are enlightenment," as well as repeatedly reiterating that "saṁsāra is nirvāṇa." The problem, and Zhiyi was more aware of this than anyone, is that such statements can be understood in various ways, according to the doctrinal context; in Tiantai terms, the same statement has a different meaning if read by a Shared Teaching, Separate Teaching, or Integrated Teaching reader. In the first case, such statements mean that defilements are emptiness and nirvāṇa is emptiness, and hence they are the same thing (the teaching of Exclusive Emptiness). In the case of the Separate Teaching, such statements would mean that both defilements and nirvāṇa are provisional positings, ways in which a bodhisattva compassionately leads beings to realize what is beyond the extremes of defilements and nirvāṇa (the teaching of the Exclusive Mean). In the Integrated Teaching, these statements mean these extremes of defilement and nirvāṇa are both provisional positings, which are at the same time, however, since they lead to the realization of the Mean that transcends them (and the distinction between ends and means is itself provisional), identical to that Mean; thus both are ultimately true and ultimate false at the same time, and both are just different names for the Mean that transcends them both; thus they are identical.

17. The only Esoteric sūtras (or rather, the only sūtras classified in the *Taishō Canon* as belonging to the esoteric tradition) that Zhiyi mentions are *dhāraṇī* (ritual chant) sūtras such as the *Qing guanshiyin xiaofu duhai tuoluoni jing* 請觀世音消伏毒害陀螺尼經 and the *Great Vaipulya Dhāraṇī Sutra*, which do not contain any of the antinomian doctrines characteristic of later esoteric Buddhism. A few words, however, can be said about the Tantric treatment of this problem. According to David Snellgrove (*Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*), the explicit injunctions to immoral behavior in the Buddhist tantras are related to but not identical to the more general Mahāyāna doctrine of the bodhisattvas' use of various means for the deliverance of all sentient beings: "The freedom to kill, to rob, to live with total sexual licence, to lie, which is proclaimed in so many Buddhist tantras (with varying forms of interpretation) is clearly a deliberate reversal of the first four of the set of ten moral rules imposed upon any convert to Buddhism. In origin it may be understood as a form of hyperbole, which proclaims the perfected yogin's total freedom of action. . . . [From

Candamaharosana tantra]: 'By the same evil acts that bring people into hell, the one who uses the right means gains salvation, there's no doubt. All evil and virtue are said to have thought as their basis. One's state of rebirth, one's actual condition and so on, all such distinctions are forms of thought-construction.' [Snellgrove]: The same tantra teaches the regular moral rules as binding upon the neophyte before he should be granted any consecration, and thus a contrast is drawn between what is suitable for the beginner and what is permitted to the one whose 'perfection' (*siddhi*) transports him above all distinction of whatsoever kind. However, elsewhere the 'perverse' actions are rationalized in accordance with earlier Mahāyana teachings, which allow a Bodhisattva to commit wrong actions (and willingly pay the penalty for them by a temporary sojourn in one of the hellish abodes), if only it is for the good of living beings. This kind of interpretation seems to be found in those tantras whose origins may be more closely linked with Mahayana sūtras. . . . [This accords with] the more general Mahayana willingness to countenance evil acts if they are committed for an ultimate good. . . . It is however likely, as suggested above, that the original notion was the total freedom of the perfected yogin from all social restraint, even such universally acknowledged evils as sexual relations with another's wife, not to mention one's mother, sister, daughter and so on. To my knowledge these last extremes of license are not justified by appeal to a Bodhisattva's willingness to sacrifice his own personal destiny, which is something quite different from being in a state which is 'beyond good and evil.' . . . Yet . . . even these two quite different notions can be linked" (pp. 174–76). However, in the midst of this total freedom, there is one iron law that can never be transgressed: "The basis of all tantric practice, namely that of the absolute necessity of total devotion to one's chosen teacher or master. . . . Here no exception whatsoever is permitted, and it may be noted how in the midst of so many 'evils,' which are acceptable in given circumstances, this one is specifically listed as allowing of no reservations. It is noteworthy that it receives in the tantras . . . a central importance, which it never had in the early history of Buddhism" (p. 176). A cynical observer might note that this effectively negates all the other forms of freedom, in that the practioner has zero autonomy until his teacher dies, and this is indeed the sole form of authority that might be binding him in actual life. In other words, this freedom and transcendence of all values seems to amount to saying, "Do whatever your teacher tells you to, even if it seems crazy and wrong." According to the structure of values and meta-values described in Chapter 1, the Tantras end up, in this analysis, revealing a quite simple structure: one absolutely dichotomous ultimate value/anti-value pair (obedience or disobedience to one's teacher), in subordination to which all other values are merely instrumental. In addition to this, the stress seems to be on the state of enlightenment—at that point, one is beyond good and evil; however, a neophyte must observe moral rules—especially obedience to one's master. As we shall see, this is reminiscent of the version of Tiantai that comes to the fore in Zhanran and in the Shanwai thinkers—evil is to

be used only after enlightenment, whereas practice must use good. Zhili, however, specifically countenances the use of evil as a form of practice, as indeed Zhiyi had, and as the tantra quoted above, as opposed to the later examples, also seems to.

18. For an indication of the centrality of this issue in early Chinese Buddhism, see the famous story of Zhu Daosheng in the *Gaosengzhuan* (T50.366c–67a).

19. Jizang enumerated eleven distinct early interpretations of Buddha-nature, which he classifies into three types: those that take the Buddha-nature to be concrete dharmas, those that take it to be mind or mental, and those that take it to be principle, i.e., emptiness (*Dashengxuanlun* T45.35c–36a). Zhiyi's identification of the Buddha-nature with the Non-exclusive Mean, and thus with the Three Truths, effectively encompasses all three of these aspects—in effect, *everything* is the Buddha-nature, and everything without exception, on every level of abstraction, will attain Buddhahood; this sets the stage for Zhanran's development of the explicit statement of the doctrine that inanimate objects also possess the Buddha-nature in the *Jin'gangpi*—for the Buddha-nature is the Three Truths, and all entities by definition possess these three aspects.

20. See Zhiyi's iteration of the debates between the *Dilun* (*Daśabhūmi-śāstra*) masters and the *Shelun* (*Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra*) masters concerning the relative status between the true and the deluded in the arising of the deluded world of present experience; the former held that the delusion was dependent on, and hence to some degree an expression of, the dharma-nature, whereas the latter held that phenomenal changes in purity and taint occurred only in the *alaya*-consciousness and had no effect on the dharma-nature. The first view would mean anti-value inheres in value but offers no explanation of their conflict; the latter view dichotomizes value and anti-value, but also provides no explanation of their phenomenal relation. Zhiyi's solution depends on his deployment of value paradox; only because what was formerly named anti-value can just as validly be named value is it possible to find a way out of this dilemma. What originally exists is neither definitively true nor definitively false—and indeed, the same applies to Buddhahood itself, as we shall see in detail below.

21. Indeed, we could say that the analytic refutation of all wholes that lies at the bottom of dharma analysis is incompatible with unicentric holism but promotes omnicentric holism; it amounts to a deconstruction of the priority and solidity of any posited center, by virtue of the principle of holism itself, which had posited them in the first place. The whole, in other words, does not exist apart from its parts—thus the true "whole" is composed of the dyad "whole-part." This critique can then be extended to the next order of abstraction: this whole dyad "whole-part" together with its two parts, "whole" and "part," form a new whole, and so ad infinitum. This, in fact, is precisely how Zhiyi understands emptiness as implicating the Three Truths. But this implication does not seem to be stressed in Indian theoretical treatments of emptiness.

22. Tanaka, *Dawn of Chinese Pure Land Buddhist Doctrine*, pp. 24–25.

23. In this claim I am only echoing Zhanran's assessment of Zhiyi's achievement, as given in the "Zhiguan dayi": "The sūtras and *śāstras* in the Tripiṭaka all contradict each other, their words and theories are all at variance; there is no way to force them into consistency by means of ordinary emotions and views, and no breadth of learning will yield a consistent explanation of them. But here [Zhiyi, in the *Mohezhiguan*] uses the concept of the four *siddhāntas* [four modes of speech outlined in the *Dazhidulun*: conventional usage, usage aimed at a particular listener, usage aimed to remedy a specific misconception, and ultimate truth; but all of these, even the last, are relative to the listener], such that all obstructions are melted into interpenetration" (T46.459a–b).

Chapter 4

1. The first thing to be noted about the so-called Four Teachings, technically the "Four Doctrines of Conversion" (*huafa sijiao* 化法四教), is the deceptiveness of any straightforwardness about them. They are only one of many ways in which Zhiyi classifies the teachings of the Buddha. It is, in fact, one of three main schemes, the other two being (1) the Five Periods (*wu shi* 五時) of the Buddha's preaching career, which are correlated to the five forms of milk from the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*; and (2) the Four Modes of Conversion (*huayi sijiao* 化儀四教), the sudden, the gradual, the uncertain, and the esoteric. It may convincingly be argued that their final systematized form was the work not so much of Zhiyi as of later Tiantai writers, as Sekiguchi Shindai has suggested. A comparison of Zhiyi's *Sijiaoyi* (T46.721–69), which starts off directly speaking of the Four Teachings, called simply *sijiao* throughout, with, say, Chegwan's 諦觀 *Tiantai sijiaoyi* (T46.774c), which begins by delineating the three alternative conversion schemes, testifies to this ambiguity. However, Chegwan unambiguously grants the greatest importance to the Four Teachings. Moreover, although it is possible and customary to connect each of the four with a particular set of scriptures in a rule-of-thumb sort of way, Zhiyi makes it very clear that each teaching is not limited to the particular sūtras in question, each of which contains a complex and carefully specified mix or alloy of the various teachings. This picture is further complicated by the central Tiantai notion of the mission of the *Lotus Sūtra* to "open up the provisional to reveal the real" in all the other teachings; after this process is applied, even the scriptures of the Hīnayāna are read as speaking of the ultimate Integral Teachings ("Opening up the Dharma of the Śrāvakas, revealing it to be the king of all teachings," as Tiantai interprets an ambiguous line [*jueliao shengwenfa, wei zhujing zhi wang* 決了聲聞法，爲諸經之王] in Kumārajiva's translation of the *Lotus*). The hermeneutic principle of the *Lotus* (and also, explicitly, of its traditional "preface," the *Sūtra of Infinite Meanings*) implies that all teachings are in all texts. This said, however, of all the classificatory systems em-

ployed in Tiantai, this is the most prevalent and the most useful. It seems to me to be built into the structure of the *Mohezhiguan* and the *Fahuaxuanyi*'s expositions of various ideas, even when it is not explicitly invoked. For example, it can be seen in the successive discussion of the four forms of understandings of the Four Truths (in both the *Mohezhiguan* and the *Fahuaxuanyi*), namely, the Impermanent, the Unborn, the Infinite, and the Uncreated, which correlate with the Four Teachings without actually using the terms. Similar examples abound throughout these two works.

2. Sometimes translated "The Threefold Truth," which has the advantage of emphasizing the mutual interpenetration of the three aspects, also emphasized in the original.

3. Occasionally Zhiyi connects these four teachings to the old tetralemma of Being, Non-being, Both, and Neither. The Tripiṭaka teachings focus on Being, the Common on Non-being, the Separate on Both, and the Integrated on Neither. (See, e.g., *Mohezhiguan*, T46.66b and 73c–74a, and *Sinianchu*, T46.567.a: "The separate teaching . . . although it has all four gates [being, non-being, both, and neither] usually uses the gate of Both Being and Non-being in its teaching and in its practice" and T46.573.b: "The Integrated Teaching . . . usually uses the gate of Neither Being nor Non-being in its teaching and in its practice.") The last two are tricky, for Zhili would later almost reverse them, generally allying the Separate to a "neither/nor" position and the Integrated to a "both/and." This is, of course, consistent with the concepts of the Exclusive and Non-exclusive Mean in Zhili, and I believe it can be shown that Zhiyi intends this meaning, in spite of the opposite impression created by the terms used. "Both Being and Non-being" means for Zhiyi a concept of both as separately existing and ontologically consistent, with the Mean being a neutral point that stands above these two but can transform into either of these two fixed consistent points. "Neither Being nor Non-being" indicates the interpenetration of the Non-exclusive Mean: since the extreme of being in itself is not consistently or fixedly being, it is already "not being." Since the extreme of non-being in itself is not consistently or fixedly non-being, it is itself already "not non-being." Thus this neither-nor, in the context of the teaching of Emptiness, is another way of asserting the Non-exclusive Mean and its thoroughgoing both-and.

4. These Four Teachings do not pertain only to Buddhist doctrines. Rather, they are intimately related to all the ways of experiencing reality within all types of ordinary ("deluded") experience as well. From the point of view of the Integrated Teaching, the Four Teachings are associated with the Ten Realms (to be enumerated in detail below) as follows: The six realms of ordinary beings (purgatory, hungry ghosts, animals, Asuras, humans, gods) believe in the reality of all things and are not yet even advocates of the Tripiṭaka teaching. The Two Vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratekya-buddhas) hold the Tripiṭaka teaching, which is ineluctably connected to the ordinary state by being its most direct and thorough negation, a point that is of great importance below. The Bodhisattvas hold to the Separate Teaching, and the

Buddhas to the Integrated Teaching, with the Common Teaching running through all three, variously interpreted. The six paths are said to act and perceive under the belief that "all is real," which corresponds, N.B., to Conventional *Truth*. The Two Vehicles are committed to the view that "All is Empty," the so-called Ultimate Truth; the Bodhisattvas embrace the position that "All is Neither Empty nor Non-Empty," corresponding to the Truth of the Mean, and Buddhas also to "All is the Mean," but in a new sense, that is, the Non-exclusive Mean. If the Buddha held *only* to the Mean, he would still be the Buddha of the Separate Teaching, i.e., a proponent of "the Exclusive Mean." The Mean in the Integrated Teaching must imply that all dharmas are reducible, not just to the Mean itself, but to any dharma. The doctrine of the mutual inherence of the ten realms is another way of stating the interfusion of the Three Truths. A Buddha who is "only a Buddha" (i.e., who realizes only the Exclusive Mean) is not the Buddha of the Integrated Teaching.

5. Compare this with Richard Robinson's rendering directly from the Sanskrit: "It is dependent co-arising that we term emptiness; this is a designation overlaid [on emptiness]; it alone is the Middle Path" (Robinson, *Early Madhamika*, p. 40.) Here it is clear that "designation overlaid" refers to the term "emptiness" itself, not to the phenomenon of dependent co-arising, and that this point of view itself is what is called the Middle Way.

6. Ng, *T'ien-t'ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika*, p. 125.

7. Ibid., p. 126.

8. Ibid., p. 127. The *Dazhidulun* says on *jiaming*: "The provisional name-being (*jiamingyou*) is like the curd, which is composed of four factors, namely, color, smell, taste, and touch. When these causal factors combine together, there is provisionally the name 'curd.' The being of the curd is not of the same sort as that of its causal factors. It is unreal, and yet it is not unreal in the same sense as the hare's horn or the hair of the tortoise" (*TZDL*, ch. 12, T.25.147c).

9. Ng, *T'ien-t'ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika*, p. 138.

10. Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, p. 52.

11. At times, Zhiyi almost says that he is basing his system primarily on his own meditation experience and then, as it were, trumping up his sūtra quotes to match this experience. See, e.g., *Mohezhiguan*: "The above exegeses are based on contemplation of the mind; in reality it is not from reading the sūtras that one can securely set out the order of things in this way. It's just that in order to avoid giving rise to doubts in the minds of my listeners, I simply quote the sūtras when there fortuitously happens (*xing* 幸) to be something in them that is in accord [with my experience]" (T46.26b). This is a bold thing to say and testifies not only to Zhiyi's originality but also to his conception of where the ultimate authority lay, or as he would put it, what "the Buddha" was. He knew full well that the scriptures *could* be read in a number of different ways—indeed, his whole system is addressed to this hermeneutic multifariousness. For an interesting discussion of this aspect of Zhiyi's

method, see Paul L. Swanson, "What's Going On Here: Chih-i's Use (and Abuse) of Scripture," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 1997.

12. T46.473b

13. Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, pp. 50–51.

14. T46.63.a.

15. Indeed, Zhiyi takes pains to justify the characterization of this falsehood as a form of "truth." We find the following in the *Mohezhiguan*: "*Q*: The real [Emptiness] and the Mean are both called 'Truths,' [fine], but as to the Vulgar [Provisional Positing] within and without the realms of ordinary experience—well, since it's vulgar [and provisionally posited], why should it be called a 'Truth' at all? *A*: The Dilun scholars tell us of the two forms of dharma-nature. One is the dharma-nature qua events, because the nature has differentiations, and the second is the actual dharma-nature, because the nature is true and actual. These are just other names for the Two Truths. Since they're both called 'dharma-nature,' why should they not both be called 'Truths'? *Q*: In that case, can they both be called Nirvāṇa? *A*: A scripture says, 'When a poor man finds a jewel, up to when monkeys get some wine, these are all forms of the samādhi beyond thought, which is the worldly Nirvāṇa.'—this is the meaning of that passage. *Q*: If so, are both without impurities? *A*: The *śāstra* speaks of them as 'the worldly correct view, and the transworldly correct view.' *Q*: Then are both birthless [and deathless, i.e., eternal, free, pure, and joyous, the marks of the ultimate reality]? *A*: The sūtra says, ' There is no mark of difference between them'" (T46.24b–c). The sly affirmation of the purity and eternity of the worldly truth, and thus of all worldly dharmas, together with all the provisional forms of nirvāṇa (winning the lottery and getting drunk are cited as examples) as identical with the ultimate, are of course just the distinctive Tiantai doctrines that form the focus of this study.

16. T46.7a.

17. See *Fahuaxuanyi*, T46.55b.

18. Cf. Guanding, *Guanxinlun shu*: "*Q*: Since emptiness refutes provisional positing, and provisional positing refutes emptiness, and moreover the Mean refutes both emptiness and provisional positing, how can they function as one body? *A*: Even in the worldly concept of obstructive matter, the four great marks [earth, water, fire, and wind] come together to form one body; how much more so in the case of the numinous wisdom, where the three contemplations all refute one another and yet at the same time support each other, as the three virtues [*prajñā*, liberation, and Dharmakaya] forming the great nirvāṇa ? What is worth doubting here? And why? Since Emptiness refutes Provisional Positing, the Provisional Positing [that is left] has no [definite] mark; since Provisional Positing refutes Emptiness, the Emptiness [that is left] has no [definite] mark. Since the Mean refutes both Emptiness and Provisional Positing, there is no error of clinging to the two extremes; since the two functions refute the Mean, the Mean doesn't lose its ability to express both the blooming [of

the two extremes] and the barrenness [of the two extremes]. Since Emptiness comes to the aid of Provisional Positing, its upāyas have wisdom-explanations in them; since Provisional Positing comes to the aid of Emptiness, its wisdom has upāya-explanations; since the Mean comes to the aid of Emptiness and Provisional Positing, their two wisdoms are quiescent; since Emptiness and Provisional Positing come to the aid of the Mean, it constantly has its two functions, like the two birds [of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*] who always travel together. . . . Where one is refuted, all are refuted, so that all confusions are destroyed; where one is aided all are aided, so that all dharmas are brought to completion" (T46.615b).

19. T33.702c. This discussion of the seven levels of Two Truths (702c–703c) is the locus classicus in Zhiyi's own works for the basic content of the Three Truths (in the form of which the contents of the Two Truths are recast in a very summary fashion at T33.704c–5a) as they are understood in the Four Teachings. For an English translation, see Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien-t'ai Philosophy*.

20. T46.55b. Zhiyi goes on unequivocally to correlate the Provisional with upāya, Emptiness with the real, and the Mean with both. Just before the passage quoted here, Zhiyi says, "When I say, 'One dharma is all dharmas,' this refers to [Nāgārjuna's] 'all dharmas produced by causes and conditions,' and this is what we call 'provisional name,' and the contemplation of Provisional Positing. When I say 'All dharmas are one dharma,' [this refers to Nāgārjuna's] 'I say are themselves empty," the contemplation of Emptiness. When I say "Neither one nor all,' [this refers to Nāgārjuna's] 'This is the contemplation of the Middle Way.'" After the quoted passage about how each of these is reducible to the others, he goes on, "'All dharmas produced by causes and conditions' refers to the wisdom of upāya, the provisional wisdom of the types of teachings, which follows the emotional attachments of others. 'All dharmas are one dharma' and 'I say are themselves empty' refer to the wisdom of all, which speaks [one's own] wisdom. 'Neither one nor all' and 'This is also the meaning of the Middle Way' refer to the wisdom of all types, which is neither provisional nor ultimate. So by the same token, we can say, since one is provisional upāya, all are provisional upāya; since one is ultimate truth, all are ultimate truth; and also, all are neither provisional nor ultimate. This applies to everything, and it is this that we call the inconceivable three wisdoms." Note the way "Emptiness" is here referred to as "one dharma." This will be a key point later; even Emptiness, which here serves as the universal of universals, is merely a dharma, is itself a particular, is itself a provisional posit, to the extent that it is determinate at all, that is, to the extent that it is opposed to "the particular" as such.

21. This refers initially to "the Buddha Nature" (which in Tiantai is identical to the dharma-nature or the real-mark of all dharmas), but, for Zhili at least, this is a one-sided way of designating what could equally be called "the dog nature," "the dung-beetle nature," "the purgatory nature"—all these terms refer to the same thing, the unchangeable nature of all things.

22. Jizang defines "principle" (*li*) this way. See *Dasheng xuanlun*, T45.19a.

23. We are thus to regard any given dharma as (1) thoroughly negated (other-referenced, passive, dependent, reducible to something else) and also as (2) provisionally posited as a certain particular entity with specific characteristics and, at the same time, to see (3) the perfect harmony, indeed mutual implication, of these two views of the same dharma, a view that allows us to preserve the particular characteristics of this dharma as such but to see that this entity as such is the center and essence of everything else, a self-creative power, the one explanatory principle to which everything else can be reduced, availing itself of everything else (self-sufficient, independent, irreducibly what it is). Note also that in one sense Emptiness is to be conceived as something very axiologically negative and destructive, a thorough negation of all the beliefs of the worldings in the six paths and intimately tied to the basic teachings of suffering, impermanence and non-self. It is what "destroys" all views, all securities, all known or possible dharmas. As Zhanran says, "The Truth of Emptiness destroys all dharmas" (*min yiqiefa* 泯一切法; T46.473b). In the same text, Zhanran summarizes the other two truths as "establishing" (*li* 立) all dharmas (Provisional Positing) and "unifying"(*tong* 統) all dharmas (the Mean). This last characterization will be helpful when we consider the Mean more closely. Cf. also Zhiyi himself on the same topic in *Mohezhiguan* (e.g., T46.24b.) But Emptiness is also a straightforward, first-order value within the context of primitive (Two Vehicles) Buddhist practice (which stands in direct opposition to the value position of worldly life). Hence, the truth of emptiness is identified with the "real truth" (*zhendi* 眞諦), and fixation on Emptiness is generally referred to in Tiantai as "partiality toward the real truth" (*pian zhen* 偏眞) (i.e., at the expense of Provisional Positing, that is, lies of various kinds)—a disparaging epithet. The same problematic applies in reverse to the aspect of Provisional Positing: from the worldly perspective, it is what is positively valued, from the perspective of truth-seeking primitive Buddhist practice, it is identified with delusion (as quoted above) and thus anti-value.

24. T33.702c.

25. Their content is as follows:

a. The Tripiṭaka Teaching's version of the Two Truths: "The Conventional Truth holds that all things actually exist. The Ultimate Truth is to see the dissolution of these actually existing things."

b. The Common Teaching's version of the Two Truths: "The Conventional Truth holds that things exist in an illusory way. The Ultimate Truth is that this illusory existence is itself empty."

The next five forms, which introduce the concept of the Mean, represent all possible combinations of the other Two Teachings and the Common Teaching.

c. The Separate Teaching conceived in terms of the Common Teaching: "The Conventional Truth is that there is illusory existence. The Ultimate Truth is that this illusory existence is itself both empty and non-empty."

d. The Integrated Teaching conceived in terms of the Common Teaching: "The Conventional Truth is that there is illusory existence. The Ultimate Truth is that this illusory existence is itself both empty and non-empty, and all dharmas are reducible to this emptiness-and-non-emptiness."

e. The Separate Teaching proper: "The Conventional Truth includes both the claim that there is illusory existence and that this illusory existence is itself empty. The Ultimate Truth is that there is neither this existence nor this Emptiness." This is the teaching of the Exclusive Mean, also known as "Exclusive Principle."

f. The Integrated Teaching as picking up where the Separate Teaching left off: "The Conventional Truth includes both the claim that there is illusory existence and that this illusory existence is itself empty. The Ultimate Truth is that there is neither this existence nor this Emptiness, and that all dharmas are reducible to this 'neither existence nor Emptiness.'" This is the second understanding of "reducible" mentioned above: the Separate teaching holds that "non-emptiness is principle only, and to manifest this principle, it is necessary to practice various upāyas; thus they say, all dharmas [here, meaning mainly teachings, practices] ultimately lead to (*qu* 趣) non-emptiness" (T33.703b.). This is also what is known as the Exclusive Mean.

The seventh notion of the Two Truths is that of the Integrated Teaching proper and is described in detail below.

26. The same is true of the concept of the Mean introduced implicitly in alternative c in note 25 above. Those conceiving the case entirely according to the Common Teaching take "neither defiled nor non-defiled" (or "neither empty nor non-empty," i.e., any such paradoxical indication of the concept of the Mean) as a way of asserting the Emptiness of Emptiness: "When these people hear 'it is not defiled,' they take this as a negation of the conventional truth; when they hear 'nor is it non-defiled,' they understand it as a way of destroying attachment. That is, the practitioner, in following the undefiled, gives rise to attachments to this undefiled, such that when this following is interrupted, it becomes an affliction. By destroying this attachment [to non-defilement], he is thus able to return to true non-defilement." Here the teaching of the Mean fails to take root; it is understood as just another way of preserving the bias toward emptiness, but in a more thoroughgoing way. The teaching of "non-emptiness" is here merely a way of preserving the dominion of the teaching of Emptiness. Thus do practitioners of the Common Teaching take the teaching of the Mean, if they happen to hear it, and so, in alternative B in note 25, no Mean is established at all; it simply reduces back into another case of the Emptiness of all.

In the teaching of alternative C, in which the Separate Teaching of the Mean is established but still understood mainly in Common Teaching terms, the Mean is understood as "neither defiled nor non-defiled, thus negating the two extremes and revealing a separate principle of the Mean, which is then taken as the Ultimate Truth." The teaching of alternative D is that of those who, on hearing "neither de-

filed nor non-defiled," take it to mean "this negation per se of the two extremes is itself precisely the Mean [rather than a way of indicating some other thing that is neither this extreme nor that; the Mean *is* the state of 'being neither this nor that']. This Mean is the entire dharma-realm, its power and function are vast, it is equal to empty space, and thus 'all dharmas are reducible to' [this understanding of] neither defiled nor non-defiled."

27. Here the Chinese term *qu* is taken to mean mainly "going to"—all dharmas [teachings and practices] *lead to* the comprehension of this principle of the Mean. This is the Integrated teaching of "all is reducible to" as understood in terms of the Separate Teaching.

28. T33.703a.

29. T33.703b. This metaphor should be understood in terms of a similar mode of expression later in the same work: "One principle makes all the different upāyas, and these upāyas are just that one ultimate truth. . . . It is like the three grasses and two types of trees—they are all born from the one earth. . . . The foolish, not understanding this, say 'But the grasses and trees are made of atoms of the four elements, which are forever different from the earth itself,' but the wise understand that when the atoms of the four elements are produced, it is just transformations of the earth itself, and when they are destroyed, it is a returning to the earth—where are there any plants or trees that are not the earth itself?" (T.33.749c). That is, it may seem from the metaphor used for absolute oneness here and there (earth and plants, the wishing jewel, and its uses) still admits of considerable duality—as between substance and attributes, etc. But Zhiyi wants the metaphor understood in the sense specified here: the plants are themselves the substance of the earth in a particular shape. The same goes for the wishing jewel metaphor here, and thus for the metaphrand, the Ultimate and Conventional Truths.

30. See below for a detailed explanation of this term.

31. T33.705a.

32. T33.788a–9c.

33. This threefold analysis of Provisional Positing is adopted into Tiantai through Jizang from the *Chengshilun* 成實論.

34. Jizang says that the Śrāvakas are concerned mainly with the Provisional Positing by efficient cause, the Pratyeka-buddhas with the Provisional Positing by temporal series, and the bodhisattvas focus on the Provisional Positing by logical contrast and relativity. He specifies, importantly, that the superiority of this last contemplation rests on the facts that it is (1) universally applicable, even to imaginary theoretical constructs; (2) already freed of any suggestion of a concrete reference that might suggest a self-nature, and, most important, (3) it is *reversible*, i.e., the dependence of X on non-X is also the dependence of non-X on X, which cannot be said for the one-way causality of the other two types of Provisional Positing (see *Dasheng Xuanlun*, T45.18b–c) This reversibility may be viewed as a bridge to the

Tiantai truth of the Mean. Guanding calls the last form of Provisional Positing the entranceway to the Mahāyāna. There were in fact many more detailed divisions made, further specifying the types of the third category of positing. See Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, pp. 50–52.

35. Our ordinary consciousness takes present appearances as a prelude or sign of some real, which they will lead to or turn out to be or reveal; the expectation is that there is always more to appearance, some explorability or result coming from it—and this is indeed the case. But the naïve consciousness tacitly assumes that this other state is *not* itself a mere appearance in the same way, i.e., it is not something that itself will turn out to be otherwise, which presents itself only by concealing most of itself, and so on. Instead, it devalues the present impermanence by tacitly assuming a permanent reality *of which* it is the appearance. The first remedial upāya then must be a "pan-appearance," flat, depthless world picture: i.e., there are only appearances, no things, each appearance is just what it is, points to nothing beyond itself, as in Hīnayāna momentariness. But the next remedial upāya reverses us back to ordinary consciousness in a sense: here, nothing is what it appears, everything is a means to some other end, everything will turn out otherwise, including the end, or the "otherwise." "Appearance" is thus the structural nature of all being in precisely the sense that all appearing is the appearing of one surface of a greater whole, and this "pointing to the rest" is also an "appearance" in just this sense. It is never fully revealed, and the present concealment, too, is no less revealed than what will result from it. It is the tacit positing of the possibility of the result or end as something that will fully reveal itself and the means that destroys the depth of the present.

36. The standard Mādhyamika argument is generally made for this point. It can be summarized as follows:

a. If it were produced by itself, it would not have to be produced; production would be redundant and also endless.

b. If it were produced by another, it should be produced by all others, for all are alike in being other, unless there is something in the producers that is in some sense or other "the same" as the effect, in which case we are back in category a. Moreover, it is impossible to construe the sequential relation of cause between two othernesses; does the effect appear while the cause is still in existence? In that case, they would coexist, and the effect should be produced again. Does the cause disappear when the effect appears? What has disappeared cannot act as a cause. They can be neither in contact nor separated.

c. If produced due to both itself and another, it would have the faults of each of the previous two cases, rather than neither.

d. If it is due to neither itself nor another, it arises causelessly and thus should arise randomly at any time or place, but this is empirically not the case (observed consistency of the world).

This technique appears in almost all of Zhiyi's works, but at greatest length per-

haps in the *Mohezhiguan*, T46.17c–18c and 59b–86a (the sections on the four samādhis and on "universally refuting all dharmas").

37. The ten triads are also discussed in the *Fahuaxuanyi*, T.33.744a.

38. These "three forms of Buddha nature" are supposed to come from the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. However, an examination of the relevant passage from that scripture (T12.530.a, b.) reveals that, as Chen Yingshan (*Tiantai yuanqi zhongdao shixiang lun*, pp. 330–31) points out, only two types of cause are really indicated, and moreover these correspond much more to the old pan-Buddhist "cause" and "condition" pair than to what is made of this idea in Tiantai. From this it would seem that this concept is an invention of Zhiyi's, with little scriptural basis, trumped up from fragments in various scriptures so as to correlate with the Three Truths (indeed, the same could be said of the Three Truths themselves). This is one more point for Zhiyi's creativity and one more strike against his faithfulness to the scriptural tradition.

39. See Wang Zhiyuan, *Songchu Tiantai Foxue kuimao*, pp. 16–25, for a fuller discussion of these ten trinities.

40. See *Fahuaxuanyi*, T33.693b.

41. These can be broken down into the first three, sometimes four, which are unabashedly evil, and the other three, or two, which represent the realm of worldly morality that negates the animalistic, hellish, greedy, and violent prior realms.

42. Alternatively, however, the Six Realms of ordinary experience are sometimes directly correlated to the Truth of Provisional Positing, the Two Vehicles to Emptiness, the bodhisattvas to the Exclusive Mean, and the Buddhas to the Nonexclusive Mean. It is important to recall this flexibility in all the Tiantai categories and their application; it is a direct consequence of the Tiantai notion of truth as nothing but Provisional Positing.

43. T46.17b.

44. T33.697a. See also 697b, where Zhiyi adds that *miao* is another word for "cutting off" per se, or for "absoluteness" (*jue* 絕).

45. Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien-t'ai Philosophy*, p. 127.

46. I am here simplifying the various levels of "absolute" specified by Zhiyi for each of the Four Teachings, for the sake of the simplicity and clarity of this exposition.

47. T33.696b–697c. The same point is developed by Zhiyi with respect to the three forms of Calming and Contemplation, the last being the "Absolute," in the *Mohezhiguan*, T46.21c–22c.

48. T.46.883a–b.

49. We have here an answer to Schopenhauer's complaint about pantheism: he said he agreed with it, except that it really said nothing. If you took away the emotional associations with the term God, to say everything is God just means that everything is everything. Thus, what pantheism really means is that the awe and love that were formerly accorded to God should instead be accorded to the world. This

Schopenhauer rejected (see Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, 2: 640–46.) But the Tiantai position is that these are two steps in one process, the only way to sanctify the world. First, the world must be contrasted with God, so to speak, so that the awe and love can be established. Then, this contrast is broken down: God is the world. Now we have these notions of value in hand and can apply them to the world.

50. T46.588b-c.

51. T46.880a. The question here is posited by Zhili himself, and the answer is given by Renyue, Zhili's right-hand man and later convert to the Shanwai position. But we can regard these examination questions and answers as accurate representations of Zhili's views, not only because the students were obviously reciting by rote what their teacher wished to hear, but also because their inclusion in this text suggests that they were final versions of answers with which Zhili was somewhat satisfied. Indeed, these questions are helpful both in bringing to light the doctrines Zhili regarded as most important and most difficult and in pinpointing how they had to be answered in order to satisfy him.

52. T25.60a–61b.

53. T25.60a.

54. T25.61b.

55. T46.34a.

56. I take the *jue* in this phrase to be cognate with 抉, as is consistent with the earliest uses of this graph, meaning "to clear away obstructions, as in directing water so that it can flow freely," or as "downward flowing, (like) water" (per the *Shuowen* definition)—also meaning to overflow boundaries or even simply to open.

57. T46.34c.

58. T46.7b.

59. See Hansen, *Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought*, *passim*.

60. T33.691b.

61. T33.700b.

62. T33.690b–c.

63. T33.693.

64. This structure adumbrates the procedure Zhiyi uses in every section of the *Fahuaxuanyi* and his other main works. First, he makes a distinction, allowing the contrast to define the two poles, usually a hierarchical contrast or a straight value contrast, and then at the end he "opens the provisional to reveal the real," showing that actually all lower or negatively valued parts are identical to the higher or positive part and have been all along.

65. The term "focus" here may be regarded as a rough translation of terms like *zhangxian* 彰顯 and *xianlu* 顯露 lit. becoming manifest or apparent, as opposed to *mingfu* 冥伏 darkening and submerging (see. e.g., *Fahuaxuanyi*, T33.744a, and *Mohezhiguan*, T46.27b). Again, as in the *Laozi*, we have here a dialectic of visibility. But

all things are present at all times, with some more or less apparent. The two terms suggests a raised and spotlighted area onto which elements ascend in turn, although all are standing around in the dark, or, to use Qian Mu's metaphor quoted elsewhere in this book, perhaps the part of a floating ball that sticks up above the waterline and is thus visible. However, the further specifications made about how this process is to be understood in the Tiantai school justify conceiving of such a change of appearance not as an actual movement or change but merely as a shift in focus; this should become apparent as we proceed.

66. *Fahuaxuanyi*, T33.693c. Zhiyi goes on to align this with the Three Truths: "The ten, considered in their multiplicity as each depending on the whole dharma-realm, are (1) all the realm of Emptiness, since that which depends follows that on which it is dependent; (2) all are the realm of Provisional Positing, since the ten realms are separate and divided; and (3) all are the realm of the Mean, since each of the ten is itself precisely the whole dharma-realm."

67. Ten realms each including all the others = 100, times the ten thusnesses = 1000, times the triad of *skhandas* (individuals), sentient beings (environing beings), and physical environment for each = 3000.

68. T46.597b–c.

69. See *Mohezhiguan*, T46.63c–64a.

70. Technically, there is said to be a primary arisal and a secondary arisal, a primary persistence and a secondary persistence, etc., hence yielding "eight" marks rather than four.

71. T46.54a.

72. At least in the Shanjia version of the tradition; this is of course one of the great points of controversy in the Shanjia/Shanwai debates. The former say that any reference point is equally the includer of all quiddities; the latter say this is only true directly of the Mind and indirectly, through the medium of the Mind, of all other dharmas.

73. T46.578b–c.

74. The extent to which any form of explanation of one thing in terms of another, any interpretation of phenomena at any level whatsoever, inevitably brings with it some kind of "all is X" claim, at least for the limited field of its metaphrand, is well worth considering. It may well be that the only way to avoid this omnicentric conclusion is to eschew all explanation whatsoever, returning to the old Abidharmic notion of momentariness, where each appearance is just itself, totally unconnected to anything else. And yet the historical connection of these two extreme possibilities is itself an intriguing clue to what may be a necessary relationship between them.

75. The Tiantai notions of the four meritorious properties of nirvāṇa—eternity, bliss, freedom, and purity—as simultaneous assertions of their opposites, are established on the same basis; not as a further demand for faith in eternity, but as the re-

moval of a previous faith, of the clinging delusion that all entities must be either eternal or not-eternal.

76. See Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, pp. 83–5, 114–19, and *passim*.

77. Other accounts are possible. Chen Yingshan, for example, contends that the importance given to the notion of "nature inclusion," as opposed to Huayan "nature origination," is really the work of Zhanran, and constitutes a bit of a distortion of Zhiyi's thought. See in particular her critique of the attribution of the doctrine of inherent evil to Zhiyi, in *Tiantai yuanqi zhongdao shixiang lun*, pp. 366–403.

78. Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism*, pp. 157–65.

79. The text of this work appears at T45.672–83, with Chengguan's commentary.

80. T46.706c.

81. This might be a convenient place to express an opinion on the old question of what really separates the Tiantai and Huayan schools, which have so much in common, especially in the case of early Huayan (i.e., pre-Chengguan, and certainly pre-Zongmi), most notably the omnicentric notion that the whole is identical to each part, that one is all. My view is that the opinions expressed in the works attributed to Dushun and Zhiyan, the first two patriarchs of Huayan, are in most senses doctrinally barely distinguishable from those of Zhiyi, with the crucial exception indicated in the preceding paragraphs; if anything, Zhiyi's emphasis on mind as the object of contemplation stands out, which is ironic in light of the fact that the real difference between late (post-Zongmi) Huayan and late (Shanjia) Tiantai is that the former puts the notion of mind in a much more exalted and central position. Zongmi's Huayan is far away not only from Zhiyi, in my opinion, but also from early Huayan, although it does bear the hidden structural similarity elaborated here. This perhaps made their confluence unsurprising. But there are still important differences in the presentation and emphasis even of the early Huayan masters and Zhiyi. I will here mention two points. The first is the manner in which the self-enclosed dialectic of the Three Truths specifically focuses on the relation between a posit and its negation, X and non-X. In Huayan, the focus is on the relation between X and "the whole" per se. Of course, the content of "non-X" for any X is identical to the rest of the whole universe, whatever exists that is not this X, the whole rest of what there is. In this sense the two schools are identical, but the negative symmetrical form of the Tiantai equation has profound and far-reaching implications. This is seen in the use of the term "three thousand" instead of "the whole dharma realm" in most cases, especially in post-Zhanran Tiantai, most notably in Zhili. The inclusion in this term of mutually negating pairs of subjectivities is important for the doctrine of inherent evil. The second point that distinguishes the two schools is even more crucial; as I said above, the concept of upāya stands at the very center of the Tiantai edifice and influences every conception therein. The relation between the realms, as noted above, is understood in Zhiyi according to the notion of "opening the provisional to reveal the real," which is for him the highest

teaching of Buddhism, the teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra*. This fundamental metaphor changes the nature of the whole story. Thus it is not merely polemical claptrap (although of course it is *also* that!) when Tiantai writers allege that the Huayan school tells only of the position of enlightenment, the way the world "really is," how it is seen by the enlightened and hence the truth about it (mutual interpenetration, all is one, etc.), in spite of the fact that Huayan writers do not neglect to mention upāya and the relation between delusion and enlightenment as another example of interpenetration. Tiantai is first and foremost about upāya, how it is opened to reveal the real—from this comes the notion of all dharmas inherently included in each dharma. Huayan is constructed the other way around; it takes Zhiyi's insight about interpenetration (and that of the scriptures, of course) and makes it the first principle; this then applies also to the relation between upāya and ultimate truth, among other things. These two structure yield differing results, the most notable of course being that concerning the status of evil. Again, once Zongmi's Heze-flavored version of Huayan takes the stage, and Zhili sets up a Tiantai orthodoxy aimed specifically at rebuking the Shanwai masters influenced by it, the two schools become much further apart than Zhiyi and "Dushun" had been.

82. The full title of this text in Chinese is *Dafoding rulai miyin xiuzheng liaoyi zhupusa wanxing shou lengyan jing*, and it appears at T19.105–55. Later Tiantai texts often cite it as the *Foding jing*. As has been shown by Mochizuki Shinkō, this text was produced in China, purportedly translated by Pramiti. It was probably meant to appear as a longer, more complete translation of the Sanskrit *Śūraṅgama-samādhi sūtra* translated by Kumārajīva (T15.629–45).

83. See, e.g., *Dasheng xuanlun*, T45.40b-c. For a discussion, see Yinshun, *Zhongguo Chanzong shi*, pp. 122–23; and Penkower, "T'ien-t'ai During the T'ang Dynasty," pp. 459–62.

84. For several Southern school denials of the Buddha-nature of insentient beings, see Yinshun, *Zhongguo Chanzong shi*, p. 123. Some of these come from relatively late sources, and their attribution to Mazu's disciples (Baizhang and Huihai) is not to be taken literally. Nonetheless, their repeated presence in the sayings of Southern school masters, from Huineng to Shenhui to Baizhang to Linji, and their absence from the sayings attributed to the Niutou and Shitou lines, is surely significant.

85. *Heze Shenhui Chanshi yulu* (in *Zhongguo Fojiao sixiang ziliao xuanpian*, vol. 4, item 30, p. 91).

86. See *Lengqie shizi ji*, T85.1289b, 1290a, and *passim*. See also Penkower, "T'ien-t'ai During the T'ang Dynasty," pp. 505–7, n152.

87. See Yinshun, *Zhongguo Chanzong shi*, pp. 121–22.

88. See Zongmi's *Chanyuan zhuquanji duxu*, T48.400c, 402c. For several other contemporaneous inscriptions and other evidence, taken from the *Quantangwen*, of this exclusion of the Shitou line from the Southern school, see Yinshun, *Zhongguo Chanzong shi*, pp. 322–25.

89. Yampolsky, *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch*, p. 98.

90. Penkower, "T'ien-t'ai During the T'ang Dynasty," p. 382.

91. T48.343c, 339a-b, 340b-c, and *passim*.

92. T48.341b-c: "When the nature is present, the body and mind exist; when it departs, body and mind are destroyed."

93. T48.338c-339a: "If a single thought is cut off, the dharma-body is separated from the physical body. . . . If a single thought is cut off, one dies, and receives another body elsewhere...the physical body is a dwelling, which cannot be taken refuge in."

94. See, e.g., T48.338b.

95. See, e.g., T48.344c-45a: "The Buddha is in my own mind, and this self-Buddha is the true Buddha. . . . If one can see that the true [Buddha] resides in one's own body, then this possession of the true is the cause for becoming a Buddha."

96. T47.496c.

97. *Zhenzhou Linji huizhao chanshi yulu*, T47.497b–c.

98. For Huineng's discussion of "the Three Bodies of Buddha with your own flesh body" in the Dunhuang version, see T48.339a.

99. See, e.g., T47.499b–c, where Linji criticizes the doctrine of the teaching schools that the Dharmakāya is the substance and the other two the function, saying instead that "the Dharmakāya does not preach the dharma." Here as in Huineng, body means only mind: "Where there is a body, it is not the substance of awareness; only that which is without marks is the true form [of the Buddha]." Cf. T47.501c, where both Buddha and dharma are defined solely in terms of the mind's radiance, and T47. 497b, where all Three Bodies of the Buddha are likewise redefined as aspects of the mind—a moment of pure radiance of mind, or of non-differentiating thought, etc. In the same place, Linji goes on to define Buddha as *jingming* 精明, a soul-like radiance and awareness, and then speaks of "cutting off the heads of the Sambhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya Buddhas" (*zuo duan bao hua fo tou* 坐斷報化佛頭).

100. T46.786a.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. They *derive* from enlightenment because they are among the upāya taught by enlightened beings to transform beings, which, according to the *Lotus Sūtra* as read by the Tiantai tradition, are provisional truths that turn out to be ultimate truths; Bodhisattva practices are ultimate truth as expressed in relation to transforming others. They *lead to* enlightenment because they are the means by which one works toward one's own enlightenment; buddhahood is ultimate truth as expressed in relation to transformation of oneself. Under the intersubjective premises of Tiantai thought, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, transformation of others and self-transformation are identical.

104. T46.786a.

105. T46.783b.

106. T46.786a.

107. Andō Toshio, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, p. 121–24.

108. Ibid., p. 139.

109. Ibid., p. 142.

110. Ibid., pp. 142–43.

111. Ibid., p. 143.

112. Ibid., pp. 144–45. Deshao, however, appears to have been highly critical of the Chan claim to have a "special transmission outside the teachings," as can be seen from *Shimen zhengtong*, juan 5; and Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, pp. 144–46.

113. Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, pp. 146–47.

114. Ibid., p. 144.

115. Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism*, p. 7.

116. Ibid., p. 157.

117. The direct impetus of the debates hinged on the long and short versions of Zhiyi's *Jinguangmingxuanyi*, which seemed to imply different attitudes toward the contemplation of the mind. The long versions (embraced by the Shanjia) called for detailed contemplation of all the deluded phenomena of mind, whereas the shorter versions recommended, for those of highest ability, the direct contemplation of the true mind, ignoring the deluded phenomena. See the account in the *Fozutongji*, juan 8 (T.49.192b); and Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, pp. 147–223.

Chapter 5

1. That is, I am reading Zhiyi and Zhanran through the lens of Ẓhili's reading, as I understand it. My stress is less on what I think they thought than on what I think Zhili thought they thought; the citations from their works are meant to indicate the focal points that could serve as the supports for Zhili's understanding of them, as I understand it.

2. *Fahuaxuanyi*, T33.683a.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. T46.702c.

6. The term *trace* apparently derived from its extensive use in Six Dynasties *xuanxue* ("abstruse learning," i.e., metaphysics), particularly the work of Guo Xiang, where it has approximately the same meaning, i.e., the way something or someone influences something outside itself (its "being-for-others"). It is indicative of the philosophical differences between Guo Xiang and the Tiantai thinkers that in Guo's thought, these "traces" are in fact given a purely negative value and bear no intrinsic relation to the self-so from which they derive (even the self-knowledge of this self-so

is classified by Guo as a form of trace, as an other-relation.) For a full discussion, see my "The Self-so and Its Traces in the Thought of Guo Xiang."

7. T46.704a. On the controversies arising from Zhanran's ambiguous mode of expression in passages such as this, see the section on the Shanjia/Shanwai controversies below. The original context for this claim is Zhanran's assertion that this mutual inclusion in one another (the fact that the contents of each are the same, but focused and organized differently) is precisely what makes *ganying*, the salvific interaction of the Buddhas with sentient beings, operative in every interaction, possible, a point discussed in detail below. It is also what distinguishes an intersubjective relation in general from any other type of relation (i.e., an objective relation between two inert things or a chemical reaction in which two agents act as mutual catalysts). The two perceptual worlds include the contents of one another, which alone is what makes the interaction possible. This sense that the content included by both is the whole perceptual and conceptual world in which each is situated has often been regarded as characteristic of the intersubjective relation in general. Cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 54, "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being" and, perhaps more pertinently, p. 59: "When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consist of things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described. . . . Neighborless and seamless, he is You and fills the firmament. Not as if there were nothing but he; but everything else lives in *his* light." Whether or not Zhanran would take exception to the final qualifier, it is clear that Buber is pointing here to a sense that the encountered other forms a center of the world that in some sense pulls everything into its own orbit, and that what distinguishes the intersubjective relation as such is this annulment of the sense of being one part among many; to encounter another person is to encounter not that person as one part of the whole of existence but, rather, the whole of existence qua that person.

8. Indeed, the use of the famous "Three Thousand" 三千 as a way of designating the totality of what is may be regarded as a way of making clear that the universe is not to be conceived as a collection of discrete objects spread out in space but includes also every possible deluded perception of every possible object and the mutual perception of perceivers. By using this formula to indicate all that is, the intersubjective relations among the various dharma-realms, including the responses of the bodhisattvas and Buddhas to the beings in the six lower paths, is built into the very definition of reality itself. This is not necessarily the case if we just say, as in Huayan, "all" or "the whole" (*yiqie* 一切), which might be conceived as an objective totality consisting of a collection of objects laid out side by side or at least embraceable in one particular subjective view from one particular point of view. In contrast, the term "Three Thousand" has built into it the subjective views of the deluded

beings in purgatory, in the human realm, in the two vehicles, etc., as well as their views of each other.

9. T46.718a.

10. Indeed, we might way that this is what differentiates the successive contemplation of the Three Truths of the Separate Teaching from the simultaneous grasp of all three sides in the Integrated Teaching "in one moment of thought." Any mechanistic or analytic addition of these three "aspects" to one another would find this demand that all three contradictory thoughts be entertained simultaneously simply incoherent. This problem is also raised by Ng Yu-kwan, *T'ien-t'ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika*, pp. 144–45; Ng attempts to solve it by positing the Three Truths as three "aspects" of the Middle Way Buddha Nature, which, although a step in the right direction, does not go far enough; the intersubjective focus provides a more satisfying solution to this problem. The three must form aspects of a whole that is only afterward analyzed into three parts, for pedagogical convenience, as Zhiyi often repeats (although, recall that pedagogical convenience here is also of course "part" of the ultimate, and hence the ultimate in its entirety). Similarly, for example, Hegel claims the concept of "Becoming" can be analyzed as a combining of the opposite concepts of Pure Being and Pure Nonbeing—and yet to have the thought "Becoming," we need not entertain the two other concepts in turn; the two opposites are grasped as one immediate, concrete whole in the more complex and "concrete" concept. I would claim that the direct apprehension of any object or event as something presented provisionally by a bodhisattva who is identical to me, without knowing it and without effort, in order to enlighten me, and simultaneously something that I am presenting to enlighten him qua benighted sentient being is what is analyzed later into the three aspects of empty, provisionally posited, and the Mean. Readers can do the math for themselves, equipped with the Three Tracks and the mutual immanence of the Three Thousand Quiddities. Emptiness refers to the inner unfixity and transcendence of all the agents involved, Positing to the provisional specifics of their deceptive compassionate act, and the Mean to the identity of these two.

11. Cf. Daniel B. Stevenson, "The Problematic of the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* and T'ien-t'ai History," in Donner and Stevenson, *The Great Calming and Contemplation*, p. 76, fn.: "Zhiyi pointedly takes the notion of *kan-ying* [*ganying*] beyond its traditional unilateral sense in which the 'stimulus' is initiated by the devotee and the 'response' follows rather mechanistically from the deity. Through the notion of a 'resonantal or symbiotic interaction of stimulus and response' (*kan-ying tao-chiao*), Zhiyi makes the case for a mysterious immanence of the Buddha dharma itself working undetected within the manifest spiritual efforts or 'stimuli' of the devotee. Various scholars have sought to locate in this concept a theological basis for Zhiyi's emphasis on ritual veneration and confession." Stevenson (p. 92) notes that "on the basis of his peculiar reading of the T'ien-t'ai notion of the inseparability of Buddha, mind and

sentient being, Chih-li advocated a unique 'resonance of stimulus and response' (*kan-ying tao-chiao*) that operated between contemplation of mind and contemplation of the Buddha." The present exposition may be considered an elaboration and extension of Stevenson's insightful comments on this matter.

12. T33.749b–c.

13. Ibid., c. This specification that the responses "of the four sagely realms" (Two Vehicles, bodhisattvas, Buddhas) are identical to the "marvelous" response of the Buddha may seem to leave open the possibility that, in any case, the "responses" between beings in the lower six realms are not identical to the marvelous response, in spite of the parallelism with the previous claim that all stimuli are the Buddha's own. As we shall see, however, Zhili makes it explicit that this is to be understood as meaning that every response, of whatever kind and in whatever realm, is also the marvelous response, that every stimulus is all responses and vice versa.

14. T46.704a.

15. A term I use advisedly: "the whole" here must not be conceived as the opposite of "a part," or as any particular determination whatsoever, which would always have to be the opposite of something to be determinate to the imagination.

16. Ra, "The T'ien-t'ai Philosophy of Non-Duality," p. 161.

17. T34.892b.

18. T34.920b.

19. See, e.g., *Mohezhiguan*, T46.55a: "The worldly truth is identical to the ultimate truth. You should know that you can be constantly speaking while being constantly silent, and vice versa, constantly transcending both and constantly including both, for destruction is precisely positing, and vice versa. . . . If one grasps this meaning, every proposition is acceptable and none is acceptable."

20. As Zhiyi says, "When a moment of consciousness arises . . . both the sense organ and its object are each in themselves the entire dharma-realm. . . . When a moment of consciousness arises from the meeting of sense organ and object, the organ is a treasury of all 84,000 dharmas, and so is the object, and so is the moment of consciousness that so arises. The whole Buddha dharma–realm faces the whole dharma-realm, and thereby the whole dharma-realm arises. Each one, the faced and the facer, is the entire Buddha-realm" (T46.9a). When the sense organ encounters an object, it is a case of the whole dharma-realm (with all its inherent intersubjectivity, and the relations of merciful enlightener and deluded sufferer, built into the term "Three Thousand") encountering the whole realm, yielding a moment of consciousness that is also the whole.

21. T34.891b.

22. See, e.g., the story of Bodhisattva Never-disparage, who says to all he meets, "You are practicing the bodhisattva path and will become a Buddha" (T9.50c). Zhiyi quotes this passage to illustrate the most radical implications of his doctrine of opening the provisional to reveal the real: "To open the provisional to reveal the

real—that is to see the Middle Way in every dharma. Thus the text says, 'What you are all practicing—that is the bodhisattva path. . . .'—thus there is no need to change your path or your direction in order to seek the ultimate truth. The marvel may thus be seen precisely in the coarse" (T33.740b). Cf. also the Buddha's revelation to Śāriputra that he is mistaken in thinking himself a Śrāvaka, that in fact he long ago made the bodhisattva vow, and therefore is now just assuming this Śrāvaka form, and its forgetfulness, as one of the transformations adopted in his practice of the bodhisattva path—which he has forgotten himself to be practicing (T9.11b).

23. In fact all Tiantai hermeneutics assume this principle: any token means Three Thousand different things at once. The tragic aspect of this absolute optimism is developed in the theory of the evil inherent in the Buddha-nature, especially as Zhili presents it: the Buddha's acts are also rape and murder, and he is always equally on the murderer's path, just as the murder is always on the bodhisattva path—the only difference being that the Buddha knows himself to be on all paths at once, this being the special nature of the path known as the Buddha path.

24. T46.881b. This is Renyue's answer. Ziren answers the same question at T46.883c, making more or less the same point: "Neither of the two senses can be clung to exclusively; the two must ride upon each other. . . . If you cling to the position that it's all done by the karma of sentient beings and not the transformations of the Buddhas, then the Buddhas have no merit in liberating beings. If you cling to the position that it's all done by the transformations of the Buddhas and not the karma of beings, you fall into the heretical view of spontaneity [no cause and effect, no moral retribution, etc]. For this reason, the transformations of the Buddhas come from the power of the karma of sentient beings, and the power of the karma of sentient beings is completely a transformation of the Buddhas."

25. Cf. Zhili 's response to more or less this same question, posed by the Japanese monk Genshin: "When we're talking about how good and evil causes bring about the results of suffering or joy, then we say it is done by sentient beings and not the Buddhas. But when we talk about the same event in the sense of the use of suffering and joy to frustrate and receive sentient beings, then we say it is a manifestation of the Buddhas and not done by sentient beings. This is because it was needful to use suffering to transform sentient beings, and thus the Buddhas did it. It is like when the former kings applied punishments—this was not done to make the people suffer, but was an example of their benevolence. The Buddhas are like this too. To frustrate and receive them, they force themselves to manifest in this way. Moreover, although the sentient beings live in a realm of suffering and joy, they are not free and at ease there, whereas the Buddhas dwell within it and are able to transform it, thus we say it is from the Buddhas. Moreover, the Buddhas are sentient-being-Buddhas, and sentient beings are Buddha-sentient-beings. Thus it can be said, With every moment of experience in the minds of sentient beings, all the Buddha's are constantly realizing the Truth, whereas within the minds of all the Buddhas, all sentient

beings are constantly creating new karma. Thus we know that if we are talking about sentient beings, then at that time everything can be categorized as sentient beings; if we are talking about Buddhas, then at that time everything can be categorized as Buddha. For this reason the [*Lotus*] scripture says, 'Now everything in these three realms of existence belongs to me, and all sentient beings within them are my children'" (T46.888b). Here Zhili makes the mutual inclusion of the two sides of the dialogue most explicit; if we wish to speak from the point of view that focuses on sentient beings, it's all sentient beings, whereas from the point of view that focuses on the Buddhas, the whole belongs to the Buddha side.

26. Thus Zhili can also say, "It must be understood that there is nothing the practitioner sees which is not the power of the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata's appraisal of one's capacities is thus never off by even a hair's breadth. Whatever is needful to be manifested is manifested" (T37.224a). Zhili understands the Buddhist rituals in the same way: "When worshipping the Buddha, one must know deeply that the essence of the Buddha is not separate from one's own mind, that they are the same source of awakening, perfectly illuminating all dharmas. The Buddhas are enlightened to this and thus give rise to compassion for those who are of the same essence as themselves, while sentient beings provisionally take on various forms of delusion. The compassion and the suffering are matched to one another, which is how stimulus and response (*ganying*) comes about" (T46.868c).

27. As Zhiyi says, "Good connects to [serves as stimulus to the response of] the great love; evil connects to the great compassion" 善關於大慈，惡關於大悲 (T46.869c).

28. As Zhiyi says, it is "like a round cover fitting a round base, matching perfectly" (T34.891a).

29. T46.47a.

30. T46.872c.

31. T46.781a.

32. T46.784c.13–30.

33. Zhili makes this point about Avalokiteśvara: "Avalokiteśvara has realized the dharma-nature of evil and thus is free and at ease within evil. This is why he can freely and effortlessly respond to all difficulties experienced by sentient beings everywhere. The essential point is that all living beings and their environments are Avalokiteśvara's marvelous body and marvelous mind. All sentient beings create difficulties for themselves there within the sagely mind and matter; even the three types of karma that seek help are Avalokiteśvara himself. For this reason as soon as a stimulus appears, the response occurs immediately. If you constantly contemplate in this way, how could you fail to benefit all things together with Avalokiteśvara?" (T34.956c). This last rhetorical question points to the reversibility and performative twist to be discussed in a moment.

34. T46.782c.

35. It might be objected that this "inherence in each other," where the other is reducible to an element in the self and simultaneously the self is reducible to an element in the other, so that neither is ultimately reducible to the other, still undermines the most basic feature of our anxiety-ridden relations with others in a concrete intersubjective relation: the sense of unknowability of the other, and especially of the way the other views and objectifies us, the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the other's attitude and treatment of us, so vividly and convincingly analyzed, for example, in the section on "Being for Others" in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (pp. 301–556). But the general premise for the whole theory here is the "ungraspability" (*bukede* 不可得) of all dharmas whatsoever, which means, among other things, their ultimate unknowability and indeterminability. In Tiantai this means not that they are ultimately or really a blank but that they are not ultimately even blank or not blank, and in fact that any determination made about them always falls out its own bottom into its opposite, and even the opposite of the dyad of it and its opposite, and so on. To be seen as a Buddha sees you is to be seen in every possible way at once, so that he always sees you also as the opposite of what you would like to be seen as, what you seem to yourself to really be, and so on. Indeed, this also implies that anytime you are misunderstood by other people, they are, to the extent that they are unknowing bodhisattvas viewing you, seeing something true about you, an aspect of yourself of which you were heretofore ignorant. Every idiotic misapprehension they have about you is the truth. The Buddha in your own mind is a concept of a viewer who views you thus, i.e., who from the standpoint of your own self-knowledge gets you all wrong, objectifies you not only as your body and your past as against your pure inner uncertain subjectivity, as Sartre would have it, but even as every other possible form of objectivity. This, it seems to me, accounts for the eternal and constitutive element of anxiety and disparity, the split and alienation, in the relation that makes it still genuinely intersubjective.

36. Cf. Zhili's extensive treatment of this question, in his subcommentary to Zhiyi 's comment on the statement, "This mind makes the Buddha, this mind is the Buddha" from the *Foshuoguanwuliangshoufojing* (Visualization of Amitāyus sūtra). Zhili takes this as indicating that the Buddha, like any other particular dharma, can be exclusively characterized neither as created by practice (*xiu* 修) nor inherent in the nature of things (*xing* 性), and thus it is equally true to say that it is created by practice or that it is inherent in the nature of things, by the familiar Tiantai principle of "the non-duality of nature and practice" (see T37.220b). Indeed, this self-verifying performativity of the concept of the Buddha, Tiantai's pragmatic equivalent of the ontological argument, can perhaps be viewed as a doctrinal basis for the Tiantai emphasis on Pure Land practices of reciting the name and visualizing the body and environment of Amitabha Buddha, for by thus thinking that there exists somewhere an all-seeing "Buddha" who sees us thinking that he exists, the Buddha we have always been is made to exist.

37. Graham Parkes (*Composing the Soul*, pp. 282–89) sees a similar idea operating in Nietzsche, and even in the Platonic Socrates.

38. *Mohezhiguan*, T45.85a.

39. See T46.619a. The term is used in the course of a discussion that amply illustrates the intersubjective situation existing within one's own mind: "'Keep the company of wise guides.' This means to constantly contemplate the four saintly realms in your own mind. The realms of the Two Vehicles have 84,000 real-dharmas of the transcendent practice of Emptiness, contemplated by 84,000 conventionally-designated Śravakas. The bodhisattva-realm has 84,000 bodhisattvas, and the Buddha-realm 84,000 Buddhas. . . . This is to focus on the crowd of sages existing within one's own mind. Next, contemplate the destruction of ignorance. This means to see that the nine deluded realms existing within your own mind are identical to the Buddha-realm there. . . . Externally, request that all the Buddhas turn the wheel of dharma to deliver sentient beings, while internally, intensify contemplation of the mind; as the Buddha preaches the dharma, all sentient beings, both internal and external, receive the benefit of dharma. . . . Externally, feel sympathetic joy for the virtues of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and even for the finite goods of ordinary people; internally, feel sympathetic joy for the virtue of the four saintly crowds [existing within your mind]. 'Transferring Merit': This means, externally, to transfer the goods practiced by three kinds of karma of both ordinary and sagely beings toward the Buddha's enlightenment; and internally, to transfer the goods of the nine realms toward the result of the Buddha realm existing within your mind. Five, 'Vows': Externally, this means to vow that all sentient beings see their Buddha nature; and internally, to vow that the sentient beings [known as deluded] mental objects quickly return to their original purity" (Guanding, *Guanxinlun shu*, T46.619a).

40. This entire system is possible only because of the specific conception of the content of this enlightenment, inherited from primitive Buddhism: namely, that all dharmas are unsatisfactory, impermanent, and empty of self. Anger teaches this by causing pain, by vanishing, by being causally conditioned. The moral imperative also teaches this; it, too, causes pain, vanishes, and is causally conditioned. Everything teaches this, and thus everything is a bodhisattva, and everything, sentient or insentient, as Zhanran would later establish, will thus attain buddhahood.

41. Again, psychoanalytic parallels suggest themselves here—for in that field as well, relatedness to oneself is also considered to always already be mediated by the internalized view of some other. To put my meaning more plainly, self-indulgence may be viewed not simply as a withdrawal from all interaction into some pre-social flow of impulse and gratification, but as some kind of message to some virtual other: this could be defiant, could aim to please or show off, could wish to cause pain by self-destructing, but it can only have meaning to oneself if it is conceived of as having meaning to some imagined other.

42. According to this point of view, even this grammar, as a force of communication in a given social group that creates all sorts of determinations, is simultaneously a product of deluded karma and a force of compassionate intersubjectivity, and all the distortions that it creates are themselves salvific upāya.

43. See *Zhiyaochao*, T46.715b, for Zhili's famous claim that "Even without delusion, the distinctions exist."

44. The general structure of these formulas may be seen, for example, in Zhili's description of the *ganying* activities of Avalokiteśvara, famed for his transformative virtuosity: "Avalokiteśvara's responses appear to the sentient beings that exist within his own mind, and sentient beings' trigger-situations stimulate the Avalokiteśvara that exists within their own minds" (T34.938a). Or again, in the *Guanyinyishuji*: "Each is the entire dharma-realm, every one integrates and interpenetrates everything. Sentient beings stimulate the other Buddhas existing in their own minds, and all Buddhas respond to the other sentient beings existing within their own minds" (T34.956a).

45. T46.719a.

46. T46.718a.

47. T46.718b.

48. For a more detailed discussion of my understanding of this issue, see Ziporyn, "Anti-Chan Polemics in Post-Tang Tiantai."

49. *Xuzangjing*, 100: 111a.

50. Ibid., p. 121b.

51. Ibid., pp. 134b–35a.

52. I translate in accord with the interpretation offered in Kedu's *Shibuermen zhiyaochao xiangjie*, in *Xuzangjing*, 100, pp. 433–35.

53. T46.716b.

54. T46.703b.

55. *Xuzangjing*, 100, p. 130b.

56. T46.712c–713a.

57. T46.719a.

58. T46.704b.

59. Zhili gives one of the most striking descriptions of this situation in his answers to a Chan monk named Tai in the *Jiaoxinglu*: "The ten directions are all equally speaking [the Dharma], the ten directions are all equally listening. Past, present, and future are all equally proclaiming it, and they are equally listening. As the ancients said, 'Space asks all phenomena, and all phenomena answer space. . . .' . . . You must know that every moment and every speck of dust is always speaking and always listening, and that speaking and listening occur simultaneously; there is no difference between them" (T46.892c, 894a).

60. T46.707a–b. Indeed, all the talk of the non-duality of taint and purity, of enlightenment and delusion, of afflictions and enlightenment, make this point clear,

for these are subjective categories, not objective ones. All refer to subjective states, and it is these states that are said to be non-dual, not just the objective reference of subjectivity, which is beyond good and evil even to Spinoza or the modern scientist. Zhili has something more radical in mind here, as we shall see in the following section.

61. The issue of intersubjectivity remained of central importance in the disputes with the so-called Latter Shanwai. Although a full discussion is not possible here, a few words about Zhili's doctrine of "contemplating the Buddha with a focus on the context of one's own mind" (*yuexin guanfo* 約心觀佛) are appropriate. This phrase from the *Miaozongchao* (T37.198a), a commentary to Zhiyi's (possibly spurious) commentary on the *Visualization of Amitāyus Sutra*, was to become one of the slogans in the Shanwai/Shanjia controversies. In the *Fozutongji* biography of Zhili, it is reported that Zhiyi's break with his star disciple Renyue, who had played the role of the master's right-hand man and staunch polemicist for the Shanjia position, occurred over just this issue, making of Renyue the central figure of the Latter Shanwai movement. According to the biography, "One day Jingjue [Renyue] and Guangzhi were debating the issue of [whether contemplation was ultimately a matter of] contemplation of the mind or contemplation of the Buddha, and they asked the Master [Zhili] to resolve the issue. The Master answered with his conception of 'contemplating the Buddha with a focus on the context of one's own mind' (*yuexin guanfo*), saying that the idea was to visualize the person and environment of that other [the Amitāyus Buddha] on the basis of [i.e., as an expression of] the nature of one's own mind. Jingjue left without speaking and thereafter completely turned his back on that which he had formerly taken as his own teaching" (T49.193b). The debate between Zhili and Renyue was to focus largely on the theory of the Three Bodies of the Buddha, especially on how to classify Amitabha and the question of whether the Pure Land of Quiescent Light possessed marks (Zhili said yes, Renyue said no). But the source of the controversy is still traceable to the old problem over the status of the mind that had been the focus of Zhili's attack on Yuanqing and the earliest versions of Shanwai. The tradition has it that Renyue held that in the contemplation of the Buddha, specifically the visualization of Amitāyus, the goal was to reduce the Buddha to the mind; Guangzhi said just the opposite, that the point was to bring the mind to the Buddha, to reduce it to the buddhahood of the visualized deity (see Andō, *Tendai shōgo shisō ron*, pp. 277–78). In the one case, one's own mind is the ultimate real, and the Buddha is merely a provisional manifestation of it that must be brought back to its source; in the other, buddhahood is the ultimate real, and one's own deluded mind is a temporary digression from that reality that must be reduced to it. In the hallowed tradition of such anecdotes, Zhili takes a middle view, namely, that the situation is never resolvable in either direction; neither can ever ultimately be reduced to the other, and either can provisionally be reduced to

the other. That is, one is to see the body of the Buddha Amitāyus, an other, and the entire environment around him exactly as described in the sūtra, with all the jeweled trees and pools and birds and so on, and to see this body as the Buddha-mind itself. The Buddha-mind is this body in accordance with a vow, a vow made concerning sentient beings, including oneself. As the sūtra in question says, "To see this body of the Buddha [in visualization] is to see the mind of the Buddha. The mind of the Buddha is nothing but great compassion" (T12.343c). In seeing this world and form of the Buddha, then, one is to see the referentiality of that Buddha's vow to one's present state of mind, the intersubjective moment itself. As I suggested above, the "Buddha" one contemplates is not the Buddha-mind looking out through one's own eyes, but the one that is looking at one's activity, including one's looking. So reducing the mind to the Buddha and reducing the Buddha to the mind are actually closer to each other than either is to Zhili's position; both lack intersubjectivity.

62. T46.841a.

63. T46.836b.

64. T46.835b.

65. T46.460a–b. Cf. also T33.844a–b.

66. T46.783b.

67. It is impossible not to think of Spinoza's *natura naturata* and *natura naturans* here, among other things.

68. This parenthetical qualification is important. The claim is not that it was always knowingly positing its own obstacles in order to overcome them, with clear conscious teleological intent. It just means that whatever has been thought and done can *also* be read this way, with as much justification as any other reading. The ambiguity remains irreducible, but this ambiguity comes to be experienced as salvific.

69. T46.893c–94a.

70. Indeed, it is easy for readers in the modern age to imagine this; it is by now our commonsense notion of the evolution of life from non-life. We start with some sort of inanimate situation (ignorance at its most extreme and complete automatic deterministic non-freedom), which it some point gives rise to life and consciousness. Consciousness then looks back at its own antecedents and posits them as antecedents to its own arisal.

71. In the passage quoted above Zhili states that originally there is neither truth nor delusion. Elsewhere this is elaborated as follows:

> Q: Are truth and delusion the same or different? If they are the same, since delusion is truth, the ancients shouldn't have said: "You mistakenly take worldly wisdom for Buddha wisdom, which is like taking a fish eye for a bright pearl." If they are different, then there is some truth outside delusion, and the ancients shouldn't have said, "[Your deluded search for truth apart from delusion] is like seeking the water apart from the waves, or seeking the gold apart from the ves-

sels." If both truth and delusion are established, again the two cannot coexist. How is this to be sorted out?

A: When we say that there is truth and there is delusion, it is a way of describing enlightenment in comparison to delusion. When we speak of cutting off both truth and delusion, it is a case of transcending appearances and "leaving the fish-trap" [—quoting *Zhuangzi*]. But if you want to accurately indicate the meaning, truth is the truth that is in total identity with delusion and delusion is the delusion that is in total identity with truth (*zhen ze quan wang zhi zhen, wang ze quan zhen zhi wang* 眞則全妄之眞，妄則全眞之妄). The two do not have two essences. The Buddha, the great sage, spoke of truth and delusion because he wished for people to desire the true and break through all delusions, so that delusion can no longer arise. The people of the world do not comprehend this and thus hold fast to the present moment of deluded mentation as already being Buddha, thus falling into what the ancients called mistakenly taking worldly wisdom for Buddha wisdom. And if they abandon this deluded mentation and seek true suchness elsewhere, as in practice of the one-sided teachings, this is indeed like abandoning the wave to look for the water or abandoning the vessels to look for the gold. Of the two, "to go too far is as bad as not going far enough" [—quoting *The Analects*]. The essential is in neither identity nor difference, that is where the marvel resides, and only thus is practice acceptable. Your question asks about the sameness or difference of truth and delusion, and I answer that in what has neither sameness or difference, we provisionally (*jia*) establish both sameness and difference. What has neither sameness or difference means that truth and delusion are of the same source, and bondage and liberation are not two. The provisional establishing of sameness and difference is because there are differences between confusion and insight, differences in biased emotional consciousnesses (T.46.892b–c).

This might seem at first glance to place us right back into the same perplexities and to be evading the real question. But once again the problem is resolved when we consider the notion of upāya and its centrality in Tiantai teaching. These "biased differences in emotional consciousnesses" exist from the beginning and are not something whose appearance needs to be explained. It is simply a given that there are beings who are deluded and suffering. This is the starting situation and the problem to be solved by the Buddha's teaching, codified in old-time Buddhism as the First Noble Truth. But the content of the Buddha's teaching, his method of solving this problem, as interpreted by the Tiantai tradition, is to tell the deluded that this very delusion is itself the truth, that this suffering is bliss—in the sense that the it can reveal itself to be such. But how is this manifestation to come about? We start with unequal levels of suffering and division and delusion. To cure it, the Buddha comes along and says, first, that this delusion must be eliminated, thus

contrasting delusion to a transcendent truth that stands as its negation, and then, later, that this elimination in fact consists solely in seeing that all this delusion is the ultimate truth from the very beginning.

72. T46.17c–18a.

73. T33.744b.

Chapter 6

1. T46.296a. This is Zhanran's compact summary, in his discussion of Zhiyi's doctrine of the evil inherent in the nature.

2. T46.703b.

3. T33.743c–44a.

4. T34.90b–c.

5. T34.898b.

6. See, e.g., T46.55c, 56b–c, and *passim*.

7. T46.21b–c.

8. T46.82c–83a.

9. We have already noted the similarity between this conception of cause and effect and that held by Spinoza.

10. As stated above, these "good/evil" divisions of the realms are relative and can also be otherwise divided, as Zhiyi says in the *Mohezhiguan*. But in all cases good and evil and their transcendence are included in each.

11. T46.17c–18b. For an excellent introduction to this passage, see Donner, "Chih-i's Meditation on Evil," pp. 49–64.

12. T46.49a.

13. *Zengshangman* 增上慢: "to claim to have attained what one has not attained or to have realized what one has not really realized." A term for anyone who falsely claims to be enlightened.

14. T46.103b. Zhiyi is here paraphrasing the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra*.

15. T46.117b.

16. See, e.g., T46.85a.

17. T46.137b–c.

18. The importance of the category of negation should again be noted. The Three Truths are structured around the negation and its negation. The correct contemplation always starts with seeing that the X, while being X and precisely as X, is also not X. This negation is itself precisely the destruction of the one-sidedness, the overcoming of the bias, the cure of the partiality; any finite one-sided thing is also not that thing, and thus its finitude and one-sidedness are overcome. At the same time, it has the value qua finite of destroying or curing the opposite finite one-sidedness. The Tiantai notion of value is entirely implied in this notion of negation. Value is the negation of finitude, and this is accomplished by all finite things.

Indeed, the guarantee of the inherent inclusion of value in anti-value is found just here. I noted earlier that the ten realms arrange themselves neatly into sets of contrasts and negations: the first three are negated by the next three (sometimes, four and two), but this is merely at the level of worldly good and evil. More interestingly for our purposes, the Two Vehicles, as representatives of the realization of Emptiness, are the exact negation of the six empirical, natural realms; we may then say that the inherence of the Two Vehicles is guaranteed just by the fact that the six realms are always not just themselves, that they are empty, that they are in each particular their own negation, as finite things pitted against each other. That is, they are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and without self. These three marks of the (Hīnayāna) dharma are just the self-contradictoriness of all finite things, their inherent incompleteness—but it is precisely this which posits the things that are lacking. (Cf. Sartre's conception of value as the negation of being that thereby haunts all being—it is precisely because everyone lacks an in-itself self that this provides the standard of value that haunts all being, impelling it toward this ideal. For Sartre, this ideal is by definition unattainable, and any claim to attain it is an example of bad faith. For Tiantai, on the other hand, the attainment is precisely this lack conceived as such; the meaning of the Three Truths in this context is that the attainment of enlightenment is the restatement of a certain failure, of this impossibility itself.) The bodhisattva-realm in turn negates the one-sidedness of the Two Vehicles, and the Buddha-realm negates the one-sidedness of the bodhisattvaness. The Buddha-realm of the Integrated Teaching negates the one-sidedness of the Buddha-realm of the Separate Teaching, of "only the Buddha."

19. Besides the examples already quoted above, we might cite the passage on the contemplation of the devil-realm in the *Mohezhiguan*, T46.114c–17a.

20. This is, of course, far from always being the case; the so-called privation theory of evil, orthodox in Medieval Christianity and in many schools of Buddhism, rests precisely on denying that evil is an *ens* at all; it is merely the absence of good.

21. T46.7c.

22. T46.46c.

23. T46.274a. Indeed, this is an example of Zhanran's relatively more conservative position on the question of evil, which we will discuss below. Compare Zhanran's notion that inherent inclusion is supposed to create fear with Zhiyi's remark, "If one knows that devils and Buddhas all enter into the realm of reality, then one has no fear [of the devils]. As the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says, 'For the sake of Śravakas, I speak of quelling devils, but for the Mahāyāna, I no longer speak of quelling devils'" (T46.115c). For Zhiyi the mutual inherence of Buddhas and devils is a way to overcome fear of the devils, since one is with both wherever one goes, not a way to make one terrified of the slightest evil, as Zhanran seems to suggest here.

24. T34.882c–83a.

25. A description I fear my readers will all too readily read as a self-advertisement for the present work!

26. T46.116b.

27. T46.18c.

28. T46.19a.

29. Ibid.

30. T46.19a.

31. Ibid. See *Zhuangzi*, 38/14/41–44.

32. T46.19b.

33. Lai Yonghai (*Zhanran*, pp. 75–108), for example, takes this view.

34. T46.823c. The profound ambiguity of all of Zhanran's formulations, however, can be gauged from that fact that Renyue quotes this passage in defending Zhili's notion of the "ultimate dung beetle," supporting therefore the opposite view, i.e., the stress on the non-duality of the two sides rather than their distinction and the necessity of including evil in practice as well as nature (see *Xuzangjing*, 95, p. 858a–b.) The original context of Zhanran's text, however, leads me to interpret him as stressing the difference here, with a slightly menacing tone of warning.

35. T46.205a.

36. The story can be found at T11.594–607.

37. T46.205b.

38. Again, from T11.594–607. Note that this ascetic not only gets reborn in a heavenly realm, but he is later reborn as Śākyamuni himself.

39. T46.205b–c.

40. T46.205c.

41. See T46.296b.

42. T46.703b.

43. Ibid.

44. See note 1 to this chapter.

45. T46.703b.

46. Ibid.

47. T46.713c–714b.

48. T46.461a.

49. T.46. 707.

50. Mou Zongsan, *Foxing yu bore*, 2: 877. It is intriguing to note that even Renyue adopts this standpoint in defending the *Zhiyaochao* against its Shanwai detractors. See *Xuzangjing*, 95, p. 823b: "The *Zhiyao* says that the nature inherently includes the Three Thousand, but when has it ever said the nature inherently includes taint and purity (*ranjing*)?" But he soon changes his tune, in defending the later *Miaozongchao*, which explicitly speaks of the inherent inclusion of taint (*ran*). (See, e.g., *Xuzangjing*, 95, 844b and *passim*; and throughout the *Zhiyishu*.). Two possibilities might explain

this change: either Zhili corrected his disciple about this incorrect understanding of his teaching, hence making the inclusion of taint explicit in the later works, or Zhili himself reached a new and more thorough understanding of this issue in his later years.

51. T46.717a.

52. This is simply a way of restating the basic Shanjia position. As Lang E. Ra ("The T'ien-t'ai Philosophy of Non-duality," pp. 211–12) says, the thrust of Zhili's critique of the Shanwai position can be reduced to the insistence that "each of the three thousand realms is simultaneously ideal and material, and simultaneously the cause and effect of all the other realms as well. . . . Any of the three thousand dharma realms can be either the universal or the particular. When a dharma is seen as 'an including center' of all the other included dharmas, the dharma as an 'including center' is the universal while each of all the included dharmas is the particular. Any dharma can be seen either as the includer or the included."

53. Cf. Kedu's comment (*Xuzangjing*, 100, p. 439a) in his *Shibuermen zhiyaochao xiangjie* on this passage from Zhili: "The meaning of the response here is that the former reference to the six impure realms and the four pure realms referred to the inherent Dharma-gates of good and evil originally included in the Three Thousand realms qua principle-nature. These inhere in the substance of all dharmas; they are not decreased by delusion about them nor increased by enlightenment about them. The terms 'taint' and 'delusion' here are divided according to deluded sentiment and the principle-nature. If deluded sentiment is attached, then all Ten Realms are called tainted and obstructed. In the principle-nature's empty interpenetration, the Ten Realms are all pure."

54. Adopted by Zhanran from Huayan terminology and adapted for use in Tiantai exegesis—creating much confusion in the Song.

55. T46.713a–b. Note that here as in Zhanran, a distinction is made between practices that are "in accordance with" and those that are "at variance with" the nature, although all are completely "identical to" the nature. But Zhili, unlike Zhanran, goes out of his way to mollify the practical implications of this distinction and to stress its provisional status. As he says elsewhere, "[Q.]: Since all these events, both in-accordance and at-variance, are non-dual with the principle-essence of original enlightenment, why are they distinguished with the names 'in-accordance' and 'at-variance'? [A.]: If one knows this non-duality, such that all one's actions [are seen as being in] accord with this principle, these are called phenomena that are in accordance. If one does not know this, so that all one's actions are [seen as being] in conflict with this principle, these are called phenomena that are at variance. . . . However, since the at-variance phenomena of delusion have never for a moment been in conflict with the principle of enlightenment, they are called 'identical to Buddha in principle.' And why is this? Truly, because sentient beings inherently include taint and evil in their nature, and this can never be changed. When this nature

becomes perfectly manifest, it is called Buddha. The entirety of inherent taint and inherent evil give rise to functions, and these practiced taints and evils have no other substance, they are entirely the nature, and thus we are able to say that deluded phenomena are all identical to the Buddha in principle. It is due to principle that delusion arises, that karma is created, that one lives and dies in saṁsāra" (T37.200a–b). Note especially Zhili's claim that when this at-variance practice becomes "perfectly manifest," this is what is called "Buddha"—a notion that we will explore in more detail in the section on the ultimate dung beetle below. Cf. also *Guanxuanyiji*, T34.915c, where ultimate value is defined in terms of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra*'s "root of non-abiding," such that "being at variance with the root" means "to abide," which is to be attached to one side of a duality. In contrast to this, Zhili in at least one place seems to imply that only the in-accordance practices are manifested by enlightenment: but the context there has to do with rejecting the objection that contemplation of the principle of the Three Truths makes it impossible to concentrate on visualizing Amitāyus Buddha successfully and vividly. Zhili wants to assert that, on the contrary, the Three Truths are what make for the most vivid and fully realized manifestation. He says, "Thus we know that although all phenomena arise completely from the principle, they must be divided into those that are in accord and those that are at variance. Phenomena that are at variance with principle are extinguished and cut off (*min jue* 泯絕) when contemplated, phenomena that are in accord with principle are accomplished (*chengjiu* 成就) when contemplated" (T46.867b). But the terminology Zhili uses here gives away the provisional and ad hoc nature of this claim. For *min* is the term used for the function of the truth of Emptiness, and *jue* that used for the function of the Mean, and *chengjiu* refers to Provisional Positing. Hence Zhili's statement here is true, but partial; for all phenomena, at-variance and in-accord, are, according to the Three Truths, extinguished, cut off (from all relativity—i.e., made absolute), and accomplished as such by the successful contemplation of them as identical with the Three Truths. Hence it is true that the at-variance are extinguished and cut off, and the in-accord are accomplished; however, it also true that the at-variance are accomplished and that the in-accord are extinguished and cut off. Zhili's one-sided statement here is easily justifiable in context as a provisional statement aimed at refuting a particular claim, namely, that the Three Truths are abstract concepts that interfere with concentration on visualization of Amitāyus.

56. This point is made most explicitly by Renyue in defending Zhili's notion of the ultimate dung beetle (*Xuzangjing*, 95, pp. 857a–59a), as opposed to the Shanwai notion that "the latter five forms of identity retain only the nature of the Ten Realms, but not the phenomena of the nine deluded realms" (p. 857a), i.e., that with enlightenment evil exists only as nature, but not as phenomenon. This issue is discussed in detail in the following section.

57. The last, least typical, but most explicitly temporal formulation comes from Zhili's heading for a passage of Zhanran's on the non-duality of cause and effect (T.46.715a).

58. T46.717b. Compare Zhiyi's emphatic rejection of the traditional understanding of momentariness as the complete separation of each moment, and the goneness or unreality of the past and future, in *Mohezhiguan*, T.46.15b–c. For Zhiyi, if there were only the present in the sense of this particular moment of time, apart from the past and future, contemplation would be impossible.

59. Readers with an interest in comparative philosophy may wish to recall the Bergsonian notion of duration at this juncture and the refutation of the concept of separate moments of time that stands as its foundation. For Bergson, the whole concept of discrete moments of time arranged in a sequential line was the prime instance of the erroneous spatialization of duration, creating our usual mechanistic concept of time.

60. Or rather, all moments are seen to have always been so viewing each other, during moments of enlightenment. The Möbius strip of paradoxical turnings issuing from this consideration will be dealt with presently.

61. T9.50c.

62. This comment is made in Zhiyi's *Guangwuliangshoufojing shu*, T37.190a.

63. Again, this consideration must be recalled when examining the stress laid on Pure Land practices of visualizing and remembering the Buddha, especially by Zhili.

64. T37.207a.

65. T46.116b.

66. T46.67b.

67. T37.201b.

68. We may even say that interpenetration, in spite of Zhili's wry description of it, from the point of view of the non-duality between suffering and liberation, as "freedom and purity," and so on above, is at the surface level nothing but suffering, *duhkha*. It is another word for the lack of independent existence that is a constant concern of Buddhism. It is also impermanence (of any particular form or condition, since all other forms and conditions are equally in it), suffering, selflessness, instability, relativity, conditionality. In our present context, we can say plainly that constitutive intersubjectivity is suffering; we can never say just what we mean, our being is constantly subjected to the reappraisal, "misunderstanding," and reappropriation by all other points of view in the intersubjective matrix; our being belongs as much to their view of us as to our own view of ourselves. This will be a form of suffering as long as we believe we ought to know the real meaning of our words and deeds better than others do, that we are ourselves alone and not also others, that we alone are ourselves and others are not, that we have privileged access to ourselves, that we know who we are; after abandoning this belief, and with it the sense of being in only one position in any given confrontation, it may well be a form of blissful and liber-

ating stimulus and response. The belief in separation is a kind of defense against this original interpenetration, this impermanence, this suffering, this relativity. Or better, it is one more form of suffering, of relativity, of interpenetration.

69. T.37.196b–c. For another striking statement of the congruity between making distinctions (picking and choosing) and transcending all biases, see *Jiaoxingju*, T46.899b., where Zhili defends his plan to burn himself alive in order to be born in the Pure Land, thus again seeming to choose purity and reject impurity. We discuss this in detail below.

70. In principle we could also assert impurity, i.e., 即淨頓染. The only reason this is not done generally is practical and soteriological; for the purposes of contemplation and cultivation, aimed at the old Buddhist goal of freedom from suffering, we assert that the present taint is itself identical to purity, which is our provisional goal. As we saw in the preceding chapter, this is not a cosmological theory about the beginning of things; it is not the case that an originally pure essence encountered impure conditions and underwent a fall from grace; rather, all things have been in delusion from the beginning.

71. T46.707b.

72. T46.899b–900a. We discuss the passage from which this is lifted in greater detail below.

73. T.46.877c.

74. T34.956a.

75. "Buddhahood," however, refers precisely to the apprehension of this bothness, and deviltry to ignorance about it. Thus when all things seem to me to be aspects of deviltry, there seems to be a difference between buddhahood and deviltry; when all seem to be buddhahood, there seems to be no difference. This is the fundamental asymmetry of the situation. Both of these are true, and both of these are false. This is its fundamental symmetry.

76. T37.200a.

77. T46.712c.

78. T37.306a.

79. "Sermons and Collections," xcvi; trans. C. de B. Evans, from Franz Pfeiffer, *Meister Eckhart*, 1: 240.

80. Of course, like any statement, in the proper context this claim, too, could be read as an assertion of the Integrated Teaching, depending how "the same" is understood. This must be determined by the total context of the teaching, with a horizon of all total teachings including the Tiantai teaching itself, which "opens up" all provisional claims and reveals that they are also implicitly asserting the ultimate truth, which the Integrated Teaching asserts explicitly.

81. *Zhancha shan e yebao jing xuan yi*, *Xuzangjing*, 35, 102b–3a.

82. T34.905a.

83. T34.945b.

84. *Analects* 2:12.

85. T37.203c–204a. Cf. T37.200c–201a: "If you say the three obstacles are definitively obstructions to the Buddha-nature and must be destroyed before it can be revealed, this concept belongs to the Separate Teaching. But if you know that the nature in its entirely becomes the obstacles, the obstacles are themselves the Buddha-nature, so that obstacles are understood as the inconceivable obstacles, this . . . belongs to the Integrated Teaching." Cf. also T37.201a: "Karma and the unforgivable sins are themselves, just as they are right here and now, identical to the Three Liberations. All the obscurities and confusions of thought and view notwithstanding, the principle of original enlightenment has always had within it delusion and karma; these are entirely nothing but the Buddha-nature as Conditioning and Revealing causes, belonging to the meritorious properties of the nature. [How then could they be destroyed?] How could we destroy the principle that is Buddha? A knife cannot cut itself."

86. T37.212a.

87. T34.946a.

88. Zhili is as little shy about the way evil leads to good as Zhiyi had been. He explains the Buddha's enigmatic smile in the *Visualization of Amitāyus Sūtra*, for example, as an indication that the retribution for evil karma being endured by his listener, which will lead even to the loss of his life, is also precisely the cause of his henceforth being born in the Pure Land and attaining the ultimate fruit (T37.215c). His evil karma thus turns out to have been the one of the causes of his attainment of enlightenment and hence it is a Dharma-gate.

89. T34.946a.

90. T34.946b.

91. T33.732b.

92. T34.929c.

93. It may be easier to understand how this applies, in Zhiyi's example, to "greed" or "hatred" or "ignorance" per se, rather than a specific greed or hatred, to which in principle the same should apply. That is, whereas "universal hatred" may be read as universalization of the truth of Emptiness, the annihilation of all own-being, it is harder to understand how "hatred of Bill Smith" may be universalized to become a form of value. But in a Tiantai context, this particularly determined hatred (and any more specifically determined version, e.g., "Hatred of Bill Smith when he makes that annoying humming sound while eating fish sticks on Thursdays at Denny's") turns out to be a falsely localized revelation of the hatred that should pertain to the whole universe. That is, upon investigation of this hatred's nature via the Three Contemplations, it will come to light that this particular hatred is a mere focusing of the general hatred of being, that the thing one hates here is really an apparent sedimentation of the hatefulness that pervades all times and places. To this need only be added that this "falsely localized" should be understood as a form of upāya.

94. See Andō, *Tendai shōgu shisō ron*, pp. 102–9.

95. Indeed, the Shanwai understanding of this slogan is arguably faithful to Zhanran's own understanding that I stressed above in contrasting him to Zhili; in this sense the Shanwai got Zhanran at least as right Zhili did, a claim that we have little reason to feel uneasy about unless we are bound by sectarian considerations.

96. *Xuzangjing*, 95, pp. 856b–57a. Xianrun quotes the passage from Zhanran cited above to support his claim that this refers only to the nature, not to practice—only to have the same passage quoted by Renyue himself as refutation of the same claim.

97. Ibid., p. 856b.

98. The dung beetle is in the Buddha perhaps as the animal passions are conceived to exist within human beings in the tradition that defines the latter as rational animals; the passions are always operating in the human being but the response to them is always bound into a new structure by the specifically human contextualizations of them, the rational responses to them. But from the Shanjia position, it is not enough therefore to say that the human being is only a human being and not an animal also, even if "human" is defined in the above way, as including first the animal element and then its overcoming. For "human" is, even as such, also defined in contradistinction to "animal." The specific nature of this contradistinction means that both the distinction and the inclusion must be accounted for. If you can say, "When one is fully human, the original animal passions are thoroughly overcome," you should also be able to say, as a balance to this formulation, "When one is fully human, the original animal passions reach their truest fulfillment." Only the combination of both sides gives a complete picture. If the animal passions are domesticated by their characterization as "human" from the beginning in the human case, they fail to call forth the rational responses to them which constitute that humanity as such. Again, a consideration of the basic interpretive devices of dialogue and set-up / punch line should make clear what is at stake here.

99. T39.968a. I translate in accordance with Zhili's interpretation. Zhiyuan's reading of the same passage would result in something like "The unobstructed dharma-realm, although untainted in itself, becomes apparently tainted—this is called the poison of the principle-nature."

100. T39.978a–b.

101. T46.873c.

102. *Xuzangjing*, 95, p. 844a.

103. T46. 873b. As Renyue puts it, "Once you have heard the doctrine of inherent evil, you should know that there is not practice outside the nature. Since practiced evil is itself fundamentally quiescent, all the practices that arise [which on the literal surface level eliminate it] actually have accomplished no curative effect at all; since this practice does nothing [i.e., creates no new effect that was not always already there], we call this practice 'the meritorious quality of the nature itself'" (*Xuzangjing*, 95, p. 847b).

104. Zhili, "Shi Qing Guanyin shu zhong xiaofu san yong" (T.46.872c, *Jiaoxing lu*, juan 2). In this passage, Zhili also quotes Zhanran as saying, "Not only are the substance and nature of ignorance and dharma-nature one in what is contemplated; the consciousness doing the contemplating is itself ignorance." Cf. Zhili's *Guanyinxuanyiji*, T34.900a: "The Integrated teaching about the evil inherently included in the nature brings with it the understanding that the real-mark of delusion itself is precisely what does the contemplating."

105. *Fahuaxuanyi*, T.33.743c–44a.

106. See *Xuzangjing*, 95, pp. 843b–44a.

107. Ibid., p. 855a–b: Xianrun says, "If you take inherent evil as the essence of the three causes as practiced virtues, what will be the essence used to create evil Dharma-gates to transform others from the position of the result [i.e., Buddhahood]? . . . Without the contemplation arising from inherent good, could this evil itself give rise to contemplation?" Renyue replies, "Let me try asking you: since you take good as what eliminates and evil as what is eliminated, what will be the essence used to transform others through evil from the position of the result? If you say you mean to only eliminate practiced evil but not inherent evil, is this inherent evil a meritorious property or something that is in error? If the former, why do you not admit that it can be the eliminator? If the latter, why is it not cut off even at the position of the result? If you say that, although inherent evil is a meritorious property, it cannot be used as the essence that eliminates evils, this is to put inherent evil on one side and separately adopt inherent good on the other as that which does the eliminating. . . . You should know that the Integrated man from the beginning of his practice understands that evil is the nature and takes nothing but this inherent evil of the nature as that which does the contemplating, not cutting it off even at the position of the result and using this same essence to transform without limit." Renyue asserts that since inherent evil includes inherent good, inherent evil can itself give rise to practiced good (ibid., p. 848b).

108. Ibid., p. 844b.

109. T46.708b–c: "Universality (*zong*) and particularity (*bie*) are not directly equivalent to principle (*li*) and phenomena (*shi*). One must understand that both the Three Thousand as inherently included in principle and the Three Thousand as functioning phenomena each can be described in terms of its universality and its particularity. Only when these two [i.e., the universality/particularity of principle and the universality/particularity of phenomena] are seen to be identical can it be called the Marvelous Object [of contemplation]. . . . The text previously made clear that the fact that all dharmas maintain their own essences, which is their particularity (*bie*); now it shows that all dharmas equally reduce to this present moment of experience, which is the universal (*zong*). They constantly maintain their individuality and yet constantly reduce to this moment. The universality and particularity of all dharmas as inherently included in one another by nature (*xingju zhufa*) are mutually

reducible. The universality and particularity of all dharmas as conditioned arisings are also mutually reducible. One should also understand that both phenomena and principle take the phenomenon of this one moment of experience as their universal [during contemplation]."

110. *Xuzangjing*, 95, p. 844b.

111. Ibid., p. 846a.

112. T46.900c.

113. It might be suggested that I have been a little too quick to dismiss the content of Zhili's supposed "evil act." Isn't it quite an amazing coincidence that it turns out to be precisely a very Buddhistic and pious sort of evil, fanaticism and asceticism, rather than raping and pillaging at will? Surely this is not just a coincidence, in spite of what Zhili's rhetoric would imply, and we would be foolish to take this rhetoric entirely at face value, as I seem to here. Not only that; the fact is that Zhili never did go ahead with this "evil"; he just announced he was going to, got a lot of people to demand that he not do so, defended his intention to, and then called it off. Where's the evil in that? The implication in this objection is (1) that Zhili was just playing along with the claim that this was the devil's teaching, and on exactly equal footing with raping and pillaging; in fact, his practical preference for one over the other indicates that he did not regard them all as equally valid ways of attaining enlightenment, for we have no record of Zhili raping or pillaging anyone. Rather, he seems to have been meditating and doing Buddhist repentance rituals all the time. In point of fact he was just doing what was expected of him. And (2) he was just bluffing; he had no intention of burning himself alive, and in fact it was probably all just a scam designed to drum up precisely the response it got—that is, it got Zhili official recognition (and a purple robe from the emperor, apparently) and, as he hints in his letter to Yang Yi, seems to have attracted funds to his temple. I am willing to concede all these points. But don't we still end up with Zhili having done evil in practice? He is a hypocrite, a sneak, an opportunist, a bluffer, a sensationalist, a show-off, a liar, a charlatan, a calculating manipulator. Can his defense of evil practice not apply as much to this list of qualities as to "asceticism," the putative topic under discussion? Zhili is perhaps the one figure in history for whom we can justifiably say both that he was sincerely acting out his beliefs and was a hypocrite motivated only by "evil" practical concerns; by now I hope my readers will appreciate the manner in which this "both" is to be read.

114. T46.899b–900a.

115. T46.900b–901a.

116. For an example, one of thousands, see Zhiyi's *Liumiaofamen*, T46.550a, where this self-referentiality is named as the fifth of the six wondrous Dharma-gates, *huan*, 還, literally, "returning." The description of the actual contents of the technique are as I have stated here.

117. Also worthy of note in this passage are Zhili's wry assertion in passing that the Śravakas, the world-negating and morally rigorous Hīnayāna disciples, are even harder to "open up" and reveal the ultimacy of than the worst sinners and heretics; this is perhaps not unrelated to the final claim that overcoming of attachment to the Buddha is what is really crucial in all this. This point of view is already implicit in the structure of Zhiyi's classification of teachings, which places the *Lotus Sūtra* higher than scriptures such as the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, the *Viśesacintabrahma-pariprcchā* and the *Sarvadharma pravṛtti-nirdeśa* (*Zhufawuxingjing*) sūtras, which clearly and openly assert the buddhahood of evil but harshly rebuke the Hīnayāna disciples. We might recall Nāgārjuna's dictum that those who are attached to emptiness are incurable; for Zhiyi, as Zhili reads him, the *Lotus* is truly marvelous because it is able even to cure the incurable, the moralists, the ascetics—those whom Nietzsche spitefully called the good and the just. Indeed, there is a sense in which, for Tiantai, the meditation on good is more radical than that on evil, since both equally involve thoroughgoing negation; see, for example, the discussion of the contemplation of good in the *Mohezhiguan*, T46.15b–17b.

118. This comes in the *Fahuaxuanyi*, in the section on stimulus and response. A question is posed: Since both good and evil serve as stimuli, this applies to everyone at all times; so is everyone always receiving this benefit, whether they do good or evil? The implication is that this completely undermines the notion that karma serves as moral retribution. Zhiyi answers by comparing it to the application of medical procedures, "which either heal or do not heal. The stimuli are also thus: at any given time they are ripe or unripe, and thus the corresponding response is distant or near accordingly" (T33.748b). That is, evil, too, will bring the salvific response—it just might take a little longer.

119. *Fahuaxuanyi*: "When one moment of experience arises as a result of the interaction of sense organ and object, it must belong to one of the Ten Realms, and since each realm inherently includes a hundred realms and a thousand dharmas, in this one moment of experience, all are completely present. This mind is an illusionist who in the course of a single day and night is constantly creating various forms of sentient beings, various forms of components of existence and environments, from the provisional and actual realms of the purgatories to those of the Buddhas. Let the practitioner choose for himself which path he can follow (*xingren dang zi xuanze he dao ke cong* 行人當選擇何道可從)" (T33.696a).

120. He also states, cryptically, that this renunciation of life and wealth will aid the dharma and wealth, perhaps implying not only that Zhili was well aware that he stood to gain materially and socially from this stunt, but also, as I suggested above in note 113 to this chapter, that his chicanery and manipulativeness in doing so would be no more of a problem for him than any other, first-order, evil. His sin of blackmailing the authorities to give him power and money by means of an infantile publicity stunt is indeed evil, but this sin creates great merits, just like the evils of con-

templating the Buddha or rolling and eating balls of dung. In this case, these evils create merits by causing institutionalized Tiantai Buddhism to flourish—as an institution that both is always infested by evil and motivated by coarse material concerns *and* contains the teaching of the contemplation that transforms the world into glory, such that these two are, of course, identical.

121. Indeed, it follows from the doctrine that all things are simultaneously manifestations of the Buddhas and manifestations of individual being's deluded karma, discussed above, that all entities be readable both as teleological products of design and as random ignorant happenstances. Tiantai here steps beyond theism and atheism, in the old natural theological sense. The world around is at once both the result of careful planning by providence (which in this case is inherent to our own minds), set up to enlighten or test us, and the result of natural processes with no collective plan or intention, each ignorantly and deludedly pursuing its own greed and anger if it is animate and its own benighted inertia if it is inanimate.

122. T46.899.c.

Chapter 7

1. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, 2: 505.

2. Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, p. 7.

3. Petzold (*Tendai Buddhism*, p. 49) summarizes his analysis of Zhiyi into four points: "1. That there is no real antithesis between subject and object. 2. That the universe, being identical with the mind, is rational, and that mind being identical with the universe, is irrational. 3. That the essence of the mind is eternal like the universe, as there is nothing that is earlier than the mind and that has produced the mind. 4. That the human mind is not a passive receptacle or a mere reflect of nature, but, like nature, is active and creative." Only the third of these points cries out for emendation; the reversibility Petzold correctly adduces in 2 should be applied here as well: the mind, being identical to the universe, is eternal, but the universe, being identical to the mind, is impermanent, and so on.

4. Spinoza, *On the Improvement of the Understanding*, p. 34.

5. T46.703b.

6. At this juncture we may do well to consider another perspicacious comment from Qian Mu, who compares the Indo-European notion of infinite linear time, extending without end into the past and into the future, with another view of time, prevalent in China, where the *unknown* infinite ends are tied as it were into a circle underneath the known present time. This plays into the old dialectic of the seen and the unseen that dates back at least to the *Laozi*. The present is the seen; the past and the future are together in the realm of the unseen. The result is not so much "cyclical time"—for this still suggests *moving* around the circumference of the circle linearly—but a situation that can best be envisaged, in Qian's words, "like a ball floating

in the water, half submerged and half visible. The part of the universe and human life that can be known is the side of this ball that is above the surface of the water. The part that cannot be known is the side underneath the waterline. . . . The ball rolls, and so the knowable and unknowable portions are also always turning. But in reality it is just one ball. This is what Laozi and Zhuangzi call 'Being' and 'Non-being,' and what the *Book of Changes* calls Yin and Yang. 'Being' means what is known, for what can be known is what can be named. 'Non-being' is what is unknown, dark and obscure. . . . So what is called being and non-being, yin and yang, really just refers to what we can and can't know. Man's life is ever changing, and his consciousness is also ever changing; so when this ball is looked at by man's consciousness, the angle is always different, the surface that appears is never the same. Hence, it seems as if it is constantly changing, never dwelling in the old, as if it were daily renewed and richly productive. But really this ball is perfectly quiescent even when it is perfectly active" (*Hushang xiansi lu*, pp. 144–55).

It is notable here that in this conception of time, there can be no progress, there is nowhere to go, and nothing is left behind. Indeed, everything is always present; what seems to be absent is simply non-apparent at the moment and will presumably be visible when the ball turns again. Qian describes the sinification of Buddhism as largely a process of transforming the Indian idea of infinity into this Chinese idea of constant completeness. We cannot help being reminded here too of Hegel's contrast between the "bad infinite" (infinite succession of some things) and the "true infinite" (a self-complete, self-determining circle, being-for-self, which takes its other into itself, posits its own otherness and reabsorbs it).

7. This is why even moments of improper and foolish cognitions, moments of failing to contemplate in this way, can themselves be used by later moments, such that they too retrospectively turn out also to be this contemplation, this "way to use" moments, as Zhili put it in a passage I quoted in the Introduction, appearing *as* a delusive set-up, a "previous" moment of delusion. In terms of Guanding's parable of inherent inclusion as comparable to the notes included in the zither, even the destruction of the zither becomes a new zither that can equally be beautifully played.

8. This is of course wholly determined by the "perspective," i.e., the realm of the being in question—but since all beings interpenetrate, let's assume that all these sequences coexist, and for the sake of argument assume that this is not yet all possible sequences.

9. Perhaps the sense of the term "development" here may be profitably compared to Lancelot Law Whyte's (*The Next Development of Man*, p. 17) intriguing and initially quite puzzling definition of development: "Process consists in the *development* of form by the decrease of asymmetry. Development is decrease of asymmetry. In simple processes development is unmistakable as the separation, persistence, and extension of symmetrical form. This process of development is universal; it is the form of the order of nature."

10. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 19.

11. Quoted in Parkes, *Composing the Soul*, p. 166.

12. See the discussion of the *Jin'gangpi* at the end of Chapter 4. Prior to *bodhicitta* and practice, all that has existed for any given sentient being is afflictions, karma, and delusion. These can also be called "possessing the Good in a (merely) potential state," hence the Cause Proper, although thereafter it will be seen that this was not merely a potential but was all three Causes already functioning and hence "Original Enlightenment," and so on.

13. The second but not the first of these two claims would be accepted, I think, by both the Huayan and Shanwai thinkers.

14. In this respect, Zhanran's position bears a striking resemblance to Schelling's views on evil, summarized briefly in the Introduction.

15. A structurally similar idea, transcribed into a different register, can also be found floating around in Talmudic Judaism, as in the doctrine of the goodness of the Evil Impulse: "Rav Nahman said in the name of Rav Samuel: 'Behold, it was very good' (Gen. 1:31)—that is the will to evil. But is the will to evil good? That is astonishing! Yet were it not for the will to evil, men would not build homes, or take wives, or propagate, or engage in business. And Solomon said the same: 'I considered all labour and all excelling in work, that it is a man's rivalry with his neighbor' (Eccles.4:4). . . . They said: This being a time of good will, let us pray and ask for the will to evil. They prayed and the will to evil was delivered to them. . . . The prophet said to them: Know, if you destroy this one, the world will come to an end. They imprisoned it for three days: then they sought a new-laid egg in all the land of Israel, and not one could be found" (Gen. Rabbah IX,9 and Yoma 69b, in Glatzer, *Hammer on the Rock*, pp. 15–16.)

16. Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, p. 78. Italics in the original.

17. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Considerations by the Way," in idem, *Conduct of Life*, p. 199.

18. Here a different sort of objection presents itself: it is always possible that Zhili, like anyone else, might simply not mean what he says. After all, it is common in Chinese Chan to find teachers who combine a blunt rejection of meditation and other Buddhist practices with a strict regimen of just these practices. There are some who would for this reason suggest that the rhetoric is not to be taken seriously. But besides the fact that there are many readings of this situation that would on the contrary impel us to take this rhetoric that much more seriously because of this paradoxical situation, and also besides the fact that as a matter of principle we are probably justified in assuming a dismissive attitude of this kind only if we have exhausted all our efforts to make sense of the rhetoric in question in any other way, when we have no choice—besides this, we may again appeal to the methodological assumptions of this project: we have this rhetoric in hand, wherever it may have

come from and for whatever reason; now what can be done with it, what would happen if we applied it?

19. Here we may note an obvious structural parallel in the ethical realm to the problematic considered earlier within an epistemological context—which takes even the perspective of the whole to be merely one more perspective among perspectives. This can be seen, for example, in the break over the issue of *gong* and *si*, public or common good as opposed to biased or private good, as determinants of value, which, as noted when these terms were introduced, goes with a unicentric but not an omnicentric holism. The omnicentric view must be that universal good is just one more biased, perspectival good; the good of bias-lessness is just one more evil one-sided bias. The level-jumping trope of a late *Zhuangzi* chapter—"to be without bias—that is a kind of bias" (*wu si yan nai si ye* 無私焉乃私也)—may stand as the motto for all subsequent omnicentric ethics.

20. Smullyan, *The Tao Is Silent*, pp. 128–29.

21. I have yet to list one of the more obvious objections to this kind of morality: the psychological damage involved in this requirement for man to be at war with himself all the time, the constant dividedness and tension it may create, and what such a personality is capable of doing to the world. It seems plausible to me that there is a psychological price to pay of this kind; on the other hand, the opposite argument could also be made with some justice, i.e., that this high tension creates effects of maximum value, that the tortured soul is the source of high culture. I see no *a priori* way to decide this matter one way or the other and suspect that an empirical judgment will be powerfully influenced by one's initial assumptions. Obviously, the value of such a personality will also involve one's value standards—and this brings us back into the realm of value paradox. In Tiantai, of course, this view is represented by the Śravakas—an upāya like any other form of consciousness. Dualistic morality is also an important upāya, and perhaps its role is to create certain highly valuable forms of culture (in its failed forms—the Śravakas are of course meant to represented the *successful* extirpation of the passions, a category we do not seem to encounter in empirical reality). However, both Zhiyi and Zhili make very explicit that the Śravakas are indeed the very hardest of any kind of "evil" to open up and redeem, and hence only the *Lotus Sūtra* could do the job. The sentiment here is perhaps in accord with that expressed by Ambrose Bierce:

> From pride, guile, hate, greed, melancholy—
> From any kind of vice, or folly,
> Bias, propensity or passion
> That is in prevalence and fashion,
> Save one, the sufferer or lover
> May, by the grace of God, recover.

Alone that spiritual fetter,
The zeal to make creation better,
Glows still immedicably warmer.
Who knows of a reformed reformer?

(*The Sardonic Humor of Ambrose Bierce*, ed. George Barkin [New York: Dover Publications, 1963], p. 36)

22. T46.19a-b: "When in the due course of time political unrest appears and one is bound by service to the king and thus unable to practice good; [in such circumstances the Buddha] had one practice concentration and insight in the midst of evil. . . . But at present there is no such unrest, and you are unbound by any such constraints; you are lucky enough to have access to an easy crossing, a good road on which to drive your flock—why then follow a difficult road?"

23. This example is perhaps especially apt in light of the view of death in Zhili's suicide pact; perhaps the most anti-humanistic thing in all this is the fact that, like any consistent religious position, these guys do not care that much if someone dies. That is, it is no big deal if people die—due to the literal belief in metempsychosis: the saga will go on, and everyone will achieve Buddhahood sooner or later anyway. So the victims of a murder are really not losing anything. Even if we grant the Schopenhauerian point mentioned in an earlier note and take this doctrine less than literally, there is a certain callousness in this view of death, from our present perspective. Nonmythologically, however, its content is really about the same as Zhuangzi's callous attitude toward death and stands in the same tradition of opposition to human know-it-all-ness, especially in the realm of values. For both of these views, the assumption that dying is "bad" and living is "good" is just so much human hubris and epistemological irresponsibility; Zhuangzi leaves it at a don't-know; Tiantai expands this into "it must always be good and bad and both and neither." Neither Zhuangzi nor Tiantai think we know enough to know what's good or bad. The opposite assumption, that such sophistry is just a kind of pathetically transparent "denial of death," would seem, from the logical point of view, to beg the question.

24. Indeed, this way of viewing the implications of the dung-beetle doctrine has always been most easily palatable; even Zhili's disciple Guangzhi taught his students that the doctrine of the ultimate dung beetle is to be understood as referring to the "psychological" aspect of one's own view of the world considered as aspects of one's own mind; that is, it is a practice aimed at developing fully the dung beetle within you, as a human being and presumably as a Buddhist monk, the latter status dictating your external behavior. See *Xuzangjing*, 95, p. 859a. This allows us to avoid the horrible consequence that I will come to a moment, i.e., that in viewing someone else who is busily engaged in being a dung beetle or a murderer, we can never know whether this is good or evil, that it is always constitutively too soon to tell.

25. Whitman, *Leaves of Grass*, p. 40. Elsewhere Whitman (ibid., p. 14) expresses a similar thought, making explicit its connection to his own very omnicentric sounding version of holism:

> Omnes! Omnes! let others ignore what they may,
> I make the poem of evil also, I commemorate that part also,
> I am myself just as much evil as good, and my nation is—
> and I say there is in fact no evil,
> (Or if there is I say it is just as important to you, to the land or to me, as any thing else.)

26. Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do*, pp. 27–30.

27. We might also think here of the Kantian categorical imperative: Kant argues that evils are those things which, if universalized, would contradict and undermine themselves; if lying became the universal norm, it would be impossible to lie, since the effectiveness of lying presupposes the normalcy of good faith and trust. Kant here has an insight into the manner in which evil overcomes itself simply by being universalized. However, needless to say, this is not the means of overcoming it he goes on to recommend.

28. See Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do*, p. 40: "Law in its positive identity results from the negative self-relationship of crime by means of its universalization, from an 'absolute' criminal gesture which *excludes* all other, particular crimes" (italics added). Žižek is elsewhere willing to take this one step further: "Virtue itself can get the upper hand over Sin only by resorting to (a moderate, controlled measure of) Sin" (Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, p. 31.) That is, Good obtains its efficacy and survival only through the actual commission of a certain amount of evil—but only a "moderate, controlled measure." Zhili would seem to have no use for this last qualification.

29. Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do*, pp. 133–34.

30. Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, pp. 47–48.

31. Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do*, p. 133.

32. Indeed, the function of this contemplation is quite similar to Spinoza's adequate ideas, the knowing of determinism that makes us free. In the Tiantai case, as in Spinoza, a special type of knowing, here qua Three Truths, is enjoined. But recall Zhiyi on "the great delusion"—this knowledge is also a negation of any type of positivistic knowledge.

33. Another exemplification from the arts suggests itself here; not only the immortalized and universalized indecisiveness and wishy-washiness of the classic Woody Allen characters, but the immortal and universal superficiality of a character like John Updike's Rabbit Angstrom; this superficiality, this failure to go deeply into anything, automatically becomes profound by being transferred exactly as is into the universal medium of Updike's flawless prose.

34. Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder*, p. 86.

35. The Tiantai view on this point is very unclear; in one sense it would seem that there can be no guarantee from one moment to the next that enlightenment will continue, on the literal level; but on the other hand, it could be argued that the truly perfect contemplation of the Three Truths would somehow include the endeavor to ensure that the subsequent moment will continue to be aware of the Three Truths, as a form of compassion if nothing else. The texts seem to me a bit ambiguous on this point. I have written at length on this question elsewhere ("How to Will Backwards: Time, Repetition and Forgetting in the *Lotus Sutra*," forthcoming). The issue of backsliding is addressed there in terms of the nature of that which is putatively backslid from: for enlightenment is a state that can see itself in its own absence, and indeed will appear precisely as its own absence, which makes the notion of backsliding somewhat moot.

36. Intersubjectivity also leads us in another direction. Compassion is a form of evil (bringing to mind the Laozian notion of "holding to," i.e., keeping in touch with, anti-value as the source and foundation of value), and self-indulgence is a sort of compassion (an application of this can perhaps be gleaned from Zhili's attitude toward his own irrational obsessions and fetishes, as quoted at the end of the Chapter 6), but be what you are all the way as a kind of compassion on the model of exemplification—leading us back to the Ruist dialectic of exemplary men. In other words, to be a mass murderer all the way to the bottom and truly realize it, although it may "harm" certain people in the immediate environment, has a greater bodhisattva power to transform and enlighten others, both negatively and positively (Zhili is clear that it is to function both as negative and positive example—desire is to be destroyed and dwelled in); that is, as an example in authenticity. Thorough constitutive intersubjectivity guarantees that we are always putting on a morality play for all others (Sartre makes a similar point in "Existentialism is a Humanism"; see Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre*, pp. 291–94), always showing off, always playing to Three Thousand audiences. Zhili's view is thus that any act always functions as both karma (senseless, non-educational ignorance) and upāya (a wise heuristic for all other beings, including yourself qua other).

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Glossary

Atomism. A term used here in the broad sense to denote any doctrine that entities—physical objects, minds, persons, ideas—are separate and substantial, or have only external relations, such that each thing is simply what it is, regardless of its relationships to other things. The alternative to holism, with roots in Greek atomistic metaphysics, it is epistemologically associated with reductionism, which claims that explanations are best achieved by reducing an object to its smallest part rather than by examining its relation to other objects.

Center. A figurative term for the authoritative point in a whole from which all other points derive their significance, value, and identity; the master signifier or locus of ultimate value upon which the meanings of all other parts, as instrumental values, depend. This is the point from which the whole can be seen in its "true" aspect, as it "really is," and from which the true value and nature of each of the parts can be validly assessed, as opposed to the distorted partial perspectives of the parts. It is the point or perspective that beholds the whole qua whole and to which all the points have a direct relation.

Fact/value fusion. The tendency in Chinese rhetoric for the realm of fact and the realm of value to be joined and for prescriptive implications to reside in descriptions and vice versa. In the present work, speculations have been made concerning the primacy of the value side of this polarity, such that the category of fact is itself assimilated to the category of value, rather than the other way around, as is more common in Western philosophy. This has the effect of both making the realm of value all-pervasive and changing its nature, keeping ultimate value outside the realm of discourse itself, so that all discussion of values takes on the paradoxical margin proper to the discussion of instrumental value, thus setting the stage for value paradox and omnicentric epistemology.

Holism, oligocentric (*oligocentrism*). A compromise or mixture of unicentric and omnicentric holism. Basically, it is the doctrine that the quiddities of all things are determined solely by their relations to other things and thus the whole is more than the sum of its parts (holism), but that there are in any whole many centers. Not every point functions as a center, but, usually, any point has the potential to do so. This is made possible by the application of the categories of hierarchy and degrees of expression; some points in the whole more adequately express its true nature, qua whole, than others, although all express it to some extent.

Holism, omnicentric (*omnicentrism*). The doctrine that the quiddities of all things are determined solely by their relations to other things, and thus the whole is more than the sum of its parts (holism), but that this is true in so thorough a sense that each point in any whole is a center of that whole, such that each one adequately represents, perceives, and includes the whole. This means that any part *is* the whole itself, and all the parts inherently include each other.

Holism, unicentric (*unicentrism*). The doctrine that the quiddities of all things are determined solely by their relations to other things, and thus the whole is more than the sum of its parts (holism), but that a whole has only one center, and hence one and only one true perspective that can validly determine the value and nature of the parts. These parts are themselves separate and considered in themselves represent a distortion; they can be properly understood only in the perspective of the whole, that is, from the one center. The center may be found either within the whole in question (homocentrism; an example is the Legalist notion of the empire) or outside it (heterocentrism; an example is the God of theism).

Identity. In the Tiantai system, which claims that value is "identical" to anti-value (nirvāṇa to saṁsāra, the Buddha to the devil or to a dung beetle or to a deluded sentient being), this is a consequence of inherent inclusion and omnicentric holism. Since each particular quiddity is simply a way of naming all Three Thousand, all quiddities are identical to one another. To say "dung beetle" is to say "Three Thousand" (with the focus on its inherent all-pervading quality of dung-beetlehood), and to say "Buddha" is also to say "Three Thousand" (with the focus on the equally inherent and all-pervading quality of buddhahood); both of these terms have the same referent, the whole Three Thousand, and so it is said that the Buddha is identical to the dung beetle. These names are, moreover, not merely adventitious; buddhahood and dung-beetlehood are inherent to the Three Thousand, by its very nature, such that both quiddities and the distinction between them are present at any locus in the Three Thousand.

Inherent inclusion / inherent entailment. The Tiantai doctrine that every possible quiddity inherently "includes" or "entails" every other possible quiddity. This is the most extreme known form of omnicentrism. Inclusion in this context, however, amounts to the assertion of the incoherence of the claim that anything is either exclusively

internal to or exclusively external to anything else. All Three Thousand possible quiddities are inherently included in any of these quiddities, not as grains of sand might be contained in a bag, nor as potentials born out of a pre-existing prior substratum. Nor are they absent from it, as horns are thought to be absent from a rabbit. There is to be no priority to either the includer or the included. The Three Thousand are included in the sense that a thing includes the characteristics of which it is constituted. For example, a triangle includes equiangularity, equilaterality, extension in planar space, and three-sidedness. The triangle does not exist prior to these characteristics, nor, on this reading, do they exist prior to it; it is nothing but them, they are nothing but it. In a nutshell, the includer and the included are simply two ways of describing the same Three Thousand, with, as it were, a different focus. To say "X inherently includes/entails Y" thus means "X is inescapably readable as consisting of Y, as instantiating Y, and, ultimately, simply as Y itself."

Intersubjectivity. The special condition that pertains to the impact that the existence of other subjectivities has on any given subjectivity. When we speak of "all-pervasive" or "constitutive" intersubjectivity, as in the Tiantai case, we mean that this reference to other minds is essential to and internal to any subjectivity, that it cannot exist without this reference to other subjectivities, and that it is, as it were, composed of intersubjectivity in every atom, with none left out.

Opening the provisional to reveal the real (transformative self-recontextualization). The most distinctive aspect of the Tiantai theory of upāya, by which it is developed into a truly omnicentric epistemology. The term "opening up" is derived from the metaphorical image of the lotus flower, in which the flower represents provisional truth and the fruit represents ultimate truth; the flower blossoms and opens up, thereby revealing the fruit that has always been concealed within it. Both the fruit and the flower have been present from the beginning (in the lotus, as opposed to other types of plants), and it was merely a rearrangement of the flower—the opening of its petals—that resulted in the fruit being revealed; they are not changed or discarded. Moreover, to blossom is itself the nature of the flower per se, brought to its full development. In the same way, according to the Tiantai system, all apparently false positions and claims turn out to be upāya, provisional truths that, when "opened," are revealed to have had the fruit, ultimate truth, within them all along. This opening up is conceived of, not as a refutation of the original position or even the addition of anything to it, but rather as the thinking through of all its implications and the full development of its nature, as the bud is brought to full development by blossoming. The provisional and ultimate are conceived in this scheme as being both opposed and congruent at the same time; in this work I have used the metaphor of the set-up and punch line of a joke to illustrate this structure, in which the set-up represents the provisional, and the punch line the ultimate. The humorousness of the joke is dependent on the contrast between the seriousness of the set-up and the

humor of the punch line, but once the punch line has been cracked, it can be said that the whole joke, including the set-up, is itself funny—it is funny precisely because it is serious. The two parts are in harmony (both funny) precisely because they are opposed. They must always be both.

Quiddity. Any experienced characteristic or qualitative feature, distinguishable from its opposite; the "whatness" of a thing, greenness or blueness or wetness or dryness or stillness or movingness or hotness or coldness, or even thingness, in a phenomenological sense. Any distinguishable element of experience.

Three Thousand. The Tiantai name for all possible quiddities, as constituted by all possible perspectives, including the intersubjective perspectives on other perspectives. Technically, the term derives from the Ten Realms, each of which includes all the others, and each of which is characterized by the Ten Thusnesses, as applied to the three fields of components of existence, sentient beings, and environment.

Three Tracks. The threefold nature of all possible experience, derived from the Three Truths: the objective aspect, derived from the Mean; the subjective aspect, derived from Emptiness, and the practico-inert aspect, derived from Provisional Positing.

Three Truths. The fundamental Tiantai doctrine, which in the Integrated Teaching is understood to mean that every entity can be described equally as (1) something lacking in own-being (Empty); (2) an inherently included aspect of the Three Thousand quiddities, provisionally posited, via deluded discrimination, as one or the other of these Three Thousand, both as a delusion and as a skillful means to create the comprehension of the Three Truths; and (3) both—these two ways of describing the case are actually referring to one and the same fact (the Mean), that to be without own-being *is* to provisionally posit in this manner. The last of these, the Mean, is also understood to imply inherent inclusion, the incoherence of any claim that anything is either exclusively internal to or exclusively external to anything else, which serves as the premise for omnicentric holism.

Threefold Buddha-nature / Three Causes. The Tiantai doctrine of the Buddha-nature as cause of Buddhahood in three senses: (1) that which is realized in enlightenment, the Buddha-nature qua objective truth, the Cause Proper of buddhahood; (2) that which realizes this truth, the Buddha-nature qua subjective apprehension of the truth, the Revealing Cause of buddhahood; (3) the practices and conditions that make this subjective apprehension possible, the Buddha-nature qua practico-inert practice of this truth, the Conditioning Cause of Buddhahood.

Upāya. Literally, "skillful means." In Tiantai, it is used interchangeably with "provisional truth." All possible positions, in the Tiantai view, are upāya, in the sense that they all lead to enlightenment. Since enlightenment itself is a condition that entails the mastery of upāya to teach other beings, it does not dispense with these "temporary" measures but rather discovers that they are eternal aspects of its own nature

qua enlightenment. Every possible proposition is an upāya, which entails that each is true, false, both, and neither.

Value paradox. Any doctrine asserting that positive and negative terms (whatever is defined as good and evil, or as good and bad, desirable and undesirable) are not dichotomous. This can range from the weak sense that there is some ambiguity to them, or that the two overlap in some places, or that some items are of indeterminate nature such that they are sometimes good and sometimes bad, to the stronger claim that the two are mutually dependent and inseparable, to the still stronger claim that they are but two sides of the same object, to the strongest claim that are actually identical to one another, two names for the same object that does not even change in the rudimentary sense of "flipping over" but is called by one name or the other according to a change in focus. In short, that ambiguity is not adventitious to the meaning of value terms, but essential and constitutive; they only have a meaning and identity by being fundamentally ambiguous. On this view, in fact, to be meaningful and to be ambiguous are convertible terms.

Index

Abidharma, 101, 199
Absolute, 121, 140–59, 167, 178. *See also* Transcendental marvels (*miao*)
Ālayavijñāna, 199, 230
Ambiguity: of motivation, 12, 210, 253, 370–71; and "centers," 36–39; and Emptiness, 104, 128–30; of scriptures, 107; of Nāgārjuna, 118
Ames, Roger, 395–97
Amitābha Buddha, Amitāyus Buddha, 200, 341, 432–33, 439
Analects (*Lunyu*), 59, 96–97, 100, 146, 329, 434, 442; focus and field in, 51, 53, 54; paradoxical rhetoric in, 89–90
Andō Toshio, 119, 410, 416, 423, 443
Aṅgulimālya, 265
Antagonistic Seeds (*diduizhong*), 103, 229, 243
Antinomianism, 20–21, 362; Zhiyi's critique of, 251–60
Aquinas, Saint Thomas, 6, 19
Aristotle, 6, 162, 393, 402
"As" structure, 130–35, 345, 352, 354; and inherent entailment, 155–57, 163; between delusion and enlightenment, 190–95; and value paradox, 252–53, 299–303, 308, 332
Aśvaghoṣa, 19, 331
Augustine, Saint, 5–6, 19, 56, 59, 71–72
Avalokiteśvara (Guanyin), 206, 309, 314, 428, 431
Avataṁsaka Sūtra (*Huayan jing*), 15, 21, 109, 141, 170–71, 213, 263, 309, 340, 378; relation to *Lotus Sūtra*, 144–45
Awakening of Faith śāstra, 196–97, 233

Bai Juyi (Bo Juyi), 151
Batailles, Georges, 373
Bergson, Henri, 357
Bias, 288–94, 334, 373; mutually curative, 155, 217, 239, 268–69; as antivalue, 247–51, 258, 260, 281, 306, 309, 329, 352; universal as, 320–22, 370; full manifestation of, 341–43, 361, 367
Bierce, Ambrose, 450–51
Black, Alison Harley, 401
Bodhicitta, 188, 263

Bodhisattva Never-disparage (Sadāparibhūta), 148, 217, 278, 426–27
Boehme, Jacob, 6, 17
Book of Changes (*Yijing*), 46, 50–55, 95–96, 100, 448
Book of Odes (*Shijing*), 52, 53, 54, 395
Both/and structure, 4–5, 38, 60, 74–78, 286–89, 323, 326, 399, 409; in Daoism, 76, 98–99
Brahmajāla sūtra, 14, 327, 336
Buber, Martin, 424
Buddha-nature, 107; self-recognition of, 194. *See also* Threefold Buddha-nature
Bukowski, Charles, 368

Caoxi Huineng, *see* Huineng
Causality, 44–47, 50–55, 355–56
"Center," 29; and value, 33–34, 48, 55, 93; and epistemology, 34, 359; and ethics, 34–35; and ambiguity, 36, 39; as representative, 36; as empty, 39–40; in Chinese holism, 47–48, 50–55; Three Truths, 123–25, 128; *Lotus Sūtra* as, 144–45; present experience as, 163–64, 192, 320; as truth, 238; as subject, 273
Chan Buddhism, 18, 176, 196, 232, 264, 363, 369; schools and doctrines of, 183–95, 228, 421–22; Zhili's confrontation with, 329–31, 334–35
Chegwan, 408
Chengguan (Qiangliang Chengguan), 171, 197, 312, 420
Chen Yingshan, 417, 420
Chinese Communist Party, 16
Christianity, 16–17, 19, 68, 71, 75, 387–88, 400
Classification of Teachings, *see* Four Teachings
Conflict avoidance, 16
Confucianism, *see* Ruism
Confucius, 54, 74, 96–97, 305, 329, 370
Consciousness-only, 165–66
"Cutting off without cutting off" (*duan er bu duan*), 126, 273–74, 289, 319, 325

Daochang Ningfen, 196
Daoism, 76, 91, 92, 93, 97–99, 323, 372, 397
Daosui, 196
Daśabhūmi-śāstra, 407
"Daxue" ("Great Learning"), 51, 58, 59, 100
Dazhidulun, 118, 146–47, 150, 279, 405, 408, 410
De (virtue), 47–55 *passim*
Deshao, 123, 196
Deluded mind, contemplation of, *see* Zhili
Delusion, 18, 107, 136, 139, 154, 158–62, 249, 291–95, 433–35; as upāya, 19–20, 267, 325–27; Buddhism as, 110–11; Provisional Positing as, 119–20; in *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*, 179–81; as all-pervading, 192; origin of, 230–35; in Zhiyi, 240–51; mutually curative, 251; Separate Teaching on, 253, 305; necessity of 256; as bias, 291–99; Zhili on, 315–19
Delusion and enlightenment: relationship between, 119–20, 140–45, 190–95, 201, 203–8, 212–17, 218–39 *passim*, 305–6, 433–35; simultaneity of, 257, 262, 270–85, 323–29; Zongmi on, 289–90
Descartes, René, 70, 346

Desire, 72–78, 81, 92, 98–99, 102, 253–54, 307–8, 398
Devadatta, 278
Dharmakāya, 136, 183, 209, 264, 305, 318, 422. *See also* Threefold Buddha-nature
Dialogue structure, 225–26, 269, 283–85, 289, 338, 428; between delusion and enlightenment, 245, 256–57, 261–62, 271–72, 277, 279, 292, 294, 326
Dīgha-Nikāya, 102
Dixin Dushun, *see* Dushun
"Doctrine of the Mean," *see* "Zhongyong"
Donner, Neil, 435
Duck/rabbit (Wittgenstein), 31–33, 37
Dushun (Dixin Dushun), 171–74, 181, 187, 193, 421
"Dwelling deeply" (*shenzhu*), 14–15, 295–312 *passim*, 319, 326, 336–37, 339, 381–82; in bias, 287, 290–92, 322, 332

Eckhart, Meister, 299
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 363, 366, 397, 449
Empedocles, 4
Emptiness, *see* Exclusive Emptiness; Three Truths
Enlightenment, 84, 96, 120, 155–56, 159, 191–95, 247, 260, 263; in *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*, 182; Three Thousand manifested in, 245; and false views, 249; as delusion, 251; Zhanran on, 251–52; as confused, 256. *See also* Delusion and enlightenment
Eno, Robert, 401
Epistemology, 12, 31, 34–41, 108, 110, 320, 328, 333, 340–41; omnicentric, 61–66, 169, 237, 238, 280–85, 358–61, 411; Daoist, 146; absolutist and relativist, 169, 360; Chan, 186; and inherent evil, 311, 318; Shanwai, 313
Evil, 68–69, 74, 76, 113, 154, 155, 161, 190, 395–96; as perversion of will, 6; as unfulfilled potential, 6; privation theory of, 6, 19, 70–72, 363–64, 436; and holism, 42–43, 60; Augustine on, 56; instrumental and ultimate values, 78–81; in *Book of Changes*, 96; in Daoism, 98–99; in Indian Buddhism, 101–2; as object of meditation, 102–3; and parable of raft, 103; in Nāgārjuna, 105–7; in Separate and Integrated teachings, 126; and the Mean, 134; cause of good, 153. *See also* Evil inherent in the (Buddha-)nature; Good and Evil
Evil Inherent in the (Buddha-)nature (Inherent Evil), 22, 120, 266–67, 444; in Zhiyi, 139, 254–57, 350; in Huayan, 196–97; in Zhili, 270–72, 281, 292, 303, 312–19, 444. *See also* Shanwai; Zhanran
Exclusive Emptiness, 192, 199, 230
Expression, degrees of, 67–68, 132–35, 359, 401
Extirpation morality, 11, 369, 372

Fact and value, *see* Value and fact
Fahuaxuanyi (Zhiyi), 122, 125, 140, 149, 204, 239, 310, 409, 411, 417, 418, 419, 423, 444, 446
Fazang (Xianshou Fazang), 171, 197, 312
Fengxian Yuanqing, *see* Yuanqing
Fingarette, Herbert, 58
Flaubert, Gustave, 365
Flew, Anthony, 401
Focus and field, 50–55, 221–22, 226, 395

Following conditions but unchanging (*suiyuan bubian*), *see* Unchanging but following conditions
Four Foundations of Mindfulness, 102–3, 143
Four Meritorious Properties of Nirvāṇa, 139, 142, 143
Four Siddhāntas, 146–7, 152, 408
Four Teachings, 114–23, 139, 335–37, 340, 405, 408–10, 413–15, 425; contrast between Separate and Integrated teachings, 123–27, 141, 192, 245–46, 257, 260, 277, 286–88, 442; Zhili on, 298, 305, 317
Free will, 357–58
Frege, Gottlob, 389
Fu Weixun (Charles Fu), 397

Galileo Galilei, 70
Gandhi, Mohandas, 383
Ganying (stimulus and response), 46, 51–52, 248, 250, 278, 289, 350, 425–26, 428, 431; and intersubjectivity, 200, 203–8, 218, 221–25, 229, 235, 238
Genshin, 427
Guangzhi Shangxian, 432–33, 451
Guanyin, *see* Avalokiteśvera
Gestalt psychology, 397
Gnosticism, 5
Good and Evil, 75, 362–84, 438–39, 442, 445; Zhili on, 1, 4, 13–15, 18–21, 60, 74, 270–343; Zhiyi on, 139, 212, 239, 240–60, 262, 366, 372–73, 407, 436; Zhanran on, 260–70, 319, 388, 436–40 *passim*, 449
Goodman, Paul, 397
Graham, Angus C., 401
"Great Learning," *See* "Daxue"
Gregory, Peter, 420–23
Guanding (Zhangan Guanding), 112, 143, 161–62, 170, 216, 411–12, 416, 430
Guanwuliangshoufojing shu miaozongchao (Zhili) 295, 432
Guanyinxuanyi (Zhiyi), 206, 208, 254
Guanyinyishuji (Zhili), 310–11, 431
Guanzi, 75, 399
Guifeng Zongmi, *see* Zongmi
Guo Xiang, 423–24
Gushan Zhiyuan, *see* Zhiyuan

Hall, David, 395–97
Hansen, Chad, 87, 91, 401, 418
Harmony, 16, 50–55, 154
Hefferline, Ralph, 397
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 18, 42, 150, 252, 267, 310, 393, 398, 425, 448; on good and evil, 6, 8–9, 10, 11, 388, 390–92, 400; cunning of Reason, 156
Heraclitus, 4, 45, 75
Heze Shenhui, *see* Shenhui
Hick, John, 56
Hierarchy, 67
Hīnayāna, Two Vehicles, 14, 138, 139–43 *passim*, 147, 152, 217, 249, 304, 336–37
Hitler, Adolf, 383
Hobbes, Thomas, 70
Holism, 17, 22, 26–94, and *passim*; and interest, 81, in Ruism, 96–97. *See also* Oligocentrism; Omnicentrism; Unicentric holism
Hsu, Francis, 67, 402
Huainanzi, 75, 399
Huayan Buddhism, 18, 230, 312, 319, 322, 397, 420–21, 424, 438, 449; as Separate Teaching, 123, 131; Nature-origination (*xingqi*), 161, 170–82 *passim*, 196–97

Huineng (Caoxi Huineng), 183, 185, 335, 422; *Platform Sūtra*, 183, 335
Huisi (Nanyue Huisi), 392
Huiyuan (Lushan Huiyuan), 109

Icchanti(ka)s, 254–56
Idealism and materialism, 169, 219, 230, 352–55
Individualism and collectivism, 57–60, 169, 397–98
Indra, 336
Inherent Entailment (Inherent Inclusion) (*xingju*), 22, 113, 114, 139, 159–70, 189–93, 392–93; and epistemology, 62–63, 65, 152, 237–38; and Three Truths, 121, 123, 125, 168–69; and nature-arisal (*xingqi*), 174, 179–80; and intersubjectivity, 202–3, 206, 213–17 *passim*, 222, 224; Zhili on, 218–19, 221, 223, 224, 228, 232, 235–36; and evil, 241, 245–46, 261, 275, 303, 316–17, 331, 337; and causality, 242; and desire, 250, 253–54; form-only, 295; and dung-beetle, 301; and principle, 321; as universalized ignorance, 328
Inherent Evil, *see* Evil Inherent in the (Buddha-)nature; Shanwai; Zhanran; Zhili; Zhiyi
Inherent Inclusion, *see* Inherent Entailment
Integrated Teaching, *see* Four Teachings
Interpellation: existence as, 226–27, 230, 352
Intersubjectivity, 22, 101, 275, 294, 426–29, 440, 467; in Chinese thought, 41–50, 73, 94, 96–97, 99; and epistemology, 62–63, 77, 83–85, 109, 241; and upāya, 120, 146, 151, 153, 154, 160–61, 167–68, 201–3; Ten Realms and, 139; and *ganying*, 200, 203–8, 218, 221–25, 229, 235, 238; and Three Truths, 202–3; and multiplicity, 202–3; and evil, 245–48, 267, 311, 318; internal, 250; Zhili on, 272–90; and temporality, 277; and dung beetle, 300, 304, 316, 325, 326; and Shanwai, 313

Jiaxiang Jizang, *see* Jizang
Jingde chuandenglu, 185
Jinguangmingxuanyi (Zhiyi), 136, 423
Jingxi Zhanran, *see* Zhanran
Jizang (Jiaxiang Jizang), 119, 127, 407, 413, 415–16
Joke structure (set-up / punch line), 32; and upāya, 154–57, 159, 235, 241, 248, 270, 288, 340; and Buddha-nature, 188–89; and enlightenment, 195, 280, 300; and "dwelling deeply," 249, 292; and evil, 271, 288, 290, 292, 306, 332–33, 366, 375, 379, 383–84; as performative, 345; and mind/matter, 354; and time, 356
Judaism, 388, 449

Kant, Immanuel / Kantian, 10, 348, 392
Kapila, 161
Kedu (Wulin Kedu), 431, 438
Koffka, Kurt, 397
Kohler, Wolfgang 397
Kojève, Alexandre, 393
Kripke, Saul, 420
Kumārajiva, 123, 137

Lacan, Jacques, 392, 398
Lai Yonghai, 437
Lakoff, George, 42, 393

Language: in Chinese thought, 87–94; in Nāgārjuna, 106–7
Laozi, 91–93, 97–99, 151, 257, 364, 369, 372, 401, 447–48, 453; value theory, 10, 11, 76, 146
Lefebvre, Henri, 349
Legge, James, 395
Leibniz, G. W., 72
Lengyanjing, see *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*
Liezi, 74, 75, 399
Liji (*Record of Rites*), 100
Linji Yixuan, 185–86, 195
Lotus Sūtra (*Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra*), 14, 21, 127, 137, 140–45 *passim*, 155, 184, 201, 202, 209, 216, 243, 260, 278, 310, 324, 327, 335–37, 408, 421, 446, 450, 453; on upāya, 107–8, 110–11, 119, 120, 146–48, 152, 153, 207
Lunyu, see *Analects*
Lushan Huiyuan, *see* Huiyuan
Luther, Martin, 371

Ma Zhijie, 329–30
Mādhyamika, 18, 104–7, 109, 119, 162, 207, 298, 403–4, 416–17
Mahā-satipatthāna-sutta, 102
Mahāyāna, 104, 142, 152, 199–200, 231, 262
Mahāyāna-saṁparigraha-śāstra, 407
Maitreya, 263
Manicheism, 9, 72
Manjusri, 331
Marx, Karl, 393
Mathematics, 42–43
Mean, the, 156, 159–60; Non-exclusive (*budanzhong*), 97, 113, 116, 139, 158, 160, 251; Exclusive (*danzhong*), 116, 192, 257, 292, 298, 324; in Three Truths, 117, 121–37 *passim*, 286–87, 292, 303, 307, 322, 325–26, 331, 333, 339, 412, 414–15; and Huayan, 172; and value paradox, 287–88; and "dwelling," 319; as constitutive contradiction, 324–25. *See also* Both/and; Neither/nor; Three Truths
Mencius, 51, 52, 54, 91, 96–97, 100, 146, 162, 191, 310, 370
Metempsychosis, 346–49, 451
Miao, *see* Transcendental marvels
Mill, John Stuart, 373
Miller, Henry, 368
Mind, 144, 158, 162–64; and matter, 164–67, 206–7, 269, 276, 292, 352; true (pure), 171, 174–75, 192, 223–24, 227–30, 316; true, in *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*, 176–82; true, in Chan, 183–86; true, in Zhanran, 186–93; true, as principle, 198–99; Shanwai on, 208, 219, 228, 290, 315–18; Zhanran on, 213–16, 269, 287; Zhili on, 223–24, 227–30, 270; deluded (impure), 227–30, 287, 322; nature of, 298; as Pure Land, 341
Mindfulness meditation, 102–3, 143, 164
Möbius-strip structure, 281–82, 309, 321–22, 324, 339, 342
Mohezhiguan (Zhiyi), 121, 139, 141, 163, 212, 239, 248–49, 257–58, 261, 262, 408–13 *passim*, 417, 418, 419, 425, 426, 430, 436, 440, 446
Mohism/Mozi, 46, 59, 97, 370
Mou Zongsan, 272, 404, 437
Mūlamādhyamikakārikās, 104, 105, 118
Munro, Donald J., 47, 53, 390, 393–95, 401

Nāgārjuna, 17, 104–5, 108, 117, 118, 119, 122, 146, 404, 446; delusion and enlightenment in, 104–6

Naming, 15, 169, 244, 368
Nanyang Huizhong, 185
Nanyue Huisi, *see* Huisi
Neither/nor structure, 4, 5, 60, 74–78, 106, 288–89, 369, 409; in Daoism, 76, 98–99; in Buddhism, 102; in Zen, 322
New Testament, 10, 387–88, 400
Ng Yu-kwan, 104–5, 118, 403, 404–5, 410, 425
Nicholas of Cusa / Nicholas Cusanus, 390
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 73, 76, 363, 399, 449; on values, 2, 3, 4, 11, 78, 361, 369, 387, 400
Nirmāṇakāya, 184, 186, 209, 422
Nirvāṇa, 104–6, 142
Nirvāṇa Sūtra, 107, 143, 183
Non-bias: as ultimate value, 250, 306–7
Non-duality, 200, 208
Non-self (*anātta*), 101
Nyanaponika Thera, 402, 403

Old Testament, 387
Oligocentrism, 33, 55–68; defined, 41; as social, 43–47, 73
Omnicentrism, 16, 22, 24, 29, 33, 55–68, 95, 117, 176, 396–97, 407; defined, 37–41; in Daoism, 97–100; and value paradox, 113 and *passim*
Opening the provisional to reveal the real (transformative recontextualization), 139, 145–59, 166, 200–201, 214, 240, 272, 324, 346, 351–52, 467–68; in Indian Buddhism, 102; and the Mean, 131–34
Original enlightenment, 18, 136, 192, 232–33, 275, 305, 362, 449; in *Śūraṅgama Sūtra*, 181; Zhanran on, 187, 234; Zhili on, 233–34
"Ought," probable, 91
Overdetermination, 77, 210
Ouyi Zhixu, *see* Zhixu

Pali canon, 101, 103
Parable of the raft, 86, 103
Parkes, Graham, 398, 430, 449
Parmenides, 5
Payutto, P. A., 103, 403
Penkower, Linda, 185, 421, 422
Perfect Enlightenment Sūtra (*Yuanjue jing*), 196
Performativity, 169, 238, 279, 345–46, 360; and Buddhahood, 215
Perls, Frederick, 397
Petzold, Bruno, 355, 447
Phenonemon as universal (*shizong*), *see* Zhili
Platform Sūtra, *see* Huineng
Plotinus, 19, 56
Plato/Platonism, 5, 6, 9, 19, 349, 398; Idea of the Good, 70–71
Polanyi, Michael, 81–83, 163–64, 229, 401
Poison of principle (*lidu*), *see* Zhili
Pope, Alexander, 10
Practice and nature (*xiu* and *xing*): Zhiyi on, 255–60 *passim*; Zhanran on, 260–70 *passim*; Zhili on, 270–312 *passim*, 357–58
Prajñā-pāramitā sūtra, 107, 117, 123, 171, 183
Principle (*li*), 13–14, 160, 171–74, 186, 219, 223, 224, 319–22; as "center," 32; in Ruism, 52–55; following principle-only, 116, 196, 224, 257, 277, 297, 305, 318; as Three Truths, 122, 197; in Huayan, 197; Buddhas and, 205; as poison, 212; naming and, 244; and phenomena, 252, 319–22; exclu-

sive, 257, 277, 297; purity and impurity in, 273, 286–87; identity in, 296–336
Privation theory of evil, 6, 19, 70–71, 363–64, 436
Pseudo-Dionysus, 75
Psychology, depth, 238, 250
Pure Land, 19, 323, 348; Zhili and, 20, 286, 329–31, 334–35, 341–42, 432–33, 440–42
Pyrrho, 167
Pythagoreans, 43

Qian Mu, 49, 58, 61, 395–96, 397, 419, 447–48
Qing (emotional bias, passion), 291–92
Qiangliang Chengguan, *see* Chengguan
Qingyuan Xingsi, *see* Xingsi

Ra, Lang E., 161, 206, 426, 438
Ratnakūta Sūtra, 107
Reason: and emotion, 65, 291–92; cunning of, 156
Reducibility, mutual, 121–23, 130, 191, 211, 253, 257, 276, 281–82, 304, 352, 424–25, 429
Relations, internal and external, 168–69, 237
Renyue (Zhachuan Renyue), 312, 316, 322, 418, 427, 432–33, 437, 439, 443
Reversibility, 82–84, 191–94, 214, 218, 352, 356, 415, 428
Rhetoric, 80, 85–95
Robinson, Richard, 104, 106, 404, 405, 410
Ruism (Confucianism), 30, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 87, 91, 92, 96, 98, 100, 146, 397, 402; Neo-Confucianism, 53, 58, 76
Ṛṣabha, 162

Sadāparibhūta, see Bodhisattva Never-Disparage
Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra, see *Lotus Sūtra*
Śākyamuni, 200, 263, 278
Sāṅkhya, 161
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 399–400, 429, 436, 453
Sarvadharma-pravṛtti-nirdeśa sūtra (*Zhufawuxingjing*), 405, 446
Saul of Tarsus, 371
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 6–9, 18, 349, 388, 449
Scholem, Gershom, 388
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 72, 348, 401, 417–18, 447, 451
Self: as unifier, 92–93; as intersubjective, 237–39, 328, 358
Sentient beings: mental acts as, 216–17
Separate Teaching, *see* Four Teachings
Sextus Empiricus, 167
Shangshu, 47, 48
Shanjia, 195–98, 201, 210, 218–39, 312–23 *passim*, 419, 432, 438. *See also* Zhili
Shanwai, 112, 163, 195–98, 270, 289–90, 299, 307, 421, 437, 439, 443; and intersubjectivity, 62–63, 73, 77, 83–85, 94, 101, 109, 120, 160–61, 167–68, 201, 208, 218–39, 253, 256–58, 270; in Ruism, 96–97; in Daoism, 99; and Ten Realms, 139; and upāya, 146, 151, 153, 154; and evil, 245–48, 267, 311, 318; internal, 250; Zhili on, 272–94; and dung beetle, 299, 300, 304, 316, 325, 326; compared to Zhili, 312–23; Shanjia and, 313; on evil, 339, 363–64, 376, 404, 439, 449; on mind, 419, 432
Shenhui (Heze Shenhui), 183
Shibuermen (Zhanran), 314

Shibuermen zhiyaochao (Zhili), 272, 319, 431
Shinran, 371
Shitou (Shitou Xiqian), 184
Siddhāntas, *see* Four Siddhāntas
Siming Zhili, *see* Zhili
Siming zunzhe jiaoxing lu (Zhili et al.) 141–45 *passim*, 210–11, 441
Sinianchu (Zhiyi), 409
Six Identities, 295–306, 338
Six Pāramitās, 269
Skepticism: and value, 70; inherent entailment as, 167
Skillful Means, *see* Upāya
Smullyan, Raymond, 370, 450
Smuts, Jan, 27–29, 50, 392, 395
Snellgrove, David, 405–7
Spinoza, Baruch, 11, 19, 72, 73, 208, 298, 355, 432, 433, 447, 452
Śrāvakas, 138, 141–42, 148, 152, 247, 450. *See also* Ten Realms
Stevenson, Daniel, 425–26
Stimulus and response, *see Ganying*
Subject/object relation, 65, 92–93, 160–61, 179–80, 352, 360, 383, 389; and focus/field, 82, 129, 222, 237; and intersubjectivity, 208, 213, 216–17; Zhili on, 227–30, 272–80, 285–94, 314–17, 331, 335
Suchness, 192, 199. *See also* Ten Thusnesses
Śūraṅgama Sūtra (*Lengyanjing*), 170, 176–82, 228, 363, 421
Sūtra of the Dhāraṇī That Invokes Avalokiteśvera to Dissipate Poison and Harm, 314
Sūtra of Infinite Meanings (*Wuliangyijing*), 408
Swanson, Paul, 140, 411, 412, 417
Tanaka, Kenneth, 408
Tantric Buddhism, 107, 405–7
Tao Yuanming, 394
Tathātaga-garbha, 107, 161, 178–81, 192, 199, 230, 232–33
Temporality, 157, 248, 267, 275–76, 293–94, 352–57, 447–48; and intersubjectivity, 277
Ten Realms, 138–39, 152, 245–46, 272–73, 283, 297, 301–3, 341, 379
Ten Thusnesses (Ten Suchnesses), 137–38, 152
Thales, 45
Theodicy, 5, 362
"Things," in China and West, 42–47, 54, 62–63, 94
Three Contemplations (*sanguan*), 21, 229, 245, 337, 442; as ultimate value, 247
Threefold Buddha-nature, 182–95, 412; and Three Truths, 136, 241–42; Nirmāṇakāya as all-pervasive, 209; and insentient beings, 213, 230; as "sentient-being-nature," 223; and delusion, 231–32, 234, 305–6; evil inherent in, 266–67
Threefold Truth, *see* Three Truths
Three Paths (karma, *kleśa*, *duhkha*), 136
Three Poisons, 252, 304, 309–10
Three Thousand Quiddities, 191, 206, 279, 297–99, 328, 468; inherent entailment of, 145, 159–70 *passim*, 191, 202, 206, 344, 350, 379, 381; Three Thousand meets Three Thousand, 205, 206, 216, 274–75, 426; and intersubjectivity, 205, 216, 218–39 *passim*, 424–25; enlightenment as full manifestation of, 224–45, 268, 295–306, 311, 313; as Buddha-nature, 241–42; and evil, 245–46, 266–67,

274; as universal and particular, 320–22, 357
Three Tracks, 135–37, 184, 202, 242, 318, 425, 468
Three Truths (Threefold Truth), 108, 184, 262, 302, 348, 365, 367, 381, 413–15, 468; and upāya, 111, 153, 156, 240–42, 245, 247, 250; and inherent entailment, 114–35, 168–69; and Three Tracks; 136–37; in Zhanran, 190–92; and intersubjectivity, 208–14 *passim*; and Shanjia/Shanwai controversy, 222, 231–32, 234–35; and desire, 253, 374; as the nature, 267, 318, 320, 324–27, 407; and the dung beetle, 299–300; and Zhili's evil plan, 333–41; and idealism, 353–55; and "centers," 392–93
Tiantai Zhiyi, *see* Zhiyi
Time, *see* Temporality
Transcendental marvels (*miao*), Relative and Absolute, 127–28, 134–35, 140–45, 151, 165, 204, 288; Daoist precedent, 98–99
Transformative recontextualization, *see* Opening the provisional to reveal the real
Two Truths, 106–10, 122
Two Vehicles, *see* Hīnayāna

Ultimate Dung Beetle, *see* Zhili
Uluka, 162
Unchanging but following conditions (*bubian suiyuan*), 230–35, 273
Uncreated, 117, 155, 316, 409
Unicentric holism, 17, 36–37, 55–68, 236, 358–59, 407; and truth, 62–65; in Mohism, 95, 97
Universal, 368–69, 376, 444–45, 452; Emptiness as, 150; potential as, 166; and the Mean, 208, 324–25; this moment as, 319–22; Buddhahood as, 324; Will as, 388
Upanishads, 75
Upāya (skillful means), 110, 141–42, 145–58, 166, 317, 332–34, 442, 450; inherent in ultimate truth, 21, 337, 340; and epistemology, 62, 169, 238, 249, 359; and intersubjectivity, 84, 161, 207–12 *passim*, 230, 256, 258, 350; and Three Truths, 111, 119; and Ten Realms, 139, 420–21; in *Lotus*, 143, 201; original enlightenment as, 233, 434; and value paradox, 240–51, 258–60, 264–65, 277–79, 286–88, 311, 366, 372, 376–78, 382–83; delusion as, 267, 325–27
Updike, John, 452

Vaipulya sūtras, 107, 141
Vairocana Buddha, 213
Vaiśeṣika, 162
Value: antithetical, 2–3, 101–2, 351, 387–88; dichotomous, 4–11, 102, 107; ultimate and instrumental, 33, 78–85, 326; as inconceivability, 142–43
Value and fact, 45, 69, 87–88
Value paradox, *see* Good and Evil
Vasubandhu, 164
Vasumitra, 263, 265, 307, 337, 340
Vedanta, 4, 298
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra, 107, 170, 331, 405, 435, 446
Visualization of Amitāyus Sūtra, 286, 323

Wang Zhiyuan, 417
Whitehead, Alfred North, 279, 397, 401
Whitman, Walt, 377, 452

Whyte, Lancelot Law, 448
Will: and evil, 6–8, 72–73, 388; to Power, 73–78, 355, 399; and completness, 91–94; free, 357
Wulin Kedu, *see* Kedu

Xianrun (Yongfu Xianrun), 312–13, 316, 318–19, 443, 444
Xianshou Fazang, *see* Fazang
Xingsi (Qingyuan Xingsi), 184
Xunzi, 46, 41, 59, 76, 98, 394, 395

Yajñadatta's head, 180–82
Yampolsky, Philip, 185, 422
Yang Danian, *see* Yang Yi
Yang Yi (Yang Danian), 329–32, 334–35, 342, 445
Yanshou (Yongming Yanshou), 196
Yinshun, 184, 421
Yin-Yang, 49, 95–96, 271, 448
Yogācāra, 199, 353
Yongming Yanshou, *see* Yanshou
Yuanjue jing, see *Perfect Enlightenment Sūtra*
Yuanqing (Fengxian Yuanqing), 219–23 *passim*

Zen, *see* Chan Buddhism
Zhachuan Renyue, *see* Renyue
Zhangan Guanding, *see* Guanding
Zhanran (Jingxi Zhanran), 220, 315, 321, 366, 408, 420, 423–25, 429, 430, 443, 444, 449; and Chan, 183–95; on Buddha-nature, 186–95; on intersubjectivity, 201–8 *passim*, 220–24 *passim*; on origin of delusion, 224–27, 231–39, 362; on illusion, 225; on good and evil, 260–70, 319, 388, 436–40 *passim*, 449; on practice and nature (*xiu/xing*), 260–70 *passim*; compared to Zhili, 306–12; on Three Truths, 413
Zhili (Siming Zhili), 156, 158, 170, 195, 203, 217, 404, 418, 423, 431, 451; on good and evil, 1, 4, 13–15, 18–21 *passim*, 60, 74, 270–343, 362, 363, 366–84 *passim*, 438–39, 442, 445; on Huayan, 123; on ultimacy of the dung beetle (*jiujing jieqiang*), 139, 156, 166, 236, 245, 260, 295–306, 309, 312–14, 318, 323–29, 338, 340, 342–43, 381, 437, 443, 451; contemplation of the deluded mind (*wangxin guan*), 174–76, 227–30, 295, 432; hammer and chisel metaphor, 175–76; on intersubjectivity, 206–8, 218–39 *passim*, 426–29, 440; on poison of principle (*lidu*), 212, 314–22, 443; on purity and impurity, 220–21, 272–73, 282–83, 286–93, 308, 441; on interpenetration, 223–24, 282–85; on delusion, 249; on evil inherent in the Buddha-nature (*xing e*), 270–72, 281, 292, 303, 312–19, 444; on practice and nature (*xiu/xing*), 270–312 *passim*; compared to Shanwai, 312–23; doctrine of phenonemon as universal (*shizong*), 319–22, 444–45; on appropriation and rejection, 332–43, 441
Zhixu (Ouyi Zhixu), 301–2
Zhiyi (Tiantai Zhiyi), 19, 21, 26, 112, 197, 405, 421, 423, 429, 442; and Indian Buddhism, 107–11; on Three Truths, 118–28, 157–58, 404, 411, 412, 413, 419; on Four Teachings, 118–28, 140, 204, 408, 409; on Two Truths, 122, 125, 413–14; on Three Tracks, 136–37; on good and evil,

139, 212, 239, 240–60, 262, 366, 372–73, 407, 436; on evil inherent in the Buddha-nature (*xing e*), 139, 254–57, 350; on transcendental marvels, 140–41; and the *Lotus Sūtra*, 147–48, 184, 310; on provisional and ultimate, 148–52, 412, 420; on inherent entailment/inclusion (*xingju*), 159–70; on intersubjectivity, 201–17 *passim*; critique of antinomianism, 251–60; on practice and nature (*xing/xiu*), 255–60 *passim*; interpreted by Zhanran, 261–70 *passim*; "cutting off without cutting off" (*duan er bu duan*), 273; compared to Zhili, 306–12; use of scripture, 410; epistemology, 411, 426; on Threefold Buddha-nature, 417; Three Thousand meets Three Thousand, 426; on momentariness, 440

Zhiyuan (Gushan Zhiyuan), 196, 314–19

"Zhongyong" ("Doctrine of the Mean"), 54, 100, 395

Zhou Enlai, 383

Zhuangzi, 19, 46, 62, 76, 98–99, 146, 259, 327, 434, 449, 450, 451

Ziren, 427

Žižek, Slavoj, 36, 349, 366, 377–82 *passim*, 392, 397, 447, 449, 452, 453

Zongmi (Guifeng Zongmi), 171, 187, 196–97, 208, 289–90, 420–21

Zuozhuan, 3

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